THE 


WAR    WITH    SPAIN 


BY 


HENRY   CABOT    LODGE 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW   YORK   AND    LONDON 

HARPER  &   BROTHERS   PUBLISHERS 

1899 


luJM  / 


BY    HENRY  CABOT   LODGE 


CERTAIN  ACCEPTED  HEROES,  and  Oth 
er  Essays  in  Literature  and  Politics.  (Con 
temporary  Essayists.)  Post  8vo,  Cloth,  $i  50. 

Contents  : — As  to  Certain  Accepted  Heroes :  The  Last 
Plantagenet :  Shakespeare's  Americanisms  :  Chatterton  : 
Dr.  Holmes:  A  Liberal  Education:  The  Home  of  the 
Cabots:  English  Elections  :  Our  Foreign  Policy. 

Senator  Lodge  is  a  clear  and  forcible  writer.  .  .  .  He 
makes  his  points  in  a  manner  which  prevents  any  misun 
derstanding,  and  then  enforces  them  in  temperate  but 
unmistakable  language.  There  is  not  a  single  paper  in 
the  collection  that  will  not  repay  reading. —  Brooklyn 
Eagle. 

A  SHORT  HISTORY  OF  THE  ENG 
LISH  COLONIES  IN  AMERICA.  Map. 

8vo,  Half  Leather,  $3  oo. 

The  life,  the  thought,  the  manners  and  habits  of  the 
people  were  the  subjects  that  the  author  investigated  and 
has  well  described.  The  volume  may  be  commended  as 
a  scholarly  production. — C.  K.  ADAMS. 


NEW   YORK    AND    LONDON 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  Publishers 


Copyright,  1899,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 


All  rights  reserved. 


PREFACE 


THE  war  of  the  United  States  with  Spain  was  very 
brief.  Its  results  were  many,  startling,  and  of  world 
wide  meaning.  Hence  its  importance.  The  history 
of  this  war,  in  the  broadest  and  truest  sense  of  the 
word,  cannot  be  written  for  many  years,  because  until 
years  have  passed  it  will  be  impossible  to  get  all  the 
necessary  material,  or  to  secure  the  perspective  and 
proportion  which  distance  alone  can  give. 

It  is  not  too  soon,  however,  to  write  the  brief  chron 
icle  of  the  time,  or  to  give,  in  connected  and  coherent 
narration,  a  history  which,  like  Browning's  poem,  shall 
tell  "  How  it  strikes  a  contemporary." 

This  story  of  the  war  of  the  United  States  with  Spain 
is  based  on  the  official  reports  of  the  military  and  naval 
operations,  everything  accessible  having  been  carefully 
examined.  The  official  reports  have  been  supplemented 
by  an  examination,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  the  accounts 
of  eye-witnesses  which  had  either  interest  or  authority, 
and  which  have  appeared  in  such  abundance.  The 
political  portions  of  the  story,  and  the  account  of  events 
in  Washington,  have  been  written  from  a  somewhat  close 
personal  knowledge  of  all  that  happened  at  the  capital 
during  the  war  period. 


PREFACE 

I  desire  to  thank  Adjutant- General  Corbin  and  Gen 
eral  Schwan  for  the  courtesy  and  readiness  with  which 
they  aided  me  in  getting  access  to  the  army  reports 
and  to  statistics  very  difficult  to  obtain.  I  am  very 
much  indebted  to  my  friend  Secretary  Long,  and  to 
Mr.  Allen,  the  Assistant-Secretary  of  the  Navy,  for  the 
kindness  with  which  they  have  helped  me  in  all  that 
related  to  naval  affairs.  I  also  owe  an  especial  debt  of 
gratitude  to  Captain  Crowninshield,  Chief  of  the  Bureau 
of  Navigation,  for  the  unfailing  patience  with  which  he 
answered  my  many  inquiries,  and  for  the  help  which  he 
was  always  ready  to  give  me  in  the  kindest  and  most 
generous  manner. 

H.  C.  LODGE. 

Washington,  1899. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION i 

II.  THE  COMING  OF  WAR 31 

III.  MANILA 45 

IV.  THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 68 

V.  THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 82 

VI.  SANTIAGO — THE  LAND  FIGHT 108 

VII.  SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 134 

VIII.  THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 153 

IX.  THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  Rico 168 

X.  THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA  AND  THE  CAPTURE  OF  GUAM  191 

XI.   IIo\v  PEACE  CAME 222 

APPENDIX  A— RESOLUTIONS  OF  CONGRESS  DEMANDING 

WITHDRAWAL  OF  SPAIN  FROM  CUBA  .  .  ...  237 

APPENDIX  I) — PROCLAMATION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  .     .  240 

APPENDIX  C— PEACE  PROTOCOL  OF  AUGUST  12,  1898, 

AND  CORRESPONDENCE 248 

APPENDIX  D— THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE 267 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


THE   MAINE  AT    HER    FINAL    BERTH    IN    HAVANA    HARBOR  .  Frontispiece 
THE    VIRGINIUS  OVERHAULED    BY    THE    SPANISH    GUNBOAT 

TORNADO Facing  P.         IO 

SENOR    CANOVAS    DEL    CASTILLO 1 6 

GENERAL  FITZHUGH    LEE .       .  "                 22 

GENERAL    STEWART    L.   WOODFORD 24 

SENOR    DUPUY    DE    LOME 26 

THE   MAINE   OFF    MORRO    CASTLE 28 

CAPTAIN    CHARLES    I).    SIGSBEE "                 32 

WILLIAM    R.    DAY 34 

SENOR    PRAXEDES   MATEO    SAGASTA 36 

UNITED     STATES    SENATE     COMMITTEE     ON     FOREIGN     AF 
FAIRS    ...  38 

REDFIELD    PROCTOR ...  40 

PRESIDENT    MCKINLEY    SIGNING   THE    ULTIMATUM     ...  42 

PLAZA    DE    FONDO,    MANILA 44 

PRIESTS    GATHERING    TAXES    IN   THE    PHILIPPINES     ...  48 

WRECK    OF    THE    CRUISER    ISLA  DE  CL'BA 54 

WEST    BATTERY,    CAVITE.    AFTER    DESTRUCTION.       ...  56 

WRECK  OF  THE   FLAG-SHIP,   THE  CRUISER    RE/MA    CRISTI\A  58 

WRECK    OF    THE    CRUISER    ISLA  DE  LUZON 60 

RESIDENCE    OF    AGUINALDO 64 

THE    SAILING    OF    THE   AMERICAN    FLEET    FROM    TAMPA      .  "                 68 

THE    BOMBARDMENT    OF    MATANZAS 70 

THE    SPANISH    SQUADRON    AT  CAPE  VERDE  ISLANDS        .       .  72 
COLONEL     DORST'S     EXPEDITION     IN     THE     Gl'SSIE — THE 

LANDING    AT    POINT    ARBOLITAS "                 76 

CUTTING    THE    CABLES    UNDER    FIRE    AT    CIENFUEGOS     .       .  So 

THE    HOME-COMING    OF    THE    OREGON "                 82 

vii 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

THE  DAILY  POSITIONS  OF  THE  SPANISH  SQUADRON  UNDER 

ADMIRAL  CERVERA Facing  p.        84 

BOMBARDMENT    OF    SAN   JUAN 86 

THE    DAILY    POSITIONS    OF    FLEET   IN    CAMPAIGN    AGAINST 

THE   SPANISH    SQUADRON "                 88 

CAPTAIN    EVANS    OF    THE   lOll'A    SIGHTING    THE    CRISTOBAL 

COLON  AND  THE  MARIA  TERESA  IN  SANTIAGO  HARBOR  .  "                  94 

THE    LAST   OF   THE   MERRIMAC "               IOO 

SOLDIERS    OF   THE   CUBAN   ARMY "               1O4 

THE    LANDING   OF  THE   AMERICAN   ARMY   AT   DAIQUIRI      .  "               112 

GENERAL  GARCIA  AND   BRIGADIER-GENERAL  LUDLOW .       .  "               114 

JOSEPH    WHEELER "               Il6 

WILLIAM    R.    SHAFTER "               Il8 

THE  HOTCHKISS  BATTERY   IN   ACTION  AT  LAS  GUASIMAS  .  "               I2O 

THEODORE   ROOSEVELT "               122 

THE   CAPTURE   OF   EL   CANEY 124 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE   BLOCK-HOUSE,    SAN   JUAN     ...  "              126 

GENERAL   H.   S.  HAWKINS    AT    SAN    JUAN 128 

GENERALS   IN    THE  SANTIAGO    CAMPAIGN    ...              .       .  "               132 

PASQUALE    DE   CERVERA "              136 

NAVAL   OFFICERS   IN    SANTIAGO    CAMPAIGN "               138 

THE    GLOUCESTER   AND   THE    SPANISH    TORPEDO-BOATS  .       .  142 

THE   LAST   OF   CERVERA'S    FLEET 148 

THE   MEETING  OF  THE  GENERALS  TO  ARRANGE   THE    SUR 
RENDER   OF   SANTIAGO "              158 

RAISING     THE     AMERICAN    FLAG    ON    THE    CITY    HALL    OF 

SANTIAGO "              162 

NAVAL   OFFICERS   IN    PUERTO    RICAN    CAMPAIGN  ....  "               166 

SAN  JUAN,   PUERTO    RICO,   FROM    THE    HARBOR     ....  168 

AN    ANCIENT    GATEWAY,    SAN   JUAN,    PUERTO    RICO.       .  "               170 

THE    STREET   OF   THE   CROSS,    SAN    JUAN,    PUERTO    RICO     .  "              172 

THE   LANDING   AT   GUANICA 174 

THE    BANNER    OF    PONCE "               176 

SPANIARDS    SURPRISED    BY    COLONEL    HULING'S  REGIMENT 

IN   THEIR   FLIGHT    FROM    COAMO "               178 

GENERALS    IN    PUERTO    RICAN    CAMPAIGN "               iSo 

MAP  OF  PUERTO   RICO "              182 

A  VIEW  OF  THE  MILITARY   ROAD  TO    THE  SOUTH    OF   THE 

SPANISH    POSITION   AT    AYBONITO "               184 

THE   EXPEDITION   AGAINST    LARES    AND    ARECIBO       ...  1 86 

THE   MILITARY   ROAD   LEADING   INTO   YAUCO       ....  1 88 

ON  THE   ADJUNTAS  TRAIL IQO 

viii 


I  L  L  U  S  T  R  A  T  I  O  N  S 

GEORGE  DEWEY ...  Facing  p.  192 

THE  OFFICIAL  RESIDENCE  OF  THE  GOVERNOR-GENERAL, 

MANILA  .  194 

ELWELL  S.  OTIS .  .  196 

HENRY  GLASS 2OO 

THE  CHARLESTON  ENTERING  THE  HARBOR  OF  GUAM  .  .  2O2 

THOMAS  M.  ANDERSON 2O4 

FRANCIS  V.  GREENE 2O6 

MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANILA 2O8 

THE  ADVANCE  TOWARD  MANILA  ...  .  .  2IO 

THE  MONTEREY  IN  ACTION 212 

WESLEY  MERRITT 214 

RESISTANCE  FROM  THE  HOUSES  IN  MALATE 2l6 

AFTERNOON  ON  THE  LUNETA,  NORTH  OF  THE  ERM1TA 

SUBURB  OF  MANILA .  2l8 

PUERTA  REAL,  OR  THE  KINC/S  GATE,  IN  THE  OLD  WALL 

OF  MANILA "  22O 

NEWS  OF  THE  PEACE  PROTOCOL  —  GENERAL  BROOKE 

STOPPING     THE     ARTILLERY    IN    ITS    ADVANCE    UPON 

AYBONITO "  222 

THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MAYAGUF./ 224 

JULES  CAMBON "  226 

PUERTA  DE  ESPANA,  FROM  THE  CHURCH  OF  SANTO 

DOMINGO "  228 

MOUTH  OF  THE  PASIG  RIVER,  FROM  THE  CHURCH  OF 

SANTO  DOMINGO 230 

THE  CATHEDRAL,  MANILA 232 

ESCOLLA,  MANILA 034 

THE  PEACE  COMMISSION "  266 

ix 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

THREE  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago  the  empire  of 
Charles  V  circled  the  globe,  and  was  the  greatest  mili 
tary  and  political  power  among  civilized  men.  Of  that 
mighty  fabric,  the  year  1898  has  witnessed  the  unla- 
mented  end.  We  of  to-day  have  thus  beheld  the  closing 
scene  of  one  of  the  great  dramas  of  history.  The  colo 
nies  planted  in  America  by  the  English  and  the  Dutch 
have  risen  to  be  a  great  nation,  and  that  nation  has  fin 
ished  the  work  begun  by  the  followers  of  William  of 
Orange,  when,  amid  the  dikes  of  Holland  and  upon  the 
stormy  waters  of  the  English  Channel,  they  struck  at 
the  power  of  Philip  II  even  in  its  pitch  of  pride.  Such 
events  as  these  are  not  accidents,  nor  are  they  things 
of  yesterday.  The  final  expulsion  of  Spain  from  the 
Americans  and  from  the  Philippines  is  the  fit  conclusion 
of  the  long  strife  between  the  people  who  stood  for  civil 
and  religious  freedom,  and  those  who  stood  for  bigotry 
and  tyranny  as  hideous  in  their  action  as  any  which 
have  ever  cursed  humanity.  The  work  has  been  a  long 
one,  but  Spain  at  last  is  confined  practically  to  her 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

peninsula,  where  her  people  can  do  as  they  please  with 
each  other,  but  whence  they  can  trouble  the  world  no 
more.  Spain  has  ceased  to  rule;  her  once  vast  empire 
has  gone,  because  she  has  proved  herself  unfit  to  gov 
ern,  and  for  the  unfit  among  nations  there  is  no  pity  in 
the  relentless  world-forces  which  shape  the  destinies  of 
mankind. 

The  irrepressible  conflict  between  Spain  on  the  one 
side  and  England  and  Holland  on  the  other,  after  the 
former  had  been  crippled  in  Europe,  was  transferred 
from  the  Old  World  to  the  New.  They  seemed  at  first 
very  remote  from  each  other  in  the  vast  regions  of  the 
American  continents,  but  nevertheless  the  two  opposing 
forces,  the  two  irrevocably  hostile  systems,  were  always 
drawing  steadily  together,  with  the  certainty  that  when 
they  met  one  of  them  must  go  down  before  the  other. 
The  Seven  Years'  War  drove  France  from  eastern 
North  America,  and  fixed  forever  the  fate  of  that  re 
gion.  It  was  to  be  English,  not  French : 

The  lilies  withered  where  the  lion  trod. 

The  expulsion  of  France  not  only  removed  the  long 
standing  northern  peril  to  the  English  colonies,  but 
swept  away  the  last  barrier  between  them  and  Spain'. 
In  the  American  Revolution,  France,  seeking  her  re 
venge  for  the  conquests  of  Pitt,  forced  Spain  to  become 
her  ally  against  England ;  but  Spain  had  no  love  for  the 
rebellious  colonists.  A  treacherous,  nominal  friend,  she 
tried  to  wrest  advantage  from  their  weakness,  and  to 
secure  to  herself  in  final  possession  the  Mississippi  val 
ley  and  the  great  Northwest.  Failing  in  this,  she 
sought,  after  American  independence  had  been  won,  by 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

false  and  insolent  diplomacy  and  by  corrupting  in 
trigues  among  the  Western  settlers,  to  check  the  Amer 
ican  advance  across  the  continent.  It  was  all  in  vain. 
Through  woodland  and  savanna,  over  mountain  and 
stream,  came  the  steady  tramp  of  the  American  pioneer, 
lie  was  an  adventurer,  but  he  was  also  a  settler,  and 
what  he  took  he  held.  He  carried  a  rifle  in  one  hand, 
he  bore  an  axe  in  the  other,  and  where  he  camped  he 
made  a  clearing  and  built  a  home.  The  two  inevitable 
antagonists  were  nearing  each  other  at  last,  for  they 
were  face  to  face  now  all  along  the  western  and  south 
ern  borders  of  the  United  States.  The  time  had  come 
for  one  to  stop,  or  for  the  other  to  give  way.  But 
there  was  no  stopping  possible  to  the  Americans, 
and  through  the  medium  of  French  ownership  the 
Louisiana  purchase  was  made,  the  Mississippi  be 
came  a  river  of  the  United  States,  and  their  pos 
sessions  were  stretched  across  the  continent  even  to  the 
slopes  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Still  not  content,  the 
Americans  pressed  upon  the  southern  boundary  until, 
in  1819,  they  forced  Spain,  in  order  to  avoid  war,  to 
sell  them  Florida  and  the  northern  coast  of  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  as  far  as  Louisiana.  Meantime,  inspired  by 
the  example  of  the  United  States  in  rejecting  foreign 
dominion,  and  borne  forward  by  the  great  democratic 
movement  which,  originating  in  America,  had  swept 
over  Europe,  the  Spanish  colonies  rose  in  arms  and 
drove  Spain  from  Central  and  South  America. 

A  few  years  passed  by,  and  then  the  restless  Amer 
ican  advance  pressed  on  into  Texas,  took  it  from  Mex 
ico,  and  a  territory  larger  than  any  European  state  ex 
cept  Russia  was  added  to  the  United  States.  Still  the 

3 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

American  march  went  on,  and  then  war  came  with 
Mexico,  and  another  vast  region,  stretching  from  Ore 
gon  to  Arizona,  became  an  American  possession.  All 
the  lands  of  North  America  which  had  once  called 
Spain  master,  which  Cortez  and  De  Soto,  Ponce  de 
Leon  and  Coronado,  had  bestowed  upon  the  Spanish 
crown,  had  passed  from  the  hands  of  the  men  who 
could  not  use  them  into  those  of  the  men  who  could. 
The  expulsion  of  Spain  from  the  Antilles  is  merely  the 
last  and  final  step  of  the  inexorable  movement  in  which 
the  United  States  has  been  engaged  for  nearly  a  cen 
tury.  By  influence  and  example,  or  more  directly  by 
arms  and  by  the  pressure  of  ever-advancing  settle 
ments,  the  United  States  drove  Spain  from  all  her  con 
tinental  possessions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  until 
nothing  was  left  to  the  successors  of  Charles  and  Philip 
but  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico. 

How  did  it  happen  that  this  great  movement,  at  once 
racial,  political,  and  economic,  governed  as  it  was  by 
forces  which  rule  men  even  in  their  own  despite — how 
did  it  happen  to  stop  when  it  came  to  the  ocean's  edge? 
;,  The  movement  against  Spain  was  at  once  natural  and 
/  organic,  while  the  pause  on  the  sea-coast  was  artificial 
f  and  in  contravention  of  the  laws  of  political  evolution  in 
/I    the  Americas.  The  conditions  in  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico 
did  not  differ  from  those  which  had  gone  down  in  ruin 
wherever  the  flag  of  Spain  waved  upon  the  mainland. 
The  Cubans  desired  freedom,  and  Bolivar  would  fain 
have  gone  to  their  aid.    Mexico  and  Colombia,  in  1825, 
planned  to  invade  the  island,  and  at  that  time  invasion 
was  sure  to  be  successful.    What  power  stayed  the  on 
coming  tide  which  had  swept  over  a  continent?     Not 

4 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

Cuban  loyalty,  for  the  expression  "Faithful  Cuba"  was 
a  lie  from  the  beginning,  like  many  other  Spanish  state 
ments.     The  power  which  prevented  the  liberation  of 
Cuba  was  the  United  States;  and  more  than  seventy 
years  later  this  republic  has  had  to  fight  a  war  because^ 
at  the  appointed  time  she  set  herself  against  her  own 
teachings,  and  brought  to  a  halt  the  movement  she  had  j 
herself  started  to  free  the  New  World  from  the  oppres-  j 
sion  of  the  Old.     The  United  States  held  back  Mexico  ' 
and  Colombia  and  Bolivar,  used  her  influence  at  home 
and  abroad  to  that  end,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  contem 
porary  mankind,  succeeded,  according  to  her  desires,  in 
keeping  Cuba  under  the  dominion  of  Spain. 

The  reason  for  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  is  worse  than  the  fact  itself.  The  Latin  mind  isp- 
severely  logical  in  politics,  which  accounts  in  a  measure/ 
for  its  many  failures  in  establishing  and  managing  free/ 
governments.  Being  of  this  cast  of  mind,  the  Spanish- 
American  states,  when  they  rose  to  free  themselves 
from  Spain,  also  freed  their  own  slaves,  and  in  this  in 
stance  they  were  not  only  logical,  but  right.  The  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  were  at 
once  illogical  and  wrong,  for  they  held  just  then  that 
white  men  should  be  free  and  black  men  slaves.  So 
they  regarded  with  great  disfavor  this  highly  logical 
outcome  of  South-American  independence,  and  from 
this  cause  Southern  hostility  brought  the  Panama  Con 
gress,  fraught  with  many  high  hopes  of  American 
solidarity,  to  naught.  The  sinister  influence  of  slavery 
led  the  United  States  to  hold  Cuba  under  the  yoke  of 
Spain,  because  free  negroes  were  not  to  be  permitted  to 
exist  upon  an  island  so  near  their  Atlantic  seaboard.  It 

5 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

was  a  cruel  policy  which  fastened  upon  Cuba  slavery  to 
Spain  as  well  as  the  slavery  of  black  men  to  white, 
when  both  might  have  been  swept  away  without  cost  to 
America.  Those  who  are  curious  in  the  doctrine  of 
compensations  can  find  here  a  fresh  example.  Lincoln, 
in  the  second  inaugural,  declared  once  for  all  that  our 
awful  Civil  War  was  the  price  we  paid  for  the  sin  of 
slavery;  and  the  war  of  1898  was  the  price  paid  at  last, 

P"  such  debts  always  are  paid  by  nations,  for  having 
pt  Cuba  in  bondage  at  the  dictates  of  our  own  slave 
wer. 
The  United  States  had  thus  undertaken  to  stop  the 
movement  for  the  liberation  of  Spanish  colonies  at  the 
point  selected  by  itself,  and  had  deliberately  entered 
upon  the  policy  of  maintaining  Spanish  rule  in  its  own 
neighborhood.  This  policy  meant  the  assumption  of  a 
heavy  responsibility,  as  well  as  a  continuous  effort  to 
put  to  rest  an  unsettled  question,  by  asserting  stoutly, 
and  in  defiance  of  facts,  that  it  really  was  settled  if  peo 
ple  would  only  agree  pleasantly  to  think  so.  But  in 
this,  as  in  all  like  cases,  the  effort  was  vain.  Cuba  was 
held  under  Spanish  rule,  and  the  question  which  had 
received  the  wrong  answer  began  almost  at  once  to 
make  itself  heard,  after  the  awkward  fashion  of  ques 
tions  which  men  pretend  to  have  disposed  of,  but  which 
are  still  restlessly  seeking  the  right  and  final  answer, 
and,  without  respect  for  policies  or  vested  interests, 
keep  knocking  and  crying  at  the  door.  Some  American 
statesmen  saw  that  there  was  a  real  question  in  Cuba 
demanding  a  real  settlement,  and  declared,  like  John 
Quincy  Adams  and  Henry  Clay,  that  Cuba  must  be  an 
nexed,  and  that  it  would  become  indispensable  to  the 

6 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

integrity  of  the  Union.  Even  then  did  Adams  also  as 
sert  that  the  transfer  of  Cuba  to  some  other  power  was 
a  danger  obtruding  itself  upon  our  councils.  But  the 
plan  of  leaving  the  island  with  Spain  prevailed.  Cuba 
had  come  near  to  both  independence  and  annexation, 
but  both  gave  way  before  the  slave  power,  and  for 
twenty  years  the  policy  of  1825  had  sway.  As  late  as 
1843,  indeed,  Webster  said  that  negro  emancipation  in 
Cuba  would  strike  a  death-blow  to  slavery  in  the  United 
States,  thus  giving  cynically  and  frankly  the  bad  and 
true  reason  for  the  policy  steadily  pressed  since  1825. 
Never  at  rest,  however,  the  slave  power  itself,  a  few 
years  after  Webster's  lucid  definition  of  its  Cuban  pol 
icy,  changed  its  own  attitude  completely.  From  desir 
ing  to  keep  Cuba  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  in  order  that 
the  Cuban  negroes  might  remain  slaves,  it  passed,  as 
dangers  thickened  round  it  at  home,  to  the  determina 
tion  to  secure  Cuba,  in  order  that  more  slave  territory 
might  be  added  to  the  United  States.  Hence  a  con 
tinuous  effort  to  get  the  island  by  annexation,  and  vari 
ous  projects,  all  fallen  into  more  or  less  oblivion  now, 
to  bring  that  result  about,  were  devised  by  American 
slaveholders  and  their  allies.  Their  schemes  ranged 
from  Buchanan's  offer  to  purchase,  rejected  with  deep 
scorn  by  Spain  the  intelligent,  to  the  Ostend  Manifesto 
— a  barefaced  argument  for  conquest — and  included  at 
tempts  to  bring  about  Cuban  independence  by  exciting 
insurrections  and  landing  filibustering  expeditions. 
But  the  time  was  fast  drawing  near,  even  while  the 
American  slaveholders  were  thus  seeking  new  territory, 
when  the  slave  power  would  be  thinking  not  of  exten 
sion,  but  of  existence.  In  1861  American  slavery  in- 

7 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 


voked  the  ordeal  of  battle,  and  perished  utterly.  With 
it  died  its  political  power,  and  the  policies,  foreign  and 
domestic,  which  it  had  so  long  imposed  upon  the  United 
States.  But  slavery  also  left  a  number  of  debts  to 
humanity  which  were  not  buried  with  it,  but  which  re 
quired  payment  at  the  hands  of  the  American  people, 
who  had  been  responsible  for  slavery  living,  and  could 
not  avoid  settling  its  debts  when  it  was  dead.  Among 
these  debts  was  Cuba.  Nobody  had  thought  of  it  much 
since  the  Ostend  Manifesto.  If  anybody  chanced  to 
remember  it  during  or  after  the  Civil  War,  the  thought 
probably  was  that  Cuba  at  last  was  well  out  of  the  way, 
together  with  the  slave  power  which  had  been  forever 
meddling  with  it,  and  talking  about  it,  and  casting 
covetous  eyes  upon  its  rich  lands  and  forests. 

None  the  less,  although  the  slave  power  of  America 
had  undertaken  to  fix  the  destiny  of  Cuba,  and,  spurred 
by  its  own  sense  of  weakness  to  eternal  restlessness,  had 
kept  the  question  constantly  alive,  it  was  not  the  ques 
tion  itself.  Cuba  and  Spain  and  Spanish  oppression 
remained,  even  if  American  slavery  was  dead.  More 
over,  the  slaveholders  who  had  caused  the  United 
States  to  force  Cuba  back  under  Spanish  rule  had  gone 
a  step  beyond  this,  and  had  warned  off  all  other  na 
tions.  In  a  word,  the  United  States  had  become  re 
sponsible  for  Cuba,  and  had  drawn  a  ring-fence  around 
the  island  to  exclude  all  other  nations.  In  this  way  we 
undertook  and  sought  to  maintain  a  wrong  settlement 
of  a  great  question,  and  wrong  settlements  are  equiv 
alent  to  none  at  all.  So,  after  the  inconsiderate  fashion 
of  unsettled  problems,  the  Cuban  question  would  not 
stay  quiet.  The  slave  power  kept  stirring  it ;  and  when 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

the  slave  power  perished  and  men  thought  it  was  all 
over,  the  ancient  wrong  reared  its  head  again,  and 
turning  to  the  power  responsible  for  its  existence,  de 
manded  redress. 

This  time  the  movement  came  from  the  island  itself. 
Cuba,  although  uninvaded,  had  not  been  untouched  by 
the  revolutionary  movement  in  the  first  quarter  of  the 
century.  Societies  were  formed  to  support  Bolivar  and 
the  Mexicans;  and  after  the  movement  was  checked, 
Spain,  acting  in  her  usual  fashion,  instead  of  ignoring 
the  indications  of  revolutionary  sympathy,  proceeded 
to  give  the  Captain-General  the  powers  of  the  gov 
ernors  of  besieged  towns,  or,  in  other  words,  put  the 
whole  island  under  martial  law.  With  this  piece  of 
sweeping  and  needless  tyranny,  resistance  to  Spain  be 
gan  in  Cuba,  and  has  continued  at  intervals  to  the  pres 
ent  day,  each  successive  outbreak  becoming  more  for 
midable  and  more  desperate  than  the  one  which  pre 
ceded  it. 

The  first  rising  came  at  once.  In  1826,  only  a  year 
after  the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  an  insur 
rection  broke  out,  and  its  two  chiefs  were  executed. 
Soon  after  came  another,  known  as  the  ''Conspiracy  of 
the  Black  Eagle,"  which  was  also  harshly  repressed,  and 
those  engaged  in  it  were  imprisoned,  banished,  or  exe 
cuted.  In  1837  the  representatives  of  Cuba  and  Puerto 
Rico  were  excluded  from  the  Cortes,  on  the  ground 
that  the  colonies  were  to  be  governed  by  special  law. 
In  1850  and  1851  occurred  an  expedition  for  the  libera 
tion  of  Cuba,  and  the  death  of  its  leader,  Narciso 
Lopez.  There  were  also  expeditions  under  General 
Quitman  and  others,  and  in  1855  Ramon  Pinto  was  put 

9 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

to  death,  and  many  other  patriots  banished.  These  last 
raids  were  part  of  the  slaveholders'  movement  intend 
ed  to  bring  about  the  independence  of  the  island,  and 
subsequent  annexation  to  the  United  States,  but  they 
failed  like  their  predecessors.  After  this,  for  a  num 
ber  of  years,  the  Cubans  attempted  by  peaceful  methods 
to  secure  from  the  government  at  Madrid  some  reliei 
from  the  oppression  which  weighed  upon  them,  and 
some  redress  for  their  many  wrongs.  All  their  efforts 
came  to  naught,  and  such  changes  as  were  made  were 
for  the  worse  rather  than  for  the  better. 

The  result  of  all  this  was  that  in  1869  a  revolution 
broke  out  under  the  leadership  of  Carlos  Manuel  de 
Cespedes,  and  the  United  States  was  aroused  to  the 
fact  that  the  Cuban  question  was  as  unsettled  as  ever. 
The  existence  of  slavery  in  Cuba  dulled  the  edge  of 
American  sympathy,  for  the  bitterness  of  our  own  con 
flict  was  still  upon  us.  Still  there  was  much  interest  in 
the  United  States,  and  a  strong  feeling  in  behalf  of 
men  struggling  for  freedom.  The  old  American  senti 
ment  against  the  domination  of  Europe  in  the  New 
World,  which  slavery  for  its  own  objects  had  for  a  time 
suppressed,  woke  again  and  found  active  and  ardent 
expression.  The  revolutionists,  it  is  true,  did  not  suc 
ceed  in  getting  beyond  the  eastern  part  of  the  island, 
but  they  were  successful  in  many  engagements,  they 
crippled  still  further  the  already  broken  power  of  Spain, 
and  they  could  not  be  put  down  by  force  of  arms.  At 
first  the  United  States  held  carefully  aloof ;  but  the  war 
went  on ;  Spain  was  in  the  throes  of  revolution  at  home ; 
and  the  administration  of  President  Grant,  however  re 
luctant,  was  compelled  to  take  notice  of  the  fire  burning 

10 


, 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

at  our  very  doors.  Mr.  Fish,  Secretary  of  State,  re 
verted  to  the  old  idea  of  purchase,  and  informally 
brought  the  proposition  to  the  attention  of  the  Spanish 
government.  General  Prim,  the  one  very  able  man 
Spain  has  produced  in  recent  times,  saw  at  once  the 
sense  and  advantage  of  this  solution,  but  the  scheme 
got  noised  about  prematurely,  there  was  an  outbreak 
of  silly  passion  which  the  Spaniards  call  pride,  and 
Prim  was  obliged  to  declare  vehemently  against  any 
alienation  of  the  national  territory.  Then  in  1873  came 
what  was  certain  to  come  sooner  or  later,  an  outrage  by 
Spain  against  the  United  States.  The  Virginius>  a 
vessel  of  American  register,  was  captured  on  the  high 
seas,  taken  to  a  Cuban  port,  and  some  fifty  of  her  of 
ficers  and  crew,  Americans  for  the  most  part,  summa 
rily  shot.  The  wrath  of  the  American  people  flamed1. 
out;  President  Grant  could  have  had  war  and  ended! 
everything  in  a  moment  ;  but  the  forces  which  cared/ 
nothing  for  humanity  and  a  great  deal  for  an  undis-j 
turbed  money  market  prevailed.  The  register  of  the' 


was  opportunely  proved  to  be  fraudulent,  we 
took  money  for  our  dead,  and  peace  was  preserved. 
The  unsettled  question  had  come  very  near  a  solution, 
and  had  shown,  to  all  who  cared  to  think,  that  Spanish 
tyranny  was  capable  of  dangerous  crimes  against  others 
than  its  own  subjects. 

Still  the  war  dragged  on.  It  was  very  annoying, 
especially  to  those  who  were  afraid  of  being  disturbed 
in  their  daily  business,  and  the  administration  was 
forced  to  intimate,  in  1875,  that  if  Spain  did  not  stop 
the  war,  the  intervention  of  other  powers  might  be 
come  necessary.  The  hint  was  not  without  effect,  and, 

ii 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

coupled  with  Spain's  increasing  exhaustion,  hastened 
the  end.  In  two  years  more,  after  the  insurrection  had 
lasted  ten  years,  peace  was  made  with  the  insurgents, 
but  only  by  a  treaty  in  which  Martinez  Campos,  in  the 
name  of  Spain,  promised  to  the  Cubans  certain  reforms 
for  which  they  had  taken  up  arms.  In  consideration  of 
these  reforms  the  insurgents  were  to  abandon  their 
fight  for  independence,  lay  down  their  arms,  and  re 
ceive  a  complete  amnesty.  The  insurgents  kept  their 
word.  They  laid  down  their  arms  and  abandoned  their 
struggle  for  independence.  Spain  unhesitatingly  vio 
lated  the  agreement.  With  a  cynical  disregard  of  good 
faith,  her  promise  of  amnesty  was  only  partially  kept, 
and  she  imprisoned  or  executed  many  who  had  been 
engaged  in  the  insurgent  cause,  while  the  promised  re 
forms  were  either  totally  neglected  or  carried  out  by 
some  mockery  which  had  neither  reality  nor  value. 
The  result  of  this  treachery,  of  the  bloodshed  which  ac 
companied  it,  and  of  the  increased  abuses  in  govern 
ment  which  followed,  was  that  the  Cubans  again  pre 
pared  for  revolt,  and  in  February,  1895,  Jos^  Marti 
landed  in  eastern  Cuba  and  another  revolution  broke 
out.  The  unsettled  question  had  again  appeared,  still 
demanding  the  right  answer. 

There  is  no  need  to  trace  here  the  history  of  this  last 
insurrection.  The  insurgents  formed  a  government, 
carried  on  a  vigorous  guerrilla  warfare,  swept  over  the 
island  from  Santiago  to  the  outskirts  of  Havana  and 
into  Pinar  del  Rio,  and  soon  held  sway  over  most  of 
the  provinces  outside  the  towns.  They  fought  better, 
and  were  better  led,  by  partisan  chiefs  like  Maceo  and 
Garcia,  than  ever  before.  But  the  head  and  front  of  the 

12 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

Rebellion  was  Maximo  Gomez,  a  man  of  marked  ability 
and  singular  tenacity  of  purpose.  His  plan  was  to  re 
fuse  all  compromises,  to  distribute  bis  followers  in  de- 
tacbed  bands,  to  fight  no  pitched  battles,  but  incessant 
skirmishes,  to  ravage  the  country,  destroy  the  possibil 
ity  of  revenue,  and  win  in  the  end  either  through  the 
financial  exhaustion  of  Spain  or  by  the  intervention  of 
the  United  States,  one  of  which  results  he  believed  must 
come  if  he  could  only  hold  on  long  enough.  His  wis 
dom,  persistence,  and  courage  have  all  been  justified, 
for  the  results  have  come  as  he  expected,  and  the  rest 
of  the  story  is  to  be  found  in  the  course  of  events  in  the 
United  States. 

When  the  insurrection  of  1895  broke  out  it  excited, 
at  first,  but  a  languid  interest  among  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  who  are  only  too  well  accustomed  to 
revolutions  in  Spanish-American  countries.  It  soon 
was  apparent,  however,  that  this  was  not  an  ordinary 
South-American  revolution,  that  the  Cubans  were  fight 
ing  the  old  fight  of  America  to  be  free  from  Europe, 
that  they  were  in  desperate  earnest,  would  accept  no 
compromises,  and  would  hold  on  to  the  bitter  end. 
Then,  too,  a  few  months  sufficed  to  show  that  this  time 
the  Cubans  were  well  led,  that  their  forces  were  united, 
that  they  were  not  torn  with  factional  strife,  arid  that 
they  were  pursuing  an  intelligent  and  well-considered 
plan.  Interest  in  the  United  States  began  to  awaken, 
and  grew  rapidly  as  the  success  of  the  Cuban  arms  be 
came  manifest.  In  the  Ten  Years'  War  the  insurrection 
never  spread  beyond  the  hill  countrv  of  the  extreme 
east.  Now,  in  six  months,  the  province  of  Santiago, 
except  for  the  seaports,  had  fallen  into  Cuban  control, 

13 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  the  Cuban  forces  marched  westward,  taking  pos 
session  of  all  the  rural  districts  as  far  as  Havana. 
"This  brave  fight  for  liberty  and  against  Spain  pres 
ently  aroused  the  sympathy  of  the  American  people, 
which  showed  itself  in  the  newspaper  press  and  in  pub 
lic  meetings,  always  with  gathering  strength.  When 
Congress  met,  the  popular  sentiment  sought  expression 
in  both  branches.  A  minority  desired  the  immediate 
recognition  of  Cuban  independence,  a  large  number 
wished  to  recognize  belligerency,  an  overwhelming  ma 
jority  wanted  to  do  something,  while  the  naturally  con 
servative  elements  were  led  by  a  few  determined  men 
who  were  opposed  to  any  interference  of  the  remotest 
kind,  and  a  few  of  whom,  even  if  they  did  not  openly 
avow  it,  were  bent  on  leaving  Spain  a  free  hand  in  the 
island.  Out  of  this  confusion  came,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  a  compromise,  in  which  the  men  in  the  small 
minority,  who  knew  just  what  they  wanted,  got  the 
substance,  and  the  large,  divided,  and  undecided  ma 
jority,  who  vaguely  desired  "to  do  something  for 
Cuba,"  obtained  nothing  but  a  collection  of  sympathetic 
words.  The  compromise  took  the  form  of  a  concurrent 
resolution,  which,  after  much  debate,  delay,  and  con 
ference,  finally  passed  both  Houses. 

This  resolution  merely  declared  that  a  state  of  war 
existed  in  Cuba,  that  the  United  States  would  observe 
strict  neutrality,  and  that  the  President  should  offer  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  with  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  the  island.  As  the  resolution  was  concurrent,  it  did 
not  require  the  President's  assent,  and  was  nothing  but 
an  expression  of  the  opinion  of  Congress.  It  therefore 

14 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

had  little  weight  with  Mr.  Cleveland,  and  none  at  all 
with  Spain.  Whatever  was  done  by  the  administra 
tion  in  offering  our  good  offices  to  secure  the  recogni 
tion  of  Cuban  independence,  there  was  no  result,  and 
the  only  part  of  the  resolution  which  was  scrupulously 
carried  out  was  in  observing  neutrality,  which  was  done 
by  the  President  with  a  severity  that  bore  heavily  upon 
the  Cuban  side  alone. 

The  administration  was  in  fact  opposed  to  any  inter 
ference  in  Cuba,  and  the  action  of  Congress  left  it  free 
to  follow  its  policy  of  holding  rigidly  aloof.  Spain  re 
lied  with  entire  confidence  on  the  friendly  attitude  of 
Mr.  Cleveland,  and  this  confidence  was  not  misplaced. 
But  the  unsettled  question  could  not  be  put  down  in 
this  fashion,  or  pushed  into  a  corner.  It  kept  on  pro 
claiming  its  ugly  existence.  The  war  did  not  die  out, 
as  the  opponents  of  Cuba  confidently  predicted  that  it 
would,  in  the  course  of  a  month.  On  the  contrary,  it 
continued ;  the  insurgents  were  successful  in  their  plan 
of  campaign ;  they  kept  gaining  ground  and  getting  a 
more  and  more  complete  control  of  the  interior  of  the 
island.  On  July  13,  1895,  the  battle  of  Bayamo  was 
fought — the  only  considerable  action  of  the  war,  for 
Gomez  avoided  steadily  all  stricken  fields.  At  Bayamo, 
however,  they  won  a  decisive  victory,  and  Martinez 
Campos,  who  barely  escaped,  was  forced  to  resign,  and 
was  recalled,  six  months  later.  The  retirement  of 
Martinez  Campos  was  an  important  advantage  to  the 
Cuban  cause,  for  he  was  the  wisest  and  most  humane 
of  the  Spanish  Captain-Generals.  He  had  settled  the 
last  revolt,  and  by  diplomacy  and  good  management 
there  was  always  danger  that  he  would  divide  the  in- 

15 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

surgents  again  and  bring  about  another  compromise. 
He  was,  however,  neither  successful  enough  nor  suf 
ficiently  ferocious  to  satisfy  Spain,  and  hence  his  re 
moval.  The  man  who  succeeded  him,  if,  as  events 
proved,  equally  unsuccessful  in  war,  left  nothing  to  be 
desired  in  the  way  of  ferocity.  Valeriano  Weyler  came 
to  Cuba  February  10,  1896,  with  an  evil  reputation  for 
cruelty  and  corruption  earned  in  the  Philippines  and 
in  the  suppression  of  the  disorders  at  Barcelona,  a  repu 
tation  which  he  not  only  maintained,  but  enhanced  in  his 
new  government.  His  military  movements  were  farci 
cal,  consisting  in  marching  columns  out  here  and  there 
from  garrisoned  posts,  having  an  ineffective  brush  with 
the  Cubans,  and  then  and  there  withdrawing  the  troops, 
with  as  little  effect  as  the  proverbial  King  of  France 
who  marched  up  the  hill.  The  insurgents  continued 
their  operations  without  serious  check;  they  broke 
through  the  trochas,  swarmed  into  Pinar  del  Rio, 
wandered  at  will  about  the  country,  and  carried  their 
raids  even  into  the  suburbs  of  Havana.  Weyler,  who 
seems  never  to  have  exposed  himself  to  fire,  but  to  have 
confined  his  operations  in  the  field  to  building  more 
trochas,  made  his  few  military  progresses  by  sea,  and 
preferred  to  stay  in  Havana,  where  he  could  amass  a 
fortune  by  blackmailing  the  business  interests,  and 
levying  heavy  tribute  on  all  the  money  appropriated  to 
public  uses  by  the  bankrupt  and  broken  treasury  of 
Spain.  If,  however,  Weyler  was  ineffective  as  a  com 
mander  in  the  field  and  no  lover  of  battle,  he  showed 
that  he  was  energy  itself  in  carrying  out  a  campaign 
of  another  kind,  which  was  intended  to  destroy  the  peo 
ple  of  the  island,  and  which  had  the  great  merit  of  be- 

16 


SEXOR    CAXOYAS    DKI.    CASTILLO 
Late   Prime  Minister  of  Spain 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

ing  attended  with  no  risk  to  the  person  of  the  Captain- 
General.  A  large  portion  of  the  Cuban  population  in 
the  country  were  peasants  taking  no  part  in  the  war, 
and  known  as  "pacificos."  They  were  quiet  people,  as 
a  rule,  and  gave  no  cause  for  offence,  but  it  was  well 
known  that  their  sympathies  were  with  the  insurgents, 
and  it  was  believed  that  they  furnished  both  supplies 
and  recruits  to  the  rebel  forces.  Unable  to  suppress  or 
defeat  the  armed  insurgents,  the  Spanish  government 
characteristically  determined  to  destroy  these  helpless 
"pacificos."  Accordingly  an  edict,  suggested  apparent 
ly  by  Weyler,  was  issued  on  October  21,  1896,  which 
applied  to  Pinar  del  Rio,  and  was  afterwards  extended 
to  all  the  island,  and  which  ordered  the  army  to  con 
centrate  all  the  pacincos,  practically  all  the  rural  popu 
lation,  in  the  garrisoned  towns.  These  wretched  peo 
ple  were  to  be  driven  in  this  way  from  their  little  farms, 
which  were  their  only  means  of  support,  and  herded  in 
the  towns  and  in  the  suburbs  of  Havana,  where  they 
had  nothing  before  them  but  starvation,  or  massacre  at 
the  hands  of  Spanish  soldiers  and  guerrillas.  Whether 
the  idea  of  this  infamous  order  originated  in  Havana 
or  Madrid  is  not  of  much  consequence.  The  Queen- 
Regent,  for  whom  some  persons  feel  great  sympathy, 
because  she  is  an  intelligent  woman  and  the  mother  of  a 
little  boy,  set  her  hand  to  the  decree  which  sent  thou 
sands  of  women  and  children  to  a  lingering  death,  and 
the  whole  government  of  Spain  is  just  as  responsible 
for  all  the  ensuing  atrocities  as  Weyler,  who  issued  the 
concentration  edict  and  carried  it  out  with  pitiless  thor 
oughness  and  genuine  pleasure  in  the  task. 

By  March,  1896,  Spain  had  sent  121,000  soldiers  to 
2  17 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  island,  which  gave  her,  at  that  time  with  the  forces 
already  in  Cuba,  150,000  men.  Her  debt  was  piling  up 
with  frightful  rapidity ;  the  insurgent  policy  of  prevent 
ing  the  grinding  of  the  sugar-cane  was  largely  success 
ful,  had  paralyzed  business,  and  wellnigh  extinguished 
the  revenues.  It  was  apparent  to  all  but  the  most  prej 
udiced  that  even  if  the  insurgents  could  not  drive  the 
Spaniards  from  Cuba,  the  island  was  lost  to  Spain. 
With  200,000  soldiers  in  1897  Spain  had  utterly  and 
miserably  failed  to  put  down  the  rebels,  who  never  had 
in  arms,  in  all  parts  of  the  island,  over  35,000  men.  The 
Spanish  government  could  give  protection  neither  to 
its  own  citizens  nor  to  those  of  foreign  nations,  nor 
could  it  even  offer  security  to  business,  agriculture,  or 
property.  So  Spain,  impotent  and  broken,  but  as  sav 
age  and  cruel  as  she  had  ever  been  in  her  most  pros 
perous  days,  turned  deliberately  from  the  armed  men 
she  could  not  overcome  to  the  work  of  starving  to  death 
the  unarmed  people,  old  and  young,  men  and  women, 
whom  she  could  surely  reach. 

These  facts  began  to  grow  very  clear  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States  in  the  spring  of  1896,  and  the  two 
great  political  parties,  at  their  national  conventions, 
passed  resolutions  of  strong  sympathy  with  Cuba,  and 
demanded  action.  Even  the  excitement  of  the  most 
bitterly  fought  election  ever  known  in  the  United 
States  could  not  wholly  shut  out  Cuba,  and  when  the 
election  was  over,  the  Cuban  question  came  to  the  front 
again  as  soon  as  Congress  met.  Even  the  all-absorb 
ing  financial  question  could  neither  obscure  nor  hide  it. 
There  it  was  again,  under  discussion,  and  the  reason 
for  its  reappearance  was  simply  that  the  feeling  of  the 

18 


THE  UNSETTLED   QUESTION 

American  people  was  growing  constantly  keener  and 
stronger,  and  forced  the  subject  forward  in  Congress!, 
Among  those  who  sympathized  with  Cuba  there  was 
a  general  belief  that  it  was  not  merely  right  to  recog 
nize  the  independence  of  the  island,  but  that  such  ac 
tion  would  enable  the  insurgents  to  raise  money,  fly  the 
flag  of  the  republic  on  ships  of  war,  and  open  ports, 
and  that  they  would  then  secure  their  independence 
without  involving  the  United  States  in  war  with  Spain. 
Subsequent  events  have  shown  that  even  recognition 
would  not  probably  have  strengthened  the  insurgents  to 
such  a  degree  that  they  could  drive  out  the  Spaniards. 
But  it  is  equally  clear  now  that  recognition  was  the 
only  chance  of  saving  the  United  States  from  ultimate 
intervention  and  war.  A  majority  of  the  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations  holding  this  opinion,  Sen 
ator  Cameron  reported  from  that  committee  on  De 
cember  21,  1896,  a  brief  resolution  recognizing  the  Re 
public  of  Cuba,  and  setting  forth  the  reasons  for  doing 
so  in  a  very  able  and  elaborate  report. 

This  resolution  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
caused  much  excitement.  Stocks  fell,  and  the  financial 
interests  of  the  great  Eastern  cities  rose  in  wrathful 
'opposition.  They  declared,  without  any  reservation, 
that  war  "would  unsettle  values" — a  horrid  possibility 
not  to  be  contemplated  with  calmness  by  any  right- 
thinking  man.  The  error  of  the  financial  interests  was 
in  thinking  that  war  would  "unsettle  values."  That 
which  "unsettled  values"  was  the  Cuban  question,  and 
so  long  as  that  remained  unsettled,  "values"  would  fol 
low  suit.  There  was  but  one  way  to  remove  this  dis 
turbing  element,  and  that  was  for  the  United  States  to 

19 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

bring  the  Cuban  War  to  an  end.  So  long  as  it  was  per 
mitted  to  go  on,  the  damaging  uncertainty  and  suspense 
were  sure  to  continue,  and  sooner  or  later,  out  of  the 
fighting  in  Cuba  and  the  agitation  in  the  United  States, 
would  come  the  overt  act  which  would  bring  the  sword 
from  its  scabbard.  Nevertheless,  financial  interests  had 
their  way.  Mr.  Olney  announced,  in  an  interview  in 
the  Washington  Star,  that  no  attention  would  be  paid 
to  the  joint  resolution  even  if  it  passed  both  Houses 
over  the  veto,  because  the  right  of  recognition  pertained 
solely  to  the  Executive,  and  the  resolution  would  only 
be  the  opinion  of  certain  eminent  gentlemen.  This  was 
quite  conclusive  at  the  moment  in  regard  to  the  Cuban 
war,  for  nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  under  our 
system  of  government  no  serious  measures  can  be  wise 
ly  undertaken,  or  indeed  undertaken  at  all,  against  a 
foreign  nation  unless  the  Executive  and  Congress  act 
together.  This  was  entirely  obvious  to  the  Foreign  Re 
lations  Committee  of  the  Senate.  It  was  doubtful  if 
they  could  carry  the  resolution  for  recognition  of  the 
Cuban  Republic  through  the  Senate,  and  quite  certain 
that  it  would  be  useless  if  they  did.  So  the  resolution 
slumbered  on  the  calendar  and  was  never  called  up,  the 
wise  financial  interests  prevailed,  Cuban  independence 
was  not  to  be  recognized,  and  we  were  to  go  on  pre 
tending  that  the  war  was  not  there,  and  that  we  had 
answered  the  unsettled  question,  when  we  really  had 
simply  turned  our  heads  aside  and  refused  to  look. 

And  then  when  the  troublesome  matter  had  been  so 
nicely  laid  to  sleep,  the  result  followed  which  is  usual 
when  Congressmen  and  Presidents  and  nations  are  try 
ing  to  make  shams  pass  for  realities.  Only  a  few  weeks 


20 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

went  by,  and  the  Cuban  question  was  up  again.     It 
could  not  be  kept  out  of  the  newspapers,  or  the  minds 
of  men,  or  the  debates  in  Congress.     \Ye  were  engaged 
in  enforcing  the  neutrality  laws  and  preventing  fili 
bustering  expeditions.    If  an  expedition  got  out  of  our 
ports  it  was  a  success  in  almost  every  instance,  for  the 
Spanish  were  so  inefficient  that  they  could  hardly  ever 
prevent  a  landing,  and  the  upshot  was  that  the  United 
States  did  the  main  work  in  checking  the  insurgents. 
In  other  words,  the  enforcement  of  neutrality  meant  in 
practice  our  being  the  ally  of  Spain.     This  fact  came 
gradually  into  public  view  and  gained  general  appre 
ciation,  with  a  consequent  increase  of  feeling  among 
the  American  people,  who,  horrified  by  the  reports  of 
the  starvation  of  the  "reconcentrados,"  did  not  at  all 
relish  being  made  even   indirect  participants   in  that 
odious  crime  against  humanity.     A  still  deeper  source 
of  irritation  was  in  the  treatment  accorded  to  Amer 
icans  by  the  Spaniards.    Cases  were  continually  arising 
in  which  American  citizens  were  seized,  thrown  into 
prison,  kept  in  solitary  confinement,  and  subjected  to 
every  kind  of  cruelty,  in  total  disregard  of  both  treaty 
and  international  rights.     So  long  as  these  unfortunate 
men  were  of  Cuban  birth  and  had  Spanish  names,  the 
opponents  of  Cuba  felt  that  they  had  in  these  facts  a 
complete  answer,  and  that  the  additional  fact  that  they 
held   the  naturalization   papers  of  the  United   States 
could  be  entirely  disregarded.     Still  the  cases  kept  on 
coming  to  the  surface,  gave  rise  to  sharp  debates  in 
Congress,  and  stimulated  popular  feeling.     The  Span 
iards,  however,  emboldened  by  our  government's  ap^ 
parent  indifference  to  the  rights  and  the  protection  of 

21 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

American  citizens,  soon  ceased  to  confine  their  out 
rages  to  naturalized  citizens  of  Cuban  extraction,  and 
proceeded  to  extend  the  same  treatment  to  men  whose 
names  were  as  American  as  their  birth-place.  The  ad 
ministration  could  not  plead  ignorance  of  the  situation, 
for  General  Lee,  who  had  taken  charge  of  the  Consul- 
General's  office  in  Havana  on  June  3,  1896,  informed 
the  State  Department  three  weeks  after  his  arrival  that 
while  the  insurgents  could  not  drive  the  Spaniards 
from  the  island,  it  was  equally  impossible  for  Spain  to 
subdue  the  insurrection.  The  President  therefore  knew 
that  without  decided  measures  on  our  part  there  was 
nothing  possible  in  Cuba  but  bloodshed,  pillage,  the 
wholesale  destruction  of  life  and  property,  and  the 
gradual  extermination  of  the  inhabitants  by  starvation 
and  massacre,  but  he  remained  entirely  unmoved  in  his 
determination  not  to  interfere  even  to  the  extent  of 
putting  pressure  on  Spain.  As  the  winter  of  1896-7 
wore  away  it  also  became  generally  understood  that 
General  Lee,  whose  good  sense  and  firm  courage  had 
steadily  won  the  confidence  of  the  country,  was  not  sus 
tained  by  the  administration  as  he  should  have  been  in 
some  of  the  cases  of  American  prisoners.  The  manner 
in  which  the  consular  reports  were  withheld,  or  only 
grudgingly  or  partially  given  out,  augmented  the  pop 
ular  distrust,  for  the  secrecy  observed  convinced  every 
one  that  the  publication  of  the  official  truth  was  feared 
by  those  who  wished  to  hold  aloof  from  Cuba  and  to 
pretend  that  there  was  no  question  there  demanding 
settlement.  The  American  people  are  justly  sensitive 
in  regard  to  the  protection  of  American  citizens,  and 
the  imprisonment  of  Scott,  the  murder  of  Ruiz,  and 

22 


(;K.\ERAL  rnvjircn  LF.E 

United  States  Consul-General  in  Havana 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

the  treatment  of  the  Competitor  prisoners,  together 
with  many  other  cases,  especially  when  there  were  added 
to  them  the  ill-concealed  differences  between  the  ad 
ministration  and  General  Lee,  stirred  popular  feeling 
and  excited  popular  anger  to  a  high  degree.  The  situ 
ation  growing  out  of  the  Spanish  treatment  of  Amer 
icans  was  fast  bringing  on  a  crisis  which  threatened 
to  prove  not  only  acute,  but  decisive. 

Just  at  this  moment,  when  the  unrighted  wrong 
seemed  about  to  force  the  inevitable  decision,  Mr. 
Cleveland  went  out  of  office,  and  with  the  interest 
awakened  by  a  new  administration,  and  the  hopes  of  a 
changed  policy,  the  immediate  excitement  subsided,  and 
men  who  realized  that  however  absorbing  the  tariff 
might  be,  the  real  and  great  question  lay  south  of  Flor 
ida,  were  content  to  wait  and  give  to  the  new  authority 
every  possible  opportunity  and  assistance.  The  Repub 
lican  party,  which  now  returned  to  power,  had  taken 
very  strong  ground  at  its  convention  in  regard  to  Cuba, 
asserting  practically  that  it  would  charge  itself  with  the 
duty  of  compelling  a  final  settlement  of  the  question. 
President  McKinley  not  only  sympathized  with  the 
declaration  of  his  party,  but  he  felt  profoundly  the 
gravity  of  the  Cuban  situation,  and  cherished  a  deep 
desire  to  meet  it  successfully  and  conclusively.  The 
question  had  been  left  in  such  an  acute  state,  and  so 
near  to  extreme  action,  by  neglect  of  the  cases  of  Amer 
ican  prisoners,  that  it  was  plain  that  something  must 
be  done  at  once  or  the  new  administration  would  find 
itself  plunged  into  hostilities  before  it  had  fairly  taken 
the  reins  of  power  into  its  hands.  The  crucial  point 
was  the  American  prisoners,  and  President  McKinley, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

less  sensitive  than  his  predecessor  in  regard  to  injuring 
the  feelings  of  Spain,  immediately  demanded  prompt 
release  and  redress  in  every  case.  His  tone  was  so 
firm  that  the  Spaniards  at  once  gave  way,  and  by  the 
end  of  April  every  American  prisoner  had  been  re 
leased.  With  the  removal  of  the  immediate  and  crying 
evil  the  situation  grew  quieter,  the  crisis  passed  by,  and 
the  impending  peril  of  war  rolled  back  again  into  the 
distance.  The  cause  of  war  would  not  come  from 
Spanish  outrages  upon  American  citizens.  So  much 
was  fixed  by  the  President's  decided  action.  But  the 
question  was  still  there,  still  moving  and  pressing,  nev 
er  at  rest.  And  just  when  every  one  who  was  against 
doing  anything  was  saying  again  contentedly  that  all 
was  nicely  over,  and  that  the  sham  was  a  reality,  and 
that  there  was  no  Cuban  question,  out  the  question 
would  break  in  a  new  quarter.  May  20,  1897,  the  Sen 
ate,  without  division,  passed  a  joint  resolution  recog 
nizing  Cuban  belligerency.  This  resolution,  taking  its 
usual  course,  had  scarcely  had  time  to  reach  the  House 
and  be  sent  by  the  Speaker  to  slumber  in  the  Commit 
tee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  because  there  was  not  and  ought 
not  to  be  a  Cuban  question,  when  in  came  a  message 
from  the  President  on  that  very  subject.  It  appeared 
oddly  enough,  that  war  was  still  going  on,  and  that 
under  the  reconcentration  system  American  citizens,  as 
well  as  natives  of  the  island,  were  being  starved  to  death 
in  Cuba.  This  the  President,  thoroughly  informed 
by  the  consular  reports,  thought  that  he  could  not 
permit,  and  he  therefore  asked  Congress  for  $50,000 
to  purchase  and  send  supplies  to  these  Americans  who 
were  being  put  to  death  by  the  methods  of  war  em- 

24 


GKNKRAI.    STRWART    I,.  WOODFORH 

United  States  Minister  to  Spain 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

ployed  by  Spain.  Congress  gave  the  money  at  once, 
and  the  act  was  approved  May  24,  1897.  \Ve  de 
manded  and  received  the  assent  of  Spain,  and  there 
upon  ships  were  chartered  and  food  sent  to  all  the 
American  consuls,  in  order  to  feed  starving  Americans. 
The  Americans  were  fed,  and  many  others  not  Ameri 
cans  also,  and  the  United  States  by  this  action  had  at 
last  interfered  in  Cuba;  for  no  more  complete  act  of 
intervention  than  this,  which  tended  to  cripple  the  mili 
tary  measures  and  check  the  starvation  campaign  of 
the  Spaniards,  could  be  imagined.  It  was  not  admitted, 
certainly  not  generally  realized,  that  the  United  States 
had  finally  broken  from  the  old  policy  of  holding  aloof, 
and  had  entered  on  the  new  policy  of  intervention  in 
Cuba ;  but,  nevertheless,  the  true  answer  to  the  unset 
tled  question  was  beginning  to  draw  visibly  nearer. 

Meantime  the  President,  after  careful  consideration, 
selected  General  Stewart  L.  Woodford  for  minister 
to  Spain — the  most  important  diplomatic  post  to  be 
filled  at  this  juncture.  No  one  could  have  been  chosen 
who  was  more  conciliatory  than  General  Woodford, 
or  more  desirous  to  obtain  a  peaceful  solution  of  the 
ever-increasing  differences  with  Spain.  With  such  a 
minister  at  Madrid  it  was  certain  that  no  effort  would 
be  spared  to  soothe  Spain  and  bring  about  an  agree 
ment  calculated  to  gratify  everybody,  if  such  a  thing 
were  possible  under  the  circumstances,  which  seemed 
unlikely,  for  it  looked  as  if  the  question  had  gone  be 
yond  the  stage  when  it  could  be  dealt  with  by  soft  and 
gentle  handling.  Nevertheless,  until  the  new  adminis 
tration  and  the  new  President,  through  the  freshly  ap 
pointed  minister,  could  take  up  the  thread  of  the  nego- 

25 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

tiations  with  Spain,  there  came  a  pause  in  the  con 
troversy  between  the  two  nations.  There  was  no 
pause  in  Cuba,  no  pause  in  starving  to  death  the  misera 
ble  "reconcentrados,"  or  in  the  desolating  raids  of  both 
combatants,  which  were  fast  making  the  island  a  desert 
waste.  There  was  no  pause  in  the  agitation  in  the 
United  States,  or  in  the  growth  of  the  popular  feeling 
about  Cuba  and  the  horrid  scenes  there  existent.  The 
unsettled  question  kept  moving  on,  even  though  ne 
gotiations  paused.  Then  came  another  delay,  for  be 
fore  General  Woodford  reached  Spain  on  September 
i,  Senor  Canovas,  the  Prime  Minister,  was  murdered, 
on  Sunday,  August  8,  1897,  by  an  Italian  anarchist. 
There  was  much  alarm,  a  ministerial  crisis,  and  then 
Senor  Sagasta  came  in  and  formed  a  Liberal  ministry. 
At  last  General  Woodford  was  able  to  open  his  nego 
tiations,  and  the  demands  of  the  United  States  were 
seriously  pressed.  We  asked  for  the  recall  of  Weyler, 
and,  above  all,  for  the  revocation  of  the  reconcentration 
edict.  The  new  ministry  made  haste  to  comply  in  ap 
pearance  with  every  request,  and  to  promise  every 
thing  we  demanded.  Then  they  asked  in  turn  that  we 
should  give  them  opportunity  to  try  autonomy  in  Cuba 
— another  wrong  answer  to  the  old  question,  absolutely 
useless,  and  quite  gone  by  in  the  autumn  of  1897.  But 
after  all  the  ostensible  compliance  of  the  Sagasta  min 
istry  with  our  requests,  the  opportunity  to  try  auton 
omy  could  not  well  be  refused.  The  trouble  was  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  recall  of  Weyler,  on  October 
9,  1897,  about  which  no  deception  or  postponement 
was  possible,  not  one  of  these  Spanish  promises  was 
worth  the  paper  upon  which  it  was  written.  It  was  all 

26 


Spanish   Min 


TUY    DK    l.O.MK 

•  in  tlie  I Hited  States 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

entirely  characteristic  of  Spanish  diplomacy,  much 
vaunted  by  Spaniards,  and  much  admired  in  Europe, 
and  consisted  simply  of  lying,  evading,  and  making 
promises  which  there  was  no  intention  of  performing. 
As  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  tried  to  tell 
the  truth,  they  laid  themselves  open  to  much  European 
criticism  for  their  rude  diplomacy,  and  for  not  under 
standing  the  refined  methods  of  older  nations ;  but  they 
had  one  grave  disadvantage  in  a  failure  to  realize  that 
Spanish  diplomacy  consisted  chiefly  of  falsehood,  as  it 
had  done  for  some  centuries,  and  that  no  faith  could 
be  put  in  anything  they  alleged  or  promised. 

Meantime  all  agitation  in  the  United  States  was 
restrained  on  the  ground  that  after  the  Spanish  con 
cessions  we  were  bound  to  give  them  a  reasonable  time 
to  try  autonomy,  which  was  an  entirely  just  view  if  the 
concessions  had  been  real  and  autonomy  either  honest 
or  practical.  But  as  the  weeks  passed  by  it  became  ap 
parent  that  autonomy  was  neither  practical  nor  gen 
uine;  the  atrocities  and  starvation  went  on  despite  the 
withdrawal  of  Weyler  and  the  coming  of  the  less  brutal 
Blanco,  and  both  Congress  and  people  again  began  to 
grow  restless. 

The  situation  of  the  Americans  in  Havana  also  began 
to  cause  uneasiness,  and  there  was  so  much  disquiet 
that  the  administration  very  wisely  determined  to  send 
a  ship  of  war  to  that  port.  The  battle-ship  Maine  was 
selected  for  this  duty,  and  reached  Havana  on  the 
morning  of  January  24,  1898.  We  were  at  peace  with 
Spain,  and  we  had  an  entire  right  to  send  a  ship  to 
any  Cuban  port.  If  it  had  been  done,  as  it  ought  to 
have  been  done,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Cuban  troubles, 

27 


\TH 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

it  would  haveVxcited  no  comment ;  but  at  this  late  date 
in  the  war  it  assumed  an  importance  which  did  not 
rightfully  belong  to  such  an  accident.  The  Spanish 
minister,  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  blustered  in  private 
and  talked  about  war,  but  being  informed  quietly  and 
decidedly  by  Mr.  Day  that  the  ship  was  going  in  any 
event,  he  quieted  down  in  public,  and  the  Spanish 
cruiser  Vizcaya  came  to  New  York  to  demonstrate 
that  the  presence  of  the  Maine  at  Havana  was  only  a 
friendly  visit.  The  sending  of  the  Maine  was  received  by 
the  country  with  a  sense  of  relief,  and  the  action  of  the 
President  was  universally  approved.  Public  atten 
tion,  however,  was  soon  distracted  from  this  subject 
by  an  incident  which  in  a  flash  revealed  the  utter  worth- 
lessness  of  all  the  Spanish  concessions  and  promises. 
A  letter  of  Senor  Dupuy  de  Lome,  dated  December  25, 
1897,  and  addressed  to  a  friend,  Senor  Canalejas,  had 
been  stolen  in  Havana  by  some  one  in  the  Cuban  in 
terest,  and  sent  to  the  Cuban  Junta  in  New  York,  which 
gave  it  to  the  press  on  February  9,  1898.  This  letter 
contained  a  coarse  and  vulgar  attack  upon  President 
McKinley,  which  led  to  the  immediate  resignation 
and  recall  of  the  writer,  who  had  served  Spain  well  and 
unscrupulously.  But  far  more  important  in  its  wider 
bearings  than  this  disclosure  of  the  character  of  Du 
puy  de  Lome  was  the  fact  that  the  letter  revealed  the 
utter  'hollowness  of  all  the  Spanish  professions,  and 
showed  that  the  negotiations  in  regard  to  autonomy 
and  commercial  relations  were  only  intended  to  amuse 
and  deceive  the  United  States.  The  effect  of  this  rev 
elation  was  just  beginning  to  make  itself  felt  when 
the  American  people  were  stunned  by  an  event  which 

28 


THE  UNSETTLED  QUESTION 

drove  everything  else  from  their  minds.  On  the  morn 
ing  of  February  16  came  the  news  that  on  the  previous 
evening  the  battle-ship  Maine  had  been  blown  up  and 
totally  destroyed  in  the  harbor  of  Havana.  The  ex 
plosion  occurred  under  the  forward  part  of  the  ship, 
and  264  men  and  two  officers  were  killed.  The  overt 
act  had  come.  This  gigantic  murder  of  sleeping  men 
in  the  fancied  security  of  a  friendly  harbor  was  the 
direct  outcome  and  the  perfect  expression  of  Spanish 
rule,  the  appropriate  action  of  a  corrupt  system  strug 
gling  in  its  last  agony.  At  last  in  very  truth  the  un 
settled  question  had  come  home  to  the  United  States, 
and  it  spoke  this  time  in  awful  tones,  which  rang  loud 
and  could  not  be  silenced.  A  wave  of  fierce  wrath 
swept  over  the  American  people.  But  a  word  was 
needed,  and  war  would  have  come  then  in  response  to 
this  foul  and  treacherous  act  of  war,  for  such  in  truth 
it  was.  But  the  words  of  Captain  Sigsbee.  the  com 
mander  of  the  Maine,  whose  coolness,  self-restraint, 
and  high  courage  were  beyond  praise,  asking,  even  in 
the  midst  of  the  slaughter,  that  judgment  should  be 
suspended,  were  heeded  alike  by  government  and 
people. 

Scarcely  a  word  was  said  in  either  House  or  Senate, 
and  for  forty  days  the  American  people  and  the  Amer 
ican  Congress  waited  in  silence  for  the  verdict  of  the 
board  of  naval  officers  who  had  been  appointed  to  re 
port  on  the  destruction  of  the  Maine.  To  those  who 
understood  the  American  people  this  grim  silence,  this 
stern  self-control,  were  more  threatening  than  any 
words  of  sorrow  or  of  anger  could  possibly  have  been. 
Spain,  rushing  ignorantly,  arrogantly,  on  her  doom, 

29 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

understood  nothing.  A  generous  sympathy,  a  prompt 
offer  to  make  every  reparation,  while  she  disclaimed 
all  guilt,  and  she  could  have  turned  the  current  of  feel 
ing  and  gone  far  to  save  herself  and  her  colonies.  In 
stead  of  that,  with  incredible  stupidity  and  utter  mean 
ness  of  soul,  she  announced,  before  any  one  had  even 
looked  at  the  wreck,  that  the  ship  was  blown  up  from 
the  inside,  owing  to  the  carelessness  of  the  American 
officers.  Her  ambassadors  abroad  reiterated  this  min 
isterial  falsehood,  and,  not  content  with  that,  insulted 
the  brave  men  who  had  the  Maine  in  charge,  while 
official  Spaniards  everywhere  insinuated  or  declared 
that  lack  of  discipline  was  what  blew  up  the  battle 
ship.  There  was  much  anger,  -nostly  of  the  very  silent 
sort,  in  the  United  States  as  these  charges  flew  on 
wires  and  cables  about  the  world ;  but  the  American  re 
ply  to  them  was  not  given  until  some  months  later  on 
May  i  and  July  3  when  certain  proofs  were  given  of 
the  discipline  and  quality  of  American  sailors  which 
even  Spain  could  not  overlook.  Still  the  Spanish  at 
titude  in  regard  to  the  Maine  had  one  undoubted  merit 
—it  moved  the  unsettled  question  forward,  and  made  a 
wrong  answer  more  difficult  than  ever. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE   COMING   OF   WAR 

As  the  weary  days  went  by  after  the  destruction  of 
the  Maine,  public  feeling  grew  tenser  every  instant,  and 
the  waiting  became  more  intolerable,  until  at  last  the 
report  of  the  American  board  appeared,  closely  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  the  Spaniards,  which  told  the  lie 
agreed  upon  forty  days  before,  and  which  they  had  not 
even  taken  the  trouble  to  back  up  with  any  substantial 
evidence,  or  with  more  than  a  perfunctory  examination 
of  the  wreck.  No  one  heeded  the  Spanish  report ;  pub 
lic  men,  of  course,  read  it,  but  the  people  knew  Spain  at 
last,  and  their  instinct  told  them  with  entire  certainty 
that  here  was  a  sham  and  an  untruth,  very  patent  and 
flagrant,  upon  which  time  was  not  to  be  wasted.  The 
American  report  was  based  upon  a  most  elaborate  ex 
amination  of  the  wreck  and  of  witnesses,  and  upon  the 
most  carefully  sifted  testimony.  It  was  honest  and  cool, 
and  said  that  the  Maine  had  been  blown  up  from 
outside.  There  was  no  mortal  doubt  after  reading 
the  report,  and  Captain  Sigsbee's  evidence  before  the 
Senate  committee,  that  the  outside  engine  of  destruc 
tion  was  a  government  submarine  mine,  and  had  been 
exploded  without  the  authority  or  knowledge  of  the 
Spanish  government,  by  men  who  wore  the  uniform 
of  Spain. 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

The  President  transmitted  the  report  of  the  board  to 
Congress  without  comment.  It  was  perhaps  needless  to 
make  any,  for  Senate  and  House  and  country  supplied 
all  that  was  necessary.  Moreover,  the  President,  as 
became  a  chief  magistrate,  had  been  and  still  was  using 
every  possible  effort  to  avert  war  by  peaceful  and  dip 
lomatic  methods,  and  continued  to  hope  against  hope 
for  a  successful  result.  The  American  people  like 
wise  were  averse  to  war.  An  overwhelming  majority 
would  have  so  declared  even  after  the  report  on  the 
Maine  had  been  submitted  to  Congress.  On  the  other 
hand,  an  equally  overwhelming  majority  were  deter 
mined  that  there  should  be  atonement  for  the  Maine, 
and  that  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba — which  had  caused  the 
destruction  of  the  ship — and  the  horrors  of  the  "re- 
concentrados"  should  end.  These  demands  meant  war 
even  if  those  who  made  them  did  not  realize  it,  and  it 
was  this  public  sentiment  that  drove  Congress  forward 
to  meet  the  popular  will,  which  members  and  Senators 
very  well  knew  could  be  fulfilled  by  war  and  in  no 
other  way.  Against  the  sentiment  springing  from 
the  popular  instinct  wrhich  at  the  great  crisis  of  Amer 
ican  history  has  always  been  true  and  right,  an  opposi 
tion  strong  in  purpose  although  in  large  measure  con 
cealed,  was  arrayed.  The  naturally  timid  and  con 
servative  elements  of  the  community  shrank  from  war, 
and  the  powerful  financial  interests  of  the  Eastern  cities, 
too  short-sighted  to  see  that  their  selfish  advantage  was 
in  the  certainty  of  action  and  not  in  suspense,  exerted 
their  great  force  to  stop  every  forward  step  along  the 
inevitable  path.  For  the  result  now  was  inevitable; 
had  been  so,  in  reality,  since  the  fatal  I5th  of  February, 

32 


•ATTAIN    CHARLES    1).    SK1S1IKI 
United  States  liattle-ship  Maine 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

although  men  did  not  understand  it  at  the  moment,  and 
still  thought  that  they  could  stay  the  current  of  events 
which  had  been  gathering  strength  for  seventy  years 
and  broken  loose  at  last. 

The  Maine  message  was  sent  in  on  March  28,  and 
as  men  everywhere  discussed  the  evidence,  it  became 
clear  that  although  the  President  was  reluctant  to 
abandon  hope,  the  resources  of  diplomacy  had  failed. 
What  the  exact  course  of  the  negotiations  conducted 
by  the  President  and  the  able  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  Judge  Day,  had  been  was  unknown  then,  is  not 
known  now,  and  will  not  be  thoroughly  known  until  the 
time  comes  when  the  secret  correspondence  between 
Washington  and  Madrid  is  open  to  the  historian.  But 
it  was  perfectly  well  understood  that  Spain  would  not 
grant  independence  to  Cuba,  and  that  whether  our  min 
ister  had  made  the  fact  plain  to  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  or  not,  no  peaceful  settlement  was  possible  on 
any  other  basis.  Diplomats  might  plan,  and  twist,  and 
devise,  and  exchange  notes,  and  deal  in  all  the  forms 
so  futile  at  a  great  crisis,  but  the  American  people  had 
made  up  their  minds  that  the  only  real  and  possible 
solution  was  the  end  of  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba.  They 
had  determined  that  the  unsettled  question  must  receive 
this  time  a  right  answer,  that  it  should  knock  at  their 
door  no  longer,  and  the  American  people  were  right. 

Meantime  the  tension  and  excitement  steadily  in 
creased.  The  peace-at-any-price  people  fought  hard 
but  in  vain  against  the  sweeping  tide  of  public  senti 
ment.  It  was  understood  that  a  message  would  come 
to  Congress  on  Monday,  April  4.  Then  it  was  given 
out  that  it  would  be  sent  in  on  Wednesday,  April  6, 

3  33 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  the  Capitol  was  thronged  in  expectation  of  the 
great  event.  When  the  House  met,  there  was  delay, 
and  then  the  leaders  of  the  House  and  three  Senators 
of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  were  summoned 
suddenly  to  the  White  House.  There  the  President 
showed  them  a  despatch  from  General  Lee,  saying  that 
if  the  message  went  in  that  day  he  could  not  answer 
for  the  lives  of  the  Americans  in  Havana,  and  that  he 
ought  to  have  until  Saturday  at  least  to  get  them  out 
of  Cuba.  To  this  appeal  there  could  be  but  one  answer. 
The  message  must  be  held  back,  and  the  Senators  and 
members  returned  and  made  the  announcement  to  their 
respective  Houses. 

Thereupon  the  tension,  the  excited  suspense, 
the  doubts,  the  rumors,  were  all  renewed  and 
Intensified.  It  was  generally  believed  that  Spain 
would  take  advantage  of  this  respite  to  make  some 
new  proposition,  even  if  she  had  not  already  done  so, 
and  Saturday  proved  the  correctness  of  the  anticipa 
tion.  On  that  day  word  came  that  Spain  proposed  an 
armistice  with  the  insurgents,  and  that  her  council  had 
voted  $600,000  for  the  relief  of  the  "reconcentrados." 
Those  who  wished  to  be  deceived  by  these  offers  were 
so  deceived,  but  no  one  else.  An  armistice  was  im 
possible  without  the  assent  of  both  parties  to  the  war, 
and  the  Cubans,  on  the  eve  of  victory,  of  course  would 
not  consent.  Moreover,  the  armistice,  as  soon  ap 
peared,  consisted  merely  in  an  invitation  to  the  in 
surgents  to  come  in  and  lay  down  their  arms.  The 
proposition  was  not  even  a  well-framed  or  judicious  lie. 
As  to  the  money  for  the  "reconcentrados,"  it  was  an 
empty  sham.  There  is  no  proof  that  a  peseta  was  ever 

34 


WILLIAM    R.    DAY 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

really  appropriated ;  and  if  it  had  been,  as  General  Lee 
justly  said,  it  would  all  have  been  absorbed  by  Spanish 
officials  before  it  reached  its  destination.  The  Spanish 
case  closed  fittingly  with  these  false  and  fraudulent 
promises. 

Anxious  as  the  President  was  for  peace,  he  could 
not  and  would  not  accept  as  realities  such  shams  as 
these,  and  on  Monday,  April  n,  the  fateful  message 
on  Cuban  affairs  at  last  came  in,  and  was  referred  to  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committees  of  both  Houses.  The 
reading  of  the  message  was  listened  to  with  intense 
interest  and  in  profound  silence,  broken  only  by  a  wave 
of  applause  when  the  sentence  was  read  which  said, 
"In  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization, 
in  behalf  of  endangered  American  interests  which  give 
us  the  right  and  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the  war  in 
Cuba  must  stop."  The  President  led  up  to  this  declara 
tion  by  a  dispassionate  review  of  the  Cuban  question, 
and  by  a  strong  and  moving  description  of  the  condi 
tions  of  the  island,  which  he  characterized  as  a  wilder 
ness  and  a  grave.  He  asked  Congress  to  empower  him 
to  end  hostilities  in  Cuba,  and  to  secure  the  establish 
ment  of  a  stable  government,  capable  of  maintaining 
order  and  observing  its  international  obligations."  He 
said  that  he  had  exhausted  diplomacy,  and  therefore 
left  the  issue  with  Congress,  wrhile  he  referred  to  Con 
gress  for  its  consideration  the  statement  that  the 
Queen-Regent  had  ordered  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 
In  the  deep  excitement  of  the  moment  many  persons 
felt  that  the  message  wras  too  gentle,  and  that  the  Presi 
dent  really  did  not  desire  as  yet  decided  measures.  But 
it  was  pointed  out  that  when  he  asked  Congress  for  au- 

35 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

thority  to  establish  a  government  in  Cuba  "capable  of 
observing  international  relations,"  he  requested  power 
to  make  Cuba  independent,  because  only  an  independent 
people  can  maintain  relations  of  that  character.  More 
decisive,  still,  indeed  absolutely  conclusive,  was  the  sim 
ple  fact  that  the  President,  having  declared  that  he  had 
exhausted  diplomacy,  had  remitted  the  question  to 
Congress.  Congress  has  no  diplomatic  functions  or 
attributes.  With  a  foreign  nation  it  has  but  one  weapon 
—the  war  power;  and  when  a  President  calls  in  Con 
gress  in  a  controversy  with  another  nation,  his  action 
means  that  Congress,  if  it  sees  fit,  must  exercise  its 
single  power,  and  declare  war.  On  this  sound  ground, 
which  is  constitutionally  the  only  ground  possible  under 
such  conditions,  Congress  proceeded  to  act. 

For  more  than  a  week  a  draft  of  a  resolution  to  be 
passed  by  Congress  had  been  in  existence,  and  had  been 
seen  by  some  Senators  and  a  few  others,  which  pro 
vided  that  the  President  should  be  authorized  to  in 
tervene  in  order  to  stop  the  war  in  Cuba,  to  secure  their 
peace,  order,  and  a  stable  government  established  by 
the  free  action  of  the  people,  and  to  use  the  army  and 
navy  of  the  United  States  for  these  purposes.  Whence 
this  resolution  came,  or  who  drafted  it,  was  not  known, 
but  some  of  those  to  whom  it  was  submitted  pointed  out 
that  it  was  utterly  vague,  that  under  its  carefully  loose 
terms  the  forces  of  the  United  States  could  be  used  to 
crush  the  insurgents,  and  that  the  government  to  be  set 
up  might  be  Spanish  just  as  well  as  independent. 
Whether  this  resolution  emanated  from  those  opposed 
at  all  hazards  to  Cuba  and  to  war,  or  not,  it  sank  out 
of  sight  for  a  time,  and  then  reappeared  in  the  report 

36 


SENOR    I'RAXKDKS    MATEO    SAGASTA 
Prime  Minister  of  Spain 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

of   the  Committee  on   Foreign   Affairs   made  in   the 
House  on  April  13.     It  read  as  follows: 

Resolved,  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  and  directed 
to  intervene  at  once  to  stop  the  war  in  Cuba,  to  the  end  and  with 
the  purpose  of  securing  permanent  peace  and  order  there,  and 
establishing  by  the  free  action  of  the  people  thereof  a  stable  and 
independent  government  of  their  own  hi  the  island  of  Cuba;  and 
the  President  is  hereby  authorized  and  empowered  to  use  the  land 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  execute  the  purpose  of 
this  resolution. 

One  very  important  change  had  been  made  in  the 
original  draft,  without  which,  it  is  safe  to  say,  it  could 
not  have  passed  the  I  louse  committee.  The  alteration 
was  the  insertion  after  the  word  "stable"  of  the  words 
"and  independent."  This  greatly  improved  the  reso 
lution,  but  it  still  remained  dangerously  loose  and 
vague,  and  had  the  cardinal  defect  of  not  saying  square 
ly  and  honestly  what  the  American  people  and  Congress 
intended,  which  was  the  expulsion  of  Spain  from  Cuba. 
Nevertheless,  after  the  Republican  majority  had  voted 
down  the  Democratic  proposition  to  recognize  the  in 
surgent  government,  the  resolution  ns  reported  by  the 
committee  passed  by  a  vote  of  324  to  19,  and  was  sent 
to  the  Senate. 

The  situation  in  the  Senate  was  quite  different.  For 
a  week  before  the  message  of  April  T  i  came  in,  the 
Committee  of  Foreign  Relations  had  been  at  work  upon 
a  resolution  based  upon  one  introduced  by  Senator 
Foraker  of  Ohio.  The  committee  were  determined 
that  any  resolution  reported  by  them  should  be  perfectly 
clear  on  the  point  that  the  object  of  the  United  States 
was  to  put  an  absolute  end  to  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba. 
With  a  preamble  setting  forth  the  treatment  of  the 

37 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

"reconcentrados"  and  the  destruction  of  the  Maine 
as  the  grounds  of  intervention,  a  resolution  of  this 
character  was  agreed  to  tentatively,  and  Senator  Davis 
of  Minnesota,  the  chairman  of  the  committee,  drafted 
a  report  to  accompany  it.  Both  the  resolutions  and  the 
report  were  sent  to  the  President  for  such  suggestion 
and  comment  as  he  might  see  fit  to  make.  After  the 
message  of  April  n  came  in,  these  resolutions  were 
taken  up  for  immediate  action.  There  was  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  some  members  of  the  committee  to  come 
as  near  as  might  be  to  the  general  line  taken  in  the 
House  resolution,  but  the  chief  point  of  difference 
arose  upon  the  question  of  recognizing  the  government 
of  the  insurgents.  The  President,  with  wisdom  and 
foresight,  had  declared  in  his  message  against  any 
such  recognition.  A  majority  of  the  Senate  committee 
sustained  the  President's  position ;  and  while  the  whole 
committee  supported  the  main  and  essential  resolution 
as  to  the  withdrawal  of  Spain,  a  minority  reported,  as 
an  amendment,  a  clause  recognizing  the  insurgent  gov 
ernment.  Senator  Davis  made  the  report  for  the  com 
mittee,  and  in  that  report  the  case  of  the  United  States 
against  Spain  and  the  grounds  of  armed  intervention 
were  stated  not  only  in  the  best  way,  but  with  a  force 
•  and  power,  both  legally  and  historically,  which  left 
nothing  to  be  desired.  The  resolutions  of  the  commit 
tee  and  the  minority  amendment  submitted  to  the 
Senate  on  April  13  were  as  follows: 

RBfORT  OF   COMMITTEE   ON    FOREIGN    RELATIONS. 

Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for  more 
than  three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own  borders, 
have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 

38 


MCl.I.l.OM  IA/      VVJ  JOSI  I'll  B.i-OKAKKR  ^TT 

I\.OI-.  (V   C-'A^Sl  *  rxP* 


IAiKS    SF.NA'I'K    ( '( >M  M  I  1TKK    o.\    !•'(  iR  I-.Ii  ;  N    AFKA1K 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

have  been  a  disgrace  to  Christian  civilization  culminating  as  they 
have,  in  the  destruction  of  a  United  States  battle-ship,  with  266 
of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of 
Havana,  and  cannot  longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to  Congress  of 
April  nth,  1898,  upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited; 
Therefore, 

Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

First.  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right 
ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand, 
and  the  government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand, 
that  the  government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and 
government  in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and 
naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent 
as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

VIEWS   OF  THE    MINORITY. 

The  undersigned  members  of  said  committee  cordially  concur 
in  the  report  made  upon  the  Cuban  resolutions,  but  favor  the  im 
mediate  recognition  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  as  organized  in  the 
island,  as  a  free,  independent,  and  sovereign  power  among  the  na 
tions  of  the  world  DAVID  TURPIE. 

R.  Q.  MILLS. 
JNO.  W.  DANIEL. 

J.  B.   FoRAKER. 

The  amendment  reported  by  the  minority  committee 
was  to  amend  the  first  paragraph,  by  inserting,  in  line 
4,  after  the  word  "independent,"  the  following: 

And  that  the  government  of  the  United  States  hereby  recog 
nize  the  Republic  of  Cuba  as  the  true  and  lawful  government  of 
that  island. 

On  the  presentation  of  the  resolutions  to  the  Senate 
a  very  earnest  and  very  able  debate  ensued,  which 

39 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

turned  almost  entirely  upon  the  question  of  recognizing 
the  insurgent  government,  and  scarcely  touched  at  all 
the  second  resolution,  which  was  the  one  really  effect 
ive  and  essential  portion  of  the  measure,  which  meant 
war,  and  could  mean  nothing  else.  The  discussion 
lasted  until  Saturday  evening,  and  then  the  Senate, 
with  only  one  absentee,  voted  in  the  presence  of 
crowded  galleries  and  in  the  midst  of  intense  excite 
ment.  The  amendment  of  the  minority  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of 
51  to  37,  thirty-three  Republicans  and  four  Democrats 
constituting  the  minority,  and  ten  Republicans  voting 
with  the  Democrats  and  the  Populists  in  the  majority. 
The  amendment  of  Senator  Teller  of  Colorado,  dis 
claiming  any  intention  of  seeking  sovereignty  or  do 
minion  over  Cuba,  was  accepted  by  the  committee  and 
agreed  to  without  division.  All  other  amendments 
were  voted  down,  a  few  short  speeches  were  made, 
chiefly  by  those  opposed  to  the  resolutions,  the  Senate 
resolutions  were  substituted  for  those  of  the  House,  and 
then  the  resolutions  as  amended  were  passed  by  a  vote 
of  67  to  21,  nineteen  Republicans  and  two  Democrats 
forming  the  minority,  and  twenty-four  Republicans 
voting  with  the  Democrats  and  Populists  in  the  major 
ity.  The  resolutions  were  then  sent  to  the  House  with 
out  a  request  for  a  conference,  and  the  Senate  ad 
journed  until  Monday. 

The  Sunday  which  intervened  was  a  day  of  rumors 
and  excitement.  There  was  a  well-founded  appre 
hension  that  enough  Republicans  would  break  away 
and  unite  with  the  Democrats  to  carry  concurrence 
in  the  Senate  resolutions  as  they  stood,  including  the 

40 


Whose   report   of  his  observations  of  the  results  of  Spanish  rule  i; 
profoundly  influenced  pul)iic  feeling  in  America 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

recognition  of  the  Cuban  Republic.  To  prevent  this 
the  Republican  leaders  of  the  House  put  forth  all  their 
power,  and  made  every  exertion,  with  entire  success, 
as  the  event  proved,  so  far  as  recognition  was  con 
cerned.  When  the  House  met  on  Monday,  Mr.  Ding- 
ley  of  Maine  moved  to  concur  in  the  Senate  resolu 
tions,  with  an  amendment  striking  out  the  words  "are 
and"  in  the  first  resolution,  and  the  entire  clause  em 
bodying  the  recognition  of  the  insurgent  government. 
This  motion  prevailed  by  a  majority  of  22.  Thus  did 
it  come  about  that  in  the  struggle  over  the  question 
of  recognition,  forced  into  the  resolutions  by  the  ac 
tion  of  the  ten  radical  Republican  Senators,  every 
thing  else  had  been  lost  sight  of,  and  in  "everything 
else"  was  the  one  essential,  vital  resolution  which  de 
manded  the  withdrawal  of  Spain  from  Cuba.  This 
second  resolution  was  the  effective  one,  for  it  meant 
war,  and  to  this  the  leaders  of  the  House,  in  their 
eagerness  to  defeat  recognition  of  the  republic,  had 
been  forced  to  agree,  and  the  House  accepted  it  with 
out  debate.  With  the  two  Houses  agreed  on  this  reso 
lution,  the  real  issue  was  settled,  but  much  remained 
to  be  done  in  order  to  end  the  controversy  under  which 
had  been  carried  the  one  absolutely  vital  clause  in  the 
entire  measure. 

So  the  amended  resolutions  came  back  to  the  Senate, 
the  crowd  rushed  over  from  the  House,  pouring  into 
the  deserted  galleries,  there  was  a  short  debate,  and  then 
the  motion  of  Senator  Davis  to  concur  was  voted  down 
by  46  to  32,  and  the  resolutions  went  back  to  the  House 
with  the  Senate's  insistence  and  without  a  request  for 
a  conference.  The  excited  crowds  of  onlookers  swept 

41 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

over  to  the  House,  the  resolutions  were  at  once  taken 
up,  and  the  House,  by  a  majority  of  26,  voted  to  insist 
on  its  amendments,  and  asked  for  a  committee  of  con 
ference.  Again  the  crowds  passed  from  the  House  to 
the  Senate,  and  the  resolutions  were  once  more  taken 
up.  There  was  another  debate,  the  ten  dissenting  Re 
publicans  announced  that  they  would  no  longer  insist 
upon  recognition  of  the  Cuban  Republic,  a  conference 
was  agreed  to,  and  both  Houses  took  a  recess  until 
eight  o'clock. 

It  was  generally  understood  that  on  the  Senate's  re 
ceding  from  its  position  in  regard  to  recognition  the 
House  would  recede  from  its  first  amendment  striking 
out  the  words  "are  and,"  and  personal  assurances 
were  said  to  have  been  given  to  that  effect.  When 
Senators  and  members  returned  to  the  Capitol,  there 
fore,  they  expected  an  agreement  to  be  reported  from 
the  conference,  an  immediate  acceptance  of  the  report, 
and  an  adjournment  in  a  few  minutes.  To  every  one's 
surprise,  and  to  the  great  indignation  of  the  Senate, 
a  disagreement  was  reported  from  the  committee,  be 
cause  the  House  refused  to  recede  on  its  amendment 
to  the  first  line  striking  out  the  words  "are  and."  The 
point  was  not  worth  a  contest  on  either  side,  for  the 
whole  phrase  was  purely  rhetorical.  It  was  rhetoric 
when  Richard  Henry  Lee  first  read  it  to  the  Conti 
nental  Congress,  it  was  rhetoric  still,  hallowed  by  time 
and  association,  when  applied  to  Cuba.  At  the  most 
it  was  merely  a  declaration  of  intention,  which  it  was 
proposed  to  make  good  by  converting  the  intention 
into  a  fact.  But  personal  feelings  had  been  aroused, 
and  now  began  to  run  high.  The  Senate,  justly  or  un- 

42 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 

justly,  believed  that  it  had  been  unfairly  dealt  with, 
while  the  House  felt  that  the  Senate  was  unreasonable. 
In  this  mood  the  House,  by  a  majority  of  32,  voted  to 
insist  and  asked  for  a  further  conference,  which  was 
agreed  to  by  the  Senate.  Again  the  conferees  with 
drew  and  the  two  Houses  waited.  The  hours  wore 
drearily  away,  and  rumors  came  thickly  that  there 
would  be  another  disagreement  and  a  deadlock.  Sen 
ator  Morgan  of  Alabama  sent  a  plain  declaration  of 
wrar  up  to  the  desk,  and  announced  that  at  the  proper 
time  he  would  call  it  up.  The  hint  was  not  without 
its  effect.  Senators  hostile  to  Cuba  crossed  the  Capitol 
and  urged  upon  the  Speaker  that  the  House  should 
give  way.  At  this  juncture  the  House  conferees  asked 
to  withdraw  from  the  conference  and  hold  a  consulta 
tion  apart.  They  then  saw  the  Speaker,  returned,  and 
receded  on  the  words  "are  and."  After  this  an  agree 
ment  was  immediately  reached,  and  reported  to  both 
Houses.  Midnight  had  passed  and  a  new  day*  begun. 
It  was  the  iQth  of  April,  a  date  very  memorable  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States,  when  the  Senate,  by  a 
vote  of  42  to  35,  and  the  House,  by  a  vote  of  31 1  to  6, 
accepted  the  conference  report.  The  resolutions  as 
finally  agreed  upon  were  precisely  word  for  word  those 
reported  by  the  majority  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  with  the  single  addition  of  Senator 
Teller's  amendment,  which  the  committee  had  accepted. 
The  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  gone  clear  of 
all  pitfalls,  and  had  declared  just  what  the  American 
people  meant  it  to  declare,  that  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba 


*The  legislative  day  was  still  the  i8th  of  April. 
43 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

must  cease.     In  fact,  if  not  in  terms,  it  was  a  declara 
tion  of  war. 

The  resolutions  thus  adopted  went  at  once  to  the 
President,  who  held  them  over  one  day  and  then  signed 
them.  He  sent  a  copy,  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
2ist,  to  the  Spanish  minister,  Senor  Polo  y  Bernabe, 
who  thereupon  asked  for  his  passports  and  left  the 
country.  Before  this,  the  resolutions  had  been  cabled  to 
our  minister  at  Madrid,  but  the  despatch  was  there 
held  back  long  enough  to  enable  the  Spanish  ministry 
to  send  General  Woodford  his  passports  before  he 
could  present  the  resolutions,  a  feat  which  called  forth 
much  admiration  on  the  Continent  among  those  who 
love  diplomatic  futilities,  but  which  was  as  silly  as 
shams  usually  are  in  the  presence  of  realities.  For  the 
reality  was  war,  and  the  precise  manner  in  which  it 
was  brought  into  existence  was  of  trifling  consequence 
except  to  the  arid  diplomatic  mind  of  Europe. 

As  soon  as  Spain  severed  her  relations  with  the 
United  States,  on  April  21,  the  American  fleet,  under 
the  command  of  Admiral  Sampson,  was  ordered  to 
Havana,  and  the  President  proclaimed  a  blockade  of 
that  and  certain  other  Cuban  ports.  On  April  23,  the 
guns  of  the  Nashville  cracked  across  the  bows  of  the 
Buena  Ventura,  a  Spanish  merchantman;  and  Con 
gress,  on  April  25,  formally  declared  that  war  with  the 
kingdom  of  Spain  had  existed  since  April  21.  The 
pretences  were  over,  the  wrong  which  had  lived  on  for 
three-quarters  of  a  century  was  now  to  be  redressed, 
the  restless  unsettled  question  was  to  get  its  true  and 
right  answer  at  last. 

44 


CHAPTER  III 
MANILA 

FERNAO  DA  MAGALHAENS,  or  Magalhaes,  was  a  boy 
when  the  discovery  of  Columbus  fired  the  imagination 
of  western  Europe,  but  he  was  also  one  of  those  whose 
adventurous  spirit  was  kindled  and  roused  by  this  won 
der  tale  of  new  lands  beyond  the  Atlantic.  He  was  still 
young  when,  in  1505,  he  made  one  in  an  expedition 
from  Portugal,  his  native  land,  which,  coming  from  the 
West,  discovered  some  of  the  famous  Spice  Islands. 
Not  long  after,  wounded  by  an  insult  from  the  Portu 
guese  government,  which  impugned  his  honor  as  a  man 
and  a  soldier,  he  left  his  country,  solemnly  and  publicly 
renounced  his  allegiance  to  Portugal,  was  naturalized 
as  a  Spaniard,  and  took  service  with  Charles  V,  who 
had  the  instinct  of  greatness  in  picking  out  able  and  ef 
fective  men  to  do  his  work.  Magellan,  as  we  call  him, 
was  imbued  with  the  Columbian  ideas,  and  also  held 
that,  despite  the  Columbian  discoveries,  a  short  route 
by  water  to  the  East  could  be  found  by  sailing  west 
ward.  It  was  a  great  conception,  and  a  true  one,  ex 
cept  that  the  route  was  longer  than  that  round  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope.  With  an  expedition  splendidly 
equipped  by  the  Emperor,  Magellan  set  sail  on  August 
TO.  1519.  He  crossed  the  Atlantic,  touched  at  the  bay 
of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  made  his  way  southward,  repressed 

45 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

savagely  a  dangerous  mutiny,  and  on  October  21  en 
tered  the  strait  which  bears  his  name.  On  November 
28  he  passed  out  of  it  with  only  three  of  his  five  vessels 
left,  and  found  himself  and  his  rejoicing  crews  in  the 
Pacific.  He  felt  that  he  had  succeeded,  but  he  had  mis 
calculated  the  vast  extent  of  the  new  ocean ;  and  sailing 
on  for  days  and  days,  in  some  fashion  missed  the  count 
less  islands  of  the  Pacific,  and  did  not  see  land  until  he  * 
reached  the  little  group  which  he  called  the  Ladrones, 
because  the  inhabitants  stole  a  boat  from  him.  There 
he  lingered  a  short  time,  either  at  Rota  or  in  the  cu 
rious  harbor  of  Guahan,  destined,  nearly  four  hundred 
years  later,  to  receive  the  war-ships  of  a  nation  of 
whose  future  existence  even  those  old  believers  in  El 
Dorado  never  dreamed.  From  the  Ladrones,  which 
were  discovered  March  6,  1521,  the  weary  voyage  was 
continued  until  a  new  archipelago  was  reached,  on  the 
fifth  Sunday  in  Lent.  Gradually  the  magnitude  of  this 
new  discovery  became  apparent,  and  Magellan  named 
the  new  group  in  honor  of  St.  Lazarus,  on  whose  day 
it  was  discovered.  They  landed  on  Mindanao,  made 
their  way  to  Cebu,  flattered  themselves  that  they  had 
converted  and  subdued  the  inhabitants,  and  then  be 
coming  involved  in  a  tribal  war,  Magellan  was  killed, 
and  his  chosen  successor,  Serrano,  was  left  behind  to 
death  and  torture.  Two  ships  escaped,  one  going  east, 
and  one,  the  Victoria,  under  Elcano,  which  left  Timor 
on  February  1 1,  sailing  still  to  the  westward.  On  Sep 
tember  6,  1522,  after  many  hardships  and  perils,  the 
Victoria  reached  Spain,  and  a  great  voyage,  the  first 
which  circled  the  globe,  second  only  to  that  of  Colum 
bus  in  conception,  and  beyond  all  in  the  daring 

46' 


MANILA 

displayed  and  the  distance  traversed,  came  to  an 
end. 

Thus  was  a  new  possession  added  to  the  dominion  of 
Spain;  yet,  although  her  navigators  discovered  it,  a 
fraud  finally  made  it  hers.  By  the  treaty  of  1494,  as 
afterwards  expounded,  all  the  world  beyond  the  merid 
ian  i, 080  miles  west  of  the  Azores  was  divided  be 
tween  Spain  and  Portugal,  the  eastern  half  going  to 
Spain.  The  Spaniards,  however,  made  the  maps,  and 
putting  Magellan's  discovery  twenty-five  degrees  east 
of  its  true  position,  brought  it  within  the  Spanish  half, 
when  it  really  belonged  to  the  portion  allotted  to  Por 
tugal.  Twenty  years  later  Villalobos,  sailing  from 
South  America,  visited  the  islands  of  Magellan,  and 
named  them  the  Philippines,  in  honor  of  the  Prince  of 
Asturias,  afterwards  Philip  II.  Again  twenty  years 
passed,  and  in  1565  a  great  expedition  went  from  Mex 
ico,  and  Spanish  rule  was  established  by  Legaspi  in  the 
Philippines — first  in  Cebu,  and  later  in  Luzon — which 
was  destined  to  continue  unbroken  for  more  than  three 
hundred  years. 

Even  in  its  last  stage  of  decay,  an  empire  which  had 
once  thus  arrogated  to  itself  the  possession  of  half  the 
world  outside  Europe  still  showed  traces  of  its  former 
grandeur  in  scattered  fragments  lying  far  apart  on 
either  side  of  the  globe.  When  war  came,  and  the 
Lhiited  States  looked  out  to  see  where  to  strike  its  foe, 
it  found  Spain  present  not  only  at  its  own  doors,  but 
far  away  across  the  Pacific,  and  there  in  the  distant 
East  the  first  blow  fell. 

The  Navy  Department,  with  watchful  prevision,  as 
the  relations  with  Spain  grew  more  strained,  began  to 

47 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

send  out  orders  which  would  make  all  ready  in  case  of 
war.  Even  in  January  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
European  squadron  was  ordered  to  retain  all  men 
whose  enlistments  had  expired ;  the  Helena  was  stopped 
at  Funchal,  the  Wilmington  in  the  West  Indies,  and  at 
the  end  of  the  month  orders  were  sent  to  assemble  the 
European  squadron  at  Lisbon.  A  month  later  orders 
went  to  all  the  squadrons  to  fill  their  bunkers  with  coal, 
and  to  be  ready  to  move  on  the  click  of  the  wire.  As 
early  as  January  27  the  Asiatic  squadron  also  had  been 
directed  to  retain  all  men  whose  enlistments  had  ex 
pired,  and  on  February  25  a  cable  message  was  sent  to 
Commodore  Dewey  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  directing  him  to 
assemble  his  squadron  at  Kong-kong,  retain  the  Olym- 
pia,  which  had  been  ordered  back  to  San  Francisco,  and 
be  prepared  in  case  of  war  for  offensive  operations  in 
/  the  Philippines.  On  the  3d  of  March  the  Mohican  was 
sent  with  ammunition  to  Honolulu,  there  to  await  the 
Baltimore,  which  was  to  take  the  ammunition  on  board 
and  proceed  at  once  to  join  the  Asiatic  squadron.  No 
wiser  or  more  far-sighted  precautions  were  ever  taken 
by  an  administration  than  these,  and  it  was  all  done  so 
quietly  that  no  one  on  the  outside  knew  what  was  hap 
pening.  While  the  country  was  stirring  to  its  depths 
with  the  events  which  were  fast  bringing  our  relations 
with  Spain  to  the  breaking  point,  while  the  air  was 
filled  with  rumors  and  debates  and  the  strife  of  con 
tending  forces,  the  Baltimore  was  speeding  across  the 
Pacific  carrying  ammunition  to  the  Asiatic  squadron, 
and  Commodore  Dewey  was  preparing  very  carefully 
and  accurately  for  certain  work  which  he  saw  before 
him.  The  order  directing  the  Asiatic  squadron  to  as- 


MANILA 

semble  at  Hong-kong  had  gone  on  February  25,  and  on 
the  following  day  another  went  telling  the  commodore 
to  fill  all  the  bunkers  with  the  best  coal  to  be  had.  By 
March  28  the  squadron  had  assembled,  and  then  came 
a  period  of  waiting.  Very  dreary  and  very  hot  this 
waiting  was,  long  drawn  by  constant  strain  and  listen 
ing.  With  much  anxiety,  and  always  on  the  alert  all 
through  the  trying  time  of  suspense,  the  commodore 
was  constantly  making  ready.  First  he  sent  the  fleet 
paymaster  over  to  the  consignees  of  the  English  steam 
ship  Nanshan  and  bought  her  as  she  was,  with  3,300 
tons  of  good  Cardiff  coal  on  board.  Then  he  bought  the 
Zafiro,  a  steamship  of  the  Manila-Hong-kong  line, 
just  as  she  was,  with  all  her  fuel  and  provisions,  and  on 
her  was  placed  all  the  spare  ammunition,  so  that  she 
became  the  magazine  of  the  fleet.  On  April  18  the 
McCulloch  came  in  and  joined  the  squadron.  She  was 
only  a  revenue  cutter,  it  is  true,  but  she  was  as  good  as 
a  gunboat,  being  built  of  steel,  having  1,500  tons  dis 
placement,  and  carrying  four  4-inch  guns  and  a  crew 
of  130  men  all  ready  to  fight.  The  news  coming  now 
from  the  United  States  was  fast  removing  every  doubt 
as  to  the  future,  and  on  the  igth  of  April,  the  day  of 
Concord,  when  the  two  Houses  were  passing  the  war 
resolution,  the  American  sailors  in  Hong-kong  went 
over  the  sides  with  their  paint  brushes,  and  in  a  feu- 
hours  the  white  was  gone,  and  the  ships  looked  leaden 
and  sombre  in  the  dull  dark  drab  of  the  war-paint.  On 
the  2 ist,  when  General  Woodford  was  leaving  Madrid 
and  Senor  Polo  was  slipping  out  of  Washington,  the 
Baltimore  appeared,  a  powerful  addition  to  the  fleet, 
and  bringing  also  her  load  of  ammunition  so  that  she 
4  49 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

was  doubly  welcome.  Hardly  had  the  new-comer  found 
time  to  put  on  her  war-paint  when  news  came  of  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  then  of  the  English  proclama 
tion  of  neutrality.  This  compelled  a  departure  from 
Hong-kong  on  April  25  to  the  Chinese  harbor  of  Mirs 
bay,  a  few  miles  to  the  north ;  but  there  was  not  to  be 
much  more  of  the  dreary  waiting  at  this  new  anchor 
age.  On  the  following  day  the  McCulloch,  left  behind 
at  Hong-kong,  came  rushing  up  the  bay  bringing  a 
despatch  dated  at  Washington,  April  24,  and  worth 
reading  just  as  it  was  written,  for  it  opened  a  new  page 
in  history,  and  has  become  famous  from  its  results — 

Dewey,  Asiatic  Squadron: 

War  has  commenced  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  Pro 
ceed  at  once  to  Philippine  Islands.  Commence  operations  at  once, 
particularly  against  the  Spanish  fleet.  You  must  capture  vessels 
or  destroy.  Use  utmost  endeavors.  LONG. 

It  is  a  great  thing  to  be  ready  and  to  be  without 
doubts,  and  Commodore  Dewey  was  both.  Before 
the  day  closed  the  captains  had  all  been  called  to  consul 
tation  on  the  flag-ship,  and  at  two  o'clock  on  April  27 
the  sailing-pennant  went  up,  and  the  fleet  steamed  out 
of  Mirs  bay  and  steered  southward  across  the  620 
miles  of  one  of  the  roughest  seas  in  the  world  which  lay 
between  them  and  the  Philippines.  On  the  morning 
of  April  30  the  fleet  was  off  Bolinao  bay,  and  looked 
in  carefully.  Nothing  there.  Then  came  Subig  bay. 
More  care  here,  for  the  last  report  from  Manila — a 
report  that  had  flown  on  the  cables  all  over  the  world 
— was  that  the  Spanish  admiral  had  brought  his  fleet 
to  Subig  bay,  and  meant  to  give  battle  there.  The 
Boston  and  Concord  went  ahead  as  scouts  and  exam- 


MANILA 

ined  the  harbor.  No  enemy  here  either.  Only  two 
little  fishing-boats,  from  which  not  even  information 
could  be  obtained.  Quite  clear  now  that  the  Spaniards 
had  determined  to  make  their  stand  at  the  gates  of 
their  capital,  and  thither  the  fleet  must  go.  So,  on  Sat 
urday  afternoon,  April  30,  the  fleet  started  slowly 
along  the  thirty  miles  which  lay  between  it  and  Manila. 
The  tropical  sun  sank  red  across  the  land,  and  the 
great  yellow  moon  rose,  on  the  other  hand,  out  of  the 
sea  to  light  them  on  their  way. 

Let  us  look  at  the  squadron  for  a  moment  as  it  forges 
onward  past  the  Luzon  coast.  There  are  nine  ships  in 
all,  of  which  two  the  Nanshan,  a  collier,  and  the  Za- 
firo,  a  supply-ship,  are  non-combatants.  Then  there 
is  the  McCnlloch,  a  revenue-cutter,  but,  as  has  been 
said,  well  enough  built  and  armed  to  pass  as  a  gunboat. 
Next  is  the  Petrel,  a  true  gunboat,  but  very  small,  only 
892  tons,  and  carrying  four  4-inch  and  four  small  ma 
chine  guns.  The  Concord,  also  a  steel  gunboat,  but 
with  a  displacement  of  1,7 10  tons,  carries  six  6-inch 
guns,  and  a  secondary  battery  of  eleven  machine-guns, 
and  has  her  deck  and  conning-tower  protected.  The 
next  step  is  a  marked  advance  in  power,  and  brings  us 
to  the  Raleigh,  a  second-rate  steel  cruiser  of  3,213  tons. 
Her  armament  consists  of  one  rapid-fire  6-inch,  and  ten 
rapid-fire  5-inch  guns,  with  a  secondary  battery  of  eight 
6-pounclers,  four  i -pounders,  and  two  On tl ings.  Her 
deck  and  conning-tower  are  protected  with  armor;  she 
has  a  cellulose  belt  and  steel  sponsons.  The  Boston  is 
another  cruiser  of  the  second  rate,  of  3,000  tons,  a  par 
tially  protected  deck,  two  8-inch,  and  six  slow-fire 
6-inch  guns,  two  6-ponnders,  two  3-pound,  two 

5* 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

I -pound  rapid-lire,  and  four  machine  guns.  The  Bal 
timore  is  a  third  steel  cruiser  of  the  second  rate,  with 
a  displacement  of  4,413  tons,  and  a  protection  of  steel 
deck-plates  and  shields  for  all  the  guns  and  conning- 
tower.  Her  armament  is  heavy,  and  consists  of  four 
8-inch  and  six  6-inch  guns,  with  two  6,  two  3,  and  two 
i  pounders,  all  rapid-fire,  and  six  machine  guns.  Last 
in  the  list  comes  the  Olympia,  the  flag-ship,  a  first-class 
steel  cruiser  of  5,870  tons,  protected  by  steel  deck- 
plates,  steel-covered  barbettes,  gun-shields,  and  con- 
ning-tower,  and  a  cellulose  belt  thirty-three  inches  thick 
and  eight  feet  broad.  Her  main  battery  is  composed 
of  four  8-inch  guns,  her  secondary  battery  of  ten  quick- 
fire  fives,  and  in  addition  fourteen  6-pounders,  six 
I -pounders,  all  rapid-fire,  and  four  Gatlings. 

The  speed  of  the  ships  varied  from  21.5  knots  for 
the  Olympia,  to  13.7  knots  for  the  Petrel,  the  latter, 
or  less,  being  of  course  the  highest  speed  of  the  fleet. 
Speed,  however,  played  no  part  in  the  action,  and  need 
not,  therefore,  be  considered.  From  this  summary  it 
will  be  observed  that  although  the  American  ships  were 
all  modern,  and  armed,  as  a  rule,  with  the  best  modern 
guns,  there  was  not  a  single  armor-clad  among  them. 
They  were  all  practically  unarmored,  and  they  were  go 
ing  through  channels  which  were  said  to  be  filled  with 
torpedoes,  to  encounter,  so  far  as  they  knew,  a  more 
numerous  fleet,  composed  of  old  ships,  it  is  true,  but 
armed  with  modern  guns,  and  backed,  as  was  under 
stood,  by  forts  mounted  with  the  finest  and  heaviest 
modern  rifles.  The  prospect  was  serious,  and  it  was 
faced  by  officers  and  men  alike  with  quiet  confidence. 
The  night  was  still,  and  the  fleet,  as  it  drew  near  to  Ma- 

52 


MANILA 

nila,  waited  until  the  moon  set,  and  then  rounding  the 
last  point,  saw  the  entrance  to  the  great  bay,  which 
runs  nearly  thirty  miles  into  the  land,  open  before  it. 
A  very  splendid  bay  indeed  it  is — one  of  the  finest  har 
bors,  and  one  of  the  greatest  of  roadsteads ;  as  a  har 
bor,  in  fact,  one  of  the  prizes  of  the  world,  quite  unde 
veloped,  because  it  has  been  in  feeble,  incompetent,  and 
corrupt  hands  ever  since  it  was  taken  from  its  original 
owners.  Twenty-six  miles  from  the  mouth  is  Manila. 
Some  250,000  people  there,  the  vague  Spanish  statistics 
tell  us.  It  is  an  interesting  town,  low-lying,  and  called 
the  Venice  of  the  East,  because  rivers  intersect  it.  There 
is  a  new  and  also  an  old  town,  the  latter  beautifully 
walled  in  the  manner  of  three  hundred  years  ago,  with 
moats,  drawbridges,  and  portcullises,  altogether  very 
picturesque,  and  worthy  of  preservation.  Ten  miles 
nearer  the  bay's  mouth,  and  on  the  same  side,  lies  Ca- 
vite,  a  suburb  of  Manila,  with  some  5,000  people,  a 
navy-yard,  arsenal,  and  fortifications.  At  the  entrance 
of  the  harbor  lie  two  islands  pretty  well  in  the  middle 
— one  large,  over  600  feet  high,  called  Corregidor,  one 
small,  but  over  400  feet  in  height.  Between  the  islands 
is  a  narrow  channel  with  eight  fathoms  of  water  at 
the  narrowest  part.  Between  Caballo  and  the  little  is 
land  of  El  Eraile  three  miles  width  of  channel  with 
eighteen  fathoms  of  water,  and  known  as  the  Boca 
Grande.  On  the  other  side,  between  Corregidor  and 
San  lose  point,  a  channel  known  as  the  Boca  Chica, 
two  miles  wide  and  of  ample  depth.  Taken  together, 
they  are  very  fit  and  stately  entrances  to  the  great  bay 
beyond.  There  are  forts  on  Corregidor  and  Caballo, 
as  well  as  light-houses,  and  batteries  also  on  El  Fraile, 

53 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

which  lies  to  the  southward.  More  forts  are  on  Lim- 
bones  and  San  Jose  points,  heavily  armed  with  the  best 
Krupp  guns,  according  to  the  information  brought  to 
Hong-kong.  Nevertheless,  they  all  were  to  be  passed, 
and  as  the  ships  headed  for  the  bay  they  saw  the  great 
light,  the  guardian  of  peaceful  commerce,  burning- 
bright  upon  Gorregidor.  There  was  no  light  on  the 
ships,  but  the  throb  of  the  engines  shook  the  still  air 
as  they  entered  the  Boca  Grande,  expecting  each  mo 
ment  a  shot  from  the  batteries.  On  they  went,  well  into 
the  channel  now,  and  still  no  sign  of  life  from  the  shore. 
The  war-ships  had  all  passed,  when  some  enthusiast  on 
the  McCulloch  flung  coals  upon  the  fires,  there  was  a 
rush  of  sparks  and  black  smoke  from  her  funnel,  and 
the  Spaniards  waked  up.  A  shot  from  the  south  side 
of  the  channel  broke  the  stillness,  and  then  two  more, 
the  shells  dropping  into  the  water.  The  reply  came 
from  the  Concord,  and  one  of  her  4-inch  shells  struck 
the  fort  with  a  crash,  followed  by  a  cry  in  the  darkness. 
A  shot  from  the  El  Fraile  batteries  was  answered  by 
the  Raleigh.  Then  an  8-inch  gun  boomed  out  from  the 
Boston,  and  the  McCulloch  snapped  away  with  her 
4-pounders;  there  was  more  firing  from  the  batteries, 
and  then  the  islands  and  the  mainland  relapsed  into 
profound  quiet,  and  it  was  all  as  if  nothing  had  hap 
pened.  The  American  fleet  had  passed  the  dreaded 
forts  at  the  entrance,  and  was  in  the  bay  of  Manila. 
On  glided  the  ships,  ever  more  slowly  and  quietly, 
until  it  seemed  as  if  they  hardly  moved  at  all,  and  then 
with  the  sudden  dawn  of  the  tropics  came  day,  and 
there  ahead  lay  the  Spanish  fleet,  close  under  the  forts 
and  batteries  of  Cavite.  The  moment  had  come. 

54 


RECK    UF    THE    CRUISER    I  SLA  Dl:. 


MANILA 

It  came,  fortunately,  to  a  man  who  knew  exactly 
what  he  meant  to  do — a  most  victorious  quality,  and 
one  all  too  rare  in  a  world  given  overmuch  to  uncer 
tainty  and  stumbling.  Commodore  Dewey  had  his  plan 
thoroughly  laid  out,  and  now  proceeded  to  carry  it  into 
execution.  Making  a  wide  detour  to  the  east  to  drop 
the  supply-ships  out  of  range,  the  fleet  swept  slowly 
along.  As  it  passed,  the  batteries  and  ships  at  Cavite 
opened  fire,  the  sharp  crack  of  the  modern  rifle  min 
gling  with  the  heavier  roar  of  the  older  guns.  The 
American  fleet  made  no  answer. 

As  the  ships  turned  and  passed  in  front  of  Manila 
the  sight-seers  on  the  walls  and  the  cathedral  towers 
could  be  seen  with  a  glass,  and  the  guns  of  the  Luneta 
flung  some  heavy  shells  far  out  and  wide  of  the  ships, 
and  a  steady  and  useless  fire  continued  from  these  bat 
teries  throughout  the  engagement.  The  Concord  re 
plied,  and  up  wrent  the  signal  on  the  flag-ship,  "Hold 
your  fire  until  close  in."  So  the  fleet  moved  silently 
and  steadily  down  toward  Cavite.  Suddenly,  just 
ahead  of  the  flag-ship,  there  came  a  quivering  shock, 
and  a  great  column  of  water  leaped  into  the  air;  an 
other  quiver  and  another  burst  of  mud  and  wrater  fol 
lowed,  again  too  far  away  for  harm.  The  dreaded 
mines  \vere  really  there,  then,  and  the  fleet  was  upon 
them ;  but  no  ship  swerved,  no  man  stirred,  and,  as 
sometimes  happens,  the  brave  were  favored,  and  this 
was  the  last  of  the  Spanish  torpedoes.  If  there  were 
others,  they  failed  to  explode,  and  those  which  had  ex 
ploded  failed  to  check  the  American  ships  for  an  in 
stant.  On  they  went,  still  silently,  holding  their  fire, 
the  Spanish  batteries  and  ships  now  beginning  to  pour 

55 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

out  shot  and  shell  as  their  enemy  drew  near.  Closer 
and  closer  they  came,  until  at  last  the  distance  was  but 
little  over  five  thousand  yards.  "If  you  are  ready, 
Gridley,  you  may  fire,"  said  the  commodore  to  the 
captain  of  the  Olympia.  It  seemed  that  the  captain 
was  ready.  The  port  8-inch  gun  of  the  forward  turret 
rang  out,  and  the  great  shell  sped  over  the  water  to  the 
Spanish  flag-ship.  Up  went  the  signal  "Fire  as  con 
venient,"  and  the  ships  behind  the  Olympia  opened  at 
once.  The  Spaniards  were  not  behindhand.  From 
ships  and  forts  there  was  a  continuous  roar,  and  the 
shells  began  to  strike  all  about  the  American  squadron. 
One  burst  so  near  the  Olympia  that  its  fragments  cut 
the  rigging,  ploughed  a  furrow  in  the  deck,  and  tore 
the  bridge  where  the  commodore  stood.  Still,  none 
were  hit,  and  on  the  order  to  "Open  with  all  the  guns," 
the  American  ships  poured  forth  a  fire  which  in  volume, 
rapidity,  and  accuracy  could  not  have  been  surpassed. 
Back  they  came  from  the  second  round,  within  four 
thousand  yards  this  time,  pouring  in  the  same  volume 
of  concentrated  fire  from  the  starboard  as  before  from 
the  port  batteries.  The  Boston  and  Baltimore  were 
both  hit,  but  not  materially  injured,  and  again  they 
swung  round  in  front  of  Manila,  and  again,  nearer 
than  before,  steamed  steadily  down  toward  Cavite.  On 
each  turn  they  drew, nearer  to  the  Spanish  fleet,  and 
the  heavy,  well-aimed  American  broadsides  became 
more  and  more  deadly.  The  Spaniards  were  suffering 
severely,  and  at  seven  o'clock  the  flag-ship,  Reina  Cris- 
tina,  left  her  moorings  and  steamed  bravely  out,  di 
recting  her  course  toward  the  Olympia.  What  the  pur 
pose  of  the  Spanish  admiral  may  have  been  no  one 

56 


WEST    UATTEKV,  CAY1TK,  Al-TKK    I  )i;s  11U  C  1  K  ).\ 


MANILA 

knows,  but  word  was  at  once  passed  to  concentrate  all 
fire  on  his  advancing  flag-ship.  As  she  drew  nearer, 
the  storm  of  the  American  fire  thickened  about  her. 
Her  sides  were  torn,  her  bridge  shot  away;  she  could 
not  stand  the  awful  battering,  and  turned  about  to  re 
turn  to  her  anchorage.  As  she  swung  round,  an  8-inch 
gun  of  the  Olympia  sent  a  shell  which  struck  her  oppo 
nent  squarely  in  the  stern.  The  great  projectile  raked 
the  Rcina  Crist  ina,  tore  up  her  decks,  and  exploded  her 
after  boiler,  so  that  she  could  barely  reel  back  to  the 
shelter  of  the  forts,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the 
crew  dead  and  ninety  wounded  on  board.  While  the 
flag-ship  was  thus  engaged,  two  gunboats  equipped  as 
torpedo-boats  slipped  out  from  Cavite,  one  making  for 
the  supply-ships.  The  Petrel  rushed  after  the  latter, 
opened  with  the  4-pounders,  drove  her  ashore,  and  then 
blew  her  to  pieces  with  her  rapid-fire  guns,  which  was 
the  end  of  the  first  Spanish  torpedo-boat.  The  second 
headed  for  the  Olyuifia,  kept  on  despite  the  fire  of  the 
secondary  battery,  and  be^an  to  get  ominously  near, 
men  thought,  but  coming  under  the  fierce  storm  of  the 
machine-guns  in  the  tops,  turned  to  fly.  So  her  end 
came.  A  well-directed  shell  struck  her  fairly  inside 
the  stern  railing.  There  was  an  explosion,  the  gunboat 
seemed  to  break  in  the  middle,  and  down  she  went. 
Meantime  the  Baltimore  had  set  the  Castillo,  the  only 
wooden  ship  in  the  Spanish  squadron,  on  fire,  and  she 
was  soon  a  mass  of  flames. 

Five  times  in  all  did  the  American  ships  turn  and 
move  past  their  opponents,  each  time  closer,  and  each 
time  with  a  more  deadly  broadside.  There  had  been 
now  two  hours'  hot  work  under  the  rising  tropical  sun, 

57 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  at  a  quarter  before  eight  the  commodore,  errone 
ously  informed  that  ammunition  for  the  5-inch  guns 
was  running  short,  ran  up  the  signals  to  cease  firing  and 
follow  the  flag-ship,  so  that  he  might  consult  with  his 
captains,  and  if  needful  redistribute  the  ammunition. 
Something  quite  new  and  unheard-of,  this  stopping  in 
the  middle  of  a  great  naval  action  for  any  purpose.  It 
is  said  that  the  American  sailors,  before  they  under 
stood  the  meaning  of  it  all,  began  to  grumble  at  not  be 
ing  allowed  to  go  on  and  finish  up  their  task.  The  Span 
iards,  battered  as  they  were,  set  up  a  cheer  as  they  saw 
their  foe  withdraw  to  the  other  side  of  the  bay,  and 
sundry  telegrams  flew  over  the  cable  to  Madrid  saying 
that  the  Spanish  fire  had  "forced  the  American  ships  to 
manoeuvre"  (the  Spanish  version  of  the  skillful  evolu 
tions  w'hich  had  helped  so  much  the  American  fight 
ing),  and  that  the  enemy  had  now  retreated  to  land 
their  dead  and  wounded.  Very  characteristic  and  wor 
thy  of  note  these  messages  to  Spain — no  longer  able  to 
recognize  facts,  living  among  lies  and  delusions,  and 
quite  lost  to  that  veracity  of  mind  so  essential,  as  Car- 
lyle  has  pointed  out,  to  the  successful  existence  of  men 
and  nations.  The  evolutions  of  the  American  fleet  were 
all  planned  beforehand ;  there  were  no  dead  and  wound 
ed,  as  the  Americans  found,  not  a  little  to  their  own 
astonishment,  when  the  reports  were  made  after  this 
first  round,  and  although  several  of  the  ships  had  been 
hit,  no  injury  in  the  least  serious  had  been  done  to  any 
of  them.  Moreover,  Commodore  Dewey,  as  at  the 
start,  knew  just  what  he  meant  to  do.  The  Spanish 
fleet  could  not  possibly  escape.  It  had  been  disabled 
and  crippled  in  the  first  round,  but  it  still  held  the  har- 

58 


WRECK    OF    THE    FLAG-SHIP,    THE    CRL'ISER    A'/f/.Y./    tAV.V/A\./ 


MANILA 

bor,  and  the  land  batteries  remained  to  be  dealt  with. 
The  orders  were  to  "capture  or  destroy."  There  must 
be  none  left ;  none  must  escape  to  harass  future  opera 
tions,  or  to  try  to  cross  the  Pacific  and  alarm  and  per 
haps  attack  the  western  coast  of  the  United  States.  The 
work  demanded  could  be  most  surely  finished  and  made 
perfect  if  the  men  upon  whom  everything  depended 
were  kept  in  the  best  possible  condition.  So,  after  the 
withdrawal  to  the  other  side  of  the  bay,  there  was  a 
good  rest  for  all  the  crews,  a  hearty  breakfast  eaten 
quite  at  leisure,  a  cleaning  of  decks  and  turrets,  an  ex 
amination  of  all  the  guns,  a  fresh  supply  of  ammuni 
tion  brought  up,  and  then,  at  a  quarter  before  eleven, 
after  three  hours  thus  occupied,  up  went  the  signals, 
the  shrill  whistles  of  the  boatswains  rang  out,  and  off 
the  fleet  went  for  the  second  and  last  assault. 

This  time  the  work  was  to  be  more  direct.  Again 
the  fleet  swung  round  in  front  of  Manila,  and  again  it 
steamed  down  toward  Cavite,  the  Baltimore  in  the  lead. 
On  it  went,  and  first  one  Spanish  shell,  then  another, 
struck  the  Baltimore,  and  men  were  wounded  by  the 
splinters.  Still  silence  on  the  American  ship,  and  no 
reply  to  the  Spanish  fire  until  at  last  the  range  was  less 
than  three  thousand  yards.  Then  the  Baltimore  poured 
her  broadside  into  the  Rcina  Cristina,  whence  the  ad 
miral  had  transferred  his  flag  to  the  I  si  a  dc  Cuba,  and 
the  former  flag-ship,  fatally  wounded  in  the  duel  with 
the  Ol\inpia,  went  to  pieces  under  the  fierce  fire  of  her 
new  antagonist.  Her  magazines  blew  up,  and  she  sank. 
Then  the  Baltimore  turned  on  the  Don  Juan  dc  Austria, 
and  was  joined  by  the  Olympia  and  Raleigh.  While 
the  Spanish  ship  quivered  under  the  heavy  fire,  a  shell 

59 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

from  the  Raleigh  pierced  her  magazine  and  she  blew 
up,  tearing  off  also  the  upper  works  of  a  gunboat,  which 
was  then  destroyed  by  the  Petrel.  The  General  Lezo, 
another  gunboat,  was  driven  ashore  by  the  Concord 
and  burned,  the  Vclasco  went  down  before  the  Boston, 
the  burning  Castilla  was  scuttled,  and  the  Don  Antonio 
de  Ulloa,  the  last  ship  which  was  able  to  fight,  sank 
under  the  fire  of  the  Baltimore  with  her  flag  nailed  to 
the  mast.  Meantime  the  Petrel,  running  into  shoal 
water,  set  on  fire  and  destroyed  the  Marques  del  Duero, 
Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Isla  de  Cuba,  Isla  de  Luzon,  and 
General  Lezo.  Just  before  this,  Admiral  Montojo,  on 
his  new  flag-ship,  the  Isla  de  Cuba,  with  his  guns  si 
lenced  and  his  fleet  gone,  had  run  the  gunboat  ashore, 
hauled  down  his  flag,  left  his  vessel  to  its  fate,  and  es 
caped  to  Manila.  Thus  the  Spanish  fleet  was  complete 
ly  destroyed;  but  the  shore  batteries  continued  to  fire, 
and  one  after  another  of  them  had  to  be  silenced,  which 
was  done  as  fast  as  the  American  ships  could  close  in 
upon  them.  They  held  out  longest  at  Cavite,  but  a  last 
and  well-placed  shell  entered  the  arsenal  magazine,  a 
terrific  explosion  followed,  the  batteries  all  fell  silent, 
and  the  white  flag  went  up  on  the  citadel.  The  battle 
of  Manila  had  been  fought  and  won. 

The  next  day  die  fleet  went  into  Cavite,  and  a  land 
ing  party  destroyed  the  batteries.  On  May  3  the  forts 
on  Corregidor,  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  surren 
dered  to  the  Raleigh  and  Baltimore.  At  Cavite  there 
was  an  effort  to  pretend  that  no  white  flag  had  been 
run  up,  and  some  cheap  falsehood  was  indulged  in,  but 
facts  were  a  little  too  strong  even  for  Spaniards.  The 
Spanish  commander  ran  up  the  white  flag  again  before 

60 


WRECK    UK    'I III-:    CRllbER    /S/..-1   DJi  LL'ZOX 


MANILA 

eleven  o'clock,  and  departed  with  his  men,  whereupon 
the  American  marines  landed,  and  having  assured  the 
priests  and  nuns  that  they  were  not  going  to  massacre 
the  wounded  in  hospitals,  as  the  Spanish  had  stated, 
established  a  guard,  and  took  possession  of  the  arse 
nal  and  dock-yards  of  Cavite.  Commodore  Dewey, 
through  the  British  consul,  announced  the  blockade  of 
Manila;  and  as  the  Spaniards,  still  unable  to  recognize 
more  than  one  or  two  facts  at  a  time,  refused  to  let  him 
control  the  cable,  he  promptly  cut  it,  and  thus  held  the 
great  harbor  and  city  firmly  in  his  grasp,  stripped  of  all 
means  of  communication  with  the  outside  world  which 
he  did  not  allow. 

The  rapidity,  brilliancy,  and  completeness  of  the 
American  victory  at  Manila  riveted  the  attention  of 
the  world.  In  Europe,  where  hostility  to  the  United 
States  was  everywhere  felt  and  expressed,  the  news  was 
received  either  in  the  silence  which  is  sometimes  the 
sincerest  flattery,  or  with  surprised  expressions  of  won 
der  and  grudging  admiration.  England,  which  from 
the  beginning  manifested  a  genuine  and  cordial  friend 
ship,  praised  Dewey's  work  generously  and  freely.  Yet 
both  on  the  Continent  and  in  England,  after  the  first 
shock  had  passed,  critics  appeared  who  sneered  at  the 
battle,  called  it  a  butchery,  exaggerated  the  American 
force  and  diminished  that  of  Spain.  One  English  critic 
called  it  marvellously  easy,  and  a  well-known  English 
journal  said  Dewey  had  merely  destroyed  a  few  old 
wooden  ships.  The  last  allegation  was,  of  course, 
merely  a  wilful  falsehood,  for  there  was  only  one  wood 
en  ship,  the  Cost  ilia,  in  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  the  fact 
that  the  others  also  burned  proved  nothing,  for  all  Cer- 

61 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

vera's  ships,  the  very  latest  productions  of  European 
dock-yards,  took  fire,  in  the  Santiago  fight,  just  like  the 
older  types  at  Manila.  As  to  "its  being  so  easy,"  it 
certainly  looked  easy  after  it  was  all  done,  and  so  did 
setting  an  egg  on  end  seem  easy  after  Columbus  had 
shown  how  to  do  it.  Such  criticisms  are  really  beneath 
contempt,  but  it  is  important  to  bring  the  facts  clearly 
;  together  and  examine  them,  for  on  those  facts  Dewey's 
victory  can  stand  without  fear,  and  take  its  place  in 
history. 

The  greatest  naval  action  in  which  the  victor  came 
down  upon  his  enemy  anchored  in  a  harbor  was  Abou- 
kir.  Of  the  splendor  of  Nelson's  performance,  and  of 
the  victory  which  he  won,  there  can  be  no  question.  Let 
us  try  Dewey  by  that  high  standard. 

The  Bay  of  Aboukir  is  an  almost  open  roadstead. 
All  that  was  necessary  was  to  keep  clear  of  the  shoals 
which  make  out  from  Aboukir  point  and  island,  and 
then,  if  the  wind  were  fair,  as  Nelson's  was,  to  bear 
down  on  the  hostile  fleet.  The  French  fleet  was  an 
chored  at  Aboukir,  and  so  were  the  Spaniards  at  Ma 
nila,  with  the  additional  protection  of  a  boom  at  Ca- 
vite.  The  distance  to  be  traversed  by  Nelson  from  the 
open  sea  to  the  French  fleet  was  trifling.  He  had  no 
channels  to  come  through,  no  entrance-forts  to  pass,  no 
mines  to  fear.  Dewey  had  to  pass  through  a  wide  chan 
nel,  with  powerful  forts  armed  with  modern  guns  on 
either  side,  in  order  to  enter  the  bay.  He  then  had  to 
steam  sixteen  miles  before  he  came  opposite  Cavite, 
while,  from  the  best  information  received,  he  expected 
mines  to  be  all  about  him,  and  two  actually  exploded  in 
his  near  neighborhood.  Nelson's  fleet  was  numerically 

62 


MANILA 


a 

Ulllll 

|gg|||gg|  : 

0 

'3 

w 

of 

eS  n 

ll^illl  1 

§|§eSSi;gSte    8 

I-J 

Si 
go 

~ 

rH" 

0 

1 

:Eti  :;;:;;• 

::::::: 

•'PH      ::::::        p} 

1 

:*;:.:: 

:M  :::::::       .2 

o 
a 

::::::: 

> 

•  •  •'.'.'.  '. 

I 

d  ddd  '•  :  : 

fa'i  :fa:  '•  :fe  :  :        ? 

B 

£.3  x  fl^^'  : 
.S.2.Srd°r.2.S 

°o  X)  ao  .^,  ~Y  "—  "^ 

1 

o 
.2 

,0 

Illllll 

/<                        ^          jf 

~'~ 

n]      ::::;••••       ^ 

1 

5 

Protected  Cruiser  
Protected  Cruiser  
Par.  Protected  C'ruiser. 
Protected  Cruiser  
Gunboat  
Gunboat..  . 
Keveriue-Cutter  

co      ••••>-  tj  :::       -d 
:  :  :  :.2  2  :  :  :       § 

ii^ii^n  I 
! 

Admiral  Uewey's  list  oi 

::::::  : 

•  •  •  i  •  ~.  '.  '.  '  ' 

g 

13 

•  '  •  •  •  •a' 

<O 

.:::::  c 

:      :  ':  :  :  :  :  : 

.2 

. 

::::'•  :* 

'•  i—'E  :  :  ic  : 

a 
<& 

S 

'."* 

•  •£)•£  •  •  :  ^  • 

•    ;       ^j    •    •    -  D    . 

SSai 

......  o 

*  Rl  Correo 
s  followed  her 

63 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  same  as  that  of  his  opponent,  but  all  the  English 
fighting-ships  were  seventy-fours,  while  the  French  had 
three  heavier,  one  of  120  guns  and  two  of  80  each.  It 
has  been  said  freely  and  frequently  that  the  Spanish 
were  so  hopelessly  inferior  that  they  could  only  hope  to 
die,  and  that  Dewey's  sole  glory  was  in  the  rapidity 
with  which  he  and  his  captains  and  men  did  their  work 
without  injury  to  themselves.  There  is  scarcely  more 
foundation  for  this  statement  than  for  the  wholesale 
falsehood  of  the  English  weekly  that  all  the  Spanish 
ships  were  made  of  wood.  The  statistics  on  this  point 
are  worth  consideration  and  study. 

Commodore  Dewey  had  six  fighting-ships,  and  the 
revenue-cutter  McCulloch,  acting  as  convoy  to  the  sup 
ply-ships,  and  not  taking  part  in  the  action.  These  six 
ships  have  already  been  described,  but  for  a  better  un 
derstanding,  their  tonnage,  armament  and  state  of  con 
struction  are  given  in  the  table  on  page  63. 

Numerically  the  Spaniards  had  ten  fighting-ships 
and  two  torpedo-boats  against  the  American  six.  Com 
modore  Dewey  had  no  armored  ships  at  all,  and  no 
more  protection  against  shell  than  his  opponent.  The 
Spanish  ships,  compared  to  the  American,  were  older 
and  of  inferior  types,  but  as  they  fought  from  an  an 
chorage,  speed  and  engines  did  not  count,  and  they 
were  armed  with  modern  guns,  which  was  by  far  the 
most  important  qualification.  The  Spaniards  had  52 
classified  big  guns*  and  72  rapid-fire  and  machine  guns ; 
the  Americans  57  classified  big  guns,  and  74  rapid-fire 
and  machine  guns.  The  Americans  had  10  eight-inch 
guns,  while  the  largest  Spanish  guns  were  6.2  inches. 

*Argos  guns  estimated  at  three. 
64 


£ 


v   /V>*** 

Kl-:siHK.\CE    OF    AGUINALDU 


MANILA 

Commodore  Dewey  therefore  had  the  advantage  in 
weight  of  metal  and  in  heavy  guns,  and  his  flag-ship, 
the  Olympia,  far  outclassed  anything  opposed  to  him. 
Nelson  at  Aboukir  was  slightly  inferior  to  his  antago 
nist  in  weight  of  metal  and  number  of  guns,  and  had 
no  ship  as  powerful  as  L' Orient.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  equalled  his  foe  in  number  of  ships,  while  the  Span 
iards  outnumbered  Dewey  two  to  one,  and  had  1,796 
men  against  the  American  1,678  engaged  in  action.  A 
far  more  important  difference  was  that,  while  Nelson 
had  only  the  French  fleet  to  deal  with,  the  Spaniards 
at  Manila  were  supported  by  powerful,  strongly 
manned  shore  batteries  mounted  with  modern  rifled 
guns,  some  of  very  large  calibre.  This  last  fact,  too 
much  overlooked,  made  the  odds  against  Dewey  very 
heavy,  even  after  the  two  mines  had  exploded  without 
result. 

Both  Dewey  and  Nelson  hunted  down  the  enemy, 
and  engaged  them  at  anchor  where  they  found  them. 
Nelson  entered  an  open  roadstead  by  daylight,  began 
his  action  at  sunset,  and  fought  on  in  the  darkness. 
Dewey  ran  past  powerful  entrance-forts  and  up  a  deep 
bay  in  the  darkness,  and  fought  his  battle  in  daylight. 
Neither  took  the  enemy  by  surprise,  for  Admiral  Mon- 
tojo's  report  shows  that  he  had  tried  Subig  bay  and 
given  it  up,  and  that  he  then  made  every  preparation 
possible  to  meet  the  Americans  at  Cavite  under  the 
shelter  of  the  batteries.  Nelson  practically  destroyed 
the  French  fleet,  but  Admiral  Villeneuve  escaped  the 
next  morning,  with  two  ships  of  the  line  and  two 
frigates,  and  there  was  only  one  English  ship,  the  Zeal 
ous,  not  enough  for  the  purpose,  in  condition  to  follow 

5  6 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

them.  Dewey  absolutely  destroyed  every  Spanish  ship, 
including  the  transport  Mindanao,  and  captured  the 
other  transport,  the  Manila.  He  silenced  all  the  land 
batteries  and  took  Cavite.  Aboukir  had  its  messengers 
of  death  in  the  escaping  French  ships ;  Manila  had  none. 
Absolute  completeness  like  this  cannot  be  surpassed. 
The  Spaniards  admitted  a  loss  of  634  killed  and  wound 
ed  in  ships  and  forts,  while  the  Americans  had  none 
killed  and  only  eight  wounded,  all  on  the  Baltimore. 
The  American  ships  were  hit  several  times,  but  not  one 
was  seriously  injured,  much  less  disabled.  This  has 
been  attributed  to  the  extremely  bad  marksmanship  of 
the  Spaniards,  and  has  been  used  to  explain  Dewey's 
victory.  It  is  easy  to  exaggerate  the  badness  of  the 
Spanish  gunnery.  They  seem,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  to 
have  shot  well  enough  until  the  Americans  opened  upon 
them.  The  shells  which  struck  the  Baltimore  effect 
ively  were  both  fired  before  that  ship  replied  in  the  sec 
ond  round.  But  when  the  American  fire  began,  it  was 
delivered  with  such  volume,  precision,  and  concentra 
tion  that  the  Spanish  fire  was  actually  smothered,  and 
became  wholly  wild  and  ineffective.  The  great  secret 
of  the  victory  was  in  the  accuracy  and  rapidity  of  the 
American  gunners,  which  have  always  been  character 
istic  of  the  American  navy,  as  was  shown  in  the  frigate 
duels  of  1812,  of  which  the  United  States  won  against 
England  eleven  out  of  thirteen.  This  great  quality  was 
not  accidental,  but  due  to  skill,  practice,  and  national 
aptitude.  In  addition  to  this  traditional  skill  was  the 
genius  of  the  commander,  backed  by  the  fighting  ca 
pacity  of  his  captains  and  his  crews.  True  to  the  great 
principle  of  Nelson  and  Farragut,  Dewey  went  straight 

66 


MANILA 

after  his  enemy,  to  fight  the  hostile  fleet  wherever 
found.  In  the  darkness  he  went  boldly  into  an  unfa 
miliar  harbor,  past  powerful  batteries  the  strength  of 
which  his  best  information  had  magnified,  over  mine 
fields  the  extent  and  danger  of  which  he  did  not  and 
could  not  know.  As  soon  as  dawn  came  he  fell  upon  the 
Spanish  fleet,  supported  as  it  was  by  shore  batteries, 
and  utterly  destroyed  it.  The  Spanish  empire  in  the 
East  crumbled  before  his  guns,  and  the  great  city  and 
harbor  of  Manila  fell  helplessly  into  his  hands.  All  this 
was  done  without  the  loss  of  a  man  or  serious  injury 
to  a  ship.  The  most  rigid  inspection  fails  to  discover  a 
mistake.  There  can  be  nothing  better  than  perfection 
of  workmanship,  and  this  Dewey  and  his  officers  and 
men  showed.  The  completeness  of  the  result,  which 
is  the  final  test,  gives  Manila  a  great  place  in  the  his 
tory  of  naval  battles,  and  writes  the  name  of  George 
Dewey  high  up  among  the  greatest  of  victorious  ad 
mirals. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

To  THE  American  fleet  which  through  many  weary 
weeks  had  been  waiting  for  action  in  grim  impatience 
at  Key  West  the  news  of  the  resolution  of  Congress  and 
of  the  President's  order  to  sail  brought  great  relief. 
The  order  came  in  the  late  afternoon  of  April  21,  but 
there  were  still  some  ships  to  coal,  some  more  detailed 
instructions  to  be  received  from  Washington,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  next  morning  at  half  past  six  o'clock 
that  they  got  under  way  and  steamed  slowly  off  toward 
Havana.  The  blockade  proclaimed  by  the  President 
covered  Havana  and  all  ports  east  and  west  between 
Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  as  well  as  Cienfuegos  on 
the  south  coast,  from  which  a  railroad  ran  to  the  capital 
city.  It  was  generally  believed  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  that  Havana,  which  drew  most  of  its  supplies  from 
the  United  States,  would  soon  be  starved  into  surrender 
when  cut  off  from  the  continent  and  with  nothing  but  a 
desolated  country  behind  it  to  turn  to  for  relief.  Events 
showed  that  this  conception,  a  perfectly  natural  one  at 
the  time,  was  absolutely  unfounded.  Either  Havana 
had  vast  stores  on  hand,  or  the  surrounding  country 
and  the  blockade-running  through  the  southern  ports 
were  able  to  supply  the  city,  or  all  three  sources  com 
bined  were  sufficient  for  that  object.  Whatever  the  ex- 

68 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

planation,  certain  it  is  that  although  there  was  a  great 
deal  of  suffering  in  the  capital,  there  is  no  indication 
that  at  the  end  of  the  war  it  was,  as  a  military  position, 
much  nearer  to  surrender  on  account  of  starvation  than 
at  the  beginning  of  hostilities.  Nevertheless,  with  the 
theory  then  prevalent  as  to  the  desperate  condition  of 
the  city  whose  fall  meant  the  end  of  Spanish  rule  in 
Cuba,  the  American  blockade  closed  tightly  over  Ha 
vana,  and  in  the  opening  days  of  the  war  Spanish  ves-, 
sels  and  steamships  plying  to  the  blockaded  port  fell 
rapidly  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  until  this  com 
merce  was  practically  stopped  or  destroyed. 

Blockading  and  prize-taking  were  not,  however,  the 
sole  duties  of  the  American  fleet.  It  was  obvious  that 
any  attempt  to  get  into  the  harbor  of  Havana  through 
its  narrow  channel  crammed  with  mines  would  be  at 
once  mad  and  useless.  But  it  was  at  the  same  time  very 
desirable  to  keep  open  and  unprotected,  so  far  as  possi 
ble,  the  other  harbors,  because  at  that  moment  the 
theory  was  that  we  should  either  land  a  large  army  to 
proceed  against  Havana,  or  important  expeditions  to 
co-operate  with  the  insurgents  in  a  movement  to  cut  off 
the  capital  from  the  interior.  This  theory,  whether 
strongly  or  lightly  held,  was  soon  set  aside  by  events 
and  never  acted  upon — a  very  fortunate  thing,  for  it 
rested  upon  a  gross  underestimate  of  the  strength  of 
Havana  and  of  the  Spanish  forces,  and  upon  an  equally 
gross  over-estimate  of  the  numbers  and  efficiency  of  the 
insurgents.  In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  however,  it 
had  sufficient  strength  to  affect  the  naval  operations 
near  Havana,  but  very  luckily  led,  practically,  only  to 
work  which  it  would  have  been  well  to  do  in  any  event. 

69 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

The  first  affair  growing  out  of  these  conditions, 
and  the  first  action  of  the  war,  occurred  at  Matan- 
zas.  It  was  discovered  that  the  Spaniards  were  es 
tablishing  batteries  and  raising  new  fortifications  at 
that  port,  and  on  April  27  Admiral  Sampson's  flag 
ship,  the  New  York,  supported  by  the  monitor  Puritan 
and  the  unarmored  cruiser  Cincinnati  bombarded  the 
defences.  The  Spanish  shooting  was  very  bad,  only 
three  shots  coming  near  the  New  York,  and  none  hit 
ting  the  Cincinnati,  which  was  much  exposed.  The 
American  shooting,  on  the  other  hand,  was  good,  from 
the  guns  of  the  Puritan  to  the  rapid-fires  of  the 
Cincinnati.  The  Spanish  batteries  and  earth-works 
were  badly  shattered  and  broken  up,  and  many 
guns  dismounted.  As  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba 
announced  that  only  one  mule  was  killed,  we  may  con 
clude  with  almost  absolute  certainty  that  there  must 
have  been  a  very  considerable  loss  of  life  among  the 
troops  exposed  to  the  American  fire.  Except  as  a  warn 
ing  to  the  Spaniards,  and  as  a  test  of  American  marks 
manship,  the  affair  of  April  27  at  Matanzas  was  of  tri 
fling  importance,  although  great  attention  was  given  to 
it  at  the  moment  because  it  was  the  first  action  of  the 
war  by  land  or  sea.  But  while  the  fleet  was  thus  carry 
ing  out  its  orders  by  its  vigorous  blockade,  by  opening 
a  bombardment  on  the  lesser  ports,  and  by  harassing 
the  coast  batteries  and  garrisons,  events  were  occurring 
elsewhere  which  determined  the  future  course  of  the 
war. 

On  April  23  the  President  called  for  125,000  volun 
teers,  and  on  April  25  Congress  adopted  a  formal  dec 
laration  of  war,  which  stated  that  war  had  existed  since 

70 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

April  21 — an  unquestioned  truth.  On  the  26th  the 
President  announced  that  the  United  States,  although 
not  a  signatory,  would  adhere  to  the  agreement  of  Paris, 
and  permit  no  privateers.  The  wisdom  of  this  prompt 
and  righteous  declaration  was  seen  at  once  in  the  ap 
proval  which  it  received  abroad,  and  in  the  embarrass 
ment  which  it  caused  to  Spain,  where  hopes  were  enter 
tained  that,  all  social  and  national  efficiency  being  dead, 
something  might  still  be  done  by  legalized  piracy.  In 
ternational  opinion  was  still  further  conciliated  by  our 
giving  thirty  days  to  all  Spanish  ships  to  leave  our 
ports.  Thus,  while  Congress  was  voting  money  and 
preparing  a  bill  for  war  revenue,  while  the  call  for  vol 
unteers  was  going  through  the  land,  while  camps  were 
being  formed,  men  mustered  in,  the  regulars  brought 
together  from  all  parts  of  the  country  and  mobilized  at 
Tampa,  we  were  settling  rapidly  and  judiciously  our 
relations  with  the  other  powers  of  the  earth.  There 
was  never  a  moment  when  any  European  power  could 
or  would  have  dared  to  interfere  with  us,  although  col 
umns  of  speculations,  predictions,  and  mysterious  warn 
ings  filled  the  newspapers  on  this  subject.  And  as  there 
was  no  danger  that  any  one  power  would  interfere,  so 
after  Manila  there  was  no  peril  to  be  apprehended  from 
any  combination  of  powers.  That  was  the  crisis,  and 
when  England  refused  to  join  the  concert  of  Europe 
in  interfering  with  us  in  the  Philippines — an  act  not  to 
be  forgotten  by  Americans — all  possible  danger  of  in 
terference  from  any  quarter  was  at  an  end.  Neverthe 
less,  as  we  adjusted  our  relations  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
wisely  and  quickly,  when  we  caught  Spain  by  the  throat, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

so  the  rest  of  the  world  made  haste  to  define  their  rela 
tions,  both  to  us  and  to  our  antagonist. 

England  declared  her  neutrality  on  April  23,  the 
same  day  on  which  the  Governor-General  of  Hong 
kong  requested  Commodore  Dewey  to  leave  English 
waters  within  forty-eight  hours — a  polite  invitation 
fraught  with  much  meaning  to  what  remained  of 
Charles  V's  empire  in  the  East.  But  we  were  not  the 
only  people  who  had  a  fighting  fleet  in  neutral  waters. 
For  some  time  past  Spain  had  been  collecting  a  torpedo- 
boat  flotilla  and  a  squadron  of  armored  cruisers.  The 
fleet  thus  brought  together  had  come  to  the  Canaries, 
and  thence  had  proceeded  to  the  Cape  Verde  Islands. 
In  the  days  after  the  Maine  explosion,  when  relations 
between  the  two  countries  were  straining  to  the  break 
ing  point,  the  movements  of  these  Spanish  ships  excited 
intense  interest.  It  was  rumored  that  they  were  to 
come  to  Puerto  Rico,  and  had  they  done  so  their  arrival 
would  have  precipitated  war.  But  they  did  not  start ; 
they  remained  quietly  at  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  and 
when  war  came  they  still  lingered.  It  may  well  be 
doubted  whether  they  would  have  moved  at  all  if  they 
had  been  in  a  Spanish  harbor,  but,  unluckily  for  them, 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands  were  Portuguese,  and  al 
though  Portugal  was  entirely  friendly  to  Spain, 
she  was  obliged  to  issue  a  proclamation  of  neu 
trality  on  April  29.  Thereupon  the  Spanish  fleet 
departed,  under  orders  from  Madrid.  The  light  tor 
pedo  boats,  unprotected  cruisers,  and  transports  went 
north  to  the  Canaries,  and  thence  to  Spain.  The  fight 
ing-squadron  was  lost  sight  of  steering  westward. 
This  squadron  consisted  of  the  Colon,  the  Almirante 

72 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

Oquendo,  the  Viscaya,  and  the  Maria  Teresa,  armored 
cruisers  of  the  first  class,  all  new,  all  the  best  work  of 
European  dock-yards,  with  heavy  batteries  of  the  finest 
modern  rifles,  eight  inches  of  armor,  and  a  contract 
speed  of  over  twenty  knots,  and  of  three  large  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers,  the  Furor,  Pint  on,  and  Terror,  just  out 
of  English  yards,  the  last  expression  of  Scotch  and 
English  building,  and  with  a  contract  speed  of  thirty 
knots.  The  squadron,  as  it  appeared  on  paper  and  in  the 
naval  registers,  was,  as  a  whole,  powerful  in  armament, 
fast,  and  very  formidable.  There  it  was,  then,  loose  on 
the  ocean,  and  the  question  which  at  once  arose  and 
overshadowed  all  others  was  where  Admiral  Cervera 
and  his  ships  were  going,  for  they  represented  the  Span 
ish  sea  power.  When  they  were  found  and  destroyed, 
the  campaign  on  the  Atlantic  side  would  be  over,  and 
the  expulsion  of  the  Spaniards  from  the  American  hem 
isphere  could  be  effected  at  the  pleasure  of  the  United 
States.  Until  they  were  destroyed  no  movement  could 
be  safely  or  conclusively  undertaken  against  either  Cuba 
or  Puerto  Rico.  It  was  the  old,  ever-recurring  prob 
lem  of  the  sea  power,  as  crucial  and  decisive  to  the 
United  States  in  the  spring  of  1898  as  it  was  to  Rome 
when  Hannibal  faced  the  legions,  or  to  the  English 
when  Napoleon  banded  all  Europe  together  against 
Great  Britain. 

The  Spanish  fleet  was  somewhere  in  the  mid- Atlantic; 
that  was  all  that  was  known,  and  speculation  was  rife  as 
to  its  destination.  The  people  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
thought  that  a  descent  upon  the  coast  towns  was  at 
hand — an  obviously  impossible  solution,  because  in  the 
waters  of  New  England  the  Spaniards,  far  removed 

73 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

from  any  base,  would  have  courted  destruction.  So 
this  opinion  was  rejected  by  the  Navy  Department. 
Another  opinion  was  that  Cervera  was  steaming  away 
southward  to  cut  off  the  Oregon.  Here,  unfortunately, 
there  was  much  greater  probability  of  truth  than  in  the 
chimera  of  the  descent  on  the  Atlantic  coast  towns. 
But  the  Strategy  Board  wisely  decided  that  to  divide 
or  scatter  the  fleets  in  an  effort  to  protect  the  Oregon 
would  be  a  mistake  of  the  first  order.  The  great  bat 
tle-ship  must  take  her  chance.  Either  she  would  slip 
by  her  enemies  safely,  or,  if  she  met  them,  she  would  so 
cripple  them  that  their  effectiveness  would  be  gone. 
So  the  Oregon  was  left  to  her  fate. 

Thus  two  possibilities  for  the  Spanish  fleet  were  con 
sidered  and  set  aside.  A  third  was  that,  after  making 
a  wide  turn,  the  fleet  would  return  to  Spain,  and  rumors 
of  its  reappearance  at  Cadiz  kept  coming  until  the  mo-1 
ment  when  the  truth  was  known.  Such  a  proceeding 
as  this,  however,  seemed  too  absurd,  even  for  a  Span 
iard,  to  a  world  which  had  not  yet  seen  Admiral  Camara 
go  back  and  forth  through  the  Suez  Canal ;  and  the  au 
thorities  in  Washington,  in  consultation  with  Admiral 
Sampson,  decided  that  Cervera  was  intending  to  do  the 
sensible  thing  from  a  naval  standpoint  and  make  for  a 
port  from  which  he  could  operate  toward  the  relief  of 
Havana.  It  was  further  conjectured,  and  on  all  the 
known  facts  and  conditions  very  wisely  conjectured, 
that  the  Spanish  fleet  would  come  to  Puerto  Rico,  the 
natural  and  only  strong  Spanish  base  for  operations 
directed  toward  Cuba.  On  the  speed  to  be  fairly  esti 
mated  for  such  a  fleet  the  time  of  their  arrival  at  Puerto 
Rico  could  easily  be  determined.  So  it  came  about,  on 

74 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

this  theory  of  the  conditions,  that  soon  after  noon  on 
May  3  the  battle-ships  Iowa  and  Indiana  left  Key  West, 
whence  the  flag-ship  New  York  followed  them  at  night. 
The  rendezvous  was  at  Juruco  Cove  about  twelve  miles 
east  of  Havana.  There  they  were  joined  by  the  two 
monitors  Terror  and  Amphitrite,  from  the  blockading 
squadron,  the  two  unarmored  cruisers  Detroit  and 
Montgomery,  the  torpedo-boat  Porter,  the  tug  Wom- 
patuck,  and  a  collier.  Then  they  started  east  to  find  the 
Spanish  fleet.  A  more  ill-assorted  squadron  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  imagine,  and  the  necessity  which 
made  it  so  came  from  the  insufficient,  unsystematic 
naval  authorizations  of  Congress  running  back  over 
many  years.  In  the  two  essential  qualities  of  the 
modern  fleet,  homogeneity  of  type  and  evenness  of 
speed,  they  were  painfully  deficient.  The  squadron 
was  composed  of  the  most  discordant  types,  and  varied 
in  speed  from  the  twenty  knots  or  more  of  the  New 
York  to  the  monitors'  maximum  of  less  than  ten.  The 
monitors,  in  fact,  were  nothing  but  a  perilous  incum- 
brance.  Their  low  speed  and  limited  coal  capacity 
made  it  necessary  to  tow  them,  and  they  thus  reduced 
the  speed  of  the  fleet  to  about  seven  knots.  In  any  sort 
of  seaway  it  was  impossible  to  fight  their  guns,  and  if 
an  enemy  had  been  encountered  in  the  open  ocean,  they 
would  have  been  a  hindrance  and  a  danger,  not  a  help. 
Thus  burdened  with  ships  fit  only  for  the  smooth  waters 
of  a  harbor,  and  with  a  fleet-speed  of  seven  knots,  Ad 
miral  Sampson,  thanks  to  the  parsimony  of  Congress, 
set  forth  in  pursuit  of  a  powerful  squadron  of  homo 
geneous  armored  cruisers,  with  a  uniform  contract 
speed  of  twenty  knots. 

75 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

His  departure  was  the  end  of  the  crude  idea  with 
which  the  war  opened,  that  we  were  to  batter  down  the 
Morro  Castle  and  the  Cabanas  forts,  land  a  few  thous 
and  troops,  and  take  Havana  out  of  hand.  Before  the 
war  a  high  authority  was  reported  to  have  said  that  in 
ten  days  we  could  have  40,000  men  ready  for  operations 
in  Cuba.  April  23  the  President  called  for  125,000 
volunteers,  and  a  month  later  for  75,000  more.  It  was 
at  once  discovered  that  but  very  few  of  the  regiments 
furnished  by  the  States  were  fully,  equipped;  most 
of  them  were  only  partially  prepared,  and  many  were 
not  equipped  at  all.  Instead  of  being  able  to  mobilize 
40,000  soldiers  in  ten  days,  it  was  found  that  it  was  not 
possible  to  even  muster  them  in  that  time.  While 
sundry  newspapers  were  clamoring  for  an  immediate 
advance  on  Havana,  it  was  becoming  quite  clear  to  all 
men,  even  in  those  confused  days,  that  it  would  take 
weeks  and  months,  rather  than  days,  to  make  these 
really  fine  volunteers  into  an  army ;  that  the  machinery 
of  transportation,  supplies,  hospital  service,  and  the  rest 
was  utterly  inadequate  for  the  strain  suddenly  put  upon 
it,  even  if  it  had  been  good,  and  that  it  was  not  good, 
but  bad  and  rusty.  On  May  14,  ten  days  after  Samp 
son's  departure  for  Puerto  Rico,  there  were  only  a  little 
over  10,000  men  at  Tampa,  and  the  wise  men  who  had 
said  from  the  beginning  that  we  ought  to  move  on 
Puerto  Rico,  the  Spanish  base,  and  not  begin  in  early 
summer  on  Havana,  ultimately  carried  their  point  be 
cause  of  facts  more  potent  than  the  best  reasoning. 

But  no  military  movement  being  possible  until  we 
had  command  of  the  sea,  the  pursuit  of  Cervera's  fleet, 
from  both  the  military  and  the  naval  point  of  view,  was 

76 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

the  one  thing  to  which  all  else  had  to  be  subordinated. 
So  while  the  generals  and  admirals  of  civil  life  were 
laying  out  and  discussing  campaigns  in  the  newspapers, 
facts  were  putting  the  real  war  into  the  right  channels ; 
and  while  the  prepared  navy  was  off  after  Spain's  sea 
power,  the  unprepared  army  was  occupying  the  time 
thus  fortunately  given  in  getting  ready  with  an  energy 
and  speed  most  remarkable  when  one  understood  the 
wretched  system  imposed  upon  it  by  Congress,  and  the 
weight  of  needless  clerks,  endless  red-tape,  and  fear  of 
responsibility  which  had  grown  up  in  choking  luxuri 
ance  during  the  long,  neglectful  peace. 

But  although  the  direct  attack  on  Havana  so  confi 
dently  looked  for  at  the  outset  was  thus  practically 
abandoned  the  work  of  blockading  the  island  and  cut 
ting  it  off  from  all  outside  communication  went  dili 
gently  forward.  Various  expeditions  were  undertaken 
to  open  connection  with  the  Cuban  insurgents  and  sup 
ply  them  with  arms  and  ammunition,  as  the  exagger 
ated  estimate  then  existing  of  their  numbers  and 
efficiency  made  the  belief  general  that  they  could  be 
developed  into  a  powerful  offensive  force,  and  be  used 
with  effect  against  the  Spaniards.  Then  and  later 
various  expeditions  were  sent  forth  in  the  Leyden, 
Gussic,  and  Florida,  but  they  had  no  result.  The 
earlier  landings,  managed  and  conducted  in  large 
measure  by  Captain  Dorst  of  the  regular  army,  a  most 
gallant  and  accomplished  officer,  \vere  effective  some 
times  in  the  face  of  a  sharp  fire.  The  first  skirmishing 
took  place  on  one  of  these  expeditions,  much  courage 
was  shown,  some  blood  \vas  shed,  arms  were  landed, 
and  communication  opened  with  the  insurgents,  but 

77 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

that  was  the  end  of  it.  There  was  no  trouble  about  the 
expeditions,  but  nothing  was  developed  by  them  among 
the  insurgents. 

More  serious  work  was  that  entailed  by  the  blockade 
and  by  attacks  upon  the  lesser  ports  to  break  down  the 
defences  and  destroy  any  lurking  gunboats.  Before 
the  New  York  went  eastward  she  had  broken  up  some 
parties  of  Spaniards  who,  with  strange  absence  of  hu 
mor,  had  opened  on  her  with  Mauser  rifles  at  Mariel, 
but  she  was  drawing  very  near  to  San  Juan  when,  on 
May  n,  a  far  more  serious  affair  than  any  which  had 
yet  taken  place  occurred  at  Cardenas.  Off  that  port 
the  gunboats  Machias  and  Wilmington,  the  torpedo- 
boat  Window,  and  the  converted  revenue-cutter  Hud 
son  were  maintaining  the  blockade.  After  a  time  it 
was  learned  that  there  were  three  Spanish  gunboats 
in  the  harbor,  and  on  the  8th  of  May  an  attempt  was 
made  to  decoy  them  out  of  the  harbor,  which  so  far  suc 
ceeded  that  one  came  within  range  of  the  Machias,  got 
a  6-pounder  shell  landed  upon  her,  and  quickly  re 
treated.  It  was  obvious,  after  this,  that  to  fight  the 
Spaniards  it  was  necessary  to  go  after  them  wherever 
they  might  be,  a  discovery  which  became  later  an  ac 
cepted  principle  of  the  war.  Acting  on  this  theory,  the 
Wilmington,  Winslow,  and  Hudson,  on  May  n,  made 
their  way  into  the  bay  along  an  unused  channel,  which 
was  free  from  mines,  until  they  were  within  a  mile  and 
a  half  of  the  wharves  where  the  enemy's  gunboats  were 
lying.  Then  the  water  became  too  shoal  for  the  Wil 
mington,  and  the  Winslow  was  ordered  ahead  to  at 
tack.  It  was  a  most  reckless  piece  of  work  to  under 
take,  for  the  Winslow  was  a  torpedo-boat,  not  a  fight- 

78 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

ing-ship,  her  sides  were  not  over  a  quarter  of  an  inch 
thick,  and  she  was  going  to  meet  ships  carrying  12- 
pounders.  Her  daring  commander,  Lieutenant  Berna- 
dou,  and  his  officers  and  men,  were,  however,  only  too 
eager  to  make  the  attempt.  On  they  went,  opening 
vigorously  with  their  i -pounders  to  which  the  Span 
iards  replied  fiercely.  Presently  they  found  themselves 
among  some  red  buoys,  which,  as  it  proved,  marked 
ranges,  and  the  shots  from  the  batteries  and  the  gun 
boats  began  to  come  home.  Ten  struck  the  unpro 
tected  boat ;  Lieutenant  Bernadou  was  badly  wounded, 
but  managed  to  keep  his  feet,  the  steering-gear  was 
smashed,  and  one  engine.  Then  came  the  eleventh 
shot,  which  killed  Ensign  Bagley  and  four  men.  The 
brave  little  boat  was  now  floating  helplessly  in  full 
range  of  the  Spanish  guns.  Her  destruction  seemed 
certain,  but  the  Hudson,  really  nothing  more  than  an 
armored  harbor  tug,  but  commanded  by  a  gallant  rev 
enue  officer,  Lieutenant  F.  H.  Newcomb,  came  bravely 
to  the  rescue.  The  Hudson  had  crept  slowly  after  the 
!  Winsloiv,  and  firing  rapidly  on  the  Spaniards,  now 
:  started,  in  the  midst  of  a  storm  of  projectiles,  to  bring 
!  off  the  disabled  torpedo-poat.  Twice  she  got  a  line  to 
the  Winslow,  and  twice  it  parted.  Then  the  Hudson 
got  alongside,  and  towed  the  wounded  boat,  with  her 
\  blood-stained  decks  and  broken  sides,  out  of  range  and 
into  safety.  There  were  five  killed  and  five  wounded 
out  of  the  Winslow's  complement  of  twenty-one  officers 
and  men,  a  terrible  percentage,  and  the  heaviest  loss 
incurred  by  the  American  navy  in  any  action  of  the 
h  war.  It  was  a  rash  undertaking,  but  most  gallantly 
faced  and  brilliantly  attempted,  a  proof,  to  those  who 

79 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

rightly  interpreted  it,  of  a  very  high  and  victorious 
spirit  in  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  waiting  only  for 
a  large  opportunity  to  win  corresponding  triumphs. 
Nor  did  the  blow  dealt  the  Winslow  go  unavenged. 
When  the  Hudson  and  her  consort  were  out  of  the  way, 
the  Wilmington  drew  in,  destroyed  the  Spanish  gun 
boat  which  had  been  engaged,  and  smashed  and  si 
lenced  all  the  shore  batteries,  with  a  heavy  loss  to  the 
garrisons.  There  was  nothing  more  to  be  feared  from 
the  gunboats  or  defences 'of  Cardenas. 

The  same  day  that  the  Winslow,  the  Hudson  and 
the  Wilmington  were  having  their  action  at  Cardenas, 
far  away  on  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba  another  fight 
was  taking  place,  in  the  progress  of  the  work  of  sepa 
rating  the  great  island  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  On 
the  night  of  May  10,  Captain  McCalla  of  the  Marble- 
head  called  for  volunteers  to  protect  the  cable-cutters 
in  their  work.  The  roll  was  soon  filled,  and  the  next 
morning  the  steam-launches  of  the  Marblehead  and 
Nashville,  towing  the  two  sailing-launches  under  com 
mand  of  Lieutenants  Winslow  and  Anderson,  started 
into  the  harbor  of  Cienfuegos  about  quarter  before 
seven.  They  carried  a  squad  of  marines  picked  for 
proficiency  as  marksmen,  and  a  machine-gun  in  the  bow 
of  each  boat.  The  Nashville  and  Marblehead  then 
opened  fire  on  the  Spanish  batteries,  and  under  cover 
of  this,  and  that  of  the  steam-launches,  the  crews  of 
the  other  boats  went  to  work.  It  was  a  perilous  busi 
ness,  but  the  sailors  grappled  and  cut  successfully  the 
two  cables  they  had  been  ordered  to  destroy.  They  also 
found  a  third  small  cable,  but  the  grapnel  fouled  the 
bottom  and  was  lost.  Meantime  the  Spanish  fire  grew 

80 


CVTTIXU   THE    CA15LKS    UNDER    FIRE    AT   CIENFUEGOS 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

hotter  and  hotter,  pouring  out  from  the  batteries  and 
machine-guns,  and  the  boats  began  to  suffer.  The 
well-directed  fire  from  the  rifles  of  the  marines  and 
from  the  one-pounders  kept  the  Spaniards  from  reach 
ing  the  switch-house  which  controlled  the  submarine 
torpedoes,  but  launches  could  not  contend  with  bat 
teries  at  close  range,  and  when  the  work  for  which  they 
came,  and  which  had  all  been  performed  under  a  heavy 
fire,  was  done,  they  withdrew  to  the  ships.  Nine  men, 
including  Lieutenant  Winslow,  had  been  wounded, 
some  seriously,  and  three,  as  was  reported  later,  mor 
tally.  It  was  a  very  gallant  exploit,  coolly  and  thor 
oughly  carried  through,  under  a  galling  fire,  and  it 
succeeded  in  its  purpose  of  hampering  and  blocking  in 
the  enemy  at  the  important  port  of  Cienfuegos,  which 
was  the  road  to  Havana  from  the  southern  coast.  It 
was  another  twist  in  the  coil  which  the  United  States 
was  tightening  about  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE   PURSUIT   OF   CERVERA 

MEANTIME  the  ill-assorted  fleet  under  Admiral 
Sampson  was  making  the  best  way  it  could  eastward, 
and  the  pursuit  of  Cervera's  fleet  had  fairly  begun.  It 
was  known  when  the  Spaniards  had  sailed,  but  whither 
they  had  gone  could  only  be  a  matter  of  guess.  They 
might  be  going  to  harry  the  New  England  coast,  or  at 
least,  as  has  been  said,  some  persons  thought  this  possi 
ble.  More  reasonable  was  the  second  theory  already 
alluded  to  that  they  intended  to  intercept  the  Oregon. 
The  great  battle-ship  had  arrived  on  March  9  at  San 
Francisco,  and  on  the  iQth,  with  Captin  Clark  in  com 
mand,  she  started  on 'her  long  voyage  round  Cape  Horn, 
to  join  the  North  Atlantic  Squadron.  On  April  7  she 
left  Callao,  where  she  coaled,  for  Sandy  Point,  run 
ning  steadily  on  through  heavy  seas,  and  maintaining 
high  speed.  On  April  16  she  reached  the  strait,  and 
rode  out  a  severe  gale  at  her  anchors,  at  Port  Tamar. 
The  next  day  the  battle-ship  was  at  Sandy  Point,  where 
she  coaled  again,  and  picked  up  the  gunboat  Marietta. 
On  the  2  ist  the  ships  ran  through  the  strait  by  which 
Magellan  passed  to  found  Spain's  empire  in  the  East 
and  turned  northward  in  Atlantic  waters.  Here  came 
the  shadow  of  a  new  danger,  for  the  Spanish  torpedo- 
boat  Temerario  was  at  Montevideo,  menacing  an  at- 

82 


THE  PURSUIT  OP  CERVERA 

tack  in  the  night.  But  there  was  no  change  in  speed  or 
direction.  On  the  ships  forged,  with  guns  shotted,  the 
rapid-fires  ready,  and  lights  screened  at  night.  Offi 
cers  and  men  stood  double  watches,  and  those  carried 
insensible  from  the  fire-room  begged  to  return  as  soon 
as  they  came  to  themselves.  Luckily  for  her,  the  Tem- 
erario  never  became  visible,  and  on  April  30  the  Ameri 
can  ships  were  at  Rio.  Here  they  met  a  cordial  recep 
tion,  and  once  more  were  coaled.  Here  too  came  news 
of  the  existence  of  war,  and  of  the  sailing  of  the  Span 
ish  fleet  with  an  unknown  destination.  Four  power 
ful  armored  cruisers  and  three  torpedo-boats,  some 
where,  perhaps  on  the  track  to  the  north :  heavy  odds 
these  for  one  ship.  But  Captain  Clark  leaves  Rio  on 
May  4,  drops  his  slower  consorts,  the  Marietta  and 
Nictheroy,  off  Cape  Frio,  and  there  is  no  quiver  in  his 
despatch  of  May  9,  from  Bahia.  He  says,  quite  simply, 
"The  Oregon  could  steam  fourteen  knots  for  hours, 
and  in  a  running  fight  might  beat  off  and  cripple  the 
Spanish  fleet,"  and  those  who  read  these  words  think 
of  Sir  Richard  Grenville  in  the  years  gone  by,  and 
know  that  the  sea  spirit  of  the  north,  drawn  from  a  far- 
distant  past,  is  still  burning  strong  and  clear  in  this 
American  captain  and  his  crew.  So  he  leaves  Bahia, 
and  on  May  18  he  is  at  Barbadoes,  and  then  comes  an 
other  space  of  anxiety,  deeper  among  men  on  land  than 
among  those  on  the  battle-ship,  and  then  the  country 
hears,  on  May  24,  that  the  Oregon  is  at  Jupiter  Inlet, 
Florida,  her  great  voyage  done.  A  pause,  and  then  the 
world  knows  that  the  Oregon,  after  her  14,000  miles 
through  all  seas  and  weather,  is  on  her  way  to  join  the 
fighting-line,  not  a  rivet,  nor  a  bolt,  nor  a  gearing 

83 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

broken  or  out  of  place.  It  appears  very  sharply  in  this 
fashion  that,  despite  wise  critics  in  Europe,  American 
battle-ships  can  make  great  voyages  and  face  the  seas 
as  well  as  fight,  and  that  there  is  a  capacity  for  true 
and  honest  workmanship  in  the  United  States  very 
comforting  to  think  on.  Very  clear,  too,  is  the  still 
greater  fact  that  the  American  seamen,  captain  and 
crew,  are  filled  to-day  with  the  old  spirit  of  the  sea- 
conquerors  shining  undimmed  and  strong. 

So  the  Spanish  fleet  did  not  seek  the  Oregon,  and 
would  have  been  crippled  and  shattered  if  it  had  made 
the  attempt,  and  the  department  very  wisely  left  the 
battle-ship  to  take  care  of  herself,  and  would  not  divide 
the  fleet.  And  it  was  also  decided,  as  has  already  been 
said,  that  the  enemy  would  not  go  to  New  England, 
but  that,  on  the  assumption  (a  very  violent  one,  as  ap 
peared  later)  of  intelligent  action,  they  would  go  to 
the  obvious  and  all-important  Spanish  base  of  Puerto 
Rico.  So  thither  went  Admiral  Sampson,  warned  at 
Cape  Haitien  from  Washington  not  to  risk  damage  to 
his  ships  in  a  bombardment,  and  on  May  n,  when  the 
Winslow  was  fighting  desperately  at  Cardenas,  and 
other  American  sailors  were  cutting  cables  at  Cien- 
fuegos,  the  fighting-fleet  was  drawing  near  to  San  Juan. 
It  was  still  dark  when  the  lights  of  the  town  became 
visible  the  next  morning,  and  when  the  sun  rose  the 
city  lay  before  them.  The  admiral's  flag  was  shifted  to 
the  Iowa,  the  tug  Wompatuck  was  anchored  to  mark 
the  ten-fathom  line,  and  then  the  ships,  with  the  De 
troit  leading,  went  in  and  opened  fire,  while  the  Mont 
gomery  ran  by  and  silenced  the  batteries  of  Fort  Canelo, 
on  the  other  side  of  the  bay.  The  Spanish  gunnery 

84 


! 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

was  bad,  the  American,  improving  after  the  first  round, 
very  good.  The  forts  were  seriously  damaged,  but 
neither  destroyed  nor  silenced.  Some  shells  passed 
over  into  the  town,  wrecking  and  setting  fire  to  certain 
buildings.  In  the  third  round  both  the  New  York  and 
lozva  were  hit,  but  not  seriously,  and  one  man  was 
killed  and  seven  wounded.  The  best  reports  ob 
tainable  put  the  Spanish  loss  at  forty  killed  and 
seventy  wounded.  After  three  hours  of  this  work 
the  signal  was  made  to  cease  firing,  and  the  bom 
bardment  of  San  Juan  was  over.  It  had  answered  en 
tirely  its  purpose,  which  was  merely  that  of  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force.  That  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  the 
fighting-ships  on  such  an  errand  is  probably  true  but  at 
least  it  had  been  demonstrated  that  the  Spanish  fleet 
was  not  there,  which  was  of  high  importance,  and  that 
the  surrender  of  the  city  could  be  compelled,  know 
ledge,  of  which  no  advantage  was  taken  at  any  time, 
and  which  was  useless  at  the  moment,  as  we  had  no 
landing  force.  Such  were  the  results  of  the  affair  of 
San  Juan  to  the  Americans ;  but  there  was  another  out 
come,  which  affected  only  the  Spaniards. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  were  striving  to 
guess  accurately  the  probable  destination  of  the  Spanish 
fleet,  and  they  very  naturally  based  their  reasoning  on 
what  was  publicly  known  of  the  character  and  quality 
of  the  enemy's  ships,  and  upon  the  proposition  that 
they  had  a  plan,  and  would  endeavor  to  do  the  best  and 
most  effective  work  possible.  We  know  now  that  the 
Spaniards  had  no  plan  whatever,  that  their  ships  were 
defective  in  guns  and  ammunition,  and  that,  instead 
of  having  a  homogeneous  and  high  speed  rate,  they 

8s 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

were  in  poor  condition,  and  the  Viscaya  in  such  a  state 
that,  in  Admiral  Cervera's  words,  she  was  "a  boil  on 
the  fleet."  All  calculations,  therefore,  based  upon  the 
contract  speed  of  the  Spanish  cruisers,  and  upon  the 
theory  that  the  Spaniards  had  a  plan,  were  quite  idle 
in  regard  to  an  enemy  with  ships  in  bad  condition  and 
no  plan  at  all.  So  while  Washington  was  carrying  the 
Spanish  fleet  rapidly  over  the  ocean  at  ten  to  twelve 
knots  an  hour  toward  a  well-defined  objective-point,  in 
reality  they  were  creeping  along  at  seven  knots  an  hour 
and  making  vaguely  for  some  point  in  the  West  Indies, 
to  do  they  did  not  know  what.  On  May  12,  withour 
any  apparent  reason,  they  brought  up  at  the  friendly 
French  port  of  Martinique,  and  there  they  heard  of  the 
bombardment  of  San  Juan,  which  had  its  last  result 
in  convincing  the  Spaniards  that,  whatever  happened, 
they  would  not  go  to  Puerto  Rico  and  run  into  the  arms 
of  Admiral  Sampson.  So,  leaving  behind  the  Terror, 
which  had  been  damaged  by  the  voyage  they  went  on 
in  purposeless  fashion  to  the  Dutch  island  of  Curacoa, 
like  Martinique,  within  touch  of  cables,  so  that  the 
wastes  of  ocean  no  longer  sheltered  them,  and  their 
whereabouts  was  published  to  the  world.  This  fact  and 
the  laws  of  neutrality  made  a  stay  impossible,  and  on 
May  15  the  poor,  aimless,  vaguely  wandering  fleet,  af 
ter  getting  a  little  coal,  set  forth  again  and  went  to 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  for  no  better  reason,  seemingly,  than 
that  it  was  the  nearest  port  under  the  Spanish  flag 
where  they  could  hope  to  coal  and  refit. 

This  haven,  the  last  they  were  ever  to  enter,  was  a 
typical  Cuban  harbor.  A  narrow  entrance,  with  a  chan 
nel  only  a  hundred  yards  wide,  cuts  sharply  between 

86 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

high  hills,  one  of  which  is  crowned  by  the  picturesque 
"Morro  Castle."  An  island  faces  the  entrance  chan 
nel,  which,  dividing,  passes  on  either  side,  and  then 
opens  out  in  a  broad  and  beautiful  bay,  with  the  city 
lying  at  the  foot  of  the  encircling  hills.  Everything 
in  the  harbor  is  quite  invisible  from  the  open  sea.  No 
more  secure  place  could  be  imagined ;  for  no  hostile 
fleet,  unsupported  by  an  army  could  pass  that  narrow 
channel  sown  with  mines;  while  on  the  other  hand,  no 
harbor  could  be  more  readily  blockaded,  and  to  go  out 
unperceived  in  the  face  of  an  alert  and  watchful  enemy 
was  impossible. 

Here,  at  all  events,  was  a  chance  to  rest.  There  was 
no  military  or  naval  purpose  to  be  served  in  Santiago, 
which  had  no  communication  with  Havana  except  by 
telegraph,  but  it  was  better  than  helpless  wandering. 
Coal,  slo\v  in  delivery,  as  well  as  provisions,  was  to  be 
had  there,  and  it  was  a  very  inviting  hiding-place  if 
not  trusted  in  too  long.  In  this  wise,  at  all  events, 
whatever  their  reasons,  the  Spaniards  hid  themselves, 
and  the  more  active  part  of  the  game  was  meantime 
carried  on  by  the  Americans,  whose  one  object  now 
was  to  seek  and  find.  This  was  a  very  difficult  task. 
We  knew  when  the  Spaniards  reached  Martinique,  we 
knew  again  when  they  left  Curacoa,  and  then  the  veil 
dropped,  and  Washington  went  to  guessing  and  con 
jecturing,  much  hampered  by  the  difficulty  of  getting 
news  and  orders  to  the  fleets  before  the  former  had 
been  superseded  by  fresh  information  and  the  latter 
had  become  obsolete.  Nevertheless  the  department  did 
its  best  in  all  the  confusion  of  reports  and  conjectures. 
On  May  13,  the  day  after  the  arrival  of  the  Spaniards 

87 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

at  Martinique,  the  Flying  Squadron  under  Commodore 
Schley,  consisting  of  the  Brooklyn,  Massachusetts,  and 
Texas,  which  had  been  kept  for  this  contingency  in 
Hampton  Roads,  sailed  for  Key  West,  and  every  effort 
was  made  to  convey  information  to  the  Puerto  Rican 
expedition. 

The  same  day  Admiral  Sampson,  knowing  now  that 
Cervera  was  not  in  San  Juan,  with  prompt  decision 
sailed  for  Havana,  the  central  point  to  be  guarded  in 
case  Cervera  was  aiming  to  break  the  blockade  there, 
as  he  ought  to  have  been.  When  Sampson  reached 
Cape  Haitien  he  received  despatches  announcing  the  ap 
pearance  of  the  Spaniards  at  Martinique,  and  then  at 
Curacoa,  with  the  subsequent  departure  from  the  latter 
island.  Telegrams  went  at  once  to  warn  blockaders 
at  Cienfuegos  and  to  the  scout  Harvard.  In  the  latter, 
dated  May  15,  the  admiral  said  that  the  destination 
of  the  Spaniards  was  unknown,  but  was  probably  San 
tiago  or  San  Juan — an  instance  of  sagacity  and  insight 
which  is  most  remarkable,  for  at  that  time  nobody  had 
thought  of  Santiago,  which  on  the  face  of  things  was  a 
most  unlikely  refuge.  This  done,  the  admiral  left  his 
slow-going  squadron,  and  in  the  New  York  steamed 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Key  West.  On  the  way  he  got 
tidings  from  a  despatch-boat,  which  told  him  that 
Schley  had  sailed,  and  that  Cervera  had  with  him  mu 
nitions  of  war  (which  is  now  known  to  have  been  un 
true),  and  that  therefore  his  object  must  be  to  connect 
in  some  way  with  Havana.  The  statement  as  to  the 
munitions  pointed  directly  to  Cienfuegos  as  the  obvious 
destination  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  Therefore,  on  ar 
riving  at  Key  West  he  sent  the  Flying  Squadron,  con- 

88 


/'    if  '  J3'W         I 


fr 


~     '-;. .     i-  5  5  ^ 

?  t        -<•  \  '       P\r  5       ' 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

sisting  of  the  Brooklyn,  Massachusetts,  Texas,  and 
Scorpion,  on  May  19,  with  orders  to  proceed  as  rap 
idly  as  possible  to  Cienfuegos.  The  following  day  the 
Iowa,  Castine,  and  the  collier  Mcrrimac,  with  over 
3,000  tons  of  coal  on  board,  were  despatched  to  re-en 
force  them.  Although  she  did  not  leave  until  eleven 
o'clock  on  May  2Oth,  twenty-seven  hours  after  Com 
modore  Schley  and  looked  in  at  Havana  on  her  way, 
the  loiva  when  she  reached  Cienfuegos  shortly  after 
noon  on  May  22,  had  gained  nearly  twenty  hours  on  the 
Flying  Squadron.  Commodore  Schley  in  starting  after 
the  enemy  went  fifty  miles  wide  of  Cape  San  Antonio 
and  did  not  reach  Cienfuegos  until  after  daybreak  on 
May  22  consuming  nearly  seventy-two  hours  with 
every  reason  and  incentive  to  hurry  in  traversing  a  dis 
tance  which  Captain  Evans  in  the  Iowa  had  covered 
in  fifty  hours.  The  Iowa  carried  a  note  from  the  ad 
miral  to  Commodore  Schley  repeating  the  information 
as  to  Cervera's  munitions  of  war  which  seemed  to  make 
Cienfuegos  their  absolutely  necessary  destination  and 
advising  the  close  blockade  of  that  port.* 


*NOTE. — Particular  mention  is  made  of  this  note  because  Ad 
miral  Schley  produced  it  in  his  reply  to  the  communication  made 
to  the  Senate  on  February  6,  1899,  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
He  called  especial  attention  to  it  with  the  object  of  apparently 
showing :  first,  that  this  important  despatch  had  been  suppressed 
by  this  department,  an  inference  certain  newspapers  were  quick  to 
draw:  and  second,  that  this  despatch  furnished  a  complete  ex 
planation  and  defence  of  his  doings  and  his  delays  at  Cienfuegos. 
The  department  did  not  suppress  the  "Dear  Schley"  note,  for  it 
had  no  knowledge  of  its  existence  on  February  6th  and  did  not 
receive  a  copy  of  it  until  February  9th.  The  note  existed  only  in 
the  original  in  Commodore  Schley's  possession  and  he  alone  had 
the  power  to  withhold  or  suppress  it.  It  is  impossible  to  suppose 
that  he  was  so  disingenuous  as  to  intend  to  convey  the  impression 
that  the  Department  or  Admiral  Sampson  had  suppressed  some- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Just  after  the  Iowa  and  her  consorts  had  gone  word 
came  from  the  department  that  press  despatches  re 
ported  the  Spaniards  at  Santiago.  The  next  day,  May 
21,  the  press  report  corresponding  with  his  own  opin 
ion,  Admiral  Sampson  sent  the  Marblehead  with  or 
ders  to  Commodore  Schley  to  go  to  Santiago  if  he  was 
satisfied  the  Spaniards  were  not  at  Cienfuegos.  Later 
in  the  day,  after  he  had  left  Key  West  for  Havana,  and 
evidently  growing  more  certain  as  to  Santiago,  he  sent 
the  Hawk  with  another  message  to  Commodore  Schley, 
ordering  him  imperatively  and  without  qualification 
to  go  to  Santiago,  and,  as  the  Hawk  would  reach  Cien 
fuegos  on  May  23,  to  leave  before  daylight  on  the  24th. 

Turning  now  to  the  Flying  Squadron  it  appears  that 
Commodore  Schley  reached  Cienfuegos  on  the  2ist, 
and  on  the  22d  he  wrote  that  he  could  not  say  whether 
the  Spanish  fleet  was  there  or  not,  and  complained  of 
the  difficulty  of  coaling.  On  the  23d  he  wrote,  in  re 
ply  to  the  unqualified  orders  conveyed  by  the  Hawk, 
that  on  account  of  the  smoke  visible  in  the  harbor  he 
believed  that  the  Spaniards  were  there,  that  he  doubted 
the  report  about  Santiago,  that  he  thought  it  unwise 
to  chase  a  probability,  and  should  remain  where  he  was. 
In  other  words  he  said  that  he  proposed  to  disobey  the 
unqualified  "Hawk"  orders  for  the  reasons  he  stated. 

thing  not  in  their  possession,  but  this  impression  got  abroad,  and 
once  for  all  should  be  shown  to  be  entirely  false.  As  to  the  sec 
ond  point,  the  "Dear  Schley"  note  furnished  neither  defence  nor 
excuse  for  the  de1ay  at  Cienfuegos,  for  on  arriving  on  May  22nd 
at  one  o'clock  it  was  superseded  together  with  the  original  in 
struction  of  May  19  at  7.30  A.  M.,  on  May  23d,  when  the  Hawk 
arrived  with  imperative  orders  to  proceed  at  once  to  Santiago,  or 
ders  which  were  not  obeyed  by  Commodore  Schley  until  the  late 
afternoon  of  May  24th. 

90 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

Later  in  the  day  he  sent  another  despatch,  saying  that 
a  steamship,  the  Adula,  just  in  reported  seven  ships 
seventy  miles  south  of  Santiago,  but  that  from  the 
firing  of  guns  which  he  had  heard  in  the  harbor,  a 
salute  of  welcome,  as  he  guessed,  although  obviously 
very  belated,  he  still  believed  the  Spaniards  to  be  there. 
The  next  day  May  24,  at  8  A.M.,theMarblehead  ar 
rived  and  Captain  McCalla  at  once  asked  permission  to 
communicate  with  the  Cubans  in  camp  at  Colorados 
point  and  find  out  from  them  whether  the  Spanish  fleet 
was  in  the  harbor  or  not.  This  was  a  sure  means  of 
getting  absolute  information  as  to  the  presence  of  Cer- 
vera  in  Cienfuegos  but  Commodore  Schley  had  con 
tented  himself  with  guessing  from  the  appearance  of 
smoke  or  the  sound  of  guns  and  had  refrained  from 
asking  the  simple  direct  question  from  those  who  knew 
because  he  considered  that  the  surf  was  heavy  and 
did  not  think  that  he  could  land  boats  to  make  the  nec 
essary  inquiries.  Captain  McCalla  was  less  anxious 
about  the  surf  and  having  obtained  the  required  author 
ity  ran  in,  opened  communication  with  the  Cubans, 
learned  at  once  that  Cervera  was  not  in  Cienfuegos  and 
had  never  been  there  and  before  three  o'clock  Com 
modore  Schley  had  the  information.  He  sent  on  that 
day  a  long  despatch  complaining  of  the  difficulty  of 
coaling  where  he  was,  and  declaring  that  he  could  not 
coal  off  Santiago,  but  saying  that  he  should  start  east 
ward  on  the  following  day.  But  after  the  direct  know 
ledge  obtained  in  quick  and  energetic  fashion  by  Cap 
tain  McCalla  there  was  no  possible  reason  or  excuse 
for  further  delay  and  at  quarter  before  six  on  May  24 
the  squadron  started  having  lost  two  days,  for  if  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Hawk  orders  had  been  obeyed  they  would  have  been 
at  Santiago  on  May  24th  as  Sampson  expected  instead 
of  just  leaving  Cienfuegos.  So,  on  May  25,  while 
Sampson,  disturbed  by  Schley's  reply  to  the  Hawk  des 
patches,  and  by  the  delay  he  foresaw,  when  every  hour 
was  precious,  was  sending  still  another  boat  to  Cien 
fuegos  with  orders  for  Santiago  more  imperative  than 
any  which  had  gone  before,  the  Flying  Squadron,  con 
vinced  at  last  by  Captain  McCalla's  direct  information 
from  the  insurgents  that  the  enemy  were  not  in  Cien 
fuegos,  was  steaming  to  the  eastward  very  slowly  in 
order  to  allow  the  little  Eagle  which  was  of  no  import 
ance  whatever  to  the  fighting  line  to  keep  up.  On  the 
26th,  at  noon,  they  were  forty-seven  miles  west-south 
west  of  Santiago's  Morro;  at  eight  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  twenty-two  miles  to  the  southward  of  the  cas 
tle.  There  the  three  scouts  the  Minneapolis,  St.  Paul 
and  Yale  were  met  and  Captain  Sigsbee  of  the  St.  Paul 
who  had  been  there  since  the  2ist  of  May  reported 
that  he  had  not  seen  the  Spanish  fleet  but  that  he 
thoroughly  believed  it  to  be  there  and  the  Cuban  pilot 
Nunez  although  of  opinion  that  the  Spanish  vessels 
could  not  enter  the  harbor  admitted  that  they  might 
have  got  in  with  tugs.*  Acting  on  this  informa 
tion  and  without  an  effort  to  find  out  whether  Cervera 


*NOTE. — Admiral  Schley  in  his  letter  to  the  Senate  Committee 
states  that  Captain  Sigsbee  assured  him  that  he  did  not  believe 
that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  in  Santiago.  Captain  Sigsbee  in  his 
Jetter  of  February  24th  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  says  that 
his  belief  constantly  and  openly  expressed  was  the  exact  contrary 
of  that'  attributed  to  him  by  Admiral  Schley  and  that  Nunez  ad 
mitted  that  Cervera's  fleet  might  have  got  in  by  the  aid  of  tugs, 
a  statement  Admiral  Schley  omits  to  repeat  in  giving  the  opinion 
of  Nunez. 

92 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

was  in  Santiago,  Commodore  Schley  then  signalled, 
"Destination,  Key  West  via  south  side  of  Cuba  and 
Yucatan  Channel  as  soon  as  collier  is  ready;  speed, 
nine  knots."  For  one  week  the  door  of  Santiago  had 
been  open  to  Cervera,  coaling  slowly  and  feebly  within, 
to  issue  forth  and  go  where  he  pleased.  At  last  an 
American  fleet  was  in  the  neighborhood,  and  still  the 
door  stood  open.  Obeying  the  signal  of  the  flag-ship, 
the  fleet  started  slowly  westward  for  Key  West.  On 
the  morning  of  May  27th  the  retreating  Flying  Squad 
ron  which  had  gone  some  eighteen  miles  to  the  west 
ward  and  was  forty  miles  from  Santiago  when  it 
stopped,  met  the  Harvard  and  Captain  Colton  gave  Ad 
miral  Schley  the  following  order  from  the  Navy  DC- 
WASHINGTON,  May  25,  1898. 
HARVARD,  St.  Nicholas  Mole,  Haiti: 

Proceed  at  once  and  inform  Schley,  and  also  the  senior  officer 
present  off  Santiago,  as  follows:  All  Department's  information 
indicates  Spanish  division  is  still  at  Santiago.  The  Department 
looks  to  you  to  ascertain  facts,  and  that  the  enemy,  if  therein,  does 
not  leave  without  a  decisive  action.  Cubans  familiar  with  San 
tiago  say  that  there  are  landing  places  5  or  6  nautical  miles  west 
from  the  mouth  of  harbor,  and  that  there  insurgents  probably 
will  be  found,  and  not  the  Spanish.  From  the  surrounding 
heights  can  see  every  vessel  in  port.  As  soon  as  ascertained,  noti 
fy  the  Department  whether  enemy  is  there.  Could  not  squadron 
and  also  the  Harvard  coal  from  Merrimac  leeward  of  Cape  Cruz, 
Gonaives  Channel  or  Mole,  Haiti?  The  Department  will  send 
coal  immediately  to  Mole.  Report  without  delay  situation  at  San 
tiago  de  Cuba.  LONG. 

To  this  unqualified  order  Admiral  Schley  made  the 
following  reply. 

KINGSTON,  May  28,  1898. 

SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY,  Washington:    (written  May  27,  1898.) 
The  receipt  of  telegram  of  May  26*  is  acknowledged.     Deliv- 

93 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

ered  by  Harvard  off  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Merrimac  engines  dis 
abled;  is  heavy;  am  obliged  to  have  towed  to  Key  West.  Have 
been  unable  absolutely  to  coal  the  Texas,  Marblehead,  Vixen, 
Brooklyn  from  collier,  all  owing  to  very  rough  sea.  Bad 
weather  since  leaving  Key  West.  The  Brooklyn  alone  has  more 
than  sufficient  coal  to  proceed  to  Key  West ;  can  not  remain  off 
Santiago  present  state  squadron  coal  account.  Impossible  to 
coal  leeward  Cape  Cruz  in  the  summer,  all  owing  to  southwester 
ly  winds.  Harvard  reports  coal  sufficient  for  Jamaica ;  leaves  to 
day  for  Kingston;  reports  only  small  vessels  could  coal  at 
Gonaives  or  Mole.  Minneapolis  only  coaled  for  Key  West;  also 
Yale,  which  tows  Merrimac.  Much  to  be  regretted,  can  not  obey 
orders  of  Department.  Have  striven  earnestly ;  forced  to  proceed 
for  coal  to  Key  West  by  way  of  Yucatan  passage.  Can  not  as 
certain  anything  respecting  enemy  positive.  Obliged  to  send 
Eagle — admitted  no  delay — to  Port  Antonio,  Jamaica;  had  only 
25  tons  of  coal.  Will  leave  St.  Paul  off  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Will 
require  10,000  tons  of  coal  at  Key  West.  Very  difficult  to  tow 
collier  to  get  cable  to  hold. 

SCHLEY. 

This  telegram  repeated  to  Admiral  Sampson  at  Key  West, 
May  29. 

This  was  direct  and  admitted  disobedience  of  orders. 
Far  from  striving  earnestly,  he  had  made  no  effort 
further  than  to  ask  the  opinion  of  the  scouts  to  de 
termine  whether  Cervera  was  in  Santiago  or  not  and 
now  announced  that  he  was  forced  to  proceed  to  Key 
West  for  coal  and  that  he  was  unable  to  coal  at  sea. 
Neither  statement  was  correct.  The  coal  supply  on  the 
ships  was  as  follows. 

Extracts  from  logs  of  vessels  for  May  27. 

Massachusetts :  Tons 

Coal  remaining  on  hand  at  noon  5  to  6  days' supply.  . . .  789 

Texas : 

Coal  remaining  on  hand  at  noon  5  to  6  days' supply. . . .  394 

Brooklyn : 

Coal  remaining  on  hand  at  noon  10  to  12  days' supply. .       940 

94 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

Marblehead :  Tons 

Coal  remaining  on  hand  at  noon  3  to  4  days' supply. ...  116 

Iowa : 

Coal  remaining  on  hand  at  noon  8  to  10  days' supply.  ..  762 

Merrimac : 

Coal  at  noon,  on  hand 4,300 

As  to  not  being  able  to  coal  at  sea  from  the  Merri 
mac  with  her  4,300  tons  on  board  the  ships  were  coaled 
from  her  at  sea  during  the  two  following  days. 

The  Merrimac  before  this  had  broken  do\vn  and  the 
Squadron  had  drifted  about  while  efforts  were  made  to 
repair  her  and  while  the  Yale  was  trying  to  take  her 
in  tow  but  after  sending  his  despatch  announcing  that 
he  could  not  obey  the  orders  of  the  Department,  Admi 
ral  Schley  started  again  to  the  westward  away  from 
Santiago.  The  Squadron  made  about  twenty-five  miles 
and  then  stopped  and  remained  where  it  was  perform 
ing  the  impossible  feat  of  coaling  at  sea  until  between 
one  and  two  o'clock  on  May  28th.  Then  being  about 
forty-eight  miles  west  of  Santiago  the  door  all  this  time 
having  remained  wide  open  to  Cervera  to  go  whither 
he  pleased  Admiral  Schley  apparently  changed  his  mind 
once  more  and  made  a  signal  from  the  flag-ship  to  move 
to  the  eastward.  Steaming  slowly,  the  squadron  reached 
Santiago  that  evening.  The  next  morning,  at  quarter 
before  eight,  the  Iowa  made  out  the  Colon  and  two 
other  cruisers  in  the  harbor.  The  game  of  hide-and- 
seek  was  at  an  end,  and  the  Spanish  fleet  had  been 
found  at  last.  There  was  and  could  be  no  question 
now  as  to  going  away,  and  the  squadron  during  May 
30  stood  to  and  fro  off  Santiago,  well  out  from  the 
land  with  the  Marblehead  and  Vixen  patrolling 

95 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

nearer  inshore.  During  that  day  the  New  Orleans  ap 
peared  with  the  collier  Sterling,  and  on  the  next  day 
when  night  came  the  squadron  went  away  out  of  sight 
from  land  giving  Cervera  ample  opportunity  to  run  out 
in  the  darkness;  Admiral  Schley's  theory  being  appar 
ently  that  a  close  blockade  by  daylight  was  sufficient. 
On  May  31,  the  Massachusetts  leading,  with  Admiral 
Schley  on  board,  and  followed  by  the  New  Orleans  and 
lozva,  ran  in  and  opened  fire  upon  the  ships  and  bat 
teries  in  the  harbor.  The  ranges  began  at  7.500  yards 
and  were  increased  to  11,000,  the  bombardment  lasting 
half  an  hour,  the  shots  falling  short,  and  no  damage 
whatever  being  done  to  the  Spaniards.  Then  the  ships 
drew  off  to  their  station,  well  out  from  the  land,  to  con 
tinue  during  the  daytime  this  somewhat  remote  block 
ade  and  to  retire  out  of  sight  from  land  at  night. *  Cer- 
vera's  door  was  closing  upon  him.  He  could  still  come 
out  at  his  pleasure  more  readily  at  night  than  by  day 
but  at  the  cost,  perhaps,  a  fight. 

The  anxiety  in  Washington  and  on  board  the  flag 
ship  of  the  North  Atlantic  fleet  during  these  perilous 
days,  while  the  Flying  Squadron  was  making  its  slow 
way  eastward  from  Cienfuegos  and  drifting  about  some 
forty  miles  away  from  Santiago,  was  intense,  and  grew 
more  feverish  as  the  presence  of  the  Spanish  fleet  be 
came  more  assured  and  the  despatches  from  Commodore 
Schley  more  uncertain.  On  May  27,  after  sending,  as 

*NoxE. — The  Marblehead  at  night  remained  within  about  six 
miles  of  the  Morro,  and  the  other  ships  steamed  to  and  fro  before 
the  entrance,  where  they  could  make  out  the  entrance  clearly,  but 
so  far  off  that  they  could  not  be  seen  from  land  at  all.  See  diary 
of  Lieutenant  Muller  y  Fejeiro,  published  by  Bureau  of  Naval  In 
telligence,  pages  16  and  17. 

96 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

has  been  said,  imperative  orders  for  the  third  time  to 
leave  Cienfuegos,  Admiral  Sampson  received  Commo 
dore  Schley's  despatch  of  the  24th  depicting  the  diffi 
culties  of  coaling  and  announcing  his  departure  for 
Santiago.  Thereupon  he  ordered  Captain  Folger,  in 
the  Nezv  Orleans,  to  proceed  at  once  to  Santiago,  di 
rect  Commodore  Schley  to  maintain  the  blockade  there 
at  all  hazards,  and  to  use  the  collier  Sterling  (a  sten 
ographer's  mistake  for  the  Merrimac)  for  the  obstruc 
tion  of  the  channel  by  sinking  her  in  the  narrowest  part. 
The  next  day,  May  28,  at  midnight,  came  news  from 
Secretary  Long  of  Schley's  despatch  of  the  27th  an 
nouncing  his  departure  from  Santiago  for  Key  West, 
which  had  made  the  day  of  its  arrival  the  darkest  of 
the  whole  war  to  the  Navy  Department.  The  Secre 
tary  asked  if  Sampson  could  go  with  the  New  York, 
Oregon,  and  Indiana  to  Santiago,  and  how  long  he 
could  blockade.  Sampson  replied  that  he  could  block 
ade  indefinitely,  and  asked  leave  to  go  at  once  with  the 
Neiv  York  and  Oregon.  Permission  came  in  the  even 
ing,  and  at  eleven  o'clock  Sampson  left  Key  West  in 
the  Nezv  York,  was  joined  the  next  morning  by  the 
Oregon,  the  converted  yacht  Maynozver,  and  the  tor 
pedo-boat  Porter,  and  set  off  at  high  speed  for  Santi 
ago.  On  the  way,  filled  with  anxiety  because  the  last 
news  was  that  the  Flying  Squadron  had  left  Santiago, 
the  admiral  met  the  Yale  and  the  St.  Paul,  and  re 
ceived  from  Captain  Sigsbee  a  despatch  from  Commo 
dore  Schley  of  May  29,  announcing  that  the  Spanish 
cruisers  had  been  seen  and  that  he  was  blockading  the 
port.  Greatly  relieved,  the  admiral  sped  on,  and  at  six 
in  the  morning  of  June  i  he  saw  the  Colon  inside  the 
7  97 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Morro  point,  and  the  Flying  Squadron  lying  off  the 
narrow  entrance.  All  was  well ;  the  Spaniards  had  been 
found,  they  were  still  in  their  hiding-place,  and  now 
the  door  was  really  to  be  closed  by  night  as  well  as  day 
so  that  Cervera  would  only  be  able  to  choose  between 
capture  in  the  harbor,  or  breaking  open  the  door  and 
rushing  to  destruction  outside. 

The  first  movement  of  Admiral  Sampson  was  to  ob 
struct  the  narrow  channel.  He  did  not  hope  to  block  it 
permanently,  for  he  knew  that  any  obstruction  could 
sooner  or  later  be  removed  by  dynamite.  But  he  be 
lieved,  and  with  reason,  that  he  could  obstruct  it  tem 
porarily,  and  his  object  was  to  gain  time  for  the  ar 
rival  of  the  troops,  whose  coming  was  already  an 
nounced,  and  whose  presence  would  be  absolutely  nec 
essary  to  enable  him  to  get  at  the  Spaniards,  either  by 
forcing  Cervera  to  leave  the  harbor,  or  by  obtaining 
control  of  and  clearing  the  mine-fields  so  that  he  could 
himself  enter  and  attack.  To  attain  this  object  he  had 
decided  to  sink  a  collier  in  the  channel,  and  gave  orders 
to  that  effect  to  Captain  Folger  when  he  sent  him  off 
on  May  27  to  Santiago.  On  the  29th  he  opened  the 
subject  to  Lieutenant  Richmond  Pearson  Hobson,  a 
young  naval  constructor  of  marked  ability  and  energy, 
and  by  the  time  the  fleet  reached  Santiago  on  June  i 
Hobson  had  prepared  his  plan,  which  was  so  thorough 
and  excellent  that  the  admiral  decided  to  place  the  peril 
ous  and  important  work  wholly  in  the  hands  of  that 
young  officer.  Thus  far  nothing  had  been  done  toward 
closely  locking  Cervera  up  in  his  retreat,  but  as  soon 
as  Admiral  Sampson  arrived  the  Mcrrimac  was  se 
lected  to  be  sunk  in  the  channel,  and  the  work  of  strip- 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

ping  her  and  making  ready  the  anchors  which  were  to 
hold  her,  and  the  torpedoes  which  were  to  shatter  her 
bottom,  went  forward  with  hot  haste  under  the  direc 
tion  of  Lieutenant  Hobson.  The  call  for  volunteers 
was  made  by  signal,  and  hundreds  of  the  sailors  came 
forward.  Men  begged  to  be  taken,  implored  Hobson  to 
choose  them,  and  turned  away  utterly  miserable  be 
cause  they  could  not  go  on  a  desperate  undertaking 
which  every  one  believed  meant  certain  death  while 
those  who  were  chosen  thanked  their  officers  weeks  aft 
erwards  for  kindly  allowing  them  to  go  when  so  many 
were  seeking  this  terrible  chance.  Here  again  was  a 
very  fine  and  noble  spirit,  telling  what  the  American 
navy  was,  and  why  it  was  soon  to  be  victorious — some 
thing  here  quite  worthy  of  the  consideration  of  Spain, 
which  had  so  insisted  upon  senseless  war. 

Hobson  finally  selected  from  the  crowd  of  appli 
cants  Phillips,  Kelly,  Mullen,  and  Deignan,  of  the 
Mcrrimac,  because  they  were  familiar  with  the  ship; 
then  he  took  Charette,  a  gunner's  mate,  and  Montague, 
chief  master-at-arms,  from  the  New  York,  and  thus 
completed  his  little  crew.  Captain  Miller  of  the  Mer- 
rimac  was  bitterly  disappointed  when  the  admiral  told 
him  he  could  not  go,  but  that  did  not  prevent  him  from 
giving  every  advice  and  help  to  the  men  who  were  go 
ing  on  his  ship.  The  preparations,  although  pushed 
with  such  intense  energy,  were  so  many  that  it  was 
difficult  to  get  them  finished,  and  the  night  was  far 
gone  when  all  was  done.  At  last  the  ship  started,  and 
then  there  was  more  delay  in  trying  to  tow  the  launch, 
which  was  to  run  in  as  near  as  possible  and  wait  to 
rescue  any  survivors  after  the  ship  had  sunk.  When 

99 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

they  finally  set  forth  there  was  already  a  streak  of  light 
in  the  east,  and  as  the  Merrimac  was  steaming  to  the 
harbor  entrance,  the  torpedo-boat  Porter  dashed  up 
with  an  order  of  recall  from  the  admiral.  Back  went 
the  Merrimac,  and  a  day  of  waiting  and  suspense  fol 
lowed,  not  easy  to  bear  when  men's  nerves  were  strung 
to  such  work  as  lay  before  Hobson  and  his  crew.  Mul 
len,  utterly  exhausted  by  his  labors  in  preparing  the 
ship,  gave  out,  and  his  place  was  taken  by  Murphy,  a 
coxswain  on  the  Iowa.  Robert  Crank,  the  assistant 
engineer  of  the  ship,  with  bitter  disappointment,  was 
ordered  away  at  the  last  moment  and  not  allowed  to  go. 
Finally  the  long  day  passed,  night  came,  and  at  half 
past  three  in  the  morning  the  Merrimac  started  again, 
this  time  with  an  additional  man,  Clausen,  who  was 
coxswain  of  the  barge,  and  had  come  on  board  with 
Ensign  Powell.  He  asked  permission  to  go,  and  was 
accepted  by  Hobson,  thus  getting  his  chance  at  the 
great  prize  of  death  in  battle.  This  time  there  was  no 
recall;  on  she  ran,  every  man  at  his  post,  the  young 
lieutenant  standing  upright  and  alone  on  the  bridge, 
Deignan  at  the  wheel,  steering  coolly  an'd  taking  every 
order  with  absolute  correctness,  and  not  a  sailor  mov 
ing  except  at  the  word  of  command.  Nearer  and 
nearer  the  doomed  ship  went,  with  gradually  slackening 
speed.  Then  the  Spaniards  saw  her,  and  there  came  a, 
storm  of  shot  and  shell,  fierce,  resistless,  like  a  torrent. 
Still  on  the  ship  steered,  still  slackening  in  speed— goes 
too  far,  as  the  event  proved,  her  steering-gear  having 
been  shot  away,  and  the  lashings  of  Montague's  anchor, 
which  dropped  too  soon — and  then,  torn  by  her  own 
torpedoes  and  by  those  of  the  enemy,  she  sinks  far  up 

100 


THE    LAST    OF    THE   MLKRLMAC 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

in  the  channel.  The  parting  of  the  anchors,  the  loss 
of  the  steering-gear,  and  consequent  running  in  too  far, 
the  sweep  of  the  current,  combine,  and  she  goes  to  the 
bottom,  lying  lengthwise,  and  not  across.  The  crew, 
every  task  performed,  lie  at  the  appointed  place  upon 
the  deck  in  the  storm  of  projectiles,  the  torpedoes  ex 
ploding  beneath,  and  go  down  with  the  reeling  ship  into 
the  whirl  of  dark  waters.  They  have  done  their  duty. 
The  Mcrrimac,  as  she  lies  now,  makes  the  entrance 
perhaps  a  little  more  difficult,  but  does  not  block  it.  So 
far  the  attempt  fails,  but  the  brave  deed  does  not  fail, 
for  such  gallantry  is  never  a  failure.  It  rouses  and  up 
lifts  the  American  people,  for  these  men  are  theirs;  it 
appeals  to  the  lovers  of  daring  the  world  over;  it  is  a 
shining  and  splendid  feat  of  arms;  it  tells  to  all  what 
the  American  navy  is;  it  ranks  Hobson  with  Gushing 
when  he  pushed  his  torpedo  against  the  Albcmarle, 
with  Decatur  when  he  fired  the  Philadelphia.  And  the 
men  who  did  the  deed  cling,  chilled  and  spent  in  the 
water,  to  the  raft  which  is  fast  to  the  sunken  ship,  and 
in  the  darkness  are  not  hit  or  found,  but  in  the  morning 
are  taken  off  by  Admiral  Cervera,  who  greets  them  as 
"valiente."  On  the  American  side,  brave  young 
Powell,  creeping  about  with  his  launch,  in  the  midst  of 
a  heavy  fire  from  the  batteries,  on  the  chance  of  res 
cuing  Hobson  and  his  men,  comes  out  at  last,  much  fired 
at,  but  with  none  of  the  Mcrrimac  crew  on  board,  and 
when  he  closes  his  report,  saying  simply,  "and  no  one 
came  back,  sir,"  the  fleet  fear  the  worst,  and  believe 
that  the  gallant  deed  has  been  paid  for  with  eight  lives. 
But  later  in  the  day  comes  out  a  Spanish  boat,  with  a 
flag  from  Admiral  Cervera,  to  announce  that  Hobson 

101 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  his  sailors  are  prisoners,  alive  and  well,  and  little 
hurt.  It  is  sad  that  for  the  sake  of  Spain  they  could 
not  have  remained  with  Admiral  Cervera — a  brave 
man  facing  inevitable  ruin  with  courage — but  they  were 
turned  over  to  the  military  authorities  on  land,  who 
placed  them  and  kept  them  for  some  days  in  the  Morro 
Castle,  in  range  of  the  American  bombardment — an 
act  rather  sullying  to  a  people  who  are  fond  of  talking 
about  honor,  but  appear  to  think  that  in  that  connection 
words  are  enough. 

So  closed  the  first  move  of  Admiral  Sampson  to 
blockade  the  enemy.  The  second,  which  began  at  the 
same  time,  lasted  for  many  weary  days,  and  was  neither 
suddenly  brilliant  nor  vividly  picturesque,  but  like  much 
of  what  is  best  in  the  world,  without  show,  with  no 
chance  of  ever  getting  the  due  meed  of  praise,  except 
from  history  and  posterity  did  efficiently  and  well  the 
work  that  was  there  to  do.  This  second  move  was  the 
establishment  of  the  blockade  of  the  harbor  by  the  ships. 
Foreign  experts  doubted  whether  it  were  possible  to 
blockade  four  cruisers  and  two  fine  torpedo-boat  de 
stroyers  in  any  harbor.  The  latter,  it  was  thought, 
would  surely  slip  out  in  the  darkness,  and  then  would 
come  in  a  moment's  space  the  destruction  of  a  battle 
ship  or  two,  and  so  an  end  of  the  blockade.  But  there 
was  no  darkness  in  the  entrance  of  Santiago  Harbor 
after  the  8th  of  June.  Two  battle-ships,  relieving 
and  supporting  each  other,  went  in  every  night  within 
four  miles,  and  the  rays  of  the  powerful  search-lights 
made  the  narrow  channel  as  bright  as  day.  So  great 
was  the  glare  that  when  the  fatal  moment  came  Admiral 
Cervera  did  not  dare  to  issue  forth  into  that  zone  of 

102 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

white  light,  where  he,  blinded  by  the  glare,  would  have 
been  a  helpless  target  for  an  enemy  veiled  in  the  dark 
ness.  At  night  also  picket-launches  ran  in  less  than  a 
mile  from  the  shore,  and  there,  within  rifle  range,  toss 
ing  often  on  rough  seas,  watched  through  the  long 
hours,  ready  to  give  warning  of  the  slightest  movement 
from  inside  the  harbor.  The  close  blockade  by  day 
begun  on  June  i  was  kept  up  and  constantly  increased 
in  stringency.  The  ships,  at  first  stationed  at  six  miles 
from  the  harbor  mouth,  were  drawn  in  to  four  miles  a 
little  later,  and  the  enemy  thus  hemmed  in,  so  that  at  no 
hour  in  the  twenty-four  could  he  come  forth  without 
meeting  the  American  fleet  in  carefully  chosen  posi 
tions,  ready  for  battle,  and  with  orders  which  left  no 
room  for  doubt  as  to  just  what  they  should  do.  In  this 
blockade,  where  nothing  was  overlooked  and  nothing 
forgotten,  Admiral  Sampson,  by  strenuous  honest 
work,  by  keen  foresight,  and  by  unwearying  and  un 
ceasing  vigilance,  made  not  only  possible,  but  humanly 
speaking,  certain,  the  victory  which  was  to  come,  a 
great  feat  in  naval  warfare,  and  a  very  fine  and  lasting- 
service  to  the  American  campaign. 

The  blockade  was  varied  by  a  bombardment  on  June 
6,  by  an  attack  on  the  battery  east  of  the  Morro  by  the 
Nczv  Orleans  on  June  14,  and  by  another  general  bom 
bardment  on  June  16.  In  all  these  attacks  the  Ameri 
can  gunnery  was  excellent,  and  the  batteries  were  for 
the  time  silenced.  To  these  bombardments  were  added 
the  assaults  of  the  Vesuvius,  which  arrived  on  June  13, 
and  began  at  once  to  run  in  at  night  and  hurl  her  dyna 
mite  shells  at  the  forts  and  harbor.  The  ship  had  a 
terrible  weapon,  but  as  she  was  unable  to  get  direction 

103 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

or  aim,  the  falling  of  her  shells  was  largely  a  matter  of 
accident.  If  by  chance  they  struck  near  a  battery,  a 
ship,  or  a  building,  wreck  and  ruin  followed,  but  wher 
ever  they  dropped  the  explosion  was  so  terrific,  coming 
as  they  did  silently  out  of  the  darkness,  that  they  car 
ried  consternation  and  alarm,  and  had  a  moral  effect 
wholly  out  of  proportion  to  their  actual  results,  tending 
in  this  way,  no  doubt,  to  prevent  any  attempts  on  the 
part  of  the  Spaniards  either  to  seek  escape  at  night  or  to 
send  out  torpedo-boats. 

Only  one  point  remained  to  be  covered  in  order  to 
assure  the  successful  maintenance  of  the  blockade,  and 
that  was  to  possess  a  safe  harbor  for  shelter,  coaling, 
and  repairs.  This  indispensable  adjunct  Admiral  Samp 
son  secured  by  sending  the  Marblehead  and  Yankee  to 
Guantanamo,  where  they  drove  the  Spanish  gunboats 
to  the  inner  harbor,  which  was  protected  by  mines  in  the 
channel,  and  made  themselves  masters  of  the  outer  har 
bor,  which  was  excellently  suited  to  the  needs  of  the 
fleet.  To  make  possession  useful  as  well  as  complete, 
it  became  necessary  to  hold  a  position  on  shore  and 
drive  back  the  enemy,  so  that  they  could  not  annoy  the 
ships  and  boats  in  the  bay.  For  this  work  the  first  bat 
talion  of  marines,  which  had  left  Key  West  on  June  7, 
was  employed,  and  on  June  10  their  transport,  the  Pan 
ther,  arrived  in  Guantanamo  Bay.  The  marines,  be 
tween  five  and  six  hundred  strong,  landed  immediately, 
and  established  themselves  on  a  low  hill  where  a  Span 
ish  block-house  had  been  destroyed  by  the  guns  of  the 
Yankee.  The  next  evening  they  were  attacked  by  the 
Spaniards  concealed  in  the  chaparral,  and  two  men  on 
outposts  were  killed.  The  attack  was  renewed  in  the 

104 


f 


SOI.IMKKS    «)!••    TI1K    (THAN    ARMY 
l-'nuii  a  photograph  taken  at  the  time  of  the  landing  of  the  Ai 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

night  by  the  unseen  enemy  and  Surgeon  Gibbs  was 
killed  and  two  privates  wounded.  The  next  day  the 
camp  was  shifted  to  a  better  position,  and  some  sixty 
Cubans  came  in  and  joined  the  Americans.  The  firing 
of  the  Spanish  continued  throughout  the  night,  and 
Sergeant  Good  was  killed,  but  on  the  I3th,  with  the  aid 
of  the  Cubans,  who  knew  the  country,  they  were  easily 
repelled.  On  the  I4th  the  Americans  took  the  offen 
sive.  Two  companies  of  marines,  supported  by  the 
Cubans,  left  the  camp  at  nine  o'clock  to  destroy  the  well 
at  Cuzco,  which  was  the  only  water-supply  for  the 
Spaniards  within  twelve  miles.  They  failed  to  cut  off 
the  enemy,  as  they  had  hoped,  but  they  drove  the  Span 
iards  steadily  before  them,  reaching  the  intervening  hill 
first,  and  carrying  the  crest  under  a  sharp  fire.  As  the 
marines  descended  into  the  valley  the  Spaniards  broke 
cover  and  retreated  rapidly,  and  at  three  o'clock  the 
fight  was  over,  the  well  filled  up,  and  the  heliograph 
signal  station  captured  and  destroyed.  One  lieutenant 
and  seventeen  men  were  taken  prisoners,  and  they  re 
ported  a  Spanish  loss  of  two  officers  and  fifty-eight  men 
killed,  and  a  large  number  of  wounded.  On  the  Amer 
ican  side  one  marine  was  wounded,  and  about  a  dozen 
were  overcome  by  heat.  This  was  the  end  of  the  Span 
ish  attacks.  They  had  had  enough,  and  withdrew, 
leaving  the  American  post  undisturbed  to  the  end  of  the 
campaign.  The  marines  had  done  their  work  most  ad 
mirably.  For  three  days  and  nights  they  had  met  and 
repelled  the  attacks  of  a  concealed  enemy,  never  flinch 
ing  under  the  strain  whch  had  been  upon  them  without 
a  moment's  relief.  Then  they  had  taken  the  offensive, 
and  had  marched  and  fought  for  six  hours  under  the 

105 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

tropical  sun  and  through  a  dense  forest  and  under 
growth  with  the  steadiness  and  marksmanship  of  ex 
perienced  bushfighters.  It  was  a  very  brave,  honest, 
and  effective  piece  of  work,  showing  admirable  disci 
pline  and  a  surprising  readiness  to  meet  new  and  strange 
conditions. 

On  June  1 5  the  work  of  the  marines  was  followed  up 
by  the  Marblchcad,  Texas,  and  Suwanee  going  into 
Caimanera,  silencing  the  batteries,  and  driving  the 
Spaniards  completely  away.  The  ships  penetrated  so 
far  into  the  channel  of  the  inner  harbor  that  they  ran 
on  to  torpedoes,  the  Marblehead  picking  up  one  on  her 
propeller,  fortunately  so  thick  with  barnacles  that  it 
did  not  explode  by  contact,  as  it  was  intended  to  do. 
Thus  the  affair  at  Guantanamo  Bay  was  finished,  and  a 
secure  refuge,  base,  coaling  and  repair  station  were 
secured  for  the  fleet,  which  assured  its  ability  to  con 
tinue  the  blockade — a  very  important  operation,  per 
formed  with  the  thoroughness,  foresight,  and  minute 
care  which  characterized  all  Admiral  Sampson's  work. 
But  the  best  arranged  and  most  systematic  blockade, 
the  most  vigorous  and  sustained  bombardments,  the 
workmanlike  establishment  of  a  fine  naval  base — none 
of  these  things  could  bring  the  American  ships  along 
side  the  Spanish  cruisers.  It  was  not  the  compara 
tively  feeble  batteries  of  the  Morro,  the  Socapa,  or  Es- 
trella  Point  which  stood  in  the  way.  That  which  held 
back  the  American  fleet  was  the  mine-field  at  the  en 
trance  of  the  harbor,  sown  thick  with  torpedoes  and 
submarine  mines,  exploding  either  by  contact  or  by 
electric  wires  leading  to  batteries  on  shore.  The  navy 
which  offered  hundreds  of  volunteers  to  accompany 

106 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  CERVERA 

Hobson  had  plenty  of  officers  and  men  who  would 
have  cheerfully  dared  all  the  dangers  of  that  narrow 
channel,  defying  alike  shore  batteries  and  sunken  mines. 
But  such  an  attempt  would  have  been  not  only  perilous, 
and  worthless,  but  a  blunder  of  the  first  magnitude. 
Small  ships,  which  perhaps  might  have  slipped  in, 
would  have  been  utterly  useless  against  the  heavy  Span 
ish  cruisers,  and  a  battle-ship  sunk  by  torpedoes  in  the 
narrow  channel  would  have  been  a  useless  and  crippling 
sacrifice,  and  would  have  blocked  the  entrance  so  that 
the  Spaniards  could  never  have  been  forced  out  and  the 
American  fleet  could  never  have  gone  in.  Once  the 
mine  field  was  cleared,  the  ships  could  enter,  but  the 
mines  could  not  be  reached  or  removed  until  the  bat 
teries  at  the  entrance  were  taken  and  the  garrisons 
driven  away.  For  this  land-work  the  fleet  had  no  ade 
quate  force.  To  reach  and  destroy  the  sea  power  of 
Spain  in  the  West  Indies,  upon  which  the  whole  cam 
paign  against  both  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  turned,  an 
army  was  needed  to  support  the  fleet,  to  take  the  en 
trance  forts  and  thus  permit  the  ships  to  enter,  or  else 
to  capture  the  town  itself  and  force  the  Spaniards  out 
into  the  open.  Thus  it  was  that  while  Admiral  Samp 
son  was  perfecting  his  blockade  at  every  point,  he  was 
urgently  asking  that  land  forces  be  sent  to  his  support, 
and  all  the  officers  and  men  of  the  fleet  were  waiting 
impatiently  for  the  coming  of  the  army  which  should 
deliver  the  Spanish  cruisers  into  their  hands. 


CHAPTER  VI 
SANTIAGO — THE  LAND  FIGHT 

THE  American  navy  was  ready,  as  ships  of  war  must 
always  be,  and  when  the  President  signed  the  Cuban 
resolutions,  the  fleet  started  for  Cuba  without  a  mo 
ment's  delay.  With  the  army,  the  case  was  widely  dif 
ferent.  Congress  had  taken  care  of  the  army  in  a  spas 
modic  and  insufficient  manner,  consistently  doing  noth 
ing  for  it  except  to  multiply  civilian  clerks  and  officials 
of  all  kinds,  who  justified  their  existence  by  a  diligent 
weaving  of  red-tape  and  by  magnifying  details  of  work, 
until  all  the  realities  of  the  service  were  thoroughly  ob 
scured.  Thus  we  had  a  cumbrous,  top-heavy  system  of 
administration,  rusted  and  slow-moving,  and  accus 
tomed  to  care  for  an  army  of  25,000  men.  Then 
war  was  declared.  An  army  of  200,000  volunteers  and 
60,000  regulars  was  suddenly  demanded,  and  the  poor 
old  system  of  military  administration,  with  its  coils  of 
red-tape  and  its  vast  clerical  force  devoted  to  details, 
began  to  groan  and  creak,  to  break  down  here  and  to 
stop  there,  and  to  produce  a  vast  crop  of  delays,  blun 
ders,  and  what  was  far  worse,  of  needless  suffering, 
disease,  and  death,  to  the  brave  men  in  the  field.  There 
upon  came  great  outcry  from  newspapers,  rising  even 
to  hysterical  shrieking  in  some  cases,  great  and  natu 
ral  wrath  among  the  American  people,  and  much  anger 

108 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

and  fault-finding  from  Senators  and  Representatives. 
Then  came,  too,  the  very  human  and  general  desire  to 
find  one  or  more  scapegoats  and  administer  to  them 
condign  punishment,  which  would  have  been  eminently 
soothing  and  satisfactory  to  many  persons — just  in 
some  cases,  perhaps,  unjust  in  most,  but  in  any  event  of 
little  practical  value.  There  was  undoubtedly  a  certain 
not  very  large  percentage  of  shortcomings  due  to  indi 
vidual  incapacity,  which  should  have  been  sharply 
rooted  up  without  regard  to  personal  sensibilities.  But 
the  fundamental  fact  was  that  the  chief  and  predomi 
nant  cause  of  all  the  failures,  blunders,  and  needless 
suffering  was  a  thoroughly  bad  system  of  military  ad 
ministration.  An  inferior  man  can  do  well  with  a  good 
system  better  than  a  superior  man  with  a  bad  system, 
for  a  good  administrative  organization  will  go  on  for 
generations  sometimes,  carrying  poor  administrators 
with  it.  But  a  really  bad  system  is  wellnigh  hopeless, 
and  the  men  of  genius,  the  Pitts,  the  Carnots,  and  the 
Stantons,  who,  bringing  order  out  of  chaos  and  strength 
out  of  weakness,  organize  victory,  are  very  rare,  and  are 
produced  only  by  the  long-continued  stress  of  a  great 
struggle,  and  after  bitter  experience  has  taught  its 
harshest  lessons.  At  the  outset  of  our  war  we  had  a 
bad  system,  and  men  laid  the  blame  here  and  there  for 
faults  of  system  and  organization  which  were  really 
due  to  the  narrowness  and  indifference  of  Congress, 
of  the  newspaper  press,  and  of  the  people,  running  back 
over  many  years.  To-day  the  system  stands  guilty  of 
the  blunders,  delays,  and  needless  sufferings  and  deaths 
of  the  war,  and  war  being  over,  reforms  are  resisted 
by  patriots  who  have  so  little  faith  in  the  republic  that 

109 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

they  think  a  properly  organized  army  of  100,000  men 
puts  it  in  danger,  and  by  bureau  chiefs  and  their  friends 
in  Congress  who  want  no  change,  for  reasons  obvious 
if  not  public-spirited. 

Thus  much  by  the  way  of  preface,  essential  to  the 
comprehension  of  even  the  barest  outline  of  our  mili 
tary  operations  in  the  war  of  1898,  and  to  make  clear 
not  merely  why  there  were  shortcomings,  which  any 
account  must  notice,  but  also  the  fact  that  the  wonder 
of  it  all  lies  not  in  the  blunders  and  failures  of  organi 
zation,  but  in  the  indomitable  energy  and  force  of  the 
American  people  which  made  the  rusty,  clumsy  ma 
chine  work  in  some  fashion,  and  in  the  ability  and  bra 
very  of  American  officers  and  soldiers  which  brought 
unbroken  victory  out  of  such  conditions. 

On  April  23,  125,000  volunteers  were  called  for,  and 
a  month  later,  on  May  25,  75,000  more.  It  was  soon 
found  that  it  was  one  thing  to  call  out  volunteers,  and 
quite  another  to  make  them  into  an  army,  which, 
strangely  enough,  appeared  to  surprise  the  country. 
Even  the  mobilization  of  the  regulars  was  not  rapid, 
and  the  middle  of  May  had  passed  before  they  were 
assembled  at  Tampa.  By  the  beginning  of  June,  how 
ever,  the  regulars  were  gathered ;  but  of  all  the  volun 
teers,  slowly  mustering  in  different  camps  and  in  vari 
ous  stages  of  unreadiness,  only  three  regiments  were 
sufficiently  prepared  to  join  the  forces  at  Tampa.  These 
three  were  the  Seventy-first  New  York,  the  Second 
Massachusetts,  and  the  First  United  States  Volunteer 
Cavalry.  It  was  to  this  army  of  regulars  and  volun 
teers  that  the  government  turned  when  it  became  evi 
dent  that  troops  were  needed  at  Santiago,  and  the  com- 

IIO 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

mancl  of  the  expedition  was  given  to  General  Shafter, 
a  brave  Michigan  soldier  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion 
and  an  officer  of  the  regular  army. 

On  the  night  of  June  7  orders  came  from  Washing 
ton  that  the  army  should  leave  the  next  morning,  and 
then  was  displayed  a  scene  of  vast  confusion.  The 
railroad  tracks  were  blocked  for  miles  with  cars  filled 
with  supplies  tightly  shut  by  red-tape,  at  which  men 
unused  to  responsibility  and  to  the  need  of  quick  action 
gazed  helplessly.  The  cars  not  only  kept  the  supplies 
from  the  army,  but  they  stopped  movement  on  the  line, 
and  hours  were  consumed  where  minutes  should  have 
sufficed  in  transporting  troops  from  Tampa  to  the  Port. 
Once  arrived,  more  confusion  and  a  widening  of  the 
area  of  chaos.  No  proper  arrangement  of  transports — 
no  allotment  at  all  in  some  cases,  and  in  others  the  same 
ship  given  to  two  or  three  regiments.  Thereupon  much 
scrambling,  disorder,  and  complication,  surmounted  at 
last  in  some  rough-and-ready  fashion,  and  the  troops 
were  finally  embarked.  Then  came  orders  to  delay  de 
parture.  There  was  a  false  report  brought  of  a  Spanish 
cruiser  and  torpedo-boats  seen  by  the  Eagle  and  Nash 
ville.  Admiral  Sampson  put  no  faith  in  the  report, 
guessed  accurately  that  the  Eagle  had  been  misled  in  the 
darkness  by  certain  ships  of  our  own  ;  but  unfortunately 
he  was  at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  and  in  the  United 
States  the  false  but  definite  report  of  hostile  ships  was 
accepted,  and  the  army  waited,  sweltering  on  board 
the  crowded  transports,  many  of  them  lying  near  the 
wharves  in  the  canal  or  channel,  which  was  festering 
with  town  sewage.  A  very  heavy  price  this  to  pay  for 
a  mistaken  vision  of  the  night,  and  for  hasty  acceptance 

in 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

of  its  truth.  But  the  long  hot  days,  laden  with  suffering 
and  discomfort  to  the  troops,  finally  wore  by,  and  at  last 
the  transports,  on  June  14,  made  their  way  down  the 
bay,  pushed  on  the  next  day,  were  joined  near  Key 
West  by  some  dozen  ships  of  war  as  convoy,  and  then 
on  the  1 6th  were  fairly  on  their  way  to  Santiago.  Far 
pleasanter  this  than  broiling  in  Tampa  Harbor,  and  the 
spirits  of  the  troops  improved.  Yet  the  movement,  so 
infinitely  better  than  the  hot,  still  waiting,  was  deliber 
ate  enough.  Some  of  the  transports  were  very  old  and 
very  slow,  and  as  they  set  the  speed,  the  fleet  crept 
along  about  eight  knots  an  hour  over  a  sapphire  sea, 
with  beautiful  star-lit  nights,  and  glimpses  by  day  of  the 
picturesque  shores  and  distant  mountains  of  Cuba.  On 
Sunday,  June  19,  they  were  off  Cape  Maisi,  and  at  day 
break  the  next  morning  they  came  in  sight  of  the  wait 
ing  war-ships  and  of  Santiago  Harbor.  Then  came 
consultations  between  General  Shafter  and  Admiral 
Sampson  and  the  Cuban  generals  Garcia  and  Castillo. 
The  plan  of  capturing  the  Morro  and  the  other  entrance 
batteries,  as  the  admiral  desired,  so  that  the  mine-field 
could  be  cleared,  the  fleet  go  in,  destroy  the  Spanish 
cruisers,  and  compel  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  was 
abandoned.  General  Shafter  decided  to  move  directly 
upon  the  city,  and  orders  were  given  to  make  the  land 
ing  at  Daiquiri.  The  army  had  neither  lighters  nor 
launches.  They  had  been  omitted,  forgotten,  or  lost, 
like  an  umbrella,  no  one  knew  exactly  where;  so  the 
work  of  disembarking  the  troops  fell  upon  the  navy. 
Under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  from  the  ships,  the  land 
ing  began,  and  was  effected  without  any  resistance  from 
the  enemy.  On  an  open  coast,  without  any  harbor  or 

112 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

shelter,  with  nothing  but  an  iron  pier  so  high  as  to  be 
useless,  smoothly,  rapidly,  efficiently,  through  a  heavy 
surf,  on  the  beach  and  at  an  unfloored  wooden  wharf, 
the  boats  and  launches  of  the  navy  landed  15,000  offi 
cers  and  soldiers,  with  a  loss  of  only  two  men.  It  was 
a  very  excellent  piece  of  work,  thoroughly  and  punc 
tually  performed,  exciting  admiration  among  foreign 
onlookers,  who  had  just  beheld  with  amazement  the 
very  different  performances  connected  with  the  em 
barkation  at  Tampa. 

The  next  morning  General  Wheeler,  commanding 
the  division  of  dismounted  cavalry,  under  direct  orders 
from  General  Shafter,  rode  forward,  followed  by  two 
squadrons  of  the  First  volunteer  cavalry,  and  one  each 
of  the  First  and  Tenth  regular  cavalry.  When  General 
Wheeler  reached  Juraguacito,  or  Siboney,  he  found 
that  the  Spaniards  had  abandoned  the  block-house  at 
that  point,  retreated  some  three  miles  toward  Sevilla, 
and  had  there  taken  up  a  strong  position,  their  rear 
having  been  engaged  by  some  200  Cubans  with  little 
effect.  By  eight  o'clock  that  night  the  cavalry  division 
reached  Siboney,  and  General  Wheeler,  after  consul 
tation  with  General  Castillo,  determined  to  advance 
and  dislodge  the  enemy  lying  between  the  Americans 
and  Santiago.  The  next  morning  before  daylight  the 
rr  jvement  began.  The  troops  marched  along  two  roads, 
which  were  really  nothing  more  than  mountain  trails. 
The  First  and  Tenth  regular  cavalry,  under  the  im 
mediate  command  of  General  Wheeler,  and  General 
Young  who  had  with  him  some  Hotchkiss  guns, 
marched  by  the  main  or  easterlv  road  to  Sevilla.  Along 
the  westerly  road  went  the  First  volunteer  cavalry, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

nearly  five  hundred  strong.  This  regiment,  enlisted, 
officered,  disciplined,  and  equipped  in  fifty  days,  may 
well  be  considered  for  a  moment  as  it  moves  forward 
to  action  only  two  days  after  its  landing.  It  is  a  very 
typical  American  regiment.  Most  of  the  men  come 
from  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  and  Oklahoma,  where  the 
troops  were  chiefly  raised.  There  are  many  cowboys, 
many  men  of  the  plains,  hunters,  pioneers  and  ranch 
men,  to  whom  the  perils  and  exposure  of  frontier  life 
are  a  twice-told  tale.  Among  them  can  be  found  more 
than  two  score  civilized  but  full-blooded  Indians — 
Americans  by  an  older  lineage  than  any  of  those  who 
are  fighting  just  now  for  the  final  domination  of  the 
New  World.  Then  there  are  boys  from  the  farms  and 
towns  of  the  far-western  territories.  Then,  again, 
strangest  mingling  of  all,  there  are  a  hundred  or  more 
troopers  from  the  East — graduates  of  Yale  and  Har 
vard,  members  of  the  New  York  and  Boston  clubs,  men 
of  wealth  and  leisure  and  large  opportunities.  They 
are  men  who  have  loved  the  chase  of  big  game,  fox 
hunting  and  football,  and  all  the  sports  which  require 
courage  and  strength  and  are  spiced  with  danger.  Some 
have  been  idlers,  many  more  are  workers,  all  have  the 
spirit  of  adventure  strong  within  them,  and  they  are 
there  in  the  Cuban  chaparral  because  they  seek  perils, 
because  they  are  patriotic,  because,  as  some  think,  every 
gentleman  owes  a  debt  to  his  country,  and  this  is  the 
time  to  pay  it.  And  all  these  men,  drawn  from  so  many 
sources,  all  so  American,  all  so  nearly  soldiers  in  their 
life  and  habits,  have  been  roughly,  quickly,  and  effec 
tively  moulded  and  formed  into  a  fighting  regiment  by 
the  skillful  discipline  of  Leonard  Wood,  their  colonel, 

114 


CK.NKKAI,    CAKCIA    AND    likir,  ADI  F.R-C.KNKRAI.    I.ri>I.o\V 
Taken  during  their  confereiiLe  at  the  time  of  the  landing  of  the  American  army 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

a  surgeon  of  the  line,  who  wears  a  medal  of  honor  won 
in  campaigns  against  the  Apaches ;  and  by  the  inspira 
tion  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  their  lieutenant-colonel, 
who  has  laid  down  a  high  place  in  the  administration 
at  Washington  and  come  hither  to  Cuba  because  thus 
only  can  he  live  up  to  his  ideal  of  conduct  by  offering 
his  life  to  his  country  when  war  has  come. 

These  Rough  Riders,  as  they  have  been  popularly 
called,  marched  along  the  westerly  trail,  so  shut  in  by 
the  dense  undergrowth  that  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
throw  out  flankers  or  deploy  the  line,  and  quite  impos 
sible  to  see.  And  then  suddenly  there  were  hostile  vol 
leys  pouring  through  the  brush,  and  a  sound  like  the 
ringing  of  wires  overhead.  No  enemy  was  to  be  seen. 
The  smokeless  powder  gave  no  sign.  The  dense  chap 
arral  screened  everything.  Under  the  intense  heat  men 
had  already  given  way.  Now  they  began  to  drop,  some 
wounded,  some  dead.  The  Rough  Riders  fire  and  ad 
vance  steadily,  led  onward  by  Colonel  Wood  and  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Roosevelt.  A  very  trying  place  it  was 
for  perfectly  new  troops,  with  the  burning  tropical  heat, 
the  unseen  enemy,  the  air  filled  with  the  thin  cry  of 
the  Mauser  bullet.  But  there  was  no  flinching,  and  the 
march  forward  went  on. 

Along  the  eastern  road  the  regulars  advanced  with 
equal  steadiness  and  perfect  coolness.  They  do  not  draw 
the  public  attention  as  do  the  volunteers,  for  they  act 
just  as  every  one  expected,  and  they  are  not  new,  but 
highly  trained  troops.  But  their  work  is  done  with 
great  perfection,  to  be  noted  in  history  later,  and  at  the 
time  by  all  who  admire  men  who  perform  their  allotted 
task  bravely  and  efficiently  in  the  simple  line  of  daily  duty. 

"5 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Thus  the  two  columns  moved  forward  constantly,  along 
the  trails  and  through  the  undergrowth,  converging  to 
the  point  at  which  they  aimed,  and  Colonel  Wood's 
right  flank  finds  the  anticipated  support  from  the  ad 
vancing  regulars.  The  fire  began  to  sweep  the  ridges 
and  the  strong  rock  forts  on  the  ridge.  Spaniards  were 
seen  at  last  apparently  without  much  desire  to  remain  in 
view ;  the  two  columns  pressed  forward,  the  ridge  was 
carried,  the  cross-road  reached,  and  the  fight  of  Las 
Guasimas  had  been  won. 

There  was  no  ambush  or  surprise  about  it,  as  was 
said  by  some  people  in  the  first  confusion,  and  by  others 
later  without  any  excuse  for  the  misstatement.  The 
whole  movement  was  arranged  and  carried  out  just  as 
it  was  planned  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  divi 
sion.  It  had  been  a  hot  skirmish,  and  victory  had  come 
to  the  steady  American  advance,  unchecked  by  the 
burning  heat,  the  dense,  stifling  undergrowth,  and  the 
volleys  of  an  unseen  enemy.  That  night  the  Spanish 
soldiers  said  in  Santiago  :  "Instead  of  retreating  when 
we  fired,  the  Americans  came  on.  The  more  we  fired 
the  more  they  advanced.  They  tried  to  catch  us  with 
their  hands."  The  Spanish  official  report  stated  that 
they  had  repulsed  the  Americans  and  won,  but  as  the 
Americans  had  10,000  men  they  had  retreated,  which 
was,  perhaps,  to  the  Spanish  mind,  dwelling  these  many 
centuries  among  mendacities,  and  thereby  much  con 
fused,  a  satisfying  explanation.  The  plain  truth  was 
that  the  entire  American  force  amounted  to  964  officers 
and  men.  The  Rough  Riders  suffered  most  severely, 
having  8  killed  and  34  wounded.  The  regulars  lost  8 
killed  and  18  wounded.  The  Spanish  accounts  give 

116 


JOSEPH    WHKELER 


D,  by  AiiuC-  Uupunt 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

their  own  force  in  various  figures  from  2,500  down  to 
1,400,  the  last  statement  being  made  long  after  the  bat 
tle,  when  the  number  of  Americans  who  had  defeated 
them  could  no  longer  be  concealed.  A  comparison  of 
their  varying  statements  and  all  the  best  evidence  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  Spanish  troops  engaged  were 
not  less  than  2,000.  Forty-two  Spaniards  were  found 
dead  on  the  field;  77  were  reported  in  the  Santiago 
newspapers  the  next  day  to  have  been  killed,  and  after 
the  surrender  General  Toral  admitted  to  General 
Wheeler  a  loss  of  killed  and  wounded  of  265  at  Las 
Guasimas  and  in  the  brushes  with  the  Cubans  of  the 
two  preceding  days. 

This  action,  in  which,  in  less  than  an  hour,  American 
regulars  and  volunteers  had  driven  a  superior  Spanish 
force  from  a  strongly  intrenched  position  on  high 
ground,  put  the  army  in  high  spirits.  It  also  encour 
aged  the  mistaken  idea  which  Admiral  Sampson  had 
expressed  at  first,  and  which  General  Shafter  apparently 
held  to  firmly,  that  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
had  nothing  to  do  but  to  press  forward,  drive  the  Span 
iards  from  them,  and  take  the  town  in  forty-eight 
hours.  If  the  Americans  had  gone  on  at  once,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  they  might  have  gone 
through  successfully  to  the  city  itself.  But  to  take  the 
town  in  forty-eight  hours  in  the  first  advance  was  one 
thing,  and  to  attempt  to  take  it  on  the  forty-eight-hours 
plan  after  a  week's  delay  was  another  and  widely  dif 
ferent  business.  In  a  short  time  it  was  to  be  proved 
that  a  strong  line  of  defences,  constructed  for  the  most 
part  while  the  advance  begun  at  Las  Guasimas  was 
halted,  lay  between  the  Americans  and  Santiago,  and 

117 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

that  the  Spaniards,  after  their  fashion,  would  fight  hard 
and   stubbornly   under   cover   of   entrenchments   and 
block-houses.     Nevertheless,  it  was  with  such  views 
prevailing  that  the  army  finally  moved  forward.    Law- 
ton's  and  ChafTee's  brigades  came  up  to  the  front  the 
day  of  the  fight  at  Las  Guasimas,  and  the  other  troops 
advanced  during  the  following  days  to  the  high  ground 
around  Sevilla,  which  the  victory  of  the  cavalry  divi 
sion  had  brought  within  American  control.     During 
three  days  there  seems  to  have  been  great  confusion  in 
the  movement  of  troops,  and  still   more  in   the  trans 
portation  of  supplies.     The  narrow  trails,  bad  at  the 
best,  were  soon  torn  up  by  wagons,  and  were  choked 
by  the  advancing  regiments,  which  moved  slowly  and 
with  difficulty.     The  army  stretched  back  for  three 
miles    from    El    Pozo,    where    an    outpost    was    sta 
tioned,  and  whence  the  Spaniards  could  be  seen  hard  at 
work,  the  line  of  entrenchments  and  rifle-pits  length 
ening  continually  along  the  hills  of  San  Juan,  and  the 
defences  of   El   Caney  constantly  growing  stronger. 
Yet  during  these  days    of  waiting    no    battery    was 
brought  to  El  Pozo  to  open  on  the  Spanish  works,  no 
effort  was    made  to    interfere  with    the    enemy    in 
strengthening  his  position,  which  meant  the  sacrifice 
of  just  so  many  more  lives  by  every  hour  that  it  went 
on  unimpeded.      There  was  no  attempt  during  these 
comparatively  unoccupied   days   to   make   new   roads 
through  the  forest  and  undergrowth,  so  that  the  troops 
could  emerge  all  along  the  line  of  woods  instead  of  in 
dense  narrow  masses   from   the  two   existing  trails. 
There  were  officers  who  saw,  knew,  and  suggested  all 
these  things,  but  they  were  not  done.     So,  too,  the  val- 

118 


WILLIAM    R.  SI  I  AFTER 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

ley  or  basin  which  lay  between  the  heights  we  held  and 
the  heights  of  San  Juan  remained  silent,  impenetrated, 
unexplored.  There  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any 
reconnoitring  done  at  all,  except  by  General  Chaffee, 
who,  with  the  skill  and  coolness  of  an  experienced  In 
dian  fighter,  explored  the  ground  in  front  of  his  com 
mand  thoroughly,  even  to  the  Spanish  lines  at  El  Caney, 
a  village  lying  toward  the  northeast  of  Santiago,  and 
very  strongly  defended  by  block-houses  and  a  fort. 

It  was  at  this  point,  finally,  that  it  was  determined  to 
make  an  attack,  and  this  was,  so  far  as  can  be  judged, 
the  only  operation  that  was  planned  beforehand.  All 
the  rest  of  the  fighting  which  ensued  came  about  largely 
by  chance.  The  movement  against  El  Caney  was  in 
trusted  to  Generals  Lawton,  Chaffee,  and  Ludlow, 
brave,  skilful,  and  gallant  soldiers,  in  command  of  the 
Second  Division,  with  the  addition  of  an  independent 
brigade  under  General  Bates,  in  all  a  trifle  over  six 
thousand  men.  The  plan  was  that  they  should  capture 
El  Caney,  which  it  was  calculated  would  consume  about 
half  an  hour  to  an  hour,  and  then,  swinging  to  the  left, 
cut  off  and  take  in  the  flank  the  Spaniards  on  San  Juan 
hill,  against  which  the  main  army  was  then  to  move  in 
direct  assault.  So,  on  the  afternoon  of  June  30,  the 
order  came  at  three  o'clock  that  the  whole  army  was  to 
move  at  four,  and  then  began  a  slow  advance  as  the 
troops  crushed  and  crowded  into  the  narrow  trail.  Part 
of  Lawton's  division  got  off  first,  then  the  rest,  and  they 
all  marched  on  silently  during  the  night,  making  their 
way  over  the  ground  General  Chaffee  had  reconnoitred 
through  woods  and  underbrush.  By  dawn  they  were 
in  position  and  it  was  arranged  that  Chaffee's  brigade 

119 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

was  to  attack  from  the  north  and  east,  and  Ludlow's 
from  the  south  and  west,  and  so  carry  the  position. 
But  to  take  a  strongly  fortified  town  with  infantry 
quickly  and  without  needless  loss  it  is  absolutely  essen 
tial  to  clear  the  way  by  a  powerful  and  destructive  ar 
tillery  fire.  For  this  all-important  object  the  division 
had  only  Capron's  battery  of  four  guns,  so  absurdly  in 
adequate  to  its  task  that  the  fact  needs  only  to  be  stated. 
This  meagre  battery  opened  on  the  Fort  at  El  Caney 
with  a  deliberate  fire  at  half  past  six,  producing  little 
more  effect  than  to  very  slowly  crumble  the  walls. 
Moreover,  the  battery  was  not  only  grossly  inadequate, 
but  it  used  black  powder,  and  immediately  established 
a  flaring  target  for  an  enemy  concealed  and  perfectly 
familiar  with  the  ranges.  Why  were  there  no  more 
guns  ?  Why  were  they  left  at  Tampa  or  in  the  trans 
ports?  The  fact  requires  no  committee  of  investiga 
tion  to  prove  it,  and  somebody  was  responsible  for  the 
scores  of  men  shot  at  El  Caney  because  there  were  only 
four  guns  there  to  open  the  way.  Why  was  the  powder 
black,  so  that  a  target  of  smoke  hung  over  the  Ameri 
can  position  after  every  discharge?  Any  smokeless 
powder  was  better  than  none.  Even  poor,  broken- 
down  Spain  had  smokeless  powder  for  her  artillery. 
Why  did  not  we  have  it  ?  While  the  War  Department 
had  been  passing  years  in  trying  to  find  a  patent  powder 
just  to  its  liking,  our  artillery  was  provided  with  black 
powder  and  went  to  war  with  it,  and  men  died  need 
lessly  because  of  it.  No  need  of  a  committee  to  establish 
this  fact,  either.  Who  was  responsible?  One  thing 
is  certain — a  system  of  administration  which  is  capable 
of  such  protracted  inefficiency  is  little  short  of  criminal, 

120 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

and  the  Congress  and  the  people  who  permit  such  a  sys 
tem  to  exist,  now  that  it  has  been  found  out,  will  share 
in  the  heavy  responsibility  of  a  neglect  for  which  men's 
lives  have  dearly  paid  if  they  do  not  promptly  rem 
edy  it. 

But  these  reflections  did  not  help  matters  at  El  Caney 
that  July  morning,  and  the  feeble  battery,  the  slow  fire 
and  the  target-smoke  soon  disposed  of  the  pleasant 
headquarters  plan  of  taking  the  village  in  the  course  of 
an  hour.  There  was  nine  hours'  savage  work  ahead 
before  the  desired  consummation  could  be  reached. 
The  Spaniards,  although  without  artillery  or  siege- 
guns,  numbered  about  eight  hundred  men ;  were  en 
tirely  protected  and  under  cover  in  a  stone  fort,  rifle- 
pits,  and  strong  block-houses;  knew  perfectly  and  ac 
curately  all  the  ranges;  could  not  retreat  without  rush 
ing  on  destruction  after  our  troops  surrounded  them 
— a  sharp  incentive  to  desperate  resistance.  So,  while 
the  slow  artillery  fire  went  on,  the  infantry  began  to 
suffer  seriously  from  the  deadly  Spanish  fire.  They 
worked  their  way  forward,  creeping  from  point  to  point, 
but  it  was  very  slow,  and  equally  costly.  At  half  past 
one  the  situation  looked  badly.  The  Americans  were 
holding  their  own,  but  losing  far  more  heavily  than 
the  Spaniards.  An  order  from  General  Shafter  at 
this  moment  to  neglect  El  Caney  and  move  to  the  as 
sistance  of  the  troops  at  San  Juan  must  have  seemed 
like  a  grim  satire,  and  was  disregarded.  But  the  evil 
hour  had  really  passed.  The  artillery  fire  was  quick 
ened,  and  the  fort  began  at  last  to  go  rapidly  to  pieces 
under  the  steady  pounding.  Colonel  Miles's  brigade 
joined  General  Ludlow  in  pressing  the  attack  on  the 

121 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

south ;  and  then  at  last  General  Chaffee,  whose  men  had 
been  enduring  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  gave  the  order 
to  storm,  and  the  Twelfth  regiment  sprang  forward  at 
the  word,  eager  for  the  charge.  Up  the  ravine  they 
went  to  the  east  side,  then  swung  to  the  right,  broke 
through  the  wire  fences,  rushed  upward  to  the  top  of 
the  hill,  and  the  fort  was  theirs.  The  enemy  who  had 
fought  so  stubbornly  at  rifle  range  could  not  stand  the 
American  rush;  they  had  no  desire  to  be  taken  "by  the 
bare  hands."  The  price  paid  had  been  heavy,  but  the 
dearly  bought  fort,  in  the  words  of  an  eye-witness,  was 
"floored  with  dead  Spaniards,"  a  grewsome  sight.  Yet, 
even  as  the  wild  cheers  went  up,  it  was  seen  that  they 
were  still  exposed,  and  a  heavy  fire  came  from  the 
block-houses.  Lining  up  in  the  fort,  the  Americans 
poured  volley  after  volley  into  these  other  strongholds ; 
and  the  other  brigades  pressing  home  their  charge,  the 
Spanish  gave  way,  even  retreat  seeming  less  hopeless 
now  than  resistance,  and  fled  from  the  village,  drop 
ping  fast  as  they  wrent  under  the  shots  of  Ludlow's  men. 
By  four  o'clock  the  firing  had  died  away,  and  El  Caney, 
at  a  cost  which  proper  artillery  would  have  greatly  re 
duced,  had  been  won  by  the  unyielding,  patient  gal 
lantry  of  the  American  regular  infantry. 

The  Spaniards  had  less  than  a  thousand  men  at  El 
Caney,  but  they  were  under  cover,  strongly  fortified, 
and  knew  the  ranges.  Shut  in,  desperate,  and  almost 
surrounded  as  they  were,  they  appeared  at  their  best, 
and  fought  with  a  stubborn  courage  and  an  indiffer 
ence  to  danger  which  recall  the  defence  of  Saragossa 
and  Gerona.  Worthless  as  the  Spanish  soldiers  have 
too  often  shown  themselves  to  be,  behind  defences  and 

122 


. 


THEODORE    ROOSEVELT 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

penned  in  by  enemies,  they  have  displayed  a  fortitude 
worthy  of  the  days,  three  centuries  ago,  when  the  in 
fantry  of  Spain  was  thought  the  finest  in  Europe.  Of 
this  tradition  El  Caney  offered  a  fresh  and  brilliant 
illustration.  The  Spaniards  lost  nearly  five  hundred 
men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  much  more 
than  half  their  number,  and  among  the  killed  was  the 
commander,  General  Vara  del  Rey,  his  brother,  and 
two  of  his  sons.  On  the  American  side  the  killed  num 
bered  4  officers  and  84  men;  the  wounded,  24  officers 
and  332  men — the  loss  falling  chiefly  on  Ludlow's  and 
Chaffee's  brigades,  comprising  the  4,000  men  who  were 
actively  engaged  throughout  the  day.  The  force  was 
composed  entirely  of  regulars,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Second  Massachusetts  Regiment,  in  Ludlow's  bri 
gade.  These  volunteers,  never  in  action  before,  be 
haved  extremely  well,  coming  up  steadily  under  fire, 
and  taking  their  place  in  the  firing-line.  But  the  mo 
ment  they  opened  with  their  archaic  Springfields  and 
black  powder,  which  they  owed  to  the  narrow  parsi 
mony  of  Congress,  and  to  the  lack  of  energy  and  ef 
ficiency  in  the  system  of  the  War  Department,  they  be 
came  not  only  an  easy  mark  for  the  Spanish  Mausers, 
but  made  the  position  of  more  peril  to  all  the  other 
troops.  In  consequence  of  this  they  had  to  be  with 
drawn  from  the  firing-line,  but  not  until  they  had  suf 
fered  severely  and  displayed  an  excellent  courage.  The 
lack  of  artillery  and  the  black  powder  made  the  assault 
on  El  Caney  a  work  to  which  infantry  should  not  have 
been  forced.  Yet  they  were  forced  to  it,  and  supported 
by  only  four  guns,  but  splendidly  led  by  Lawton,  Chaf- 
fee,  and  Ludlow,  they  carried  the  position  at  heavy 

123 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

cost  by  sheer  courage,  discipline,  and  good  fighting, 
manifesting  these  great  qualities  in  a  high  degree,  and 
one  worthy  of  very  lasting  honor  and  remembrance. 

Lawton  and  Chaffee  and  Ludlow  had  gone  to  El 
Caney  with  a  well-defined  purpose  but  it  is  difficult, 
even  after  the  most  careful  study  and  repeated  reading 
of  the  official  reports,  to  detect  any  plan  whatever  in 
the  movements  of  the  rest  of  the  army.  The  troops  had 
been  moved  up  the  narrow  trail  the  night  before,  and 
at  seven  in  the  morning  Captain  Grimes's  battery 
opened  from  El  Pozo  hill.  Black  powder  again,  and  a 
magnificent  target,  so  that  the  Cubans  in  the  farm 
house,  Rough  Riders  in  the  yard,  and  the  First  and 
Tenth  Cavalry,  all  thoughtfully  massed  by  some  one 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  battery,  where 
they  could  be  most  easily  hit,  began  to  suffer  severely. 
Then  the  two  brigades  of  the  cavalry  division  under 
General  Sumner,  the  First,  commanded  by  Colonel 
(now  General)  Wood,  leading,  moved  down  the  road 
to  Santiago.  When  the  Rough  Riders  reached  the 
ford  of  the  San  Juan,  they  crossed  and  deployed  in 
good  order.  Then  a  captive  observation-balloon  was 
brought  along  and  anchored  at  the  ford  where  the 
troops  were  crossing  and  were  massed  in  the  road.  As 
one  reads  the  official  statement  of  this  fact,  comment 
and  criticism  alike  fail.  That  such  a  thing  should  have 
been  done  seems  incredible.  The  balloon  simply  served 
to  give  the  Spaniards  a  perfect  mark  and  draw  all  the 
rifle  and  artillery  fire  to  the  precise  point  where  our 
men  were  densely  crowded  in  a  narrow  road.  Fortu 
nately  the  balloon  was  quickly  destroyed  by  the  enemy's 
fire,  but  it  had  given  the  place  and  the  range,  and  there 

124 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

the  troops  remained  for  nearly  an  hour,  exposed  to 
heavy  fire  from  the  forts  and  block-house,  and  from 
guerillas  in  trees,  who  here  and  elsewhere  devoted  them 
selves  especially  to  picking  off  surgeons,  wounded  men, 
and  Red  Cross  nurses.  There  the  men  staid,  drop 
ping  under  the  shots  of  the  Spaniards,  able  to  do  noth 
ing,  waiting  orders.  No  orders  from  headquarters 
came;  the  situation  was  intolerable;  retreat  meant  not 
only  defeat,  but  useless  and  continual  exposure  to  a 
slaughtering  fire.  No  other  resource  remained,  ex 
cept  to  take  rifle  in  hand  and,  with  infantry  alone, 
carry  strong  intrenchments  and  block-houses,  defended 
by  well-covered  regulars  supported  by  artillery.  Still 
no  orders,  and  at  last  the  division,  brigade,  and  regi 
mental  commanders  acted  and  ordered  for  themselves. 
Colonel  Roosevelt  led  his  Rough  Riders  forward  from 
the  woods,  and  asking  the  men  of  the  Ninth  to  let  him 
pass  through,  the  regiment  of  regulars  rose  and  fol 
lowed  him,  and  then  the  whole  cavalry  division  went 
out  and  on  up  the  first  hill,  where  there  was  a  red- 
roofed  farm-house,  whence  they  drove  the  enemy.  A 
pause  here,  a  taking  breath,  exposed  all  the  time  to  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  strong  main  intrenchments  now  in 
plain  view.  Again  Colonel  Roosevelt  calls  on  his  men, 
starts,  comes  back  because  they  had  not  heard,  and  off 
they  go  again  over  the  long  open  space,  more  than 
half  a  mile,  which  separates  them  from  the  Spanish 
post.  The  line  of  blue  figures  looks  very  thin  and  very 
sparse  to  those  who  are  watching  it.  It  seems  to  move 
very  slowly.  But  it  is  moving  all  the  time.  Men  stag 
ger  and  drop,  but  the  line  goes  on  and  up.  It  nears  the 
top,  the  Spaniards  break  and  run,  and  the  cavalry  di- 

125 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

vision — six  regiments — all  mingled  now,  finds  itself 
with  the  heights  carried,  and  the  intrenchments  on  the 
right  in  its  firm  but  tired  grasp.  With  it  has  gone  the 
Catling  battery  under  Captain  Parker,  who  in  really 
splendid  fashion  has  kept  his  guns  right  at  the  front, 
a  powerful  ally  and  support  in  these  trying  moments. 
Colonel  Roosevelt,  who  rode  at  first,  has  left  his  horse 
at  a  wire  fence,  and  now  finds  himself  the  senior  offi 
cer  present  and  in  command  of  all  that  is  left  of  the 
six  gallant  regiments,  having  led  dauntlessly  and  un 
hurt  one  of  the  most  brilliant  charges  in  our  history. 

Meantime  over  on  the  left  the  regular  infantry  are 
repeating  against  the  fort  of  San  Juan — the  strongest 
of  all  the  Spanish  positions,  and  on  a  larger  scale — the 
splendid  work  of  the  dismounted  cavalry.  This  divis 
ion,  consisting  of  eight  regiments  of  regulars  and  one 
of  volunteers,  was  admirably  commanded  and  led  by 
General  Kent.  They  moved  up  the  road  on  the  after 
noon  of  June  30,  and  started  again  early  on  the  next 
morning  as  soon  as  Captain  Grimes's  battery  opened 
at  El  Pozo,  with  the  First  Brigade,  under  General  Haw 
kins,  in  the  lead.  Their  orders  were  to  keep  their 
right  on  the  main  road  to  Santiago.  They  too  were  held 
back  by  the  crowd  in  the  narrow  trail,  and  still  further 
delayed  by  waiting  for  the  passage  of  the  cavalry  divi 
sion,  who  were  given  the  right  of  way.  As  they  began 
at  last  to  advance  slowly  they  too  came  under  the  Span 
ish  fire,  they  too  received  the  punishment  brought  upon 
the  army  by  the  luckless  balloon,  and  thus  crowded  to 
gether,  at  a  halt  almost,  suffered  severely.  The  enemy's 
fire  steadily  increased,  the  shrapnel  poured  in  where 
the  balloon  had  marked  the  position,  and  the  sharp- 

126 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

shooters  in  the  trees  busied  themselves,  as  they  were 
doing  already  with  the  cavalry  division.  General  Kent 
attempted  to  send  the  Seventy-first  New  York  through 
a  by-path,  so  as  to  bring  them  out  in  their  proper  posi 
tion  with  the  First  Brigade,  but  when  they  came  under 
the  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy  the  first  battalion  broke, 
and  were  only  held  from  a  panic  by  the  exertions  of 
General  Kent's  staff-officers.  The  other  two  battal 
ions  remained  steady,  for  the  regiment  was  of  first- 
rate  material,  and  the  trouble  arose  from  their  being 
badly  officered  and  besides  being  endowed  with  a  col 
onel  who  apparently  did  not  come  on  to  the  field  of 
action.  In  the  end  they  rallied,  and  many  went  for 
ward  in  the  final  charge  with  the  regulars,  notably  the 
company  under  the  gallant  lead  of  Captain  Rafferty. 
But  at  the  moment  the  confusion  in  the  New  York  regi 
ment  still  further  checked  the  already  impeded  advance. 
The  First  Brigade  had  gone  on  without  the  volun 
teers,  and  the  Third  regiment  was  hurried  forward  by 
General  Kent  into  the  blocked  road,  and  finally  pushed 
through  the  New  York  regiment.  As  they  came  out 
and  crossed  the  lower  ford  Colonel  Wikoff  was  killed, 
and  two  lieutenant-colonels  who  succeeded  him  in  com 
mand  of  the  brigade  were  quickly  shot  down,  all  in 
the  course  of  ten  minutes.  Yet  nothing  could  shake 
the  nerve  or  break  the  discipline  of  this  splendid  brig 
ade.  Following  orders,  making  all  the  formations, 
operating  in  companies,  battalions,  and  regiments,  on 
they  went  through  the  heavy  under-growth,  waist- 
deep  through  the  streams,  and  across  barbed-wire  de 
fences.  Nothing  could  break  them  as  they  went 
steadily  and  fiercely  onward.  The  Second  Brigade, 

127 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

finely  led  by  Colonel  Pearson,  was  pushed  through  in 
the  same  way  beneath  a  galling  fire,  out  of  the  narrow 
trail  and  across  the  ford.  Two  regiments  of  Pear 
son's  men  went  to  the  support  of  the  Third  Brigade, 
one  to  that  of  the  First.  Meantime  the  Third 
Brigade,  connecting  with  the  First  on  the  right  and 
sweeping  round  through  a  heavy  fire,  turned  the  ene 
my's  right,  and  shared  with  the  First  in  the  assault. 
On  they  went  up  a  steep  hill  125  feet  above  the  level, 
tangled  with  barbed  wires,  and  crowned  with  deep 
trenches  and  the  strong  brick  fort  of  San  Juan.  No 
artillery  to  help  them.  Regular  infantry,  rifle  in  hand, 
were  going  to  take  this  high  and  heavily  fortified  posi 
tion.  Steadily  and  quickly  they  went  at  it,  General 
Hawkins,  a  noble  figure,  white-haired,  and  with  all 
the  fire  of  youth  in  his  gallant  heart,  leading  the 
charge  at  the  head  of  his  two  regiments.  To  those  who 
watched,  it  seemed  to  take  a  long  time.  But  it  was 
twenty  minutes  past  twelve  when  the  Third  Brigade 
followed  the  First  out  of  the  death-trap  in  the  woods, 
and  at  half  past  one  the  steady,  strong-moving  mass  of 
infantry  had  cleared  an  outlying  knoll,  crossed  the  val 
ley,  scaled  the  rough  steep  hill,  and  with  Hawkins  at 
their  head,  and  the  men  of  the  Third  Brigade  sweeping 
up  on  the  left,  stood  triumphant  on  the  crest,  where  they 
fell  to  intrenching  themselves,  and  sent  the  Thirteenth 
Infantry  off  to  support  the  cavalry  division,  while  the 
Twenty-first  regiment  pushed  on  800  yards  farther 
and  took  an  advanced  position.  Altogether  a  very 
splendid  feat  of  arms,  very  perfectly  performed. 

One  other  movement  was  made  on  July  ist  at  the 
extreme  left.     General  Dufiield  was  ordered  to  move 

128 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

along  the  railroad  by  the  coast  and  make  a  demon 
stration  at  Aguadores,  in  order  to  keep  the  Spaniards 
engaged  at  that  point  and  prevent  their  attacking  our 
left.  General  Shafter  especially  ordered  General  Duf- 
field  not  to  sacrifice  his  men,  but  to  "worry  the 
enemy."  When  he  reached  the  river  at  the  point  of 
crossing,  he  found  that  the  bridge  had  been  in  part 
destroyed.  The  river  also  was  deep,  and,  according 
to  General  Duffield's  estimate,  600  to  700  feet  wide. 
He  therefore  made  no  attempt  to  cross,  but  kept 
the  enemy  under  fire  until  three  o'clock,  engaging 
them  again  the  next  day,  and  carrying  out  in  this 
way  his  orders  to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  General 
Shafter,  who  recommended  him  for  gallantry  and  good 
conduct  at  Aguadores.  The  total  loss  in  their  skir 
mishes,  when  the  Thirty-third  Michigan  behaved  very 
well,  was  two  killed  and  fifteen  wounded. 

The  battle  of  San  Juan,  as  it  is  called,  consisted 
really  of  two  detached  attacks  on  the  hill  of  that  name 
and  the  separate  action  of  El  Caney.  There  were  6,464 
officers  and  men  at  El  Caney,  and  7,919  engaged  at 
San  Juan,  apart  from  the  small  brigade  (323  all  told) 
of  light  artillery.  There  were  among  them  three  regi 
ments  of  volunteers,  but  the  Second  Massachusetts,  after 
suffering  severely,  had  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  firing- 
line  on  account  of  its  black  powder,  and  the  Seventy- 
first  New  York  was  only  partially  engaged.  Deducting 
these  two  regiments,  there  were  12,507  officers  and 
men  engaged,  including,  of  volunteers,  only  the  Rough 
Riders,  who,  like  the  regulars,  were  armed  with  mod 
ern  magazine  rifles,  and  who  showed  themselves  on 
that  day  the  equal  of  any  regulars  in  desperate  fight- 
9  129 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

ing;  but  they  numbered  only  583  of  the  more  than  12,- 
ooo  men  brought  into  action.  The  battle  of  San  Juan, 
therefore,  was  pre-eminently  the  battle  of  the  Ameri 
can  regulars,  of  the  flower  of  the  American  standing 
army.  With  scarcely  any  artillery  support,  armed 
only  with  rifles,  they  were  set  to  take  heights  and  a 
village  strongly  held  by  regular  soldiers  and  defended 
by  forts,  intrenchments,  batteries,  and  a  tangle  of 
barbed-wire  fences.  This  is  something  which  the  best 
military  critics  would  declare  well-nigh  impossible  and 
not  to  be  attempted.  The  American  army  did  it.  That 
is  enough  to  say.  They  lost  heavily,  largely  through 
the  awkward  manner  in  which  they  were  crowded  and 
delayed  at  the  start.  There  were  21  officers  and  220 
men  killed,  and  93  officers  and  1,280  men  wounded, 
the  percentage  of  the  officers  being  remarkably  high, 
except  at  Aguadores,  where  none  were  injured.  On 
the  Spanish  side  it  is  almost  impossible  to  get  any 
figures  of  the  slightest  value,  even  their  official  reports 
being  filled  with  obvious  falsehoods  and  contradic 
tions.  General  Wheeler  gives  the  number  at  El  Caney 
as  460;  the  official  Spanish  report  puts  it  at  520,  of 
whom  only  80  returned  unwounded.  Captain  Arthur 
Lee,  of  the  British  army,  who  has  written  by  far  the 
best  account  of  El  Caney,  says  there  were  somewhat 
less  than  1,000  Spaniards  in  the  works,  and  that  at 
least  half  were  killed  and  wounded.  As  his  estimate 
of  the  losses  agrees  with  the  Spanish  report,  I  have 
accepted  it.  The  Spanish  statement  of  their  numbers 
at  El  Caney  is  so  absurd,  on  their  own  report  of 
losses,  that  Captain  Lee's  dispassionate  estimate  of 
the  total  force  must  also  be  accepted.  The  case  at  San 

130 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

Juan  is  much  more  difficult.  According  to  Lieutenant 
Muller  y  Tejeiro,  quoting  what  professes  to  be  official 
reports,  there  were  only  3,000  men  defending  Santiago, 
including  the  sailors,  and  only  250  men  at  San  Juan 
heights.  This  is  so  grotesquely  false  that  it  is  easy  to 
throw  it  aside,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  reach  the  truth. 
Muller  gives  520  men  at  El  Caney  and  250  at  San 
Juan,  and  in  one  place  gives  the  total  killed  and  wounded 
as  593,  and  in  another  as  469,  both  manifestly  absurd 
losses  for  770  men.  The  Spaniards  said  at  different 
times  that  they  had  as  few  as  1,400  and  as  many  as 
2,500  at  Las  Guasimas,  which  hardly  coincides  with  the 
statement  that  there  were  only  3,000  men  in  the  city. 
Deducting  Escario's  force,  which  came  in  on  July  2, 
there  were  13,000  rifles,  Mausers  and  Remingtons, 
surrendered  in  Santiago  city  when  it  capitulated,  which 
indicates  a  total  force  of  that  number,  unless  we  assume 
that  each  of  Lieutenant  Muller's  3,000  soldiers  carried 
four  rifles.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Spaniards  had  ul 
timately  12,000  to  13,000  men  in  Santiago;  they  had 
over  9,000  along  the  line  of  defences  on  the  east  side 
confronting  the  Americans* ;  and  the  works  at  San 
Juan  were  strongly  held  by  at  least  4,000  men,  as  stated 
by  Mr.  Ramsden,  the  British  consul,  a  thoroughly 
trustworthy  witness.  Their  actual  losses  it  is  not 
easy  to  detect  through  the  clouds  of  falsehood  in  the 
official  reports ;  but  as  we  know  that  they  were  heavier 
than  the  American  at  El  Caney,  and  also  at  Las  Guasi 
mas,  we  may  safely  assume  that  the  case  was  nearly 
the  same  at  San  Juan,  although  they  had  all  the  advan- 

*  General  Wood  puts  the  number  of  men  on  the  whole  eastern 
line  of  defences  at  9,600. 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

tage  of  cover  and  position.  It  is  certain  that  when 
the  city  surrendered  they  had  more  men  in  hospital 
than  the  Americans.  The  Spaniards  stood  their  ground 
bravely,  fired  heavily  in  volleys,  and  bore  their  punish 
ment  unflinchingly,  but  nowhere  did  they  face  the 
American  rush  and  onset  when  they  came  close  upon 
them.  It  was  a  hard-fought  battle,  and  both  sides 
suffered  severely,  but  the  steady  and  irresistible  Ameri 
can  advance  won. 

After  the  victorious  charge  there  was  still  no  rest 
for  the  men  who  had  climbed  the  steep  sides  of  San 
Juan.  Worn  and  weary  as  they  were,  they  went  to 
work  to  make  intrenchments,  and  with  scant  food — 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  men  feeding  on  what  the  Span 
iards  had  left  behind — they  all  toiled  on  through  the 
night.  At  daylight  the  Spaniards  attacked,  opening 
a  fire  which  continued  all  day.  Yet,  despite  the  fire 
and  the  drenching  rain,  the  men  worked  on,  and  the 
new  intrenchments,  now  frowning  down  toward  the 
city,  grew  and  lengthened.  At  nine  o'clock  in  the  even 
ing  another  attack  by  long  range  firing  was  made  by  the 
Spaniards,  and  repulsed.  The  losses  on  the  American 
side  during  this  fighting  on  the  2d  were  not  severe,  as 
they  were  protected  by  breastworks,  and  the  Spaniards 
were  utterly  unable  to  take  the  hill  they  could  not  hold, 
from  the  men  who  had  driven  them  from  it  when  they 
had  every  advantage  of  position.  Nevertheless,  the 
situation  was  undoubtedly  grave.  With  3,000  men 
only  on  the  extreme  ridge  at  first,  we  were  confronted 
by  9,000  Spaniards.  Our  men  were  exhausted  by  bat 
tle,  marching,  and  digging.  They  were  badly  fed, 
transportation  was  slow,  and  supplies  scarce,  and  they 

132 


GENERALS    IN    THE   SANTIAG<.)    CAMPAIGN 


SANTIAGO— THE  LAND  FIGHT 

were  at  first  unsheltered.  Under  these  conditions 
some  officers  thought  about  and  urged  withdrawal, 
while  General  Wheeler,  backed  strongly  by  many  of 
the  younger  officers  and  later  by  Lawton  and  Sumner, 
opposed  any  such  movement.  The  spirit  which  car 
ried  the  heights  of  San  Juan  held  them,  but  to  General 
Shafter,  away  from  the  front  and  the  firing-line,  the 
voices  of  doubt  and  alarm  came  with  effective  force. 
During  the  day  he  fluctuated  from  doubt  to  confidence. 
He  wanted  Sampson  to  try  at  once  and  at  all  hazards 
to  break  in,  and  he  proposed  to  General  Wheeler  to 
move  against  the  entrance  forts  of  the  harbor,  thus 
giving  a  tardy  adhesion  to  the  wise  plan  of  Sampson 
and  Miles,  which  he  had  abandoned.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  July  3  there  came  a  despatch  from  him, 
written  under  the  first  depressing  influences,  to  the 
War  Department,  saying  that  he  had  Santiago  well  in 
vested,  but  that  our  line  was  thin,  the  city  strongly  de 
fended,  and  not  to  be  taken  without  heavy  loss ;  that  he 
needed  re-enforcements,  and  was  considering  with 
drawal  to  a  position  which  an  examination  of  the  map 
showed  to  mean  a  retreat  to  the  coast.  This  news — 
the  first  received  in  twenty-four  hours — came  upon 
those  in  authority  at  Washington  with  a  depressing 
shock.  General  Shafter  was  urged  to  hold  the  San 
Juan  heights,  and  in  a  confused  hurry  every  effort  was 
made  to  get  together  more  transports — none  having 
been  brought  back  from  Santiago — and  to  drive  for 
ward  the  departure  of  troops.  It  was  the  one  really 
dark  day  of  the  war,  and  the  long  hot  hours  of  that 
memorable  Sunday  were  heavy  with  doubt,  apprehen 
sion,  and  anxiety. 


CHAPTER  VII 
SANTIAGO THE  SEA  FIGHT 

By  one  of  the  dramatic  contrasts  which  fate  de 
lights  to  create  in  human  history,  at  the  very  time  when 
the  Shafter  despatch  was  filling  Washington  with 
gloom,  the  sea-power  of  Spain  was  being  shot  to  death 
by  American  guns,  and  her  ancient  empire  in  the  West 
Indies  had  passed  away  forever.  It  matters  little  now 
why  Cervera  pushed  open  the  door  of  Santiago  Har 
bor  and  rushed  out  to  ruin  and  defeat.  The  admiral 
himself  would  have  the  world  understand  that  he  was 
forced  to  do  so  by  ill-advised  orders  from  Havana  and 
Madrid.  Very  likely  this  is  true,  but  if  it  is,  Havana 
and  Madrid  must  be  admitted  to  have  had  good  grounds 
for  their  decision.  It  did  not  occur  to  the  Spaniards, 
either  in  Santiago  or  elsewhere,  that  the  entire  Ameri 
can  army  had  been  flung  upon  El  Caney  and  San  Juan, 
and  that  there  were  at  the  moment  no  reserves.  Their 
own  reports,  moreover,  from  the  coast  were  wild  and 
exaggerated,  so  that,  deceived  by  these  as  well  as  by 
the  daring  movements  and  confident  attitude  of  the 
American  army,  they  concluded  that  the  city  was  men 
aced  by  not  less  than  50,000  men.  Under  these  con 
ditions  Santiago  would  soon  be  surrounded,  cut  off, 
starved,  and  taken.  It  is  true  that  Admiral  Cervera 
had  announced  that  if  the  Americans  entered  Santi- 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

ago  he  would  shell  and  destroy  the  city,  and  he  would 
probably  have  done  so,  with  complete  Spanish  indif 
ference  to  the  wanton  brutality  of  such  an  act.  But 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  performance  would  have 
helped  the  army  or  saved  the  fleet.  With  the  American 
army  on  the  heights  of  San  Juan,  and  extending  its 
lines,  the  ultimate  destruction  or  capture  of  the  entire 
squadron  was  a  mere  question  of  time.  The  process 
might  be  made  more  or  less  bloody,  but  the  final  out 
come  could  not  be  avoided,  and  was  certain  to  be  com 
plete.  On  the  other  hand,  a  wild  rush  out  of  the  har 
bor  might  result  possibly  in  the  escape  of  one  or  more 
ships,  and  such  an  escape,  properly  treated  in  official 
despatches,  could  very  well  be  made  to  pass  in  Spain 
for  a  victory.  In  remaining,  there  could  be  nothing 
but  utter  ruin,  however  long  postponed.  In  going  out, 
there  was  at  least  a  chance,  however  slight,  of  saving 
something.  So  Cervera  was  ordered  to  leave  the  har 
bor  of  Santiago.  He  would  have  liked  to  go  by  night, 
but  thanks  to  the  precautions  of  Admiral  Sampson  the 
narrow  entrance  glared  out  of  the  darkness  brilliant 
with  the  white  blaze  of  the  search-lights,  and  beyond 
lay  the  enemy,  veiled  in  darkness,  waiting  and  watch 
ing.  The  night  was  clearly  impossible.  It  must  be 
daylight,  if  at  all.  So  on  Sunday  morning  at  half  past 
nine  the  Spanish  fleet  with  bottled  steam  came  out  of 
the  harbor  with  a  rush,  the  flag-ship  Maria  Teresa  lead 
ing;  then  the  other  three  cruisers  about  800  yards 
apart;  then,  at  1,200  yards  distance,  the  two  crack 
Clyde-built  torpedo-boat  destroyers  Furor  and  Pint  on. 
As  Admiral  Sampson  was  to  meet  General  Shatter  that 
morning  at  Siboney,  the  New  York  had  started  to  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

eastward,  and  was  four  miles  away  from  her  station 
when,  at  the  sound  of  the  guns,  she  swung  round  and 
rushed  after  the  running  battle-ships,  which  she  could 
never  quite  overtake,  although  she  came  up  so  fast  that 
she  was  able  to  get  two  shots  at  the  torpedo  boat  de 
stroyers  before  they  went  down  which  was  only  twenty 
minutes  after  they  had  emerged  from  the  harbor  en 
trance.  It  was  a  cruel  piece  of  ill  fortune  that  the  ad 
miral,  who  had  made  every  arrangement  for  the  fight, 
should,  by  mere  chance  of  war,  have  been  deprived  of 
his  personal  share  in  it.  Equally  cruel  was  the  fortune 
which  had  taken  Captain  Higginson  and  the  Massa 
chusetts  on  that  day  to  Guantanamo  to  coal.  These 
temporary  absences  left  (beginning  at  the  westward) 
the  Brooklyn,  Texas,  Iowa,  Oregon,  Indiana,  and  the 
two  converted  yachts  Gloucester  and  Vixen  lying  near 
inshore,  to  meet  the  escaping  enemy.  Quick  eyes  on 
the  Iowa  detected  first  the  trailing  line  of  smoke  in  the 
narrow  channel  and  signal  was  made  at  9.34  "Enemy 
Escaping"  which  was  acknowledged  on  the  Brooklyn 
at  9.35.  Then  all  the  fleet  saw  them  and  there  was  no 
need  of  any  other  signals.  Admiral  Sampson's  order 
had  long  since  been  given :  "If  the  enemy  tries  to  es 
cape,  the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon  as  possi 
ble  and  endeavor  to  sink  his  vessels  or  force  them  to 
run  ashore."  Every  ship  was  always  stripped  for  ac 
tion,  each  captain  on  the  station  knew  by  heart  this  or 
der  which  was  posted  in  every  conning  tower,  his  crew 
needed  no  other,  and  the  perfect  execution  of  it  was 
the  naval  battle  at  Santiago. 

The  Spanish  ships  came  out  at  eight  to  ten  knots' 
speed,  cleared  the  Diamond  Shoal,  and  then  turned 

136 


Copyright,  1898,  by  G.  R.  Buffhai 
1'ASgl'ALE    I)E    CERYERA 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

sharply  to  the  westward.  As  they  issued  forth  they 
opened  a  fierce,  rapid,  but  ill-directed  fire  with  all  guns, 
which  shrouded  them  in  smoke.  The  missiles  fell 
thickly  and  seemed  to  come  in  a  dense  flight  over  all 
the  ships.  Around  the  Indiana  the  projectiles  tore  the 
water  into  foam,  and  the  Brooklyn,  which  the  Span 
iards  are  said  to  have  had  some  vague  plan  of  disa 
bling,  because  they  believed  her  to  be  the  one  fast  ship, 
was  struck  several  times,  but  not  seriously  injured,* 
The  Spanish  attack,  with  its  sudden  burst  of  fire,  was 
chiefly  in  the  first  rush,  for  it  was  soon  drowned  in  the 
fierce  reply.  The  American  crews  were  being  mus 
tered  for  Sunday  inspection  when  the  enemy  was  seen. 
They  were  always  prepared  for  action,  and  as  the  sig 
nal  went  up  the  men  were  already  at  quarters.  There 
was  no  need  for  Admiral  Sampson's  distant  signal  to 
close  in  and  attack,  for  that  was  what  they  did. 

This  signal  had  no  importance  so  far  as  the  action 
was  concerned  for  it  was  merely  a  repetition  of  the 


*NOTE. — Through  the  kindness  of  the  Hon.  Charles  H.  Allen, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  I  have  been  able  to  procure  the 
exact  amount  expended  to  repair  the  damage  caused  by  the  Span 
ish  shots  in  the  battle  of  July  3d.  The  statement  is  as  follows : 

Cost  of  Repairing  Damage  Caused  by  Spanish  Guns  in  Battle  of 
July  sd : 

Oregon    None 

Texas  $    752.32 

Brooklyn  1,303.15 

Indiana    4,078.58 

Iowa 4,993-65 

This  table  is  instructive  and  seems  to  dispose  of  the  proposition 
that  the  Brooklyn  suffered  more  than  the  other  ships,  bore  the 
brunt  and  was  the  especial  object  of  Spanish  attack. 

137 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

standing  order  posted  up  in  the  conning  towers.  ^  But  it 
has  importance  in  another  respect  because  it  was  a  sig 
nal  made  by  the  commanding  admiral.  Technically  Ad 
miral  Sampson  was  in  command  of  the  fleet  through 
out  the  action  for  he  was  never  out  of  signal  distance. 
The  signal  which  he  made  when  he  started  for  Siboney 
"Disregard  movements  of  flag-ship"  never  implies  re- 
linquishment  of  command  and  did  not  then.  So  long  as 
he  was  within  signal  distance  he  was  in  command  and 
he  remained  within  that  distance  constantly  shortening 
it,  from  beginning  to  end  of  the  action.  His  first  signal 
when  seeing  the  enemy  coming  out,  he  turned  his  ship 
was  neither  needed  nor  heeded  but  his  orders  to  the 
Iowa  later  to  stop  by  the  Vizcaya  and  similar  orders 
to  other  ships  were  seen  and  obeyed  as  the  New  York 
rushed  along  after  the  Oregon  and  Brooklyn.  He  was 
within  easy  signal  distance  when  the  Colon  surren 
dered  and  her  surrender  was  at  once  reported  to  him. 
As  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  Admiral  Sampson  was 
technically  in  command  throughout  it  is  equally  true 
that  Admiral  (then  Commodore)  Schley  the  next  in 
rank  was  never  technically  in  command  for  a  single 
moment.  As  to  actual  command  the  case  is  equally 
clear.  At  9.35  the  Brooklyn  acknowledged  the  lowas 
signal  "Enemy  escaping."  The  signal-book  of  the 
Brooklyn  shows  that  she  then  made  signal  "Clear  for 
action''  which  was  superfluous  when  addressed  to  ships 
which  had  been  cleared  for  action  for  thirty  days.  She 
then  made  signal  to  close  with  the  enemy  a  mere  repe 
tition  of  Sampson's  standing  order  which  all  the  ships 
were  carrying  out  to  the  fullest  extent.  The  Brook 
lyn's  signal-book  also  shows  that  these  signals  were 

'38 


NAVAL    OFFICERS    IN    SANTIAGO    CAMPAIGN 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

not  acknowledged  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  were 
never  heeded  or  noticed  and  probably  were  never  seen 
by  the  other  ships.  In  a  word  Admiral  Schley  never 
controlled  or  directed  in  the  slightest  degree  the  move 
ments  of  any  ship  but  the  Brooklyn  and  exercised  no 
general  command  whatever.  There  was  no  fleet  action. 
Each  ship  followed  the  standing  order  and  fought 
under  it  for  its  own  hand.  The  result  was  harmonious 
but  it  was  a  captain's  fight  without  a  single  fleet  move 
ment  directed  at  the  time  by  anybody. 

Each  ship  following  the  standing  order  to  close 
put  its  helm  to  starboard  and  bore  down  on  the  enemy. 
The  Brooklyn  alone  disobeyed  not  only  the  standing 
order  but  the  order  which  she  herself  had  just  set 
directing  the  other  ships  to  close.  The  Brooklyn 
put  her  helm  to  port  came  round  in  the  reverse  of 
the  other  ships,  with  her  stern  to  the  enemy  and  after 
this  wide  sweep  away  from  them  bore  on  to  the  west 
ward  parallel  to  and  outside  the  Spanish  ships.  Ad 
miral  Schley  had  signalled  to  the  other  ships  to  close 
but  he  made  no  signal  when  he  reversed  his  own  order 
by  putting  his  helm  to  port.  In  this  unexpected  move 
ment  he  not  only  took  himself  out  of  the  way  of  the 
enemy  but  he  checked  the  advance  of  the  Texas.  Had 
he  put  his  helm  to  starboard  and  borne  down  like  the 
other  ships  or  even  if  he  had  not  held  the  Texas  back 
the  Spanish  ships  would  probably  never  have  been  able 
to  clear  the  shoal  and  turn  to  the  westward.  They 
would  in  all  probability  have  been  headed  and  never 
got  out  of  the  pocket  in  which  they  were  and  which  was 
opened  for  them  by  the  movement  of  the  Brooklyn  and 
the  consequent  checking  of  the  Texas. 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Admiral  Schley's  first  explanation  of  his  movement 
was  that  he  was  afraid  of  being  rammed  it  being  under 
stood  that  the  Spaniards  were  especially  anxious  to 
destroy  the  Brooklyn  because  she  was  so  fast.  His 
second  explanation  of  his  turning  away  from  the  enemy 
in  a  direction  contrary  to  that  taken  by  the  other  ships 
was  that  he  wished  to  avoid  blanketing  their  fire.  For 
the  ship  in  the  lead,  and  with  the  highest  speed  to 
blanket  ships  in  the  rear  seems  difficult  on  its  face  but 
for  the  leading  ship  to  blanket  the  fire  of  four  battle 
ships  strung  out  over  a  mile  that  fire  being  directed 
against  four  ships  strung  out  over  an  equal  or  greater 
distance  appears  practically  impossible. 

This  necessary  definition  as  to  the  command  with 
proof  that  the  captains  fought  the  action  for  them 
selves  under  the  standing  order  of  Admiral  Sampson* 
together  with  the  closely  related  description  of  the 
exceptional  and  isolated  movements  of  the  Brooklyn 
have  led  us  away  from  the  general  narrative  of  the 
battle  itself. 

The  only  disadvantage  to  the  Americans  at  the  out 
set  was  that  they  were  under  low  steam,  and  it  took 
time  to  gather  way,  so  that  the  Spaniards,  with  a  full 
head  of  steam,  gained  in  the  first  rush.  But  this  did 
not  check  the  closing  in,  nor  the  heavy  broadsides  which 

*NOTE. — See  report  of  Captain  Clark  of  the  Oregon  addressed  to 
Admiral  Sampson  in  which  he  says :  "Acting  under  your  orders" 
i.  e. 

Under  Sampson's  standing  orders  which  Admiral  Schley  re 
peated  by  signal  from  the  Brooklyn  and  then  disobeyed.  That  is, 
he  did  not  follow  his  own  order  and  gave  no  notice  or  signal  to 
the  other  ships  that  he  was  going  to  do  just  the  opposite  to  what 
he  had  ordered  them  to  do ;  namely,  "close  with  the  enemy." 

140 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

were  poured  upon  the  Spanish  ships  as  they  came  by 
and  turned  to  the  westward.  Then  it  was  that  the 
Maria  Teresa  and  the  Oqucndo  received  their  death- 
wounds.  Then  it  was  that  a  1 3-inch  shell  from  the 
Indiana  struck  the  Teresa  exploding  under  the  quarter 
deck;  and  that  the  broadsides  of  the  lozva,  flung  on 
each  cruiser  as  it  headed  her  in  turn,  and  of  the  Oregon 
and  Texas,  tore  the  sides  of  the  Oqucndo,  the  Vizcaya, 
and  the  flag-ship.  The  Spanish  fire  sank  under  that 
of  the  American  gunners,  shooting  coolly  as  if  at  target 
practice,  and  sweeping  the  Spanish  decks  in  a  manner 
which  drove  the  men  from  the  guns.  On  went  the 
Spanish  ships  in  their  desperate  flight,  the  American 
ships  firing  rapidly  and  steadily  upon  them,  always 
closing  in,  and  beginning  now  to  gather  speed.  The 
race  was  a  short  one  to  two  of  the  Spanish  ships,  fatally 
wounded  in  the  first  savage  encounter.  In  little  more 
than  half  an  hour  the  flag-ship  Maria  Teresa  was 
headed  to  the  shore,  and  at  quarter  past  ten  she  was  a 
sunken,  burning  wreck  upon  the  beach  at  Nima  Nima, 
six  miles  from  Santiago.  Fifteen  minutes  later,  and 
half  a  mile  further  on,  the  Oquendo  was  beached  near 
Juan  Gonzales,  a  mass  of  flames,  shot  to  pieces,  and  a 
hopeless  wreck.  For  these  two,  flight  and  fight  were 
alike  over. 

At  the  start,  the  Brooklyn  as  has  been  said  putting 
her  helm  to  port,  had  gone  round,  bearing  away  from 
the  land,  and  then  steamed  to  the  westward,  so  that, 
as  she  was  the  fastest  in  our  squadron,  she  might  be 
preserved  to  head  off  the  swiftest  Spanish  ship.  In 
the  lead  with  the  Brooklyn  was  the  Texas,  holding 
the  next  position  in  the  line  and  checked  temporarily 

141 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

by  the  Brooklyn's  movement.  But  the  Oregon  was 
about  to  add  to  the  laurels  she  had  already  won  in  her 
great  voyage  from  ocean  to  ocean.  With  a  burst  of 
speed  which  astonished  all  who  saw  her,  and  which 
seemed  almost  incredible  in  a  battle-ship,  she  forged 
ahead  to  the  second  place  in  the  chase,  for  such  it  had 
now  become.  The  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo  had  gone 
to  wreck,  torn  by  the  fire  of  all  the  ships.  The  Vizcaya 
had  also  been  mortally  hurt  in  the  first  outset,  but  she 
struggled  on,  pursued  by  the  leading  ships,  and  under 
their  fire,  especially  that  of  the  Oregon,  until,  at  quarter 
past  eleven,  she  too  was  turned  to  the  shore  and  beached 
at  Asseraderos,  fifteen  miles  from  Santiago,  a  shat 
tered,  blazing  hulk.  Meantime  the  two  torpedo-boats, 
coming  out  last  from  the  harbor,  about  ten  o'clock,  had 
made  a  rush  to  get  by  the  American  ships.  But  their 
high  speed  availed  them  nothing.  The  secondary  bat 
teries  of  the  battle-ships  including  that  of  the  New  York 
as  she  came  driving  past  were  turned  upon  them  with 
disastrous  effect,  and  they  also  met  an  enemy  especially 
reserved  for  them.  The  Gloucester,  a  converted  yacht, 
with  no  armor,  but  with  a  battery  of  small  rapid-fire 
guns,  was  lying  inshore  when  the  Spaniards  made  their 
break  for  liberty.  Undauntedly  firing  her  light  shells 
at  the  great  cruisers  as  they  passed,  the  Gloucester 
waited,  gathering  steam  the  while  for  the  destroyers. 
The  moment  these  boats  appeared,  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Wainwright,  unheeding  the  fire  of  the  Socapa 
battery,  drove  the  Gloucester  straight  upon  them  at  top 
speed,  giving  them  no  time  to  use  their  torpedoes,  even 
if  they  had  so  desired.  The  fierce,  rapid,  well-directed 
fire  of  the  Gloucester  swept  the  decks  of  the  torpedo- 

142 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

boats,  and  tore  their  upper  works  and  sides.  Shattered 
by  the  shells  from  the  battle-ships,  and  overwhelmed 
by  the  close  and  savage  attack  of  the  Gloucester,  which 
fought  in  absolute  disregard  of  the  fire  from  either 
ships  or  shore,  the  race  of  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
was  soon  run.  Within  twenty  minutes  of  their  rush 
from  the  harbor's  mouth  the  Furor  was  beached  and 
sunk,  and  the  Pint  on  had  gone  down  in  deep  water. 
At  the  risk  of  their  lives  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
Gloucester  boarded  their  sinking  enemies,  whose  decks 
looked  like  shambles,  and  saved  all  those  who  could  be 
saved.  There  were  but  few  to  rescue.  Nineteen  were  taken 
from  the  Furor,  26  from  the  Pluton;  all  the  rest  of  the 
64  men  on  each  boat  were  killed  or  drowned.  It  is 
worth  while  to  make  a  little  comparison  here.  The 
Furor  and  Pluton  were  370  tons  each,  with  a  comple 
ment  together  of  134  men.  They  had  together  four  n- 
pounders,  four  6-pounders,  and  four  Maxim  guns,  in 
addition  to  their  torpedoes.  The  Gloucester  was  of  800 
tons,  with  93  men,  four  6-pounders,  four  3-pounders, 
and  two  Colt  automatic  guns.  The  Spanish  boats  were 
fatally  wounded  by  the  secondary  batteries  of  the  bat 
tle-ships,  but  they  were  hunted  down  and  destroyed 
by  the  Gloucester,  which,  regardless  of  the  fire  of  the 
Socapa  battery,  closed  with  them  and  overwhelmed 
them.  There  is  a  very  interesting  exhibition  here  of 
the  superior  quality  of  the  American  sailor.  The  fierce 
rapid,  gallant  attack  of  the  Gloucester  carried  all  before 
it,  and  showed  that  spirit  of  daring  sea-fighting  with 
out  which  the  best  ships  and  the  finest  guns  are  of  little 
avail,  and  which  has  made  the  English-speaking  man 
the  victor  on  the  ocean  from  the  days  of  the  Armada. 

143 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

When  the  Vizcaya  went  ashore  at  quarter  past 
eleven,  only  one  Spanish  ship  remained,  the  Cristobal 
Colon.  She  was  the  newest,  the  fastest,  and  the  best 
of  the  squadron.  With  their  bottled  steam,  all  the 
Spanish  cruisers  gained  at  first,  while  the  American 
ships  were  gathering  and  increasing  their  pressure,  but 
the  Colon  gained  most  of  all.  She  did,  apparently, 
comparatively  little  firing,  kept  inside  of  her  consorts, 
hugging  the  shore,  and  then  raced  ahead,  gaining  on 
all  the  American  ships  except  the  Brooklyn,  which 
kept  on  well  outside  to  head  her  off.  When  the  Viz 
caya  went  ashore,  the  Colon  had  a  lead  of  about  six 
miles  over  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon,  which  had 
forged  to  the  front,  with  the  Texas  and  Vixen  following 
at  their  best  speed.  As  the  New  York  came  tearing 
along  the  coast,  striving  with  might  and  main  to  get 
into  the  fight,  now  so  nearly  done,  Admiral  Sampson 
saw,  after  he  passed  the  wreck  of  the  Vizcaya,  that  the 
American  ships  were  overhauling  the  Spaniard.  The 
Colon  had  a  contract  speed  five  knots  faster  than  the 
contract  speed  of  the  Oregon.  But  the  Spaniard's  best 
was  seven  knots  below  her  contract  speed,  while  the 
Oregon,  fresh  from  her  14,000  miles  of  travel,  was 
going  a  little  faster  than  her  contract  speed,  a  very 
splendid  thing,  worthy  of  much  thought  and  considera 
tion  as  to  the  value  of  perfect  and  honest  workmanship 
done  quite  obscurely  in  the  builder's  yard,  and  of  the 
skill,  energy,  and  exact  training  which  could  then  get 
more  than  any  one  had  a  right  to  expect  from  both  ship 
and  engines.  On  they  went,  the  Americans  coming 
ever  nearer,  until  at  last,  at  ten  minutes  before  one,  the 
Brooklyn  and  Oregon  opened  fire.  A  thirteen-inch 

144 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

shell  from  the  great  battle-ship,  crushing  her  way  at  top 
speed  through  the  water,  fell  in  the  sea  beyond  the 
Colon  while  the  eight-inch  shells  of  the  Brooklyn  began 
to  drop  about  her.  But  the  big  shell  from  the  Oregon 
turret  was  enough ;  and  without  waiting  for  another  of 
those  grim  messengers  from  the  battle-ship,  without 
firing  another  shot,  the  Spaniard  hauled  down  her  flag 
and  ran  at  full  speed  ashore  upon  the  beach  at  Rio  Tar- 
quino,  forty-five  miles  from  Santiago.  Captain  Cook 
of  the  Brooklyn  boarded  her,  received  the  surrender, 
and  reported  it  to  Admiral  Sampson,  who  had  come  up 
just  in  time  to  share  in  the  last  act  of  the  drama.  The 
Colon  was  only  slightly  hurt  by  the  shells,  but  it  wras 
soon  found  that  the  Spaniards,  to  whom  the  point  of 
honor  is  very  dear,  had  opened  and  broken  her  sea- 
valves  after  surrendering  her,  and  that  she  was  filling 
fast.  The  Neiv  York  pushed  her  in  nearer  the  shore, 
and  she  sank,  comparatively  uninjured,  in  shoal  water. 
So  the  fight  ended.  Every  Spanish  ship  which  had 
dashed  out  of  the  harbor  in  the  morning  was  a  half- 
sunken  wreck  on  the  Cuban  coast  at  half  past  one.  The 
officers  and  men  of  the  Iowa,  assisted  by  the  Ericsson 
and  Hist,  took  off  the  Spanish  crews  from  the  red-hot 
decks  and  amid  the  exploding  batteries  and  ammunition 
of  the  Vizcaya.  The  same  work  was  done  by  the 
Gloucester  and  Harvard  for  the  Oquendo  and  Maria 
Teresa.  From  the  water  and  the  surf,  from  the 
beaches,  and  from  the  burning  wrecks,  at  greater  peril 
than  they  had  endured  all  day  in  battle,  American  offi 
cers  and  crews  rescued  their  beaten  foes.  It  was  a 
very  noble  conclusion  to  a  very  perfect  victory.  The 
Spanish  lost,  according  to  their  own  accounts  and  the 

10  145 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

best  estimates,  350  killed  or  drowned,  160  wounded, 
and  99  officers  and  1,675  men  prisoners,  including, 
of  course,  those  on  the  Furor  and  Pluton,  as  already 
given.  The  American  loss  was  one  man  killed  and  one 
wounded,  both  on  the  Brooklyn.  Such  completeness 
of  result  and  such  perfection  of  execution  are  as  striking 
here  as  at  Manila,  and  Europe,  which  had  been  disposed 
at  first  to  belittle  Manila,  saw  at  Santiago  that  these 
things  were  not  accidental,  and  considered  the  perform 
ances  of  the  American  navy  in  a  surprised  and  flatter 
ing,  but  by  no  means  happy,  silence.  At  Santiago  the 
Spaniards  had  the  best  types  of  modern  cruisers,  three 
built  by  British  workmen  in  Spanish  yards,  and  one, 
the  Colon,  in  Italy,  while  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
were  fresh  from  the  Clyde,  and  the  very  last  expression 
of  English  skill.  The  ships  of  the  United  States  were 
heavier  in  armament  and  armor,  but  on  the  average 
much  slower.  The  Americans  could  throw  a  heavier 
weight  of  metal,  but  the  Spaniards  had  more  quick-fire 
guns,  and  ought  to  have  been  able  to  fire  at  the  rate  of 
seventy-seven  more  shots  in  five  minutes  than  their  op 
ponents.*  According  to  the  contract  speed,  the  Spanish 
cruisers  had  a  great  advantage  over  all  their  American 
opponents,  with  the  exception  of  the  Brooklyn,  and  of 
the  New  York,  which  was  absent  at  the  beginning.  If 
they  had  lived  up  to  their  qualities  as  set  down  in  every 
naval  register,  they  ought  to  have  made  a  most  brilliant 
fight,  and  some  of  them  ought  to  have  escaped.  They 
also  had  the  advantage  of  coming  out  under  a  full  head 

*  See  the  admirable  article  in  Harper's  Magazine  for  January 
(p.  291)  upon  the  "Naval  Lessons  of  the  War,"  by  H.  W.  Wil 
son,  author  of  "Ironclads  in  Action." 

146 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

of  steam,  which  their  opponents  lacked,  and  yet  in  less 
than  two  hours  all  but  one  were  shattered  wrecks  along 
the  shore,  and  in  less  than  two  hours  more  that  one  sur 
vivor  had  been  run  down  and  had  met  the  same  fate.  It 
is  no  explanation  to  say,  what  we  know  now  to  be  true, 
that  the  Colon  did  not  have  her  ten-inch  guns,  that  the 
Vizcaya  was  foul-bottomed,  that  much  of  the  ammu 
nition  was  bad,  and  the  other  ships  more  or  less  out  of 
order.  One  of  the  conditions  of  naval  success,  just  as 
important  as  any  other,  is  that  the  ships  should  be  kept 
in  every  respect  in  the  highest  possible  efficiency,  and 
that  the  best  work  of  which  the  machine  and  the  organ 
ization  are  capable  should  be  got  out  of  them.  The 
Americans  fulfiled  these  conditions,  the  Spaniards  did 
not;  the  Oregon  surpassed  all  that  the  most  exacting 
had  a  right  to  demand;  the  Colon  and  Vizcaya  did 
far  less;  hence  one  reason  for  American  victory.  It 
is  also  said  with  truth  that  the  Spanish  gunnery  was 
bad,  but  this  is  merely  stating  again  that  they  fell  short 
in  a  point  essential  to  success.  They  fired  with  great 
rapidity  as  they  issued  from  the  harbor,  and  although 
most  of  the  shots  went  wide,  many  were  anything  but 
wild,  for  the  American  ships  were  all  hit  repeatedly. 
When  the  American  fire  fell  upon  them,  the  Spanish 
fire,  as  at  Manila,  slackened,  became  ineffective,  and 
died  away.  Again  it  was  shown  that  the  volume 
and  accuracy  of  the  American  fire  were  so  great 
that  the  fire  of  the  opponents  was  smothered,  and 
that  the  crews  were  swept  away  from  the  guns.  The 
overwhelming  American  victory  was  due  not  to  the 
shortcomings  of  the  Spaniards,  but  to  the  efficiency  of 
the  navy  of  the  United  States  and  to  the  quality  of  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

iws.  The  officers  and  seamen,  the  gunners  and  engi- 
leers,  surpassed  the  Spaniards  in  their  organization 
ind  in  their  handling  of  the  machinery  they  used. 
JThey  were  thoroughly  prepared ;  no  surprise  was  pos 
sible  to  them;  they  knew  just  what  they  meant  to  do 
when  the  hour  of  battle  came,  and  they  did  it  coolly, 
effectively,  and  with  perfect  discipline.  They  were  pro 
ficient  and  accurate  marksmen,  and  got  the  utmost  from 
their  guns  as  from  their  ships.  Last,  and  most  import 
ant  of  all,  they  had  that  greatest  quality  of  a  strong,  liv 
ing,  virile  race,  the  power  of  daring,  incessant  dashing 
attack,  with  no  thought  of  the  punishment  they  might 
themselves  be  obliged  to  take.  The  whole  war  showed, 
and  the  defeat  of  Cervera  most  conspicuously,  that  the 
Spaniards  had  utterly  lost  the  power  of  attack,  a  sure 
sign  of  a  broken  race,  and  for  which  no  amount  of  for 
titude  in  facing  death  can  compensate.  No  generous 
man  can  fail  to  admire  or  to  praise  the  despairing  cour 
age  which  held  El  Caney  and  carried  Cervera' s  fleet  out 
of  the  narrow  channel  of  Santiago;  but  it  is  not  the 
kind  of  courage  which  leads  to  victory,  like  that  which 
sent  American  soldiers  up  the  hills  of  San  Juan  and  into 
the  blood-stained  village  streets  of  El  Caney,  or  which 
made  the  American  ships  swoop  down,  carrying  utter 
destruction,  upon  the  flying  Spanish  cruisers. 

Thus  the  long  chase  of  the  Spanish  fleet  ended  in  its 
wreck  and  ruin  beneath  American  guns.  As  one  tells 
the  story,  the  utter  inadequacy  of  the  narrative  to  the 
great  fact  seems  painfully  apparent.  One  wanders 
among  the  absorbing  details  which  cross  and  recross  the 
reader's  path,  full  of  interest  and  infinite  in  their  com 
plexity.  The  more  details  one  gathers,  puzzling  what 

148 


SANTIAGO-— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

to  keep  and  what  to  reject,  the  denser  seems  the  com 
plexity,  and  the  dimmer  and  more  confused  the  picture. 
The  historian  writing  calmly  in  the  distant  future  will 
weave  them  into  a  full  and  dispassionate  narrative ;  the 
antiquarian  will  write  monographs  on  all  incidents, 
small  or  large,  with  unwearying  patience;  the  naval 
critic  and  expert  will  even  now  draw  many  technical 
and  scientific  lessons  from  everything  that  happened, 
and  will  debate  and  dispute  about  it,  to  the  great  ad 
vantage  of  himself  and  his  profession.  And  yet  these 
are  not  the  things  which  appeal  now,  or  will  appeal  in 
the  clays  to  come,  to  the  hearts  of  men.  The  details, 
the  number  of  shots,  the  ranges,  the  part  taken  by  each 
ship,  the  positions  of  the  fleet — all  alike  have  begun  to 
fade  from  recollection  even  now,  and  will  grow  still 
dimmer  as  the  years  recede.  But  out  of  the  mist  of 
events  and  the  gathering  darkness  of  passing  time  the 
great  fact  and  the  great  deed  stand  forth  for  the  Ameri 
can  people  and  their  children's  children,  as  white  and 
shining  as  the  Santiago  channel  glaring  under  the 
search-lights  through  the  Cuban  night. 

They  remember,  and  will  always  remember,  that  hot 
summer  morning,  and  the  anxiety,  only  half  whispered, 
which  overspread  the  land.  They  see,  and  will  always 
see,  the  American  ships  rolling  lazily  on  the  long  seas, 
and  the  sailors  just  going  to  Sunday  inspection.  Then 
comes  the  long  thin  trail  of  smoke  drawing  nearer  the 
harbor's  mouth.  The  ships  see  it,  and  we  can  hear  the 
cheers  ring  out,  for  the  enemy  is  coming,  and  the 
American  sailor  rejoices  mightily  to  know  that  the 
battle  is  set.  There  is  no  need  of  signals,  no  need 
of  orders.  The  patient,  long-watching  admiral  has 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

given  direction  for  every  chance  that  may  befall. 
Every  ship  is  in  place;  and  they  close  in  upon 
the  advancing  enemy,  fiercely  pouring  shells  from 
broadside  and  turret.  There  is  the  Gloucester  fir 
ing  her  little  shots  at  the  great  cruisers,  and  then 
driving  down  to  grapple  with  the  torpedo-boats.  There 
are  the  Spanish  ships,  already  mortally  hurt,  running 
along  the  shore,  shattered  and  breaking  under  the  fire 
of  the  Indiana,  the  Iowa,  and  the  Texas;  there  is  the 
Brooklyn  racing  by  outside  to  head  the  fugitives,  and 
the  Oregon  dealing  death-strokes  as  she  rushes  for 
ward,  forging  to  the  front,  and  leaving  her  mark  every 
where  she  goes.  It  is  a  captain's  fight,  and  they  all 
fight  as  if  they  were  one  man  with  one  ship.  On  they 
go,  driving  through  the  water,  firing  steadily  and  ever 
getting  closer,  and  presently  the  Spanish  cruisers,  help 
less,  burning,  twisted  wrecks  of  iron,  are  piled  along 
the  shore,  and  we  see  the  younger  officers  and  men  of 
the  victorious  ships  periling  their  lives  to  save  their 
beaten  enemies.  We  see  Wainwright  on  the  Glouces 
ter,  as  eager  in  rescue  as  he  was  swift  in  fight  to  avenge 
the  Maine.  We  hear  Philip  cry  out :  "Don't  cheer. 
The  poor  devils  are  dying."  We  watch  Evans  as  he 
hands  back  the  sword  to  the  wounded  Eulate,  and  then 
writes  in  his  report:  "I  cannot  express  my  admira 
tion  for  my  magnificent  crew.  So  long  as  the  enemy 
showed  his  flag,  they  fought  like  American  seamen; 
but  when  the  flag  came  down,  they  were  as  gentle  and 
tender  as  American  women."  They  all  stand  out  to  us, 
these  gallant  figures,  from  the  silent  admiral  to  the 
cheering  seaman,  with  an  intense  human  interest,  fear 
less  in  fight,  brave  and  merciful  in  the  hour  of  victory. 


SANTIAGO— THE  SEA  FIGHT 

And  far  away  along  the  hot  ridges  of  the  San  Juan 
heights  lie  the  American  soldiers,  who  have  been  fight 
ing,  and  winning,  and  digging  intrenchments  for  forty- 
eight  hours,  sleeping  little  and  eating  less.  There  they 
are  under  the  tropic  sun  that  Sunday  morning,  and 
presently  the  heavy  sound  of  guns  comes  rolling  up  the 
bay,  and  is  flung  back  with  many  ec*hoes  from  the  sur 
rounding  hills.  It  goes  on  and  on,  so  fast,  so  deep  and 
loud,  that  it  is  like  continuous  thunder  filling  all  the 
air.  A  battle  is  on  ;  they  know  that.  Wild  rumors  be 
gin  to  fly  about,  drifting  up  from  the  coast.  They  hear 
that  the  American  fleet  is  coming  into  the  harbor;  then 
for  an  hour  that  it  has  been  defeated  and  that  the  Span 
iards  have  escaped ;  and  then  the  truth  begins  to  come, 
and  before  nightfall  they  know  that  the  Spanish  fleet 
is  no  more,  and  the  American  soldier  cheers  the  Ameri 
can  sailor,  and  is  filled  anew  with  the  glow  of  victory, 
and  the  assurance  that  he  and  his  comrades  have  not 
fought  and  suffered  and  died  in  vain. 

The  thought  of  the  moment  is  of  the  present  victory, 
but  there  are  men  there  who  recognize  the  deeper  and 
more  distant  meanings  of  that  Sunday's  work,  now 
sinking  into  the  past.  They  are  stirred  by  the  knowl 
edge  that  the  sea  power  of  Spain  has  perished,  and  that 
the  Spanish  West  Indies,  which  Columbus  gave  to  Leon 
and  Castile,  shall  know  Spain  no  more.  They  lift  the 
veil  of  the  historic  past,  and  see  that  on  that  July  morn 
ing  a  great  empire  met  its  end,  and  passed  finally  out  of 
the  New  World,  because  it  was  unfit  to  rule  and  govern 
men.  And  they  and  all  men  see  now,  and  ever  more 
clearly  will  see.  that  in  the  fight  off  Santiago  another 
great  fact  had  reasserted  itself  for  the  consideration  of 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  world.  For  that  fight  had  displayed  once  more  the 
victorious  sea  spirit  of  a  conquering  race.  It  is  the 
spirit  of  the  Jomsberg  Viking  who,  alone  and  wounded, 
ringed  round  with  foes,  springs  into  the  sea  from  his 
sinking  boat  with  defiance  on  his  lips.  It  comes  down 
through  Grenville  and  Drake  and  Howard  and  Blake, 
on  to  Perry  and  Macdonough  and  Hull  and  Decatur. 
Here  on  this  summer  Sunday  it  has  been  shown  again 
to  be  as  vital  and  as  clear  as  ever,  even  as  it  was  with 
Nelson  dying  at  Trafalgar,  and  with  Faragut  and  his 
men  in  the  fights  of  bay  and  river  more  than  thirty 
years  before. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

DESPITE  the  depressing  despatch  to  Washington  say 
ing  that  he  was  considering  withdrawal,  General  Shaf- 
ter,  at  10  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  sent  to  General 
Toral  a  demand  for  immediate  surrender,  threatening 
to  shell  the  city,  although  he  had  no  siege-guns  and 
nothing  but  light  artillery  to  carry  out  his  threat  in  case 
his  demand  was  not  complied  with.  General  Toral 
answered  at  once,  declining  to  surrender,  and  saying 
that  he  would  notify  the  foreign  consuls  and  the  inhabi 
tants  of  the  proposed  bombardment.  Thereupon  the 
foreign  consuls  appeared  at  General  Wheeler's  head 
quarters,  and  asked  that  the  bombardment  be  postponed 
until  the  5th;  that  the  non-combatants,  women  and 
children,  and  the  foreign  residents,  be  allowed  to  leave 
the  town  and  pass  into  the  American  lines,  to  be  there 
fed  and  cared  for.  General  Shatter  granted  the  respite 
until  the  5th,  provided  that  there  was  no  firing  from  the 
Spanish  lines.  By  the  evening  of  the  3d  it  was  known 
that  Cervera's  fleet  had  been  completely  destroyed,  and 
the  purpose  of  the  expedition  had  been  fully  attained. 
But  in  effecting  that  purpose  the  army  had  been  so  far 
advanced  toward  Santiago  that,  although  the  purely 
military  value  of  the  place  was  next  to  nothing  after 
what  had  happened,  not  to  take  it  would  have  been  a 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

blow  to  the  prestige  of  the  United  States  which  could 
not  be  accepted.  If  the  army  had  never  advanced 
toward  Santiago,  but  had  confined  its  operations  to  the 
capture  of  the  Morro  and  other  harbor  defences,  thus 
allowing  the  navy  to  clear  the  mine-fields,  the  fleet  could 
have  entered,  destroyed  Cervera's  ships  in  the  harbor, 
and  forced  the  surrender  of  the  city.  In  this  event  the 
bulk  of  the  troops  could  have  been  placed  immediately 
on  the  transports  and  despatched  to  Puerto  Rico,  the 
natural  Spanish  base  in  the  Antilles,  and  the  point 
which  General  Miles  rightly  believed  from  the  begin 
ning  should  be  the  main  objective  of  the  American  cam 
paign,  subject  only  to  the  destruction  of  the  cruisers 
which  represented  the  Spanish  sea  power  in  the  West 
Indies.  But  since  the  plan  of  attacking  the  shore 
batteries  and  clearing  the  channel  had  been  abandoned, 
and  the  army  marched  straight  against  Santiago,  it 
was  no  longer  possible  to  withdraw  the  troops  in  order 
to  send  them  to  Puerto  Rico,  or  for  any  other  purpose. 
The  capture  of  Santiago  had  become  by  the  operations 
of  our  army  a  moral  and  consequently  a  military  neces 
sity. 

The  brilliant  victory  of  the  American  fleet  raised 
every  one's  spirits,  and  gave  assurance  of  the  final 
triumph  on  land.  General  Shafter,  who  had  first  sent 
out  the  telegram  intimating  withdrawal,  telegraphed 
General  Miles  later  that  he  was  master  of  the  situation 
and  could  hold  the  enemy  for  any  length  of  time,  and  in 
the  evening,  after  the  news  from  the  fleet  had  been  fully 
confirmed,  cheerfully  sent  word  that  his  line  completely 
surrounded  the  town  from  the  bay  on  the  north  of  the 
city  to  a  point  on  San  Juan  river  on  the  south,  and  that 

«54 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

he  thought  General  Garcia  would  be  able  to  check  the 
advance  of  Pando's  column.  Nevertheless  the  situa 
tion  of  the  American  army  was  in  some  respects  se 
rious.  The  defenses  of  Santiago  in  the  immediate  neigh 
borhood  of  the  city,  General  Shatter  said,  were  ''almost 
impregnable."  They  were  certainly  very  strong,  and  it 
wrould  have  cost  many  lives  to  carry  them  with  troops 
insufficiently  provided  with  artillery.  This  was  a  very 
grave  fact,  because  time  had  become  extremely  im 
portant  to  the  American  forces,  and  it  was  pressingly 
necessary  to  bring  the  siege  to  an  end.  Haste  was  im 
perative,  not  on  account  of  anything  to  be  feared  from 
the  enemy,  but  through  the  surrounding  conditions. 
The  entire  force  of  the  United  States,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  Duffield's  brigade,  had  gone  through  the  battle 
of  the  2d  of  July,  and  had  suffered  severely  in  killed 
and  wounded.  For  the  next  thirty-six  hours  they  had 
been  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire,  repeatedly  obliged  to 
repel  an  advance,  always  on  the  alert,  and,  in  addition, 
constantly  digging  and  laboring  on  the  intrenchments. 
The  tenacious,  unwavering  courage  with  which  they 
clung  to  the  advanced  line,  laboring  and  fighting,  was 
as  fine  in  its  way  as  the  daring,  irrresistible  rush  with 
which  they  had  swept  up  the  slopes  of  San  Juan.  But 
courage  and  energy  could  not  prevent  the  exhaustion 
incident  to  so  much  fighting  and  digging.  There  was 
no  reserve.  All  the  troops  practically  were  on  the  line, 
with  no  chance  for  any  substantial  relief.  The  trans 
portation  was  bad,  so  that  the  men  were  underfed  and 
insufficiently  tented.  With  their  exhausting  labors,  and 
not  fortified  by  food,  with  a  hospital  service  which  had 
in  large  measure  broken  down,  the  men  were  exposed  to 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

scorching  tropic  heats  and  torrential  rains,  all  in  a  cli 
mate  famous  for  malarial  fevers.  It  was  only  a  ques 
tion  of  a  very  short  time  when  these  fevers  would  be 
come  general,  striking  first  the  sick  and  wounded,  who 
were  insufficiently  cared  for  and  who  could  not  be  re 
stored  to  health  on  a  diet  of  pork  and  beans,  and  then 
the  well  and  unwounded  men  in  the  trenches.  Worst 
of  all,  behind  the  climatic  diseases  lurked  the  dread  epi 
demic  of  yellow  fever,  hidden  in  the  cabins  of  Siboney, 
which  ought  to  have  been  burned  at  once  as  the  ma 
rines  burned  the  fishing  villlage  at  Guantanamo,  and 
in  the  hordes  of  refugees  who  were  presently  to  come 
out  of  the  besieged  city. 

On  the  other  side,  the  Spaniards  were  in  reality  much 
worse  off,  although  it  may  have  appeared  at  Havana 
and  in  Madrid  as  if  they  had  only  to  hold  firm  and  trust 
to  the  climate  and  the  ravages  of  fever  to  inflict  severe 
losses  upon  the  Americans,  delay  them,  and  possibly 
force  them  to  withdraw.  The  Spanish  commmanders 
were  in  the  midst  of  a  hostile  population.  The  Cuban 
insurgents  had  for  some  time  practically  shut  them  up 
in  the  city  on  the  land  side,  breaking  their  communica 
tions  and  cutting  off  their  supplies.  They  believed  that 
the  American  forces  numbered  fifty  thousand  men,  and 
although  they  were  mistaken  in  this,  they  knew  that 
their  opponents  could  easily  receive  unlimited  re-en 
forcements,  new  regiments,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  soon 
arriving  and  extending  the  lines  rapidly  around  the 
doomed  city.  They  knew,  also,  that  Cervera's  fleet 
had  been  destroyed,  and  that  no  relief  coming  oversea 
could  possibly  be  hoped  for.  To  draw  in  the  outlying 
troops  from  other  parts  of  the  province  was  a  work  of 

156 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

time  and  difficulty,  and  meanwhile,  with  a  beaten  and 
discouraged  army  which  had  suffered  severely  in  battle, 
with  disease  rife,  and  their  water  supply  impaired,  they 
were  face  to  face  with  a  vigorous  enemy  constantly  in 
creasing  in  numbers.  Under  these  conditions  the  sur 
render  of  the  city  was  only  a  question  of  time,  but  how 
long  that  time  would  be  was  of  infinite  importance 
to  the  American  army  when  delay  meant  disease  and 
death. 

•  The  first  truce  of  two  days  following  Toral's  curt  and 
useless  refusal  to  consider  surrender  did  not  help  the 
American  situation,  for  it  brought  on  July  5  a  general 
exodus  of  non-combatants  from  the  city.  These  un 
happy  refugees,  mostly  women  and  children,  came 
pouring  into  the  American  lines  at  El  Caney  to  the 
number  of  twenty-two  thousand.  They  were  in  sad 
plight — ragged,  sick,  starved.  They  made  a  fresh 
strain  upon  the  American  resources,  for  they  had  to 
be  fed;  they  brought  yellow  fever  with  them  as  they 
scattered  through  the  camps,  and  they  relieved  very 
much  the  situation  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  the  city. 
After  their  arrival  there  was  skirmishing  along  the 
lines,  sometimes  of  quite  a  lively  character,  varied  by 
flags  of  truce  and  consequent  intervals  of  repose.  Our 
losses  were  slight,  as  the  men  were  now  well  protected 
by  intrenchments  and  breastworks.  This  condition  of 
affairs  lasted  until  the  Qth,  when  another  demand  for 
surrender  was  made.  The  Spaniards,  in  reply,  offered  to 
evacuate  if  allowed  to  withdraw  untouched  to  Holguin, 
which  was  declined.  They  then  peremptorily  refused 
to  surrender,  being  encouraged  in  their  attitude  proba 
bly  by  the  fact  that  General  Escario,  with  the  Pando 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

column,  consisting  of  3,300  men,  had  come  in  some  days 
before.*  General  Garcia  had  endeavored  to  stop  this 
re-enforcement,  and  had  fought  an  action  in  which  the 
Spanish  loss  is  said  to  have  been  27  killed  and  67 
wounded ;  but  General  Escario  forced  his  way  through, 
apparently  without  serious  difficulty,  and  reached  the 
city  in  safety.  Whether  the  arrival  of  these  fresh 
troops  was  the  cause  or  not,  the  surrender  was  declined, 
and  thereupon  the  American  lines  opened  with  small 
guns  and  artillery,  and  continued  the  fire  until  nightfall 
of  Sunday,  the  loth,  being  supported  on  that  afternoon 
by  the  eight-inch  guns  of  the  Brooklyn,  Indiana,  and 
Texas,  which  came  in  near  shore  and  fired,  most  of 
their  shells  falling  short.  The  Spaniards  replied  stead 
ily,  but,  according  to  their  own  accounts,  slowly,  owing 
to  their  desire  to  economize  their  ammunition.  The 
American  losses  were  trivial ;  the  Spanish,  by  their  own 
reports,  7  killed  and  47  wounded;  but  the  result  of  the 
bombardment  was  neither  substantial  nor  effective. 
The  next  day  the  New  York,  Brooklyn,  and  Indiana 
came  in  to  within  400  yards  of  the  shore  at  Aguadores, 
anchored,  and  opened  fire  with  their  eight-inch  guns 
over  the  coast  hills,  at  the  city  they  could  not  see,  with 
a  range  of  8,500  yards.  This  time  the  practice  was  ex 
cellent.  The  army  officers  watching  the  fall  of  the 
shells,  although  they  could  not  tell  exactly  what  hap 
pened,  saw  enough  to  make  it  clear  that  the  shots  were 
effective,  and  that  fires  broke  out  in  several  places.  It 
was  found  afterwards  to  have  been  far  more  destruc 
tive  than  the  watchers  on  the  hills  supposed.  Captain 
West  reported  forty-six  shots,  but  was  unable  to  tell 
*The  night  of  July  2. 

158 


THI-;  <;EM-;RAI.S  TO  ARRANGE  THE  STRRHNDKR 
SANTIAGO 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

the  result  of  most  of  them.    After  the  surrender  naval 
officers  found  fourteen  houses  wrecked  by  shells,  and 
nineteen  shells  in  the  Calle  de  la  Marina  near  the  water 
front;  while  Lieutenant  Muller  states  that  fifty-nine 
houses  were  wrecked  or  injured,  and  that  no  lives  were 
lost,  solely  because  the  inhabitants  had  deserted  the  city. 
As  General  Linares  said  in  the  pathetic  despatch  which 
he  sent  to  Madrid  describing  his  hopeless  and  miserable 
situation.     "The  fleet  has  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
place,  and  bombards  by  elevation  with  a  mathematical 
accuracy."     General  Shafter  considered  that  the  bom 
bardment    had    been    sufficiently    accurate    and  effect 
ive  to   warrant  him   in   advancing  the  lines  and   de 
manding  again  an  unconditional   surrender.      At  the 
same    time    he    desired    a    continuous    bombardment 
from   heavier   guns,   and   Admiral    Sampson   brought 
down   the   Oregon   and   Massachusetts  and   prepared 
to  open  with  the   1 3-inch  guns  the  next  day;   while 
General    Miles,    who    had    just    arrived,    was    ready 
to  land  fresh  troops.      But   neither  the    1 3-inch   guns 
nor   the    re-enforcements    were    needed.      The    Span 
iards  knew  that  the  naval  bombardment  was  effective, 
whatever  doubts  the  officers  of  our  own  army  may  have 
had  in  regard  to  it.     The  navy,  despite  the  long  range 
and  the  intervening  hills,  had  managed  to  supply  the 
place  of  the  lacking  siege-guns,  and  the  Spaniards  had 
had  enough.    A  truce  was  agreed  to  on  July  12  ;  and  on 
July  13  General  Miles,  who  had  come  up  from  the  coast 
after  ordering  the  burning  of  Siboney,  a  precaution 
which  ought  to  have  been  taken  two  weeks  before, 
joined  General  Shafter  and  General  Wheeler,  and  go 
ing  through  the  lines  with  them,  had  a  long  interview 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

with  General  Toral,  commanding  the  Spanish  forces. 
It  was  evident  then,  and  is  still  clearer  now,  that  the 
fight  was  really  over,  and  that  nothing  remained  but  an 
arrangement  of  the  terms  of  surrender.  General  Toral 
asked  for  a  day  to  consult  Madrid  as  to  the  deportation 
of  the  Spanish  troops,  which  was  granted.  The  next 
day  there  was  another  meeting  of  the  generals,  and  it 
was  supposed  that  all  was  arranged;  but  it  appeared 
that  there  had  been  misunderstandings;  other  meet 
ings  followed,  and  it  was  not  until  after  midnight  that 
the  preliminary  agreement  was  finally  signed.  This  was 
sent  to  Madrid,  and  being  accepted  there,  was  put  into 
due  form  as  articles  of  capitulation,  and  signed  on  July 
1 6.  The  terms  of  capitulation  provided  that  all  the 
Eastern  District  and  the  troops  therein  should  be  sur 
rendered;  that  the  United  States  should  transport  the 
Spanish  troops  to  Spain  at  its  own  expense;  that  the 
Spanish  officers  should  retain  their  side  arms,  but  that 
all  other  arms  and  ammunition  of  war  were  to  be  sur 
rendered,  the  American  commissioners  recommending 
to  their  government,  as  a  sop  to  Spanish  pride,  that  the 
soldiers  should  be  allowed  to  keep  the  arms  they  had 
so  bravely  defended,  to  which  recommendation  no  heed 
was  or  could  be  paid. 

So  the  city  and  Eastern  District  of  Santiago  passed 
into  American  hands,  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of 
the  victorious  fighting  of  the  army,  as  the  twisted 
wrecks  to  the  westward  were  of  that  of  the  navy.  The 
ceremonies  of  surrender  took  place  on  July  17.  Early 
in  the  morning  General  Shafter,  with  General  Wheeler 
by  his  side,  started  from  the  American  lines,  followed 
by  the  division  and  brigade  commanders  and  their 

1 60 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

staffs.  They  were  plainly  dressed,  without  stars  or  or 
ders — hard  fighters  all — and  presented  a  contrast  to 
General  Toral  and  his  staff,  who  were  glittering  with 
decorations.  It  was  half  past  nine  when  the  two  com 
manders  met  and  shook  hands,  and  the  American  con 
gratulated  the  Spaniard  upon  his  gallant  defence.  Then 
a  battalion  of  Spanish  infantry  marched  past,  piled  their 
arms,  and  marched  back  again,  in  sign  of  the  surrender, 
and  setting  the  example  soon  to  be  followed  by  the 
rest  of  the  army.  This  done,  the  generals  and  their 
staffs  rode  forward  into  the  city.  Along  the  road  lay 
the  carcasses  of  horses,  and  the  shallow  graves  of  sol 
diers  torn  open  by  vultures — grim  and  silent  witnesses 
of  the  work  which  had  brought  the  Spaniards  to  defeat. 
Presently  the  Spanish  lines  were  reached,  and  the  cav 
alcade  passed  through  the  intrenchments,  wire  fences, 
and  barricades  of  paving-stones,  which  it  would  have 
cost  many  brave  lives  to  force.  So  on  through  streets 
lined  with  Spanish  soldiers,  silent,  but  apparently  re 
lieved  to  have  it  over,  and  bearing  the  inevitable  with 
cheerful  philosophy.  When  the  plaza  was  reached  the 
generals  entered  the  palace,  while  the  Ninth  Infantry 
and  two  troops  of  cavalry  cleared  the  square.  In  the 
palace  General  Shafter  received  the  head  of  the  Church, 
gorgeous  in  purple  robes  and  many  decorations.  Pos 
sibly,  as  the  archbishop,  after  his  brief  interview,  took 
his  way  across  the  square  through  the  bowing  crowds, 
he  may  have  thought  upon  the  after-dinner  speech  in 
which  he  had  so  lately  declared  that  with  ten  thousand 
men  he  would  hoist  the  Spanish  flag  over  the  Capitol 
at  Washington,  and  thus  pondering,  have  found  fresh 
force  in  the  words  of  Ecclesiastes.  The  time  slipped 
11  161 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

by  as  the  crowds  waited — the  natives  rejoicing,  the 
Spanish  soldiers  cheerful,  the  Spanish  officers  and 
priests  sad  and  dejected — until,  as  all  watched  the 
cathedral  clock,  the  hand  came  round  to  five  minutes 
before  twelve.  Then  a  sharp  command  rang  out,  the  in 
fantry  and  cavalry  came  to  attention  and  stood  motion 
less.  The  five  minutes  dragged  on  with  leaden  feet,  and 
then  at  last  the  bells  began  to  sound  from  the  cathedral, 
and  the  American  flag  went  up  on  the  staff  over  the 
palace.  The  band  played  "The  Star-Spangled  Banner," 
the  officers  bared  their  heads,  the  troops  presented 
arms,  the  artillery  thundered  from  the  trenches,  and  all 
down  the  long  and  distant  line  ran  the  American  cheers 
— strong,  vigorous,  inspiring,  the  shout  of  a  conquer 
ing  people. 

It  was  all  over.  Santiago  had  passed  away  from 
Spain,  and  with  it  all  Cuba,  for  what  had  been  done 
there  could  not  be  hindered  elsewhere,  as  was  now  very 
plain  to  all  men.  It  was  one  of  the  dramatic  points  in 
the  war.  It  was  the  moment  when  the  American  flag, 
mounting  proudly  in  the  air,  told  the  world  that  Spain's 
empire  in  America  had  finally  and  forever  departed. 
Out  of  that  harbor,  famous  before,  more  famous  now, 
Grijalva  and  Cordova  had  sailed  on  the  perilous  voy 
ages  which  had  discovered  Central  America.  Thence 
in  the  early  dawn  of  a  November  morning  in  1518 
Cortez  had  slipped  away  with  his  fleet  to  escape  an  un 
friendly  Governor,  and  raising  afterwards  at  Havana 
his  standard  of  black  and  gold,  with  a  red  cross  flaring 
in  the  centre,  had  passed  on  to  conquer  Mexico  and  pour 
untold  wealth  into  the  coffers  of  the  Spanish  King. 
The  last  Spanish  fleet  had  just  left  that  harbor  a  des- 

162 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

perate  fugitive,  and  had  perished  in  its  mad  flight  a  few 
miles  beyond  the  harbor  mouth.  Now  the  speech  of 
the  men  who,  three  hundred  years  before,  had  hunted 
the  Armada  and  saved  English  freedom  was  heard  in 
the  market  place  of  Santiago,  repeating  the  old  mes 
sage  of  liberty,  grown  wider  and  stronger  than  ever 
before  in  the  hands  of  the  great  republic.  The  flag  of 
the  United  States  fluttered  in  the  breezes  which  for 
three  centuries  had  carried  the  arms  and  colors  of 
Spain,  now  fallen  and  gone.  Only  outward  symbols 
these,  but  representing  many  facts  and  many  events 
worthy  of  much  attention  and  consideration  from  those 
who  think  tyranny,  falsehood,  and  bigotry  are  suitable 
instruments  for  the  government  of  mankind. 

It  is  well  also  not  to  forget  that  while  these  great  and 
conclusive  events  were  happening  at  Santiago,  while 
Sampson  was  shutting  in  Cervera  with  his  strong  and 
patient  blockade,  the  better  to  crush  him  when  he  rushed 
out  to  fight,  while  the  American  army  was  advanc 
ing  from  the  coast,  winning  the  hot  fight  at  San  Juan 
and  taking  the  city  in  token  of  victory,  other  Ameri 
cans  in  ships  of  war  were  diligently  and  efficiently  car 
rying  steadily  forward  the  work  which  was  cutting  oft" 
Cuba  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  making  inevitable 
the  surrender  of  the  island,  even  as  the  eastern  province 
had  surrendered.  North  and  south,  all  along  that  far- 
stretching  and  broken  coast-line,  American  gunboats 
and  cruisers  kept  up  a  ceaseless  patrol.  Ships  at  the 
western  end  were  scarce  enough,  but  nevertheless  the 
blockade  was  held  tight  and  firm  around  Havana  and 
the  ports  covered  by  the  first  proclamation.  To  tell  in 
fitting  detail  all  the  work  that  was  done  would  fill  many 

163 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

pages,  and  would  be  no  more  than  the  officers  and  sail 
ors  deserve  who  performed  hard  and  often  obscure  duty 
with  an  efficiency  equal  to  that  shown  by  their  more 
fortunate  comrades  in  a  larger  and  more  brilliant  thea 
tre.  But  it  is  impossible  here  to  render  this  justice  to 
all.  The  work  was  patient  and  unceasing,  and  the  in 
cidents  of  fighting  were  of  almost  daily  occurrence. 
Now  a  great  blockade-runner  was  hunted  down  and  de 
stroyed,  as  the  Eagle  dealt  with  the  Santo  Domingo 
at  Rio  Piedras,  and  the  Hawk,  aided  by  the  Castine, 
with  another  six-thousand-ton  ship  at  Mariel,  the  men 
on  the  ships  or  in  boats  facing  a  heavy  fire  in  their  re 
lentless  pursuit.  Blockade-running  became  a  danger 
ous,  almost  impossible,  business  under  the  conditions 
imposed  by  the  American  navy.  Again  it  was  the  land 
ing  of  an  expedition  to  bring  aid  and  supplies  to  Gomez, 
as  was  done  by  the  Peoria  and  Helena  convoying  the 
Florida,  with  a  fight  in  consequence  against  the  bat 
teries  and  block-houses  at  Las  Tunas.  Again  it  was  the 
Dixie  smashing  the  block-houses  at  the  San  Juan  and 
Guayximico  rivers,  and  the  gunboats  at  Casilda.  These 
are  but  samples  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Spanish 
defences  were  harried  and  broken  up  all  along  the 
coast,  and  the  efforts  to  get  supplies  to  the  main  army 
at  Havana  frustrated  and  brought  to  naught. 

More  serious  was  the  affair  of  June  26  at  Man- 
zanillo.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  the  Hist,  under 
command  of  Lieutenant  Young,  the  senior  officer  pres 
ent,  together  with  the  Hornet  and  the  Wompatuck, 
attacked  a  gun-boat  near  the  block-house  in  Niguero 
Bay,  and,  after  a  sharp  action,  destroyed  her.  They 
pushed  on  to  the  harbor  of  Manzanillo  in  the  after- 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

noon,  and  came  upon  nine  vessels,  including  four  gun 
boats  and  a  torpedo-boat,  drawn  up  in  crescent  for 
mation,  and  supported  by  four  pontoons  and  strong 
shore  batteries.  Nothing  daunted,  these  two  converted 
yachts  and  one  tug,  with  their  light  batteries,  pressed 
forward  and  attacked  vigorously,  under  a  heavy  fire. 
The  odds  were  strongly  against  them ;  the  Hist  was  hit 
eleven  times;  the  Hornet,  also  struck  many  times,  was 
disabled  finally  by  a  shot  through  her  main  steam-pipe, 
and  was  towed  off  by  the  Worn  pat  uck,  which  received 
her  share  of  shots,  fighting  her  guns  steadily  and  ef 
fectively.  The  Spanish  torpedo-boat  was  disabled,  one 
gunboat  sunk,  as  well  as  a  sloop  loaded  with  soldiers, 
and  a  pontoon  was  destroyed.  It  was  a  very  plucky 
fight  against  a  far  superior  force.  The  next  day  the 
Scorpion,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  Marix,  and  ac 
companied  by  the  tug  Osccola,  went  in  and  vigorously 
renewed  the  attack,  but  was  inadequate  to  dispose  of 
such  odds  against  them.  These  affairs  made  it  obvious 
that  a  stronger  force  wras  necessary  in  order  to  really 
destroy  the  Spanish  ships  assembled  in  the  harbor. 
On  July  1 8  the  five  small  vessels  which  had  already 
been  engaged,  re-enforced  by  the  gunboats  Helena 
and  Wilmington,  Commander  Todd  of  the  latter  being 
the  senior  officer  present,  went  in  early  in  the  morning 
and  opened  fire  at  ten  minutes  before  eight.  At  the  end 
of  two  hours  and  a  half  they  had  destroyed  three  large 
transports,  the  Ponton,  a  guard-ship,  and  three  gun 
boats.  As  they  worked  in  closer,  batteries  opened  from 
the  shore,  and  soldiers  with  rifles,  to  which  they  replied 
effectively ;  but  when  the  shipping  was  disposed  of,  the 
American  flotilla  withdrew,  the  work  to  which  it  had 

165 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

been  assigned  having  been  performed  with  entire  thor 
oughness,  excellent  shooting,  cool  courage,  and  in  the 
same  spirit  of  completeness  as  had  been  shown  to  the 
world  at  Manila. 

Three  days  afterwards  the  Annapolis,  commanded  by 
Commander  Hunker,  supported  by  the  Topeka,  with  the 
Wasp  and  Leyden  leading,  went  in  through  the  mine- 
sown  channel  of  Nipe  bay,  on  the  northern  coast.  There 
they  found  the  gunboat  Don  Jorge  Juan,  of  935  tons 
and  armed  with  6-inch  rifles,  lying  at  anchor  in  the 
restful  belief  that  no  enemy  would  dare  to  venture  past 
the  mines.  Unluckily  the  enemy  inconsiderately  did 
that  very  thing,  faced  the  fire  of  the  Don  Jorge  Juan, 
closed  in,  and  in  half  an  hour  the  Spaniard,  shot  to 
pieces,  had  surrendered  and  sunk.  Again,  three  days 
later,  the  Nashville,  under  command  of  Commander 
Maynard,  took  possession  of  Gibara,  supporting  the 
Cubans  who  were  already  in  the  town.  Thus  the  sea 
ports  of  Cuba  were  falling  rapidly  and  steadily  into 
American  hands,  and  thus  the  net  was  being  drawn  ever 
closer  and  tighter  upon  the  main  army  at  Havana.  In 
pursuance  of  this  policy  it  was  determined  to  complete 
the  work  at  Manzanillo,  where  the  shipping  had  been 
so  thoroughly  destroyed,  by  taking  the  town  itself, 
which,  strongly  held  by  a  large  force  of  troops  and  well 
defended  by  batteries,  was  a  source  of  trouble  to  the 
American  campaign  on  land,  as  well  as  a  constant 
temptation  to  blockade- running.  With  this  object  in 
view,  the  Newark,  under  Captain  Goodrich,  on  her  way 
to  the  Isle  of  Pines  to  conduct  certain  operations 
ordered  by  Admiral  Sampson,  gathered  together  the 
Resolute,  Suwanee,  Hist,  Osceola,  and  the  Alvarado — a 

166 


NAVAL    OFFICERS    IN    ITF.RTO    RICAN    CAMPAIGN 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO 

recently  captured  Spanish  gun-boat — and  entered  Man- 
zanillo  Harbor  on  August  12.  A  demand  for  surrender 
under  pain  of  bombardment  was  refused,  and  the  ships 
opened  upon  the  batteries  at  twenty  minutes  before 
four.  In  half  an  hour  white  flags  were  seen  on  a  Span 
ish  gunboat;  the  American  fire  stopped;  the  Alvarado, 
running  in  under  a  flag  of  truce,  was  fired  upon,  and 
the  action  was  immediately  renewed.  Cuban  forces 
then  appeared  in  the  rear  of  the  town,  and  opening 
fire,  were  supported  by  the  ships.  At  half  past  five  the 
ships  anchored ;  a  slow7  fire  from  the  Nezvark  was  kept 
up  through  the  night,  and  preparations  were  made  to 
renew  the  bombardment  and  force  the  surrender  of  the 
town  the  next  morning.  When  daylight  came,  white 
flags  were  seen  in  Manzanillo,  and  the  Captain  of  the 
Port  brought  off  to  Captain  Goodrich  a  brief  despatch, 
saying,  ''Protocol  of  peace  signed  by  the  President; 
armistice  proclaimed."  No  more  bombardment,  there 
fore,  and  Manzanillo  was  to  be  yielded  without  a  strug 
gle.  The  road  of  peace  was  opened  again,  hostilities 
were  suspended,  and  the  last  shot  of  war  from  Amer 
ican  guns  in  Cuban  waters  had  been  fired. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE   CAMPAIGN    IN    PUERTO   RICO 

THE  island  of  Puerto  Rico,  the  easternmost  and  the 
most  beautiful  of  the  Greater  Antilles,  with  its  large 
population  and  commanding  strategic  position,  was 
constantly  in  the  minds  of  both  army  and  navy  as  soon 
as  war  began.  It  was  there  that  Admiral  Sampson  had 
gone  to  find  Cervera  at  what  seemed  the  most  probable 
place,  but  the  Spanish  fleet  was  not  in  the  harbor  of  San 
Juan.  The  noise  of  the  bombardment  died  away,  and 
the  people  of  the  island  continued  to  believe  that  all  was 
well,  that  Spain  was  triumphant  and  had  won  a  great 
victory  at  Manila.  American  cruisers  fluttered  about 
the  coast,  and  it  was  true  that  there  seemed  always  to 
be  a  ship  off  San  Juan.  But  this  did  not  shake  the 
general  confidence,  and  there  was  much  elation  when 
the  crack  torpedo-boat  destroyer  Terror,  detached  at 
Martinique  because  out  of  order,  came  into  the  harbor. 
On  June  22  it  seemed  that  it  would  be  a  good  thing  for 
the  Terror  to  go  out,  with  the  cruiser  Isabel  II,  and  at 
tack  the  St.  Paul,  commanded  by  Captain  Sigsbee  of 
the  Maine,  just  then  watching  the  port.  The  St.  Paul 
was  only  a  huge  Atlantic  liner  hastily  armed  and  con 
verted  into  an  auxiliary  cruiser,  and  probably  the  Span 
iards  thought  her  an  easy  prey,  if  only  she  would  not 
run  away.  It  is  said  that  they  invited  their  friends 

168 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

down  to  the  shore  to  see  the  performance.  The  cruiser 
came  out  first,  apparently  did  not  like  the  outlook,  and 
clung  to  the  shelter  of  the  batteries,  firing  ineffectively, 
while  the  St.  Paul,  apparently  undisturbed,  took  a  few 
shots  to  try  the  ranges.  Then  came  the  Terror,  and  as 
she  steamed  to  the  eastward  the  St.  Paul  steamed  along 
outside  and  parallel.  Then  the  torpedo-boat  made  a 
dash,  and  the  St.  Paul,  instead  of  running  away,  waited 
to  be  torpedoed,  and  when  the  Terror  got  within  5,400 
yards,  opened  on  her,  sweeping  her  decks  with  frag 
ments  of  shell  and  rapid-fire  projectiles.  It  was  clearly 
easier  to  blow  Captain  Sigsbee  up  in  a  peaceful  harbor 
at  night  than  in  broad  day,  and  the  Terror  turned 
round.  Then  a  beautiful  shot  at  nearly  three  miles  dis 
tance  from  the  St.  Paul's  5-inch  gun  hit  her  on  the  star 
board  side,  smashed  her  engine,  and  killed  the  chief  and 
assistant  engineers,  so  that  the  dreaded  boat  was  just 
able  to  struggle  back  and  be  dragged  sinking  to  the 
beach  by  a  couple  of  tugs.  This  disposed  of  that  mem 
ber  of  Cervera's  fleet  for  the  time  being,  and  the  pretty 
bit  of  shooting  which  was  responsible  for  it  was  the 
only  incident  until  theYosemite  appeared  and  drove  the 
Antonio  Lopes  ashore,  and  caused  theAlphonsoIII.,Isa- 
bcllall.,and  a  torpedo-boat  to  seek  shelter  in  the  harbor. 
General  Miles,  from  an  early  period  of  the  war,  was 
convinced  that  it  would  be  an  error  to  undertake  a  sum 
mer  campaign  on  a  large  scale  in  Cuba  and  directed 
against  the  principal  Spanish  army  at  Havana.  He 
thought,  and  very  justly,  that  the  correct  objective, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  was  Puerto  Rico,  which 
was  the  Spanish  base  for  all  operations  in  the  West 
Indies,  and  where  the  climate  was  much  better  for 

169 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Northern  troops  than  was  the  case  in  Cuba.  This  plan 
was  laid  before  the  War  Department,  which  was  still 
considering  the  advisability  of  a  general  movement 
against  Havana.  The  coming  of  Cervera's  fleet  and  its 
final  imprisonment  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago  changed 
the  situation  and  made  that  city  the  objective  of  the 
highest  moment.  General  Miles,  appreciating  the  im 
portance  of  this  expedition,  telegraphed  on  June  5,  from 
Tampa,  that  he  desired  to  go  at  its  head ;  but  the  com 
mand  was  given  to  General  Shaf ter,  and  on  June  6  Gen 
eral  Miles,  instead  of  being  sent  to  Santiago,  was  asked, 
in  a  despatch  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  how  soon 
he  could  have  a  sufficient  force  ready  to  go  to  Puerto 
Rico.  General  Miles  replied  that  it  could  be  ready  in 
ten  days,  and  there  the  matter  seems  to  have  dropped. 
On  June  8  the  Santiago  expedition  was  ready,  and  on 
June  14  it  sailed  with  15,000  men  and  800  officers,  in 
stead  of  the  25,000  it  was  expected  to  send.  This  was 
owing  to  a  break-down  in  the  ocean  transportation,  due 
to  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  steamships,  which  proved 
insufficient,  and  compelled  the  leaving  behind  at  Tampa 
of  10,000  men  who  ought  to  have  gone,  and  whose 
presence  at  Santiago  would  have  greatly  quickened  the 
results  and  thereby  saved  much  of  the  mortality  caused 
by  fever.  The  day  after  the  Shafter  expedition  finally 
departed,  General  Miles  was  summoned  to  Washing 
ton,  and  there,  on  June  26,  an  order  was  finally  given 
to  organize  an  expedition  to  operate  against  the  enemy 
in  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  and  General  Miles  was  di 
rected  personally  to  take  the  command.  For  some  little 
time  before,  efforts  had  been  making  to  collect  trans 
ports  for  Puerto  Rico,  and  this  work  went  slowly  for- 

170 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

ward,  for  everything  connected  with  the  business  of 
transportation  was  tardy  and  imperfect.  Then  came  a 
spur  to  the  lagging  transport  service,  which  had  already 
appealed  to  the  navy  for  aid,  and  secured  the  help  of 
vessels  of  war  in  carrying  troops.  It  was  a  very  sharp 
spur  too,  and  struck  home  hard,  being  nothing  less,  in 
fact,  that  General  Shafter's  despatch  of  July  2,  saying 
that  he  was  considering  withdrawal,  depicting  the 
strength  of  the  inner  defences  of  the  city,  and  the  im 
possibility  of  carrying  them  with  the  force  he  had  with 
him.  General  Miles  replied,  congratulating  him  upon 
the  splendid  fighting  of  his  army,  and  said  that  he  ex 
pected  to  be  with  him  in  a  week.  But  General  Miles 
overrated  the  transport  service.  Even  under  the  tre 
mendous  pressure  then  existing  he  did  not  get  away  un 
til  July  8,  and  as  it  was  he  went  on  the  Yale,  a  vessel  of 
the  navy,  with  1,500  troops  on  board,  accompanied  by 
the  Columbia,  and  followed  by  the  DncJicsse  with  more 
soldiers.  \Yhen  he  reached  Santiago,  on  July  n,  how 
ever,  no  time  was  lost,  for  General  Miles  had  a  good 
plan  already  made,  and  knew  just  what  he  meant  to  do 
— a  very  great  advantage  in  affairs  requiring  action, 
where  even  a  poor  plan  is  better  than  none  at  all,  and 
is  always  an  immense  advance  over  chaos.  So  General 
Miles,  knowing  what  he  wanted,  arranged  at  once  with 
Admiral  Sampson — delighted  to  meet  with  a  plan  and 
cordially  acquiescing — that  everything  should  be  pre 
pared  to  land  the  new  force  on  the  west  side  of  the  bay, 
and  either  attack  the  harbor  forts  and  open  the  way  to 
the  fleet,  or  else,  if  it  seemed  better,  march  on  to  the 
city  and  take  the  Spanish  position  in  reverse.  This 
done,  General  Miles  landed,  burned  the  cabins  at  Sibo- 

171 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

ney,  and  the  next  morning  rode  to  the  front  and  joined 
General  Shafter.  After  taking  part  in  the  negotia 
tions  which  resulted  in  the  capitulation  of  the  city,  and 
issuing  orders  looking  to  the  proper  camping  of  the 
troops  and  their  protection,  so  far  as  possible,  from  dis 
ease,  and  especially  from  yellow  fever,  which  had  now 
become  menacing,  General  Miles  betook  himself  to  the 
Yale,  and  telegraphed  to  Washington,  asking  permis 
sion  to  proceed  as  soon  as  possible  to  Puerto  Rico.  After 
some  delay  the  necessary  authority  was  given.  All  the 
troops  at  Santiago  were  more  or  less  infected,  so  that 
it  was  not  safe  to  take  any  of  them,  as  had  been  orig 
inally  planned  in  connection  with  the  fresh  regiments 
which  had  been  kept  on  shipboard.  This  reduced  the 
effective  force  which  General  Miles  had  with  him  to 
3,300  men,  and  he  was  obliged  to  rely  on  these  alone 
until  the  re-enforcements,  which  were  expected,  arrived 
from  the  United  States,  to  face  the  Spanish  forces  in 
Puerto  Rico,  amounting,  it  was  reported,  to  over 
17,000  men.  Tugs,  launches,  and  lighters  were  ordered 
and  anxiously  awaited,  but  none  came,  and  the  expedi 
tion  finally  started  on  July  2 1 ,  trusting  to  the  navy  and 
to  what  they  could  find  at  their  destination  to  land  the 
troops.  The  fleet  consisted  of  seven  transports  carry 
ing  troops,  and  the  Massachusetts,  Dixie,  Gloucester, 
Yale  and  Columbia  as  convoy,  the  last  two  also  having 
troops  on  board.  The  plan  was  to  land  at  Fajardo,  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  island  a  little  south  of  the  cape, 
and  not  far  from  the  city  of  San  Juan.  This  continued 
to  be  the  objective  until  the  expedition  started;  but 
General  Miles,  being  satisfied  that  Fajardo  had  been 
widely  advertised  as  the  landing-place,  and  that,  owing 

172 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

to  the  delays  and  the  publicity,  the  Spaniards  had  had 
ample  opportunity  to  concentrate  at  that  point,  very 
wisely  decided  that  he  would  not  go  where  the  enemy 
expected  him,  but  to  Guanica,  where  nobody  looked 
for  him,  on  the  southwestern  coast.  He  also  had  trust 
worthy  information,  which  events  subsequently  veri 
fied,  that  at  Guanica  he  could  get  sugar-lighters,  and 
still  more  at  Ponce,  the  principal  city  of  the  island  in 
the'  immediate  neighborhood,  whence  a  fine  military 
road  ran  to  San  Juan,  and  that  the  people  of  that  region 
were  disaffected  to  Spain  and  friendly  to  the  Amer 
icans.  Captain  Higginson  objected,  naturally,  to  this 
change,  because  at  Guanica  he  could  not  get  in  with  his 
heavy  ships  to  support  the  troops,  whereas  he  could 
cover  their  landing  at  Fajardo.  So  it  was  first  decided 
to  go  to  Fajardo,  observe  the  conditions,  and  if  they 
were  unfavorable,  return.  Later  this  plan  too  was 
changed,  and  the  Dixie  being  sent  to  pick  up  the  New 
Orleans  at  San  Juan,  and  the  transports  which  were 
supposed  to  be  on  their  way  to  the  original  point  of  at 
tack,  the  fleet  went  on  direct  to  Guanica.  They  reached 
their  destination  a  little  after  five  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  July  25,  and  the  Massachusetts  and  Gloucester, 
standing  in,  came  to  anchor  at  quarter  before  nine.  The 
battle-ship  could  go  no  farther,  and  although  it  was 
clear  that  there  were  no  entrance  batteries,  no  one  knew 
what  batteries  might  be  concealed  inside,  or  what  mines 
might  be  placed  in  the  channel.  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Wainwright  at  once  asked  permission  to  go  for 
ward,  and  on  the  request  being  granted,  the  Gloucester 
ran  briskly  in,  firing  as  she  entered.  A  landing  party, 
consisting  of  Lieutenant  Wood  and  twenty-eight  men, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

under  command  of  Lieutenant  Huse,  was  put  ashore, 
and,  on  their  hauling  down  the  Spanish  flag  the  enemy 
opened  upon  them  on  both  sides  and  from  the  village. 
Deploying,  they  drove  the  enemy  back  through  the  vil 
lage,  and  at  the  end  of  the  street  built  a  stone  wall  and 
strung  barbed  wire  to  meet  the  re-enforcements  re 
ported  to  be  coming  from  Yauco.  This  attack  and  the 
fire  from  the  Gloucester  scattered  the  small  body  of 
Spanish  regulars  who  had  resisted  the  landing.  Mean 
time  Captain  Higginson,  listening  anxiously  and  atten 
tively  after  the  Gloucester  had  disappeared  from  sight, 
became  satisfied  that  there  were  no  inside  batteries,  and 
ordered  the  transports  to  go  in.  This  was  quickly  done; 
it  was  found  that  the  men  of  the  Gloucester  had  seized 
a  lighter,  and  soldiers  from  Colonel  Black's  regiment  of 
engineers  were  at  once  landed  at  Captain  Wainwright's 
request  to  support  the  Gloucester  landing  party.  In 
a  few  minutes,  as  soon  as  the  naval  launches  could 
tow  them  in,  the  town  of  Guanica  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  American  army,  and  the  first  landing  in 
Puerto  Rico  had  been  successfully  accomplished.  The 
path  was  opened  very  swiftly  and  effectively  by  the  men 
of  the  Gloucester,  as  prompt  and  efficient  in  the  seizure 
of  the  town  as  they  had  been  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Furor  and  Pluton. 

The  next  day  at  dawn  General  Garretson,  with  six 
companies  of  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  and  one  company 
of  the  Sixth  Illinois,  moved  out  and  attacked  a  strong 
force  of  Spaniards  at  Yauco,  driving  them  before  them 
and  taking  the  town,  which  gave  us  possession  of  the 
railroad  and  of  the  highway  to  Ponce,  for  the  advance 
of  General  Henry's  brigade.  That  evening  the  Dixie 

174 


UK    LANDING    AT    GUANICA 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

returned,  and  the  next  day  General  Wilson,  on  the 
Obdam,  and  General  Ernst,  on  the  Grande  D-uchesse, 
arrived  with  more  troops,  and  the  Annapolis  and  W asp 
also  joined  the  squadron.  Captain  Higginson  was  now 
strong  enough  to  detach  a  force  against  Ponce,  which 
it  was  most  desirable  to  secure  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  not  only  because  it  was  the  largest  city  of  the 
island  and  the  terminus  of  the  military  road,  but  be 
cause  it  had  a  good  harbor  and  excellent  facilities  for 
disembarking,  in  which  Guanica  was  very  deficient. 
Captain  Davis  of  the  Dixie  was  therefore  ordered  to 
proceed  at  once  with  the  Annapolis,  IVasp,  and  Glou 
cester  to  Ponce,  reconnoitre,  seize  lighters,  and  occupy 
any  position  necessary  for  landing  the  army.  The  Dixie, 
accompanied  by  the  Annapolis  and  IV asp,  started  at 
quarter  before  two,  and  the  Gloucester  at  half  past  four. 
At  three  o'clock  the  first  three  ships  were  in  the  chan 
nel,  and  by  half  past  five  they  had  all  anchored  with 
out  resistance  in  the  harbor.  Captain  Davis  ordered 
the  Wasp  to  lie  in  such  a  way  that  her  broadside  would 
command  the  main  street  of  La  Playa,  and  Lieutenant 
Merriam  was  sent  ashore  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  demand 
the  immediate  surrender  of  Ponce,  under  threat  of  bom 
bardment,  which  was  no  idle  menace,  as  the  heavy 
six-inch  battery  of  the  Dixie  entirely  commanded 
the  town,  the  main  part  of  which  was  a  mile  and  a 
half  distant  from  the  port.  When  Lieutenant  Merriam 
returned,  he  reported  that  the  Spanish  forces  had  with 
drawn  from  the  port,  and  that  he  had  been  unable  to 
open  communications  with  their  commander.  He  was 
closely  followed  on  board  by  the  British  and  German 
consuls,  and  several  gentlemen  representing  the  com- 

i75 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

mercial  interests,  who  said  they  had  authority  from  the 
Spanish  commander  to  negotiate  for  surrender.  The 
fact  was  that  although  Colonel  San  Martin  and  his  700 
Spanish  regulars  were  quite  ready  to  fight,  their  re 
sistance  would  have  resulted  only  in  the  destruction  of 
the  city  by  bombardment — something  much  disliked  by 
the  property  owners — and  the  consequent  general  ris 
ing  of  the  hostile  people,  productive  probably  of  much 
bloodshed  and  disaster  to  the  soldiers  themselves. 
'  Hence  the  readiness  to  allow  the  commercial  interests 
to  surrender  the  town.  A  delay  was  asked  for,  long 
enough  to  permit  communication  with  the  Spanish 
headquarters  at  San  Juan,  which  was  refused  by  Cap 
tain  Davis.  Return  to  the  town  for  further  consulta 
tion  followed,  and  then  they  came  back  and  surrendered 
the  town,  subject  only  to  the  condition  that  the  Spanish 
troops  should  be  permitted  to  withdraw  unmolested, 
and  that  the  municipal  government  should  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  authority  until  the  arrival  of  the  army. 
This  done,  the  Americans  occupied  the  night  by  look 
ing  over  all  the  vessels  in  the  harbor  and  taking  such  as 
were  good  prize,  Lieutenant-Commander  Wainwright 
of  the  Gloucester,  energetic  and  efficient,  gathering  in 
some  seventy  lighters,  and  getting  them  ready  for  the 
army.  At  half  past  five  Lieutenant  Merriam  went  in, 
followed  closely  by  Lieutenant  Haines  of  the  Dixie, 
with  the  marines,  and  received  the  surrender  of  the 
port.  The  flag  was  raised  by  a  cadet  of  the  Dixie  over 
the  office  of  the  Captain  of  the  Port,  the  marines  were 
posted,  and  by  this  formal  act  Ponce  passed  into  Amer 
ican  hands.  About  seven  o'clock  the  Massachusetts, 
convoying  General  Miles  with  General  Wilson  and  the 

176 


THE    BANNER    OF    PONCE 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

transports,  now  increased  by  two  more  which  had  just 
come  up  with  the  Cincinnati,  had  joined  them.  By  half 
past  seven  General  Wilson  had  landed,  and  in  less  than 
an  hour  Lieutenant  Haines  \vas  able  to  withdraw  his 
sentries  and  turn  over  the  port  to  the  army.  Meantime 
some  officers  of  the  Dixie  had  driven  up  to  the  centre  of 
the  town,  where  they  were  received  with  enthusiasm  by 
the  people,  which  they  soon  reported  at  La  Playa.  Re 
turning  at  once,  they  went  to  the  City  Hall,  accom 
panied  by  Lieutenant  Haines,  who  released  the  political 
prisoners  found  there,  and  Cadet  Lodge  of  the  Dixie 
hauled  down  the  Spanish  and  raised  the  American  flag, 
the  great  crowd  in  the  square  cheering  wildly,  and  then 
received  «f rom  the  Mayor  the  municipal  banner  and  the 
formal  surrender  of  the  city.  Presently  Major  Flagler 
appeared  with  troops  and  took  formal  possession.  Thus 
the  whole  business  was  quickly  done  without  hesitation 
or  delay,  and  the  American  army  held  the  city  of 
Puerto  Rico  as  a  base  from  which  they  could  advance 
at  will  to  the  capital,  and  by  which  they  controlled  the 
whole  southern  coast  of  the  island. 

Once  on  shore,  thanks  to  the  capture  of  the  lighters 
and  the  efficient  aid  of  the  navy,  General  Wilson  moved 
rapidly.  That  same  afternoon  he  had  established  his 
headquarters  at  Ponce.  Then  he  proceeded  to  organize 
the  government  of  the  city  which  had  passed  into  his 
hands,  and  at  the  same  time  his  own  command,  which 
was  composed  of  General  Ernst's  brigade,  consisting  of 
the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  and  the  Second  and  Third 
Wisconsin — all  volunteers — a  battalion  of  regular  light 
artillery,  a  troop  of  volunteer  cavalry,  and  a  company  of 
the  Signal  Corps.  On  August  3  he  was  able  to  relieve 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  brigade  of  their  black-powder  Springfields,  and  sup 
ply  them  with  smokeless-powder  Krag-Jorgensons — a 
highly  beneficial  change,  which  ought  to  have  been 
made  years  before,  but  for  which  there  should  be  due 
gratitude,  after  the  Santiago  experience,  that  it  was 
made  at  all,  even  toward  the  end  of  a  war.  So  the  work, 
civil  and  military,  was  driven  rapidly  and  efficiently 
forward,  and  in  the  midst  of  it  all  the  country  was 
reconnoitred,  and  as  fast  as  possible  the  outposts  were 
advanced  along  the  great  road  to  San  Juan. 

In  this  way,  and  from  spies  and  deserters,  it  was 
learned  that  a  force  of  the  enemy,  numbering  2,000,  had 
taken  position  at  Aibonito,  about  thirty-five  miles  from 
Ponce,  a  place  of  great  natural  strength,  and  indeed  al 
most  impregnable.  Between  Aibonito  and  our  ad 
vanced  parties  lay  the  town  of  Coamo,  also  a  very 
strong  position  naturally,  held  by  250  men.  Coamo  was 
capable  of  a  very  stubborn  defence,  and  was  still  further 
protected  by  a  block-house  on  the  Banos  road,  which 
could  open  fire  upon  troops  moving  along  the  main 
military  road.  General  Wilson  decided,  therefore,  to 
turn  the  position.  The  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania,  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Hulings,  and  guided  by  Col 
onel  Biddle  and  Captain  Gardner  of  General  Wilson's 
staff,  was  ordered  on  the  evening  of  August  8  to  move 
to  the  rear  of  the  town.  In  the  darkness,  over  difficult 
mountain  trails  and  across  deep  ravines,  they  made 
their  way,  with  difficulty  and  much  hard  marching.  At 
seven  in  the  morning  of  the  Qth,  General  Ernst,  with 
the  other  two  regiments  of  his  brigade,  and  supported 
by  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  advanced  directly  upon 
the  town.  Captain  Anderson's  battery  opened  at  once 

178 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

upon  the  block-house,  which  replied  with  an  ineffective 
fire,  and  was  in  flames  in  fifteen  minutes.  The  two  Wis 
consin  regiments  at  the  same  time  moved  forward 
along  the  Banos  and  the  military  roads.  As  they  ad 
vanced  they  heard  the  sound  of  sharp  firing,  and  knew 
that  the  Pennsylvania  troops  were  engaged.  The  march 
was  quickened,  and  the  whole  force  pressed  rapidly  for 
ward,  reaching  and  entering  the  town  to  find  the  enemy 
gone  and  the  intrenchments  deserted.  General  Wilson's 
skilful  disposition  of  the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  had 
given  him  Coamo  with  hardly  a  struggle,  and  the  fight 
had  been  made  and  won  in  the  rear  of  the  town  before 
the  main  advance  reached  it. 

The  flanking  regiment,  pushing  along  over  the 
mountains  in  the  darkness,  had  come  out  too  far  to  the 
north,  and  had  been  obliged  to  move  to  the  south  by  a 
difficult  path,  which  made  them  an  hour  late  in  arriving 
at  the  point  agreed  upon.  But  when  they  reached  their 
destination  they  found  the  Spaniards  in  a  strong  po 
sition,  covered  by  the  trees  and  ditches,  and  holding 
the  road.  The  first  battalion  was  rapidly  formed  along 
two  ridges  parallel  to  the  road,  whence  they  at  once 
opened  fire,  and  a  sharp  skirmish  ensued.  Meantime 
the  second  battalion  moved  to  the  left,  toward  a  posi 
tion  whence  they  could  enfilade  the  road,  and  the  Span 
iards  surrendered.  The  action  lasted  an  hour.  The 
Americans  lost  6  men  wounded.  On  the  Spanish  side 
the  commander,  who  exposed  himself  with  reckless 
courage,  another  officer,  and  4  privates  were  killed,  and 
between  30  and  40  were  wounded.  Five  Spanish  of 
ficers  and  162  men  were  made  prisoners. 

Within  five  minutes  after  the  fight  Captain  Clayton 
179 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

with  his  troop  of  cavalry  rode  through  the  town  in 
rapid  pursuit  of  the  beaten  enemy.  The  troopers  pushed 
on  fast,  preventing,  except  in  one  instance,  the  de 
struction  of  the  bridges,  and  carrying  the  American  ad 
vance  forward  until  they  came  within  range  of  the 
strong  positions  of  El  Penon  and  Assomante,  where 
batteries  were  placed  which  swept  the  road.  To  take 
these  defences  by  direct  assault,  it  was  obvious,  would 
involve  a  heavy  loss  of  life  to  the  limited  forces  General 
Wilson  had  at  his  disposal,  and  he  accordingly  resolved 
to  again  turn  the  enemy  by  a  flanking  movement  on  the 
right.  Before  doing  so,  however,  General  Wilson  de 
termined  to  make  a  reconnoissance  with  artillery,  and 
our  batteries  opened  on  the  Spanish  positions  at  one 
o'clock  on  the  I2th  of  August.  We  apparently  silenced 
their  batteries,  but  as  we  slackened  they  opened  again 
with  a  vigorous  fire,  and  once  more,  as  at  Santiago, 
black  powder  furnished  the  enemy  a  fine  target,  while 
the  smokeless  powder  made  it  difficult  to  get  their  range 
or  exact  place.  We  lost  2  men  killed,  and  2  officers  and 
3  men  wounded,  and  demonstrated  the  strength  of  the 
Spanish  position.  General  Wilson,  before  beginning  to 
turn  the  Spaniards,  sent  in  a  demand  for  surrender, 
which  was  naturally  and  quite  curtly  refused.  Then, 
just  as  General  Ernst  was  starting  on  the  flank  move 
ment  which  would  have  forced  Aibonito  to  surrender 
like  Coamo,  word  came  that  the  peace  protocol  with 
Spain  had  been  signed  and  hostilities  suspended.  So 
the  movement  along  the  military  road  into  the  heart  of 
the  island  and  across  to  San  Juan,  which  had  been 
pushed  so  skilfully  and  successfully,  came  to  a  stop,  and 
did  not  begin  again  until  Spain  had  surrendered  on  a 

1 80 


C.KNKRALS    IN    1'UKRTO    RICAX    (JAMl'AIGX 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

larger  scale  and  it  was  able  to  go  forward  to  the  capital 
without  resistance. 

Other  movements  were  in  progress  while  General 
Wilson  was  operating  along  the  main  military  road. 
General  Brooke,  with  the  brigade  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Hains,  reached  Guanica  on  July  31,  and  going 
thence  to  Ponce,  was  ordered  to  Arroyo,  about  thirty- 
six  miles  east  of  Ponce,  the  port  of  the  large  town  of 
Guayama,  and  near  the  point  where  the  coast  begins  to 
turn  and  trend  toward  the  north.  Arroyo  had  surren 
dered  to  the  little  Gloucester  and  the  Wasp  on  August 
i,  but  on  the  arrival  of  the  army  the  old  story  of  the 
inefficient  transport  service — no  lighters,  no  boats,  no 
means  of  getting  the  soldiers  on  shore,  always  desirable 
things  to  have  in  military  expeditions  of  this  character 
—was  repeated,  and  then,  as  usual,  came  the  appearance 
of  the  navy,  and  the  navy  got  the  troops  on  shore,  to 
the  great  relief  of  the  general  in  command.  Once 
landed,  there  was  little  delay.  On  August  4  General 
Hains  was  ordered  to  move  on  Guayama,  and  on  the 
following  morning  he  advanced  with  the  Fourth  Ohio, 
holding  the  Third  Illinois  in  reserve.  Meeting  the  en 
emy  about  a  mile  east  of  Guayama,  our  men  drove  the 
Spaniards  before  them  and  through  the  streets,  had  a 
sharp  skirmish  with  them  on  the  other  side,  in  which 
four  men  were  wounded,  and  in  the  evening,  still  ad 
vancing,  took  and  held  two  strong  positions  on  the  out 
skirts  of  the  town.  The  position  was  held  until  the  8th, 
when  a  reconnoissance  was  made  by  Colonel  Coit,  with 
about  no  men,  along  the  road  running  north  from 
Guayama.  Pushing  forward,  the  party  had  advanced 
about  five  miles  when  they  ran  into  the  Spaniards,  came 

181 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

under  a  heavy  fire,  and  had  five  men  wounded  Falling 
back  steadily,  they  were  met  and  supported  by  the  rest  of 
the  regiment,  and  easily  checked  and  drove  the  Span 
iards  back.  The  reconnoissance  had  developed  the  fact 
that  the  enemy  were  in  force  and  held  strong  positions 
on  the  north.  General  Brooke  therefore  determined  to 
turn  the  position.  He  waited  until  the  I3th  in  order  to 
get  two  troops  of  cavalry  and  four  light  batteries,  and 
then  sending  General  Hains  with  one  regiment  to  make 
a  detour  and  reach  the  enemy's  rear,  he  advanced  with 
the  rest  of  his  force  along  the  road  directly  against  the 
Spanish  position.  He  moved  slowly,  in  order  to  give 
time  to  the  flanking  regiment  to  reach  its  destination, 
and  when  sufficient  time  had  elapsed  he  brought  his 
guns  within  range  and  unmasked  them.  Just  as  the 
men  were  about  to  open  fire,  a  message  came  in  from 
Ponce  announcing  the  signing  of  the  protocol  and  that 
all  was  over.  General  Brooke  retired  to  camp  at  Guay- 
ama,  and  there  waited  until,  as  one  of  the  commission 
ers,  he  rode  over  the  hills  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the 
island,  watch  the  departure  of  the  soldiers  of  Spain, 
and  become  himself  the  first  American  Governor  of 
Puerto  Rico. 

On  the  same  day  that  General  Brooke  received  his 
orders  for  Arroyo,  General  Schwan  arrived,  and  on 
August  6  received  orders  from  General  Miles  to  organ- 
ize  an  expedition  at  Yauco  and  proceed  against  Maya- 
guez,  a  large  town,  the  centre  of  a  sugar  district  in  the 
extreme  west  of  the  island,  and  thence,  swinging  to  the 
right,  to  advance  by  Lares  to  Arecibo,  the  principal  city 
on  the  north  coast.  On  August  9  the  expedition  was 
ready.  It  consisted  of  the  Eleventh  infantry  and  two 

182 


jlf  on  a-  .g  Pa  ssa  ge 

"0    ir 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

light  batteries,  all  regulars.   They  marched  twelve  miles 
in  intense  heat  and  over  a  bad  road  to  Sabana  Grande, 
where  they  were  joined  by  Captain  Macomb  with  a 
troop  of  the  Fifth  cavalry,  also  regulars.     Giving  his 
men  a  good  night's  rest,  General  Schwan  started  at 
eight  o'clock.     Having  provided  himself  with  guides 
and  spies,  and  from  the  beginning  having  made  every 
arrangement  to  secure  all  possible  information,  General 
Schwan  soon  had  news  that  the  enemy,  whose  force  was 
reported  to  be  superior  in  numbers  to  his  own,  had 
marched  out  from  Mayaguez  to  contest  the  American 
advance.    The  cavalry  and  the  advance-guard  were  or 
dered,   therefore,   to   exercise  great  care;   they   were 
drawn  nearer  to  the  brigade,  and  then  the  whole  force 
pressed  rapidly  and  steadily  forward  along  the  San 
German  road.   As  they  drew  nearer  to  Mayaguez  they 
came  into  a  country  intersected  by  two  rivers  and  their 
tributaries.     The  road  runs  along  the  valley  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  through  flat  lands  widening  out  here  and  there 
to  a  thousand  yards,  fenced  with  wire  and  crossed  by 
creeks  and  streams,  some  running  swiftly  and  with  a 
considerable  depth  of  water — altogether  a  rather  dif 
ficult  country  for  troops  to  operate  in,  and  susceptible 
of  a  strong  defence.    As  the  Americans  approached  the 
little  village  of  Hormigueros,  Spanish  scouts  opened  fire 
ineffectively  from  behind  the  hedges  near  some  sugar- 
mills.      On  went  the  cavalry,  and  the  Spanish  skir 
mishers  fled,  pursued  by  the  troopers,  who  rode  along 
under  shelter  of  a  railroad  embankment,  keeping  up  a 
steady  fire  and  getting  control  of  a  covered  wooden 
bridge.     Just  beyond  this  point  it  had  been  intended 
to  camp,  but  General  Schwan  determined,  although  his 

183 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

men  had  marched  thirteen  miles  in  the  heat,  to  finish 
with  the  enemy,  now  that  he  had  them  in  his  near 
neighborhood,  and  in  order  to  gain  possession  of  an  im 
portant  iron  bridge  on  the  main  road.  The  soldiers  re 
sponded  cheerfully  and  readily.  The  whole  force 
pressed  on,  and  when  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the 
bridge  the  enemy  opened  with  a  light  fire,  and  then 
heavily  with  volleys,  at  the  main  body  of  troops.  The 
artillery  was  brought  up.  There  was  difficulty  in  decid 
ing  the  position  of  the  enemy,  thanks  to  their  smokeless 
powder,  but  soon  the  direction  was  obtained  from  the 
course  of  the  Spanish  bullets.  Then  the  artillery 
opened,  and  the  whole  command  moved  forward.  Un 
able  to  cross  a  creek,  the  advance  made  its  way  over  a 
bridge.  The  Catlings  went  forward  with  the  infantry, 
concentrating  their  fire  and  supported  by  the  cavalry. 
Still  forward,  and  they  were  over  the  iron  bridge,  and 
masters  of  the  approach  to  Mayaguez.  The  rest  of  the 
artillery  came  up  again,  the  infantry  pressed  forward, 
the  enemy  gave  way  in  all  directions,  and  the  Amer 
icans  occupied  the  Spanish  position  and  camped  there 
for  the  night.  Again  had  it  been  shown  that  the  Span 
iards  could  not  stand  the  steady  onset  of  the  American 
troops.  They  had  equal  numbers,  knowledge  of  the 
country,  and  the  advantage  of  position.  They  fired 
heavily  as  at  Guasimas  as  soon  as  the  Americans  came 
within  range,  and  then  as  the  Americans  came  on,  open 
ing  with  all  arms  and  going  at  them  without  flinching, 
the  Spaniards,  nearly  all  regulars  in  this  case,  gave  way 
and  fled.  The  action  was  over  at  six  o'clock.  The 
American  loss  was  i  killed  and  1 5  wounded ;  the  Span 
ish,  15  killed  and  about  35  wounded.  The  skirmish 

184 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

was  well  and  skilfully  fought,  and  illustrated  as  per 
fectly  as  a  much  larger  affair  the  inability  of  the  Span 
iards  to  either  attack,  take  the  initiative,  or  make  a  firm 
stand  in  the  open. 

The  next  morning,  August  1 1 ,  by  half  past  eight,  the 
American  scouts  were  in  Mayaguez,  an  hour  later  the 
cavalry,  and  then  came  General  Schwan  and  his  staff 
and  the  infantry,  with  bands  playing  and  colors  fly 
ing.  The  Spaniards  had  gone,  the  town  gently  yielded 
itself,  the  Mayor  declared  himself  subject  to  the  or 
ders  of  the  American  general,  and  the  people  crowded 
the  streets  and  cheered  the  American  troops.  The  bri 
gade  then  went  into  camp  near  the  town,  and  the  cav 
alry  were  ordered  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  retreating 
enemy.  Following  the  easterly  road  to  Lares,  the  cav 
alry  drove  some  Spaniards  before  them,  but  it  was  soon 
discovered  that  the  main  body  had  taken  the  western 
road,  and  the  next  morning  Colonel  Burke  started  in 
pursuit  with  about  seven  hundred  men  all  told.  The 
morning  was  intensely  hot,  and  the  afternoon  brought 
a  drenching  rain,  but  the  troops  kept  steadily  on,  and 
encamped  for  the  night  at  the  forks  of  the  Las  Marias 
and  Maricao  roads.  Here  news  came  that  the  Span 
iards,  with  a  force  variously  estimated  at  1,200  to  2,500 
men,  intended  to  make  a  stand  at  Las  Marias.  As  Col 
onel  Burke's  one  desire  was  to  reach  them,  he  was  off 
at  daylight.  The  utmost  speed  was  made,  but  the  road 
in  places  was  so  bad  and  so  heavy  that  the  artillery 
could  only  be  got  along  by  the  infantry  hauling  the 
guns.  This  caused  delay,  and  there  was  much  anxiety 
and  bitter  disappointment  when  it  was  reported  that 
the  enemy  had  abandoned  Las  Marias  and  were  fleeing 

185 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

toward  Lares.  Then  word  came  that  seven  hundred 
were  still  on  the  hither  side  of  the  Rio  Grande,  which 
at  that  season  was  running  deep  and  full.  The  Amer 
icans  hurried  through  the  town,  and  presently  the  cav 
alry  came  up  with  the  fugitives,  and  then  the  engage 
ment  began.  A  large  number  of  Spaniards  had,  as  re 
ported,  failed  to  cross  the  river,  and  they  replied  with 
volleys  to  our  fire.  By  some  means  the  artillery  was 
dragged  up,  the  guns  opened,  and  our  infantry  fol 
lowed.  The  Spaniards  gave  way  in  all  directions,  now 
thoroughly  demoralized.  Many  were  drowned  in  try 
ing  to  ford  the  stream,  and  the  American  skirmishers, 
advancing  rapidly,  picked  up  more  than  50  prisoners, 
as  well  as  200  rifles  and  large  quantities  of  ammuni 
tion,  which  strewed  the  road.  The  American  loss  was 
only  6  wounded ;  5  Spaniards  were  buried  by  our  men 
in  addition  to  those  lost  in  the  river,  and  many  more 
were  wounded.  General  Schwan  now  had  the  enemy 
broken  and  in  full  flight.  Lares  was  within  his  grasp, 
and  a  clear  line  to  the  principal  northern  town  of  Are- 
cibo.  And  then  came  the  fatal  message  announcing  the 
signature  of  the  protocol,  and  "no  troops  ever  suspended 
hostilities  with  a  worse  grace."  But  a  suspension  it 
had  to  be,  and  this  expedition,  which  had  marched  and 
fought  with  so  much  spirit  and  such  restless  energy, 
stopped  like  the  rest. 

Not  far  from  them  another  command  was  brought 
in  like  manner  to  a  stand-still.  General  Stone,  with  a 
small  party,  had  pushed  along  a  trail  considered  impas 
sable,  by  way  of  Ad  juntas  and  Utuado,  and  had  made 
a  practical  road  through  the  centre  of  the  western  re 
gion,  along  which  General  Henry  marched  with  his 

1 86 


B 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

command.  In  a  day  or  two  more  they  would  have  been 
able  to  head  off  the  Spanish  detachments  retreating  be 
fore  General  Schwan,  and  would  have  effected  a  junc 
tion  with  the  latter,  thus  gaining  complete  control  of  all 
the  west,  and  at  the  same  time  of  the  northern  towns, 
and  of  the  railroad  on  the  coast.  But  they  too  were 
stopped,  and  thus  the  Puerto-Rican  campaign  came  to 
an  end. 

The  operations  of  the  American  army  in  Puerto  Rico 
have  been  described  in  some  detail,  not  on  account  of 
the  engagements  which  occurred,  for  they  were  hardly 
more  in  any  instance  than  sharp  skirmishes,  but  be 
cause  the  result  of  the  campaign  was  of  great  impor 
tance,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  operations  were 
conducted,  and  the  behavior  of  the  troops,  merit  con 
sideration.  There  has  been  an  impression  that  the 
Puerto-Rican  campaign  was  little  more  than  a  parade, 
and  it  has  even  been  spoken  of  contemptuously  as  a 
"picnic,"  owing  probably  to  the  too  prevalent  notion 
that  military  operations  must  be  estimated  solely  by  the 
losses,  or,  as  a  British  admiral  of  the  last  century  is 
said  to  have  put  it,  in  somewhat  brutal  phrase,  "by  the 
butcher's  bills."  The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  is 
undoubtedly  a  test  of  the  severity  of  fighting,  of  the 
force  of  an  attack,  and  of  the  strength  of  the  resistance. 
But  a  campaign  as  a  whole  must  be  judged,  if  it  is  to 
be  judged  fairly,  by  larger  and  different  standards. 
Malplaqnet  and  Oudenarde  were  important  and  bloody 
battles,  but  their  direct  effect  upon  the  final  results  of 
the  war  was  but  small.  Washington  forced  Howe  out 
of  Boston  without  an  action,  and  with  the  loss  of 
hardly  a  man,  yet  the  military  and  political  results  were 

187 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

enormous;  the  feat  was  so  admirable  that  the  last 
historian*  of  the  Revolution  says  it  gave  Washington 
at  once  a  place  in  history,  and  compares  it  with  Napo 
leon's  performance  at  Toulon  in  making  his  future 
fame. 

In  nineteen  days  the  different  divisions  under  the 
command  of  General  Miles  had  overrun  nearly  the  en 
tire  western  half  of  Puerto  Rico,  and  had  made  it  evi 
dent  that  in  another  fortnight  they  would  have  swept 
over  the  whole  island  and  cooped  up  the  Spaniards  in 
San  Juan,  if  they  had  not  actually  gained  possession  of 
the  capital  itself.  The  success  of  the  American  troops 
was  so  rapid  and  complete,  and  their  future  was  so 
clearly  assured,  that  a  claim  to  the  island  had  been  es 
tablished  of  such  an  undeniable  character  that,  when  it 
came  to  signing  the  protocol,  there  was  no  possibility  of 
withholding  from  the  United  States  the  cession  of 
Puerto  Rico.  Thus  the  object  of  the  campaign  was 
completely  achieved,  which,  after  all,  will  always  weigh 
heavily  in  making  up  the  final  judgment  of  history. 
Coming  next  to  the  actual  operations  of  the  campaign, 
it  is  found  that  there  was  the  same  lack  of  means  for 
disembarking  troops,  the  same  defective  transportation 
service,  as  in  Cuba.  These  difficulties  were  overcome 
by  the  assistance  of  the  navy,  and  with  their  boats  or 
the  lighters  they  had  captured.  The  men  were  rapidly 
and  skilfully  handled  at  separated  points,  showing  that 
the  two  services  worked  well  together;  and  although 
many  of  the  soldiers  arrived  in  poor  condition  from  the 
camps  in  the  United  States,  with  a  consequent  prone- 


*Sir  George  Trevelyan. 
1 88 


I 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  PUERTO  RICO 

ness  to  suffer  from  the  climatic  diseases,  they  were  so 
well  managed  that  every  division  was  enabled  to  push 
steadily  and  rapidly  forward,  making  hard  marches, 
very  often  through  difficult  country,  and  carrying  out 
successfully  everything  which  was  demanded  from 
them.  Last  and  most  important  of  all,  there  was  an 
intelligent  plan  throughout,  which,  in  its  execution, 
was  swiftly  and  comprehensively  taking  possession  of 
the  entire  island.  Each  movement  of  troops  was  so  ar 
ranged  as  ultimately  to  support  and  fit  in  with  every 
other.  The  engagements  which  took  place  were  all 
marked  by  the  same  qualities.  General  Wilson,  Gen 
eral  Schwan,  and  General  Brooke  all  fought  their 
troops  with  skill.  They  reconnoitred  their  country, 
they  knew  what  they  meant  to  do,  they  had  plans  which 
proved  their  own  soundness  when  carried  into  execu 
tion.  The  strong  positions  were  turned  by  judicious 
flanking  movements,  and  when  the  positions  were  not 
strong  the  direct  onset  drove  the  Spaniards  back  in  con 
fusion,  as  at  Hormigueros.  In  every  action  or  skirmish 
the  troops  behaved  admirably,  and  their  advance  was 
constant  and  unchecked,  so  that  the  general  plan  de 
veloped  steadily  from  the  beginning,  and  showed  its 
merits  in  its  results.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  popula 
tion  was  friendly,  and  received  the  American  troops 
with  acclamation,  a  condition  which  smooths  away 
many  troubles  in  any  campaign.  But  this  was  equally 
true  of  Cuba,  and  does  not  impair  the  excellence  of  the 
operations  in  the  eastern  island,  or  diminish  the  im 
portance  of  the  general  result.  To  this  campaign  we 
owe  the  island  of  Puerto  Rico,  and  the  manner  in  which 

189 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

it  was  carried  forward  through  many  difficulties  re 
flects  the  highest  credit  on  the  generals  who  com 
manded,  and  upon  the  discipline,  quality,  and  courage 
of  the  soldiers,  both  regulars  and  volunteers. 


ON    THE    ADJCNTAS    TRAIL 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA  AND  THE  CAPTURE  OF  GUAM 

ADMIRAL  DEWEY  employed  the  first  two  days  after  his 
victory  in  making  all  fast,  seizing  the  arsenal  at  Cavite 
and  the  islands  at  the  harbor  mouth,  and  announcing 
a  blockade  of  the  port  of  Manila,  lying  somewhat  help 
less  just  now  before  his  guns.  Then,  having  prudently 
cut  the  cables,  he  sent  to  Washington,  by  way  of  boat 
to  Hong-kong,  a  laconic  despatch,  telling  of  his  victory 
in  a  few  simple  sentences,  and  in  figures  as  dry  as  the 
multiplication  table.  It  had  one  great  merit — exact 
truth — a  quality  much  lost  and  clouded  in  the  Span 
ish  reports  which  had  gone  to  Madrid,  and  from  which 
alone  the  world  knew  anything  of  the  doings  in  the  dis 
tant  East  on  May  i.  Yet  the  victory  had  been  so  abso 
lute,  the  destruction  of  Montojo's  squadron  so  utter  and 
complete,  that  even  the  Spanish  could  not  hide  the  facts 
with  language,  an  exercise  in  which  they  have  great 
proficiency.  The  truth  tore  its  way  through  the  thin 
phrases ;  it  broke  the  pompous  sentences,  and  made  it 
self  sufficiently  visible  to  Europe.  To  the  great  powers 
there  it  came  with  a  shock.  They  were  not  pained  by 
the  unhappy  lot  of  Spain,  for  that  they  regarded  with 
all  the  philosophy  which  had  just  manifested  itself  so 
attractively  in  regard  to  poor  Greece.  The  downfall  of 
a  broken,  bankrupt  nation,  they  bore  well  enough ;  and 

191 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

although  they  were  surprised  and  annoyed  by  the 
swiftness,  accuracy,  and  fighting  efficiency  of  the 
Americans,  they  were  prepared  to  belittle  the  whole  af 
fair,  and  to  pretend  that  it  was  no  such  great  matter, 
after  all.  But  what  shocked  and  alarmed  them  very 
seriously  indeed  was  that  a  new  power,  known  to  be 
of  great  wealth  and  strength,  had  suddenly  swept  down 
on  Manila,  toppled  over  in  ruin  the  harmless  remains 
of  Spanish  power,  and  in  one  morning  had  risen  up 
master  of  a  great  port  and  city,  and  a  disagreeable  fac 
tor  of  unlimited  possibilities  in  the  East,  where  they 
were  having  a  "question"  and  starting  in  to  divide  the 
vast  Empire  of  China.  This  was  obviously  objection 
able,  and  ought  to  be  stopped.  It  became  clear  at  once 
to  several  imperial  and  many  diplomatic  minds  that 
something  should  be  done.  There  was  much  running 
about,  much  sending  of  cipher  despatches,  many  grave 
unofficial  conversations  and  representations,  and  a  gen 
eral  urgency  to  set  the  concert  of  Europe,  which  had 
performed  so  beautifully  in  the  Cretan  business,  to 
playing  again.  And  then-it-was  found  that  the  most 
important  performer,  the  great  sea  power  of  the  world, 
would  not  take  part.  It  appeared  that  these  people  who 
had  flung  Spain's  fleet  to  destruction  spoke  the  English 
tongue;  that  as  long  as  they  sent  their  grain  across  the 
ocean  to  Great  Britain,  England  had  a  base  on  the 
Atlantic,  and  could  defy  the  world;  that  England 
rather  wanted  them  as  neighbors  in  the  East,  and  had 
no  mind  to  be  aught  but  friendly  to  them.  So  England 
would  not  play  her  part,  and  without  her  fleets,  still 
more  with  those  fleets  hostile,  there  could  be  no  concert 
of  Europe ;  and  that  harmonious  body  sank  into  silence 

192 


CKORGF.    DEWEY 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

after  this  attempt  at  turning  up,  and  was  never  heard 
of  in  the  Philippines.  Many  results  came  from  this 
English  action.  The  people  of  the  United  States  knew 
instinctively  what  had  happened,  although  all  details 
were  kept  quite  obscure ;  they  valued  the  friendly  deed, 
which  was  not  to  be  forgotten ;  and  they  saw  in  a  flash 
the  community  of  interests  which  bound  them  to  their 
kinsmen  over-seas.  So  the  two  great  English-speaking 
nations  drew  together — a  very  momentous  fact,  well 
understood  and  much  disliked  on  the  Continent  of  Eu 
rope,  and  something  destined  to  have  serious  effect  on 
the  world's  history  in  the  future.  The  more  immediate 
and  direct  outcome  of  England's  refusal  to  interfere — 
as  well  as  her  evident  intention  to  let  no  one  else  inter 
fere  in  what  was  going  on  in  the  Philippines — was  that 
Admiral  Dewey  was  left  with  a  free  hand  to  work  out 
the  situation  which  he  had  himself  created. 

He  had  sprung  in  a  few  hours  into  the  ranks  of  the 
world's  great  admirals.  It  was  now  to  be  seen  whether 
the  victorious  seaman  was  also  a  commander  in  the 
widest  naval  sense,  and  at  the  same  time  a  statesman 
and  diplomatist.  The  conditions  were  full  of  peril.  He 
was  seven  thousand  miles  from  home,  the  enemy  held 
the  city  in  his  front,  he  had  no  troops  to  aid  him,  and 
he  knew  that  unfriendly  eyes  were  watching  him  nar 
rowly,  while  he  could  not  know  at  first  that  the  concert 
of  Europe  had  broken  down,  and  that  England  was  the 
friend  of  the  United  States. 

The  war-ships  of  other  powers  began  to  collect  at 
Manila — French,  English,  Japanese,  and  German,  the 
latter  finally  reaching  five  in  number,  and  including  two 
armored  vessels.  What  was  their  meaning  and  intent  ? 

13  193 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

question  very  important  to  Admiral  Dewey,  and 
demanding  much  thought.  As  they  watched  him,  it 
quickly  became  apparent  that  in  England  and  Japan  he 
had  friends  and  sympathizers.  In  France  an  ill-wisher 
was  soon  discovered,  but  nothing  more.  The  ill  wishes 
of  the  French  indeed  never  took  the  form  of  overt  ac 
tion,  but  we  can  learn  their  feelings  from  the  diary  of 
a  naval  lieutenant  at  Manila,  thoughtfully  published  in 
the  Revue  de  Paris.  The  diarist  was  much  disturbed 
(that  Europe  did  not  intervene.  He  writes  mournfully 
that  the  European  powers  were  doing  no  more  than 
watching  fate,  which  was  true  enough.  His  mind  was 
filled  with  dark  suspicions  of  England  and  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon,  and  he  thought  that  America  ought 
promptly  to  be  shut  out  from  the  East.  He  belittles 
Dewey's  victory,  but  blames  the  Spaniards  for  allow 
ing  him  to  win  it,  which  is,  of  course,  one  way  of  look 
ing  at  that  event.  Such  a  fact  ought  not  to  have  been, 
and  yet  it  was.  The  explanation  of  it  is  that  we  had 
English  gunners,  deserters,  picked  up  in  Hong-kong 
— a  dear  old  falsehood  which  has  done  much  hard  serv 
ice,  never  harder  than  in  this  case,  for  Dewey's  crews, 
except  for  a  few  Chinamen,  were  practically  all  Amer 
ican.  But  the  thought  soothes  the  French  diarist,  who 
has  never  heard  of  Truxtun  and  L'Insurgente,  or  of 
some  American  shooting  at  French  frigates  just  a  hun 
dred  years  ago.  Then  comes  the  conventional  cry  that 
the  Americans  care  only  for  dollars,  are  treacherous, 
mean,  braggarts  (this  last  a  heinous  offence  in  French 
contemplation),  and,  saddest  of  all,  have  no  nobility 
of  soul.  And  the  philosopher,  as  he  reads,  wonders 
about  the  nobility  of  soul  shown  in  the  Dreyfus  case 

194 


. 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

and  some  of  its  attendant  incidents,  and  thinks  how 
differently  the  phrase  is  interpreted  in  different  coun 
tries.     But  the  lieutenant's  diary  is  none  the  less  in 
structive,  and,  joined  to  many  much  louder  manifes 
tations  by  Paris  newspapers  and  Frenchmen  generally, 
causes   Americans    to    draw    some   conclusions    as    to 
French  friendship  not  soon  to  be  forgotten.    Still  what 
ever  they  felt  or  thought,  the  Frenchmen  did  nothing 
serious  while  they  watched  fate,  and  hostile  feelings 
certainly  troubled  Admiral  Dewey  little  enough.     But 
there  was  one  power  present  who  pushed  her  hostility 
from  thoughts  and  words  to  action.     This  power  was 
Germany.     She  had  no  especial  claim  to  be  there,  no 
large  or  peculiar  interests,  but  she  sent  more  ships  than 
any  other  power,  kept  on  meddling,  and  went  to  the 
verge  of  war.     The  Germans  broke  through  Dewey's 
regulations,  which  he  had  the  right  to  make,  and  he 
called  them  sharply  to  order.     They  would  violate  the 
rules  by  moving  about  at  night,  and  then  the  American 
search-lights  fell  with  a  glare  upon  them,  and  followed 
Uiem  about  in  a  manner  which  checked  and  annoyed  1 
ihem.     One  German  ship  put  out  her  lights  and  tried 
to  slip  in  at  night,  but  a  shell  across  her  bows  brought 
IT.T  to.     Another  made  herself  offensive  by  following 
and  running  close  up  to  our  transports  when  they  first 
arrived.     A  German  ship  went  up  to  Subig  bay  and 
prevented  the  insurgents  from  taking  the  Isla  Grande. 
So  the  Raleigh  and  Concord  went  up  too,  stripped  for 
action,  and  as  they  went  in  the  Irene  went  out,  and 
the  Americans  took  Isla  Grande.     Very  trying  all  this 
to  a  man  charged  with  great  responsibilities  and  seven 
thousand  miles  from  home.     There  must  be  no  haste, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

no  rashness,  nothing  that  could  give  his  opponents  a 
hold,  and  yet  there  must  be  no  yielding,  and  no  threat 
except  with  action  behind  it,  and  on  a  provocation 
which  the  whole  world  would  justify.  Every  annoy 
ance,  every  improper  movement,  was  quickly  checked. 
The  diplomacy  was  perfect.  Then  came  the  sufficient 
provocation,  and  the  teeth  were  shown.  To  the  vigi 
lant  admiral  the  opportunity  came  at  last  when  one  of 
the  German  vessels  was  proved  to  have  landed  provi 
sions  in  Manila.  Let  us  read  what  follows,  as  it  is 
told  by  Mr.  Stickney,  an  eye-witness. 

"Orderly,  tell  Mr.  Brumby  I  would  like  to  see  him,"  said  Ad 
miral  Dewey,  one  forenoon. 

"Oh,  Brumby,"  he  continued,  when  the  flag-lieutenant  made  his 
appearance  on  the  quarter-deck,  "I  wish  you  to  take  the  barge  and 
go  over  to  the  German  flag-ship.  Give  Admiral  von  Diederich 
my  compliments,  and  say  that  I  wish  to  call  his  attention  to  the 
fact  that  vessels  of  his  squadron  have  shown  an  extraordinary 
disregard  of  the  usual  courtesies  of  naval  intercourse,  and  that 
finally  one  of  them  has  committed  a  gross  breach  of  neutrality  in 
landing  provisions  in  Manila,  a  port  which  I  am  blockading." 

The  Commodore's  voice  had  been  as  low  and  as  sweetly  modu 
lated  as  if  he  had  been  sending  von  Diederich  an  invitation  to 
dinner.  When  he  stopped  speaking,  Brumby,  who  did  not  need 
any  better  indication  of  the  Commodore's  mood  than  the  unusu 
ally  formal  and  gentle  manner  of  his  chief,  turned  to  go,  making 
the  usual  official  salute,  and  replying  with  the  customary,  "Ay,  ay, 
sir." 

"And,  Brumby,"  continued  the  Commodore,  his  voice  rising  and 
ringing  with  the  intensity  of  feeling  that  he  felt  he  had  repressed 
about  long  enough,  "tell  Admiral  von  Diederich  that  if  he  wants 
a  fight,  he  can  have  it  right  now !" 

Thereupon  the  German  admiral  became  sorry  for 
what  had  happened,  and,  it  appeared,  did  not  know 
what  his  captains  had  been  doing — a  sad  reflection 
upon  German  discipline.  But  it  seemed  that,  although 


KLWF.I.I.    S.    OTIS 
Major-General  in  command  of  the  American  forces  in  the  Philippines 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

he  had  two  armored  ships,  and  Dewey  none,  he  did  not 
desire  a  fight,  and  the  meddling  abated  sensibly.  Then 
much  later,  in  a  manner  to  be  described  hereafter,  when 
the  Monterey  came  in,  with  her  heavy  armor  and  big 
guns,  it  wras  found  that  important  interests  required 
the  presence  of  the  German  war-ships  elsewhere.  Why 
the  Germans  behaved  as  they  did,  manifesting  every 
possible  dislike  and  hostility  without  doing  anything 
effective,  and  breeding  a  strong  and  just  enmity  toward 
them  in  the  United  States,  is  difficult  to  understand. 
To  the  higher  and  more  refined  statesmanship  of  Eu 
rope  it  may  have  seemed  wise.  To  the  ruder  and  simp 
ler  American  mind  it  seems  stupid  and  profitless,  and, 
in  any  event,  Americans  will  not  forget  it.  But  every 
one  can  admire  the  manner  in  which  Admiral  Dewey 
mixed  tact  with  firmness,  and  in  the  midst  of  jealous 
and  meddling  neutrals  steered  his  course  without  an 
error,  and  never  relaxed  for  a  moment  his  iron  grip 
on  the  great  bay  he  had  conquered  and  the  city  which 
lay  beneath  his  guns. 

To  keep  the  sympathy  and  support  of  the  friendly 
powers  and  hold  at  bay  the  hostile  nations  were  diffi 
cult  and  perplexing  tasks,  trying  to  nerves,  temper,  and 
wits.  But  this  was  not  all.  The  war  in  Cuba  had  in 
due  course  lighted  up  the  flames  of  insurrection  in  the 
Philippines,  where  Spanish  tyranny  and  extortion, 
supplemented  by  the  oppression,  cruelty,  corruption, 
and  outrages  of  the  powerful  monastic  orders,  had 
been  heaping  up  the  material  of  revolt.  To  this  mass 
of  explosives  the  troubles  of  Spain  in  Cuba  had  applied 
the  torch.  The  black  robed  bodies  of  the  hated  monks 
floating  down  the  Pasig  river  were  grim  signals  of  the 

197 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

coming  storm.  Rebellion  broke  out  in  the  back  country 
and  in  the  provinces  of  Luzon,  and  a  guerrilla  war 
fare  began  to  desolate  the  country.  The  Spaniards  met 
the  outbreak  vigorously  and  repressed  it  savagely, 
shooting  down  their  prisoners  by  scores  to  make  a  holi 
day  spectacle  for  the  crowds  on  the  Luneta.  The  fight 
ing  dragged  along,  exhausting  to  the  Spaniards  and 
without  substantial  gain  to  the  rebels,  until  July,  1897, 
when  the  insurgent  chiefs  surrendered,  on  condition 
that  certain  reforms  should  be  made  and  that  a  sum  of 
money  should  be  paid  over  to  the  families  of  those  who 
had  been  killed  in  the  war  or  ruined  by  it.  Spain,  as 
usual,  broke  her  word,  as  she  had  done  with  the  Cubans 
in  1878.  The  reforms  were  not  made,  and  only  a  part 
of  the  money  was  ever  paid.  Emilio  Aguinaldo  and 
the  other  leaders  withdrew  to  Hong-kong  in  Septem 
ber  1897,  bringing  with  them  $400,000,  which  they 
had  received  from  the  Spanish  government.  The  in 
surrection  was  over,  although  there  was  fitful  fighting 
here  and  there;  but  the  chiefs  had  retired  to  a  safe 
haven  and  were  helpless  at  Hong-kong.  Such  was  the 
situation  which  Admiral  Dewey  found  when  war  was 
declared.  The  insurgent  chiefs,  however,  stimulated 
by  the  approach  of  trouble  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  put  themselves  in  communication  with  Mr. 
Wildman,  our  consul  at  Hong-kong,  and  opened  ne 
gotiations  with  him.  They  declared  that  they  desired 
annexation  to  the  United  States,  above  all  independ 
ence  of  Spain  and  relief  from  Spanish  rule,  and  wished 
to  aid  the  Americans  in  all  possible  ways.  Admiral 
Dewey  took  the  obvious  course  of  encouraging  them, 
which  from  a  military  point  of  view  was  entirely  sound. 

198 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

He  caused  Aguinaldo  to  be  brought  over,  and  pro 
tected  his  landing  on  May  19.  So  little  response  came 
at  first  to  Aguinaldo's  appeal  to  his  countrymen  that 
he  wished  to  turn  round  and  return  to  Hong-kong, 
and  was  kept  only  by  much  pressure.  Gradually  at 
first,  and  then  rapidly,  the  natives  began  to  come  in; 
Admiral  Dewey  furnished  arms  from  the  arsenal  at 
Cavite,  and  the  insurgents  had  presently  a  respectable 
force.  They  soon  found  that,  with  the  Spanish  sea 
power  destroyed  and  an  American  fleet  in  possession  of 
Manila  bay,  the  situation  was  widelv  different  from 
that  in  which  they  had  struggled  alone,  desperately  and 
helplessly  against  the  forces  of  Spain.  They  began 
to  win  victories,  to  cut  off  detached  bodies  of  Spanish 
troops  and  take  outlying  towns.  With  victory  their 
numbers  rapidly  increased,  and  they  were  soon  able, 
under  cover  of  the  American  war-ships,  to  surround 
Manila.  So  far  all  went  well,  and  the  insurgent  forces 
and  their  operations  put  Manila  even  more  securely  at 
Admiral  Dewey's  mercy.  Then  the  difficulties  began. 
The  insurgents  forgot  that  they  owed  their  position 
entirely  to  the  American  fleet,  and  that  but  for  the 
American  war-ships  the  chiefs  would  have  been  vege 
tating  in  exile  at  Hong-kong,  and  their  followers  hew 
ing  wood  and  drawing  water  for  the  Spaniards,  as  of 
yore.  Aguinaldo,  who  had  never  adjusted  his  rela 
tions  to  the  universe,  began  to  regard  himself  as  a  gov 
ernment  and  a  nation,  and  started  to  plan  for  a  dicta 
torship.  Admiral  Dewey,  who  had  most  carefully 
avoided  recognizing  the  insurgents  or  treating  them  as 
allies,  was  obliged  to  hold  them  constantly  under  con 
trol.  He  forced  them  to  conduct  their  war  in  a  civi- 

199 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

lized  manner ;  he  insisted  upon  and  secured  the  humane 
treatment  of  their  Spanish  prisoners,  and  he  kept  a 
watchful  eye  upon  their  intrigues  with  foreign  powers, 
which  they  almost  at  once  began. 

Taken  altogether,  it  was  a  most  difficult  position, 
and  required  all  the  best  talents  of  the  statesman  and 
diplomatist.  But  the  admiral  proved  himself  to  be 
both  in  high  degree,  and  kept  the  whole  situation  al 
ways  in  hand,  never  losing  the  mastery  for  a  moment. 
So  the  slow  days  wore  by.  Very  slow  and  very  anxious 
they  must  have  been  to  a  victorious  sailor  suddenly 
charged  with  vast  responsibilities,  with  hostile  Eu 
ropean  powers  on  one  side,  and  dangerous  and  untrust 
worthy  supporters  on  the  other.  Very  often  must  he 
have  thought  of  the  seven  thousand  miles  which  sepa 
rated  him  from  home  as  he  paced  the  deck,  counting 
the  days  which  lay  between  him  and  the  coming  of  re- 
enforcements.  For  the  re-enforcements  were  very  slow 
in  starting,  owing  to  the  great  delay  in  getting  trans 
ports  and  in  mobilizing  the  troops  at  San  Francisco. 
So  deliberate  did  the  movements  seem,  so  many  were 
the  announcements  of  departure,  only  to  be  followed 
by  postponement,  that  the  country  began  to  grow  res 
tive,  and  there  were  mutterings  about  the  apparent 
abandonment  of  Dewey  and  the  fate  of  Gordon  at 
Khartoum. 

But  the  delays  which  undoubtedly  existed  were  due 
to  the  surprise  of  Dewey's  victory,  to  the  magnitude 
of  its  results,  and  to  the  unreadiness  of  the  military 
organization  to  meet  such  an  emergency.  Admiral 
Dewey  had  asked  on  May  13  for  5,000  men,  and  needed, 
of  course,  fresh  ammunition  and  naval  re-enforcements 

200 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

as  well.  Three  weeks  elapsed  after  the  eventful  ist 
of  May  before  the  cruiser  Charleston  left  San  Fran 
cisco,  and  then  she  went  without  the  troops.  The  three 
transports  the  City  of  Pekin,  Australia,  and  City  of 
Sydney  finally  got  off  on  May  25,  carrying  the  First 
California  and  Second  Oregon  regiments  of  volun 
teers,  five  companies  of  the  Fourteenth  Infantry  United 
States  regulars,  a  detachment  of  California  artillery — 
in  all,  115  officers  and  2,386  enlisted  men — under  Gen 
eral  Anderson,  the  division  commander.  They  joined 
the  Charleston  at  Honolulu,  where  she  was  waiting 
for  them,  and  started  thence  on  June  4.  As  soon  as  they 
were  clear  of  the  land  Captain  Glass  of  the  Charleston 
opened  the  sealed  orders  brought  to  him  by  the  Pekin, 
and  found  that  he  was  directed  to  stop  at  the  Ladrones 
on  his  way  to  Manila  and  capture  the  island  of  Guam. 
The  course  was  then  shaped  toward  the  first  land  seen 
by  Magellan,  after  his  long  wandering  over  the  wastes 
of  the  Pacific,  and  on  June  20,  at  daylight,  the  Ameri 
can  ships  were  off  the  island.  They  looked  in  at  the 
port  of  Agana,  the  capital,  found  no  vessels  there,  nor 
any  sign  of  a  Spanish  force,  and  so  proceeded  to  the 
other  port  of  San  Luis  d'Apra,  where  rumors  at  Hono 
lulu  had  placed  a  Spanish  gunboat  and  soldiers.  When 
they  reached  the  harbor,  shut  in  by  Apepas  Island  and 
the  peninsula  of  Orote,  the  Charleston  suddenly  disap 
peared  from  the  sight  of  the  watching  eyes  on  the  troop 
ships.  She  had  plunged  boldly  in,  following  the  deep, 
narrow,  and  tortuous  channel  hedged  by  coral  reefs. 
Against  the  gray  and  green  of  the  cliffs,  with  sudden 
rain  squalls  coming  and  going,  the  lead-colored  cruiser 
could  not  be  made  out  from  the  transports.  At  last 

201 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

something  white  was  discovered  moving  against  the 
cliffs.  Then  the  white  spots  were  discovered  to  be  the 
boats  on  the  superstructure  of  the  Charleston,  and  it 
was  apparent  that  the  cruiser  was  going  steadily  in. 
Presently  she  made  out  the  masts  of  a  vessel  beyond 
Apepas,  and  the  spirits  of  the  crew  rose  at  the  hope  of 
an  action.  Then  they  rounded  the  end  of  the  island, 
and  disappointment  fell  upon  them  when  they  dis 
covered  that  the  longed-for  enemy  was  only  a  peace 
ful  Japanese  brigantine.  No  fight  there.  On  the 
cruiser  crept  through  the  dangerous  waters,  past  old 
Fort  St.  lago.  No  sound,  no  movement,  no  enemy 
there.  All  as  quiet,  one  would  think,  as  in  Magellan's 
day.  On  again,  and  now  the  Charleston  was  opposite 
Fort  Santa  Cruz,  and  opened  sharply  with  her  three- 
pounders.  The  guns  cracked,  the  shells  whistled  over 
the  fort,  a  dozen  shots  were  fired,  there  was  no  reply, 
and  in  five  minutes  the  only  action  seen  by  Guam  was 
over.  The  Charleston  slipped  along  a  little  further, 
ever  more  slowly,  and  at  last  stopped.  Soon  boats  put 
off  from  the  shore,  and  the  captain  of  the  port  and 
some  other  Spanish  officers  came  on  board  the  Charles 
ton.  They  began  to  apologize  in  the  best  Spanish  man 
ner  for  their  inability  to  return  the  American  "salute." 
"What  salute?"  said  Captain  Glass.  It  appeared  that 
they  referred  to  the  shelling  of  Fort  Santa  Cruz. 
"Make  no  mistake,"  said  Captain  Glass,  "I  fired  no 
salute.  Our  countries  are  at  war,  and  those  were 
hostile  shots."  Poor  Spanish  officers,  stranded  far 
away  in  the  dim  Pacific !  They  had  heard  no  news  of 
war,  and  now  they  were  prisoners.  Then  Captain 
Glass  demanded  the  Governor,  who  was  at  Agana,  and 

202 


I 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

paroled  his  suddenly  acquired  prisoners  to  go  ashore 
and  get  him.  This  brought  a  pause  in  the  operations, 
and  the  three  transports  were  convoyed  in  and  an 
chored  near  the  cruiser.  As  evening  drew  on  a  mes 
sage  arrived  from  the  Governor,  stating  that  the  mili 
tary  regulations  of  Spain  forbade  his  going  aboard  an 
enemy's  ship,  and  that  he  would  be  happy  to  see  the 
American  commander  at  his  office.  This  characteristic 
exhibition  of  pompous  Spanish  etiquette  and  of  piteous 
inability  to  recognize  facts  made  the  American  captain 
hesitate  between  anger  and  amusement.  But  good 
nature  and  the  sense  of  humor  prevailed,  and  word  was 
sent  to  the  Governor  that  the  captain  or  some  officer 
representing  him  would  call  on  the  following  day.  The 
next  morning  Lieutenant  Braunersreuther  went  ashore 
with  only  four  sailors,  but  with  two  Oregon  companies 
and  fifty  marines  in  the  background  making  ready  to 
follow.  Before  the  soldiers  and  marines  could  be 
landed,  however — a  somewhat  slow  piece  of  work- 
Lieutenant  Braunersreuther  appeared,  his  task  com 
pleted,  and  the  Spanish  Governor  and  his  staff  pris 
oners  in  the  \vhale-boat.  The  poor  Spaniards  had  faced 
the  inevitable,  and  bowed  to  the  inexorable  argument 
of  an  overwhelming  force.  The  Governor  had  written 
an  order  to  the  commandant  of  the  troops  to  bring 
them  down  and  surrender  them,  had  then  penned  a 
melancholy  letter  to  his  wife,  and  in  deep  dejection 
had  followed  his  captors  to  the  Charleston.  After 
they  had  been  assigned  to  quarters  Captain  Glass  went 
ashore  and  inspected  Fort  Santa  Cruz,  and  there  on 
the  southeast  corner  of  the  terre-plein  the  flag  was 
hoisted.  As  it  climbed  slowly  to  the  top  of  the  staff 

203 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  national  salute  rang  out,  gun  after  gun,  from  the 
cruiser,  and  the  air  was  rilled,  as  the  crash  of  the  re 
ports  died  away  in  echoes,  with  the  music  of  the  regi 
mental  bands  on  the  troop-ships.  Then  all  was  done, 
and  the  flag  which  had  risen  first  on  the  distant  Atlan 
tic  coast  floated  out  before  the  afternoon  breeze  of  these 
remote  islands  which  were  henceforth  to  know  new 
masters.  The  ceremony  done,  the  practical  work 
which  the  flag  symbolized  was  soon  finished.  At  four 
o'clock  the  two  companies,  one  of  Spanish  regulars, 
and  one  of  native  Chamorros,  came  down  to  the  boat- 
house  where  Lieutenant  Braunersreuther,  backed  by 
his  bluejackets  and  forty  marines,  received  the  sur 
render.  The  Spanish  troops  were  all  disarmed,  the 
regulars  were  taken  on  board  the  ships  as  prisoners, 
and  the  Chamorros,  perfectly  overjoyed  at  the  over 
throw  of  Spain,  as  is  the  case  with  all  who  have  called 
Spain  master,  were  left  behind.  The  little  play,  in 
which  comedy  and  tragedy  had  mingled  closely,  was 
over.  The  moss-grown,  picturesque  old  forts,  the 
slender  Spanish  garrison,  the  whole  civil  government 
of  Spain,  had  passed  into  the  power  of  the  United 
States.  There  were  scenes  which  seemed  to  recall  the 
fantastic  conceptions  of  comic  opera,  and  bring  only 
laughter  to  the  onlookers.  Yet  behind  the  absurdity 
was  the  pathos  of  the  helpless  yielding  Spaniards,  and 
the  stern  historic  fact  that  the  first  possession  in  the 
Pacific  which  Magellan  had  given  to  the  Spain  that 
dominated  and  frightened  Europe  had  passed  away  for 
ever  from  the  Spain  which  had  ceased  to  rule,  and  be 
come  a  part  of  the  Western  republic,  whose  very  exist- 

204 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

ence  depended  on  the  denial  of  all  that  Charles  V  and 
Phillip  II,  represented  among  men. 

On  June  22  the  Charleston  steamed  away  with  her 
prisoners,  followed  by  the  transports.  In  the  early 
afternoon  of  Tuesday,  June  28,  they  were  off  Cape 
Engano,  and  in  a  short  time  were  joined  by  the  Balti 
more,  sent  out  to  meet  them.  Two  days  more  and  they 
were  running  into  Manila  bay.  As  they  passed  Cor- 
regidor,  three  German  vessels  were  lying  near  by,  and 
the  Kaiscrin  Augusta,  a  large  armored  cruiser,  got  up 
steam  and  followed  close  to  the  Australia,  hung  to  her 
until  the  flag-ship  was  reached,  and  then  broke  out  the 
American  flag  and  saluted.  The  whole  movement  was 
offensive,  and  to  be  offensive  without  doing  anything  to 
support  it  is  not  only  ill-bred,  but  stupid.  So  the  per 
formance  of  the  Kaiscrin  Augusta  went  down  in  the 
American  books  charged  to  the  German  account,  and 
the  ships  went  on.  Before  them  lay  the  French  ships, 
sulky  and  suspicious,  the  Japanese,  the  trim  black  Eng 
lish  ships,  with  the  "old  red  ensign"  looking  very 
friendly  and  very  welcome  to  the  American  troop 
ships.  And  then  came  the  ships  flying  the  flag  they 
loved,  and  which  they  had  come  so  far  to  serve.  There 
was  the  victor  fleet  near  together  off  Cavite,  and  the 
salutes  rang  out  from  the  Olympia  and  the  Charleston. 
Support  had  come  at  last,  and  De\vey  had  a  new  cruiser 
and  troops  of  the  United  States  at  his  back.  It  must 
have  been  a  great  relief  to  feel  that  the  long  separation 
from  home  was  over,  and  that  the  Pekin  and  her  con 
sorts  were  but  the  first  in  a  long  line  of  re-enforcements 
now  fairly  started  from  the  United  States.  The  moral 
effect  of  the  arrival  of  General  Anderson  and  his  troops 

205 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

was  great,  although  in  actual  numbers  the  force  was  a 
small  one,  but  it  was  put  to  immediate  use.  The  sol 
diers  were  quickly  landed  and  established  at  Cavite, 
which  had  been  in  American  possession  since  the  bat 
tle  of  May  i.  Then  the  admiral  faced  the  situation 
again.  There  was  still  the  hostility  of  the  European 
powers  to  be  met.  German  enmity  was  still  shown  in 
a  way  which  bordered  on  intolerable  insolence.  The 
American  troops  had  been  barely  a  week  in  their  new 
quarters  when  Admiral  Dewey  was  obliged  to  drive 
the  Irene  from  Subig  bay  and  stop  German  interfer 
ence  at  that  point  with  the  insurgents.  On  the 
other  hand  were  the  insurgents  themselves,  massed 
round  Manila,  and  inflated  by  the  victories  won  and 
the  prisoners  captured  from  outlying  Spanish  forces. 
It  was  the  I5th  of  July  when  Aguinaldo,  destitute  of 
either  loyalty  or  gratitude,  forgetting  the  hand  which 
had  raised  him  up,  and  swelling  with  a  sense  of  his 
own  importance,  felt  it  necessary  to  establish  a  govern 
ment,  of  which  he  duly  apprised  Admiral  Dewey.  The 
government  consisted  simply  of  himself  as  dictator,  but 
he  showed  his  Latin  blood  by  accompanying  the  fact 
of  his  own  dictatorship  with  high-sounding  proclama 
tions,  and  a  constitution  in  many  paragraphs,  which  he 
apparently  made  himself,  and  which  was  therefore  cer 
tainly  new,  and  to  him  probably  satisfactory.  The 
cloud  of  words  which  he  emitted  was  of  little  moment, 
but  the  fact  of  his  dictatorship  and  his  assumption  of 
autocratic  power  added  to  the  perils  of  the  situation. 
Altogether  the  conditions  were  menacing  enough.  In 
the  front  was  Spain,  an  open  and  public  enemy,  com 
paratively  easy  to  deal  with.  On  either  hand  were  the 

206 


FRANCIS    V.    GREENE 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

war-ships  of  unfriendly  powers  watching  sullenly  and 
eagerly  for  an  error,  for  a  sign  of  weakness,  for  the 
least  excuse  for  interference.  All  around  Manila  were 
the  insurgents,  supporters  in  theory,  but  untrustworthy, 
treacherously  led,  and  capable  at  any  moment  of  ac 
tions  which  might  endanger  our  relations  with  other 
powers,  or  of  intriguing  with  those  same  powers 
against  us. 

So  the  days  dragged  by,  the  admiral,  cool,  firm,  and 
vigilant,  always  ready,  and  making  no  mistakes,  and 
then,  two  days  after  Aguinaldo's  announcement  of  his 
own  greatness,  came  a  great  and  signal  relief.  On  July 
17  the  second  expedition,  under  General  Greene,  which 
had  left  San  Francisco  on  June  25,  arrived.  General 
Greene  came  on  the  China,  and  the  three  other  trans 
ports — the  Senator,  Colon,  and  Zealandia — came  in 
soon  after.  They  brought  the  First  Nebraska,  the 
First  Colorado,  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Utah 
artillery — all  volunteers — eight  companies  of  regulars, 
and  a  detachment  of  engineers,  in  all  158  officers  and 
3,428  enlisted  men.  This  raised  the  total  force  at  Ma 
nila  to  more  than  6,000  men,  and  greatly  strengthened 
the  American  position.  The  net  about  the  Spaniards 
holding  the  Philippine  capital  was  beginning  to  draw 
tighter. 

This  second  expedition  had  stopped  at  Wake  Island 
—a  barren  sand  strip,  but  with  possible  value  for  future 
cables — had  then  looked  in  at  Guam,  and  now,  on  a 
peaceful  Sunday,  rapidly  disembarked  on  the  shores 
of  Manila  bay.  Thus  re-enforced,  the  American  troops 
were  moved  forward,  and  the  camp  established  between 
the  beach  and  the  Manila  road,  about  two  miles  from 

207 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Malate.  This  brought  the  lines  very  near  the  Spaniards 
and  the  Malate  fort.  There  was  a  false  alarm  one  night, 
produced  by  some  Spanish  shots  at  the  insurgents,  but, 
on  the  whole,  the  Spaniards  kept  quiet  enough,  having  a 
proper  respect,  no  doubt,  for  the  war-ships  frowning 
upon  them  from  a  very  reasonable  range.  But  events 
were  moving  faster  now  than  in  the  long  dreary  time 
which  followed  the  battle  of  May  i.  The  second  ex 
pedition  had  scarcely  time  to  settle  down  in  their  camps 
when,  on  July  25,  General  Merritt,  one  of  the  most  dis 
tinguished  officers  in  the  army,  arrived  on  the  Newport. 
To  him  had  been  confided  the  command  of  all  the 
American  forces  in  the  Philippines — both  those  already 
there  and  those  'which  were  still  to  come.  He  had  in 
tended  to  bring  with  him  the  third  expedition,  but,  im 
patient  of  delay,  had  sailed  with  his  staff  on  the  New 
port,  on  June  27,  and  pushed  on  alone  at  the  highest 
speed  attainable.  When  he  arrived,  he  found  General 
Anderson  with  headquarters  at  Cavite,  and  some  troops 
holding  the  town,  and  General  Greene  encamped  with 
his  brigade  near  Paranaque.  On  the  north  flank  Gen 
eral  Greene  was  within  3,200  yards  of  the  outer  de 
fences  of  Manila,  which  ran  from  old  Fort  San  An 
tonio  south  of  the  Malate  suburb,  with  more  or  less  de 
tached  forts  to  the  eastward,  and  to  the  swamps  on  the 
Spanish  left.  The  queer  feature  of  the  situation  was 
that  between  our  lines  and  those  of  the  Spaniards  the 
insurgents,  who  had  established  scattered  posts  all  about 
the  city,  had  entrenched  themselves  within  800  yards 
of  the  old  powder-magazine  fort.  Thus  in  the  direct 
line  of  the  American  advance  lay  the  forces  of  their 
would-be  allies.  In  order  to  make  that  advance  it  was 

208 


MAT    ()F    11IK    li.VTTLE    OF    MANILA 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

necessary  to  get  this  intervening  line  out  of  the  way. 
General  Merritt,  as  clear  on  this  point  as  Admiral 
Dewey,  was  wisely  determined  that  he  would  recognize 
the  insurgents  in  no  way  which  could  possibly  involve 
the  government  of  the  United  States.  He  was  equally 
determined  that  he  would  have  no  military  operations 
which  depended  in  any  degree  upon  them,  and  no  joint 
military  movements,  the  difficulties  and  perils  of  which 
he  plainly  foresaw.  He  therefore  opened  no  communi 
cations  with  Aguinaldo,  who  had  now  reached  such  a 
point  of  pompous  self-importance  that  he  had  not  come 
to  see  the  American  commmander-in-chief  upon  the 
latter's  arrival.  This  made  it  all  the  easier  for  General 
Merritt  to  ignore  him,  which  was  desirable,  but  did  not 
clear  the  insurgent  line  away  from  the  American  front. 
The  difficulty  was  solved  by  General  Greene's  inducing 
the  insurgent  brigade  commander  to  move  to  the 
right,  which  did  not  commit  us  to  anything,  and  gave 
us  what  we  wanted — an  unobstructed  control  of  the 
roads  necessary  for  the  forward  movement.  With  this 
point  gained,  General  Greene,  on  July  29,  advanced  and 
took  possession  of  the  insurgent  trenches  with  a  bat 
talion  of  regulars,  another  from  the  Colorado  regi 
ment,  and  a  portion  of  the  Utah  battery.  Finding  the 
trenches  weak  and  of  bad  construction,  General  Greene 
ordered  another  line  constructed  100  yards  further  to 
the  front,  which  was  rapidly  done  during  the  night  by 
the  Colorado  men.  The  line  of  intrenchments  was 
short,  not  more  than  270  yards  in  length,  and  on  the 
right  was  protected  only  by  some  scattered  barricades 
of  the  insurgents.  Facing  it,  at  close  quarters  now, 
were  the  stone  fort,  heavy  intrenchments  with  seven 
14  209 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

guns,  a  block-house,  which  flanked  the  Americans  on 
the  right — all  manned  by  regular  soldiers,  with  abun 
dant  reserves  in  the  city  near  at  hand.  The  position 
was  by  no  means  a  safe  one,  and  the  Spaniards, 
disturbed  by  the  American  advance,  now  begin 
ning  to  press  upon  them,  undertook  to  break  up 
the  intrenchments  before  they  should  be  further 
strengthened  or  extended,  and  drive  their  approaching 
enemies  back.  They  kept  up  a  desultory  firing  upon 
our  lines,  as  they  had  done  with  the  insurgents,  but  it 
had  been  entirely  harmless,  and  so  long  as  our  men  kept 
under  cover  the  bullets  had  spent  themselves  vainly 
against  the  earthworks  or  flown  high  and  wide  through 
the  air.  On  the  night  of  July  31,  however,  a  serious 
and  concerted  effort  was  made  to  force  our  lines  back. 
The  night  was  intensely  dark,  a  tropical  storm  was  rag 
ing,  and  the  rain  was  falling  in  torrents.  In  the  black 
ness  and  noise  of  the  storm  it  was  almost  impossible 
to  know  just  what  happened.  The  Tenth  Pennsylva 
nia  was  in  the  trenches,  and  when  the  Spanish  fire  in 
creased  in  volume  they  began  to  reply  to  it,  exposing 
themselves  in  doing  so.  Then  their  outposts  came  in 
with  a  report  of  a  Spanish  advance,  and  although  the 
outposts  of  regulars  staid  where  they  were  through  the 
night,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  enemy  came  for 
ward,  and  also  tried  to  flank  us  from  the  block-house 
and  on  our  exposed  right.  No  circumstances  could  be 
imagined  more  trying  for  new  troops,  with  an  unseen 
enemy  firing  heavily,  an  utter  impossiblity  of  seeing 
or  hearing  anything,  and  a  welter  of  confusion  caused 
by  storm  and  darkness.  But  the  Pennsylvanians  fired 
vigorously,  and  their  reserves,  brought  up  through  the 

210 


THE  BLOCKADE  OP  MANILA 

zone  of  fire  in  rear  of  the  firing  line,  suffered  not  a  lit 
tle.  The  Utah  and  regular  artillery  stood  their  ground 
undisturbed,  served  their  guns  steadily  and  efficiently, 
and  held  the  Spaniards  in  check.  Nothing  could  have 
been  better  than  their  behavior.  General  Greene,  in 
formed  of  what  was  occurring  by  some  excited  and  not 
over-accurate  messengers,  sent  forward  to  the  trenches 
the  California  regiment  and  the  Third  artillery,  sup 
ported  by  the  First  Colorado,  who  were  to  stop  just  out 
of  range.  The  Californians  and  the  artillery  suffered 
in  crossing  the  open  ground  in  rear  of  the  trenches,  but 
went  steadily  forward,  and  by  the  time  they  reached 
the  firing  line  the  Spanish  fire  was  slackening  and  the 
attack  had  been  repulsed.  The  firing,  which  soon 
after  ceased,  \vas  renewed  in  the  morning  about  nine 
o'clock,  but  was  without  effect.  In  this  night  assault 
the  American  loss  reached  10  killed  and  43  wounded, 
but  despite  the  most  trying  conditions,  after  the  first 
excitement  and  confusion  our  men  stood  their  ground 
coolly;  and  the  heavy  fire  of  the  infantry,  and  espe 
cially  of  the  Utah  and  regular  artillery,  proved  too 
much  for  the  Spaniards,  whose  attempt  failed  com 
pletely.  Many  Spanish  dead  and  wounded  were  car 
ried  into  Manila,  but  what  their  actual  loss  was  it  is  im 
possible  to  determine,  as  even  their  wild  official  reports 
are  lacking  in  this  instance. 

The  Americans  naturally  held  their  line,  but  General 
Greene,  feeling  that  the  right  flank  could  no  longer  be 
left  as  it  was,  weak  and  exposed,  opened  a  new  line  of 
trenches,  which  were  rapidly  extended  for  1,200  yards 
from  the  bay  to  the  Pasay  road.  This  was  a  strong  line 
and  well  protected  on  both  flanks,  but  the  work  both  of 

211 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

making  the  trenches  and  of  holding  them  was  severe  in 
the  extreme.  The  incessant  rain  washed  away  the  para 
pets,  which  could  only  be  sustained  by  bags  of  earth. 
In  the  trenches  themselves  there  were  two  feet  of  water, 
but  the  men  worked  away  effectively  and  rapidly  with 
out  complaint.  They  had  also,  as  an  accompaniment 
to  their  labors,  constant  firing  from  the  Spanish  lines. 
Sometimes  it  was  heavy  and  concerted.  At  other  times 
it  was  desultory,  but  any  man  working  in  the  trenches 
who  showed  his  head  above  the  parapet  was  likely  to 
be  shot.  When  the  firing  became  heavy  the  Utah  bat 
tery  would  reply ;  and  if  it  was  thought  that  the  Span 
iards  were  coming  out,  the  infantry  would  join  in.  The 
heaviest  firing  came  on  August  5,  when  the  Spaniards 
opened  at  seven  o'clock  and  kept  it  up  until  ten,  and  the 
Americans  replied  vigorously  and  effectively.  Our  loss 
was  3  killed  and  7  wounded,  but  beyond  this  the  whole 
of  the  Spanish  firing  was  utterly  futile.  It  was  their 
appproved  method  of  conducting  war  in  Cuba,  and,  as 
it  now  seemed,  everywhere  else ;  but  although  it  had  no 
results,  and  was  pitifully  useless  as  a  substitute  for  fight 
ing,  it  was  none  the  less  annoying  to  men  in  trenches 
who  were  not  yet  ready  to  advance,  because  the  com 
manders  meant  to  take  the  city,  if  possible,  without  reg 
ular  assault.  So  it  was  decided  to  put  a  stop  to  the 
Spanish  firing,  and  word  was  sent,  on  August  7,  that  if 
there  was  not  an  end  to  it  the  ships  would  bombard. 
Thereupon  silence  fell  upon  the  Spanish  lines,  and  no 
more  shots  were  fired  in  the  American  direction  until 
the  general  and  final  advance  began,  a  week  later. 

At  no  time  would  the  Spaniards  have  failed  to  com 
ply  with  any  reasonable  request  backed  by  a  suggestion 

212 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

of  bombardment,  but  now  the  threat  had  a  deeper  mean 
ing  than  ever  before.  The  third  expedition,  which  fol 
lowed  General  Merritt,  arrived  on  July  31,  the  day  of 
the  fight  at  Malate,  and  brought  nearly  5,000  officers 
and  men — a  powerful  re-enforcement.  But  the  arrival 
which  was  most  impressive,  and  which  at  once  changed 
the  situation  in  a  very  important  manner,  occurred  on 
August  4.  The  new-comer  was  eagerly  expected,  and 
every  American  was  on  the  lookout  for  the  arrival 
which  meant  so  much.  Officers  in  the  yard  of  the  ar 
senal  at  Cavite  heard  the  men  on  the  walls  cry  out : 
"There  she  comes !"  "There's  the  Monterey!"  Hastily 
climbing  up,  they  looked  forth  toward  the  harbor  en 
trance,  and  it  was  true — there  indeed  was  the  Monterey. 
Leaving  San  Diego  on  June  1 1  she  had  toiled  across  the 
Pacific  slowly,  not  being  built  for  such  wide  seafaring, 
and  here  she  was  at  last  safe  and  sound.  Lying  low 
in  the  water,  she  was  not  very  fair  to  see ;  but  she  was 
clad  in  armor,  and  four  1 2-inch  guns  looked  out  from 
her  turrets,  altogether  a  very  formidable  ship  for  the 
smooth  waters  of  Manila  bay.  To  Admiral  Dewey, 
facing  armored  ships  with  nothing  but  unarmored 
cruisers,  and  quite  prepared  to  give  a  good  account  of 
himself  against  any  odds,  the  coming  of  the  Monterey 
was  worth  many  regiments,  and  the  balance  of  naval 
power  began  to  come  down  toward  his  side.  The 
meaning  of  the  Monterey  was  easily  understood — and 
by  others  than  the  Americans.  The  morning  after  her 
arrival,  officers  looking  at  the  line  of  foreign  war-ships 
thought  there  had  been  some  change.  They  counted, 
and  found  that  in  truth  there  had  been  a  change,  for 
one  or  two  of  them  had  slipped  ofY  in  the  night.  So 

213 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

they  gradually  departed  until  only  a  proper  force  for 
observation  remained,  and  the  German  squadron,  with 
its  interference  and  ill-concealed  threats  and  insolence, 
was  reduced  to  suitable  proportions.  The  Monterey 
had  demonstrated  once  more  Nelson's  famous  saying — 
that  his  fighting-ships  were  the  best  negotiators  in  Eu 
rope. 

With  all  danger  of  foreign  meddling  gone,  with  more 
than  ten  thousand  soldiers  on  shore,  and  with  the  Mon 
terey  lying  low  and  menacing  alongside  the  American 
cruisers,  Admiral  Dewey  and  General  Merritt  felt  that 
the  time  had  come  to  bring  matters  to  a  conclusion  and 
take  possessionof  the  city,  which  had  been  won  on  theist 
of  May.  On  August  7  the  American  commanders  no 
tified  the  Spanish  general-in-chief  that  after  the  expira 
tion  of  forty-eight  hours  they  might  attack  the  defences 
of  Manila,  and  that  they  sent  the  notice  in  order  to  ena 
ble  non-combatants  to  leave  the  city.  Augustin  the  tru 
culent,  the  maker  of  the  proclamation  which  described 
Dewey  and  his  men  as  the  "excrescences  of  civilization" 
who  were  about  to  cast  down  altars  and  carry  off  wives 
and  virgins,  had  slipped  away  under  orders  from  Ma 
drid,  it  is  said,  when  the  decisive  moment  drew  near ; 
with  German  aid  getting  safely  off,  and  leaving  Gen 
eral  Jaudenes  to  face  the  inevitable.  That  officer  now 
replied  to  the  American  communication,  expressing  his 
thanks,  but  declaring  that  he  was  unable,  owing  to  the 
presence  of  the  insurrectionary  forces,  to  find  a  place 
of  refuge  for  the  women  and  children  under  his  care. 
It  was  a  manly  letter,  not  without  a  note  of  pathos  hid 
den  under  the  polite  and  ceremonious  words.  His  op 
ponents  were  quite  as  anxious  as  he  to  avoid  extremi- 

214 


WKSLKV    MERRITT 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

ties  if  they  could;  and  so,  two  days  later,  they  again 
wrote  to  General  Jaudenes,  asking  for  the  surrender  of 
Manila.  They  pointed  out  the  hopelessness  of  his  sit 
uation  which  made  surrender  consistent  with  honor, 
the  useless  sacrifice  of  life  which  an  attack  and  bom 
bardment  would  cause,  and  expressed  the  earnest  de 
sire  to  spare  the  women  and  children  and  the  wounded 
from  all  the  perils  which  might  ensue.  The  Governor- 
General,  who,  it  is  reported,  had  been  appointed  be 
cause  Augustin  wanted  to  surrender  unconditionally, 
replied  with  a  refusal  of  the  American  demands,  and 
then  asked  for  time  to  consult  his  government.  This 
General  Merritt  and  Admiral  Dewey  very  properly  re 
fused.  Through  the  Belgian  consul  they  sent  a  mes 
sage  that  if  the  heavy  batteries  along  the  water-front 
kept  silent  they  would  not  shell  the  city,  but  Manila 
they  meant  to  have.  It  was  also  clear  that  the  Span 
iards  were  really  ready  to  surrender,  but  that  their 
honor  or  their  politics  or  something  demanded  a  fight 
and  a  show  of  force.  They  so  clung  to  shams  and  so 
shrank  from  realities  that,  although  they  meant  to  sur 
render,  they  were  determined  to  have  an  attack  made 
upon  them ;  and  the  American  general,  equally  deter 
mined  to  have  an  end  to  the  business,  ordered  an  attack 
on  August  13. 

The  ships  left  their  anchorage  at  Cavite  early  in  the 
morning.  As  they  got  under  way  and  the  Olympia 
moved  off,  the  English  band  on  the  Immortalite  struck 
up  "See,  the  Conquering  Hero  Comes,"  and  then,  as 
the  battle-flags  broke  out  on  the  fighting  fleet,  the  Eng 
lish  band  played  the  "Star-Spangled  Banner,"  and  the 
cheers  of  the  American  seamen  rang  strong  and  clear 

215 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

across  the  water.  As  the  American  ships  drew  away, 
the  English  followed  them  a  little  further  out,  arid  when 
they  came  to  their  old  anchorage  near  the  Pasig  river, 
the  French  and  Germans  got  under  way  too.  The  Ger 
man  flag-ship  steamed  down  behind  the  Concord,  so 
that  a  high  shot  from  Manila  aimed  at  the  latter  might 
easily  have  struck  her,  and  thereupon  the  Immortalite 
came  in  between  the  German  and  the  American,  and 
stopped.  The  hint  was  not  lost.  The  Germans  and 
French  remained  near  Manila,  while  the  English  and 
Japanese  were  grouped  on  the  American  side;  and  with 
this  arrangement  the  closing  act  of  the  drama  went  for 
ward. 

It  was  after  nine  o'clock  when  the  Olympia,  followed 
by  the  Petrel  and  Raleigh,  and  with  the  Callao  near  in, 
opened  on  the  Malate  forts.  For  the  first  few  minutes 
the  shots  fell  short.  Then  the  squalls  of  mist  and  rain 
passed  away,  the  range,  which  was  now  seen  to  be  er 
roneous,  was  readjusted,  and  what  General  Merritt 
called  "a  hot  and  accurate  fire  of  heavy  shells  and  rapid- 
fire  projectiles"  was  poured  upon  the  forts.  The 
Utah  battery  also  opened,  and  at  half  past  ten  the 
ships,  on  signal,  ceased  firing,  the  infantry  were  let 
loose,  and  the  skirmish-line  of  General  Greene's  brigade 
rushed  into  the  powder-magazine  fort  and  the  trenches, 
which  they  found  deserted.  Up  went  the  American 
flag,  and,  as  the  troops  went  forward,  they  were  met  by 
a  second  line  of  defence  and  a  sharp  fire.  The  Ameri 
cans  replied  with  volleys,  subduing  the  Spanish  fire, 
and  then  advanced  steadily  through  the  streets  of  Ma- 
late,  with  only  some  straggling  shots  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Paco.  Passing  through  Malate  and  then  Er- 

216 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

mita,  they  emerged  on  the  open  space  at  the  Luneta,  to 
see  the  white  flag  over  the  walled  city.  As  General 
Greene  rode  forward  under  a  heavy  fire  he  came  upon 
a  thousand  Spanish  troops — those  who  had  been  shoot 
ing  from  the  Paco  road,  but  had  now  stopped.  Detain 
ing  their  commander,  General  Greene  sent  the  Span 
ish  soldiers  into  the  walled  city,  and  then  halted  his  men 
in  such  a  position  that,  if  there  were  any  more  fighting, 
he  might  be  in  a  position  to  rush  the  gates. 

Meantime  General  MacArthur,  advancing  along  the 
Pasay  road,  had  encountered  a  sharper  resistance  and 
met  with  a  more  serious  loss ;  for  the  Spaniards  there, 
well  out  of  range  of  the  ships,  made  a  better  stand. 
After  an  artillery  engagement  which  silenced  two 
Spanish  guns  in  the  Spanish  battery,  and  hearing  the 
cheers  of  Greene's  men  on  the  left,  the  brigade  ad 
vanced  and  had  a  sharp  action  at  the  village  of  Singa- 
lon,  where  the  enemy  vigorously  defended  a  block 
house.  The  ground  was  difficult  and  the  advance  slow ; 
but  the  men  were  well  handled  and  fought  well,  so  that 
at  the  end  of  an  hour  and  a  half  the  Spanish,  yielding 
before  the  steady  pressure,  retreated ;  the  Americans 
followed,  and.  passing  through  the  Paco  district,  en 
tered  the  city. 

In  this  advance  of  the  two  brigades  upon  the  city 
General  Greene  lost  i  killed  and  6  wounded,  and  General 
MacArthur  4  killed  and  37  wounded.  What  loss  their 
opposition  suffered  does  not  appear  to  have  been  ascer 
tained  or  reported.  But  the  price  paid  was  not  a  heavy 
one  for  the  great  city  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Americans  and  which  the  Spanish  would  not  yield 
without  an  actual  attack.  It  is  obvious,  from  the  fig- 

217 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

ures,  that  the  resistance  was  neither  serious  nor  pro 
longed,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  might  have  been 
both.  The  Spanish  had  13,000  good  troops,  nearly  all 
regulars,  and  22,000  stand  of  arms.  Their  intrench- 
ments,  supported  by  block-houses  and  forts,  were  excel 
lent  and  formidable,  while  in  front  of  the  old  city  and 
on  the  Luneta  they  are  said  to  have  had  more  than  sev 
enty  heavy  modern  rifled  guns.  Here  was  abundant 
material  for  a  desperate  defence,  which,  if  made,  would 
have  cost  the  Americans  many  lives  and  the  utter  de 
struction  of  the  city. 

No  such  defence  was  attempted,  and  the  reasons  are 
obvious.  In  the  first  place,  the  Spaniards  had  been  de 
prived  of  any  hope  of  final  escape  by  the  victory  of  May 
I,  and  by  the  manner  in  which  Admiral  Dewey  firmly 
held  and  controlled  the  bay,  thus  cutting  them  off  from 
all  prospect  of  assistance.  In  the  second  place,  they 
were  well  aware  that  if  they  forced  the  final  test  the 
American  fleet,  now  strengthened  by  the  Monterey, 
would  wreck  and  destroy  the  city,  and  that  under  those 
conditions  the  American  troops  could  not  be  withstood. 
They  might  kill  many  of  their  foes,  they  would  lose 
many  themselves,  and  the  end  would  always  be  the 
same.  But  there  was  another  and  still  more  convincing 
reason  than  any  of  these.  The  long  years  of  tyranny, 
oppression,  and  torture  were  ready  at  last  to  exact  their 
compensation.  All  about  Manila  were  the  insurgent 
bands,  with  bitter  wrongs  to  avenge,  half-civilized  peo 
ple  raised  now  into  very  deadly  activity  by  the  coming 
of  the  new  conqueror,  and  watching  eagerly  for  the  op 
portunity  to  settle  certain  long  outstanding  accounts. 
These  native  people  wanted  to  kill  and  plunder.  A  de- 

218 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

termined  resistance  meant  a  bombardment  with  a  fierce 
assault  by  the  American  troops,  and  when  they  rushed 
in,  there  behind  them,  uncontrollable  in  the  confusion 
of  a  stormed  and  shattered  city,  would  come  the  insur 
gents  with  pillage,  bloodshed,  and  fire  in  their  train. 
The  Spaniards  shrank  from  such  a  prospect,  for  they 
knew  the  insurgents,  and  they  also  knew  what  they 
had  done  to  these  people  now  in  arms.  The  only  es 
cape  was  through  the  Americans,  who  would  protect 
them  and  the  city  and  curb  the  insurgents.  So  the 
white  flag  went  up  soon  after  the  naval  fire  ceased,  and 
then  Lieutenant  Brumby,  representing  the  admiral,  and 
Colonel  Whittier,  representing  the  general,  went  in  and 
held  a  conference.  General  Greene  went  in  also  at  the 
head  of  his  troops,  and  General  Merritt  came  ashore. 
They  passed  through  the  plaza,  crowded  with  Span 
ish  soldiers,  found  General  Jaudenes  in  a  chapel  of  the 
cathedral,  and  there  the  capitulation  was  signed  and  the 
city  surrendered.  The  Oregon  troops  brought  up  by 
water  from  Cavite  landed  through  the  surf  and 
marched  up  the  Luenta.  While  they  were  advancing, 
Lieutenant  Brumby  and  his  men  hauled  down  the  Span 
ish  standard  from  the  big  flag-staff  in  front  of  the  walls. 
As  the  great  banner  came  down,  the  Americans  were 
silent  and  the  crowd  looked  on  wondering,  some  of 
the  Spaniards  among  them  shedding  tears.  Then  there 
rose  in  its  place  a  flag  brought  from  the  Olympia.  Up 
it  went,  and  then  broke  out  before  the  breeze,  the  sun 
coming  through  a  rift  in  the  clouds  and  shining  bright 
upon  it.  The  marching  Oregon  troops  saw  it,  their 
cheers  rang  out,  and  their  band  sent  the  strains  of  "The 
Star-Spangled  Banner"  floating  down  the  promenade. 

219 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

The  ships  saw  it  too,  and  the  national  salute  pealed  out 
from  the  guns  of  the  Olympia.    The  emblem  of  what 
had  been  done  was  at  last  in  place.    Meantime,  the  real 
ities  were  going  on  elsewhere  in  the  surrounded  city, 
where  General  Merritt,  in  the  palace  of  a  long  line  of 
Spanish  governors,  was  taking  possession  of  the  treas 
ure  and  the  arms,  and  preparing  the  way  for  the  gov 
ernment  of  Manila.    Other  realities  were  the  entrance 
of  Greene's  and  MacArthur's  men  through  streets  lined 
with  Spanish  soldiers,  neither  sullen  nor  revengeful,  but 
glad  that  it  was  all  finished,  and  that  the  days  of  use 
less  fighting  and  of  wasted  lives  were  over.    Still  other 
realities  were  the  American  troops  posted  at  the  bridges 
and  approaches  to  the  city,  holding  back  the  insurgents, 
forbidding   their   entrance   entirely,    determined    that 
there  should  be  no  pillage,  no  slaughter,  no  burning, 
nothing  to  dim  or  sully  the  fine  record  which  had  run 
on  without  fleck  or  stain  from  the  May  day  of  the  vic 
tory.     It  was  all  very  simple.     There  was  very  little 
pomp  and  parade.    The  navy  of  the  United  States  were 
masters  of  the  great  bay.     The  soldiers  of  the  United 
States — the  highly  trained  regulars,  the  hardy  volun 
teers  from  the  States  of  the  West  and  Northwest 
where  half  a  century  ago  was  only  wilderness — held 
the  city.     Their  general  was  in  the  palace,  their  flag 
fluttered  on  the  Luenta.    That  was  all.    Yet  under  the 
simple  facts  were  many  meanings.    The  empire  which 
Magellan  had  found  for  Spain  in  the  East  had  passed 
away  forever.    Unfit  to  rule,  she  had  been  expelled  at 
last  from  the  Western  Hemisphere.    Unfit  to  rule,  the 
war  which  she  had  drawn  down  upon  her  own  head 
had  driven  her  also  from  the  East,  and  a  new  flag  and 

220 


If* 


V 

I      ., 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  MANILA 

a  new  power  in  their  onward  march  had  risen  up  in 
the  Orient.  The  youngest  of  nations  had  come  again 
to  the  edge  of  that  marvelous  region,  the  cradle  of  the 
race,  whence  the  Aryans  had  moved  westward  so  very 
long  ago. 


CHAPTER  XI 
HOW  PEACE  CAME 

MORE  fortunate  than  the  generals  and  the  troops  of 
Puerto  Rico,  Admiral  Dewey  and  General  Merritt, 
thanks  to  distance  and  a  severed  cable,  were  able  to 
complete  their  work  and  set  the  final  crown  upon  their 
labors  by  taking  Manila  before  the  order  reached  them 
to  cease  hostilities.  That  order,  when  it  came,  found 
them  masters  of  the  great  Eastern  city  they  had  fought 
to  win.  In  Puerto  Rico  the  news  stayed  Schwan's  cav 
alry  in  pursuit  of  the  Spaniards,  Brooke's  gunners  with 
the  lanyards  in  their  hands,  and  halted  the  other  col 
umns  in  their  march  over  the  island.  In  Cuba  it  saved 
Manzanillo,  just  falling  before  the  guns  of  Goodrich 
and  his  little  squadron,  and  checked  the  movements 
which  were  bringing  port  after  port  into  American  pos 
session.  It  stopped  also  the  departure  of  a  fleet  which, 
by  its  existence  and  intention,  was  a  potent  cause  of  the 
coming  of  peace.  Even  before  the  battle  of  the  3d  of 
July  the  department  at  Washington  was  making  ready 
to  send  a  fleet  consisting  of  the  Iowa,  Oregon,  Yankee, 
Yosemite,  and  Dixie,  under  Commodore  Watson  in  the 
flag-ship  Newark,  direct  to  Spain,  primarily  to  fight  the 
fleet  of  Admiral  Camara,  which  had  wandered  help 
lessly  across  the  Mediterranean  with  vague  outgivings 
about  going  to  Manila,  but  which  merely  went  through 

222 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

the  Suez  Canal,  and  then  turned  round  and  came  back 
again.  But  after  the  battle  of  July  3  the  preparations 
of  Commodore  Watson's  squadron  were  pushed  more 
energetically  than  ever,  re-enforcements  were  prepared, 
and  it  was  known  that  it  was  to  cross  the  Atlantic  in 
any  event,  and  carry  war  to  the  very  doors  of  Spain's 
coast  cities.  This  fact  was  soon  as  well  known  in  Eu 
rope  as  in  America.  Presently  it  became  clear  that 
Watson's  fleet  was  no  pretence,  but  a  very  grim  reality; 
that  it  was  nearly  in  readiness;  and  finally  that  it  was 
on  the  very  eve  of  departure.  What  American  ships 
and  seamen  could  do  had  just  been  shown  at  Manila 
and  Santiago,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
they  would  be  less  effective  on  the  Spanish  coast.  Spain 
did  not  like  the  prospect,  and  some  of  her  neighbors 
were  as  averse  as  she  to  the  sound  of  American  guns  in 
the  Mediterranean,  not  heard  in  those  waters  now  for 
nearly  a  century.  It  would  be  something  new,  some-' 
thing  which  might  disturb  concerts  and  Bunds  and  other 
excellent  arrangements,  and  must  not  be  permitted. 
It  became  clear  to  the  diplomatic  mind  that  Spain  must 
make  peace  and  make  it  at  once,  on  any  terms.  Hence 
arose  what  is  politely  called  pressure,  although  poor 
Spain  did  not  need  much  pressing.  The  war  which  she 
had  forced — no  one  knows  exactly  for  what  reason — 
for  what  she  called  her  pride  or  her  point  of  honor,  had 
resulted  in  a  series  of  rapid,  crushing,  and  unbroken 
defeats.  She  had  expected,  perhaps,  to  make  a  stand, 
to  win  a  fight,  somewhere;  but  her  whole  system,  her 
entire  body  politic,  was  rottener  than  any  one  dreamed, 
and  the  whole  fabric  went  to  pieces  like  an  egg-shell 
when  struck  by  the  hand  of  a  vigorous,  enterprising 

225 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

enemy.  Her  sea  power  was  shattered  and  entirely  gone 
in  the  Pacific  and  in  American  waters.  Manila  bay 
was  in  the  hands  of  Dewey,  and  the  surrender  of  the 
city  waited  only  for  his  demand.  Cuba  could  not  be  re 
lieved  ;  Santiago  province  was  in  American  hands,  and 
the  rest  of  the  island  would  go  the  same  way  as  fast  as 
the  United  States  could  land  troops  and  capture  ports. 
Puerto  Rico  was  half  gone,  and  the  American  columns 
were  marching  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  complete  con 
quest  of  the  island.  And  then  there  in  the  background 
was  Watson's  fleet,  very  imminent  now,  and  likely  to 
be  off  Cadiz  or  Barcelona  in  a  fortnight. 

Clearly  it  was  high  time  for  peace,  and  on  July  22 
the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio,  Minister  of  State, 
transmitted  through  M.  Cambon  a  letter  to  the  Presi 
dent,  asking  if  it  were  not  possible  to  terminate  hostili 
ties,  and  confessing  to  the  defeats  which  Spain  had  suf 
fered,  and  the  unequal  character  of  the  struggle  in 
which  she  was  engaged.  This  letter  reached  the  Presi 
dent  on  July  26,  and  four  days  later  Mr.  Day,  Secre 
tary  of  State,  made  reply.  He  said  that  the  President 
was  anxious  to  end  the  war,  and  disposed  to  deal  most 
generously  with  a  brave  adversary.  He  then  laid  down 
the  American  conditions,  which  were  absolutely  essen 
tial  by  their  preliminary  acceptance  to  any  negotiations 
for  a  peace.  These  terms  were — first,  relinquishment 
by  Spain  of  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba,  and  the 
immediate  evacuation  of  that  island ;  second — the  Pres 
ident,  in  a  spirit  of  generosity,  not  wishing  to  demand 
any  pecuniary  indemnity — the  immediate  cession  to 
the  United  States  of  Puerto  Rico,  all  other  West  Indian 
islands,  and  an  island  in  the  Ladrones  to  be  selected  by 

224 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

the  United  States ;  third,  that  the  United  States  should 
hold  and  occupy  the  city  and  bay  of  Manila  pending 
the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  should  deter 
mine  "the  control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the 
Philippines."  On  August  7  the  Duke  of  Almodovar 
del  Rio  replied,  accepting  with  many  wrords,  but  still 
accepting,  the  first  two  conditions,  and  answering  the 
third  demand  in  a  manner  which  might  be  taken  as  an 
acceptance  or  not,  but  which  was  evidently  designed  to 
open  up  discussion  and  controversy.  But  Mr.  Day  had 
had  recently  a  thorough  if  brief  schooling  in  Spanish 
diplomatic  correspondence,  and  he  had  no  idea  of  in 
volving  himself  or  his  government  in  further  debate  of 
any  kind.  Spain  was  to  accept  our  demands  or  war 
was  to  go  on.  The  day  of  words,  of  phrases,  and  of 
language  generally  had  passed  away  in  the  smoke  of 
war,  and  now,  if  war  was  to  cease,  it  was  to  be  Yes  or 
No.  So,  with  admirable  decision  and  great  cleverness 
and  ability,  Mr.  Day  decided  that  the  Spanish  note 
was  a  plain  acceptance  of  our  terms,  and  nothing  else. 
He  accordingly  wrote  to  M.  Cambon,  on  August  10, 
and  to  this  effect,  added  that  any  lack  of  explic- 
itness  in  the  Duke's  note  being  due  undoubtedly, 
to  errors  in  transmission,  or  in  the  translation  of 
the  cipher,  he  proposed  to  end  all  doubts  and  avoid 
all  misunderstandings  by  inviting  M.  Cambon  to 
sign,  on  behalf  of  Spain,  a  protocol  embodying 
in  precise  terms  the  three  demands  of  the  letter 
of  July  30,  and  three  other  articles  providing  for 
the  method  of  evacuating  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico,  for 
the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
of  peace,  and  for  the  cessation  of  hostilities  on  the  sign- 
15  225 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

ing  of  the  protocol.  No  room  any  more  for  explanations 
and  notes  and  arguments.  War  or  the  protocol,  that 
was  the  choice.  Spain  at  last  had  been  brought,  by  her 
refusal  to  admit  truth,  face  to  face  with  an  ugly  reality 
from  which  there  was  no  escape.  Shams  and  false 
hoods  and  large  language  were  of  no  use  here  before 
the  fact  which  could  not  be  hidden  any  longer,  and  she 
authorized  M.  Cambon  to  sign  the  protocol.  The  sign 
ing  took  place  at  Washington,  on  August,  12,  and  hos 
tilities  ceased. 

This  was  the  practical  end  of  active  war,  but  it  was 
only  a  truce  or  an  armistice.  The  war  was  not  ended 
or  over,  and  could  not  be  until  a  treaty  was  concluded. 
For  this  work,  under  the  provisions  of  the  protocol,  the 
President  appointed  Mr.  Day,  who  resigned  the  Secre 
taryship  of  State,  Senator  Davis  of  Minnesota,  Sena 
tor  Frye  of  Maine,  Senator  Gray  of  Delaware,  and  the 
Honorable  Whitelaw  Reid  commissioners  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace  at 
Paris.  The  Spanish  government  appointed  a  like  com 
mission,  headed  by  Don  Eugenio  Montero  Rios,  the 
president  of  the  Senate,  and  a  very  learned  and  able 
lawyer  of  high  distinction.  The  commissioners  of  both 
governments  met  in  Paris  on  October  i,  and  exchanged 
their  powers.  The  negotiations  then  began,  and  lasted 
until  December  10,  when  the  treaty  was  signed.  The 
Spaniards  struggled  hard  and  resisted  stoutly.  All  Eu 
rope  was  with  them  in  sympathy,  and  especially  France 
and  Germany.  The  Americans  were  doing  their  work 
in  a  hostile  atmosphere,  with  no  friendly  nation  near 
except  England,  and  they  did  it  in  a  way  which  added 
another  triumph  to  the  annals  of  American  diplomacy. 

226 


Jl.'LKS    CAMBON 
The  French  Ambassador  who  signed  the  peace  protocol  on  behalf  of  Spain 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

They  were  all  men  of  the  highest  distinction,  of  experi 
ence,  and  tried  ability,  and  they  not  only  met  the  Span 
ish  arguments  strongly  and  thoroughly^  but  they  con 
ducted  their  difficult  task  without  stumbling  or  error. 
There  was  a  contest  over  the  Cuban  and  other  debts, 
which  called  forth  much  discussion,  and  a  most  suc 
cessful  parrying  of  all  the  Spanish  efforts  to  secure  for 
those  debts  some  recognition  or  some  acceptance  by 
the  United  States.  There  was  also  discussion  on  some 
minor  points,  but  the  question  upon  which  the  real  con 
flict  turned,  and  which  soon  overshadowed  everything 
else,  was  the  Philippines.  Dewey's  victory  had  come 
with  the  shock  of  a  great  surprise  as  well  as  the  splen 
dor  of  a  great  glory.  No  one  had  dreamed  that  the  war 
meant  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  Orient. 
But  there  the  flag  was,  there  it  fluttered  victorious,  and 
the  stream  of  events,  so  much  more  powerful  than  hu 
man  plannings  when  they  are  the  outcome  of  world 
forces,  moved  relentlessly  on.  Dewey  must  be  sup 
ported  and  relieved.  So  a  ship  and  some  troops 
went  to  him.  Then  it  was  clear  that  they  were 
inadequate,  and  more  ships  and  more  troops  followed 
across  the  Pacific.  They  could  not  be  there  for  nothing. 
Manila  must  be  taken,  and  so  it  was  taken  before  news 
of  the  protocol  could  reach  that  distant  place  with  its 
cut  cable.  Hostilities  ceased,  and  we  held  Manila  in 
our  grasp.  No  one  would  have  consented  to  give  up 
that  city  and  its  noble  harbor — the  prize  and  pearl  of 
the  East.  But  if  we  were  to  retain  Manila,  the  scene  of 
Dewey's  victory,  which  the  American  people  would 
never  surrender,  were  we  to  hold  it  alone  and  nothing 
else,  surrounded  by  territory  in  other  hands,  with  all 

227 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

the  burdens  and  perils  which  such  a  situation  implied. 
We  must  hold  Manila,  and  if  Manila,  then  the  only  pos 
sible  thing  was  to  hold  the  island  of  Luzon  as  well. 
That  was  as  far  as  the  President  or  the  mass   of   the 
American  people  had  gone  when    the  commissioners 
sailed  for  Paris  in  September.     Some  members  of  the 
1  commission  were  utterly  opposed  to  the  retention  of 
uhe  Philippines  or  any  considerable  portion  of  any  one 
bf  them.     But  when  they  settled  down  to  work,  when 
the  inexorable  demand  for  action  came    upon    them, 
when  they  could  no  longer  speculate  upon  possibilities 
without  responsibility,  as  their  fellow-citizens  at  home 
could  do,  then  the  question  broadened  and  deepened, 
and  began  to  settle  itself  and  burn  away  all  doubts,  as 
great  questions  have  a  way  of  doing.     The  stream  of 
events  was  running  on  in  the  same  inevitable  fashion. 
Those  who  had  rejoiced  in  the  rush  of  the  current,  and 
those  who  tried  to  stem  it,  alike  went  with  it.     The 
forces  which  had  been  let  loose  by  the  Spanish  war 
were  world  forces,  and  they  presented  their  arguments 
with  the  grim  silence  and  the  unforgiving  certainty  of 
fate.     Will  you  go  away  and  leave    the    Filipinos  to 
Spain,  they  asked,  leave  them  to  a  tyranny  and  oppres 
sion  tenfold  worse  than  that  in  Cuba  which  carried  you 
into  the  war?     Clearly  impossible.     Will    you    force 
Spain  out  of  the  islands,  and  then,  having  destroyed 
the  only  government  and  the  only  sovereignty  which 
have  ever  existed  there,  will  you  depart  yourselves  and 
leave  the  islands  to  anarchy  and  bloodshed,  to  sangui 
nary  dictatorship,  and  to  the  quick  seizure  of  European 
powers  and  a  possible  world-wide  war  over  the  spoils  ? 
Again   clearly    impossible.     Again    no    thoroughfare. 

228 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

Again  a  proposition  which  no  strong,  high-spirited  peo 
ple  could  entertain.  Will  you,  then,  call  in  the  other 
powers  of  the  earth  to  help  you  settle  the  question  of 
these  islands,  determine  their  destiny,  and  establish  a 
government  for  their  people  ?  Once  more,  no.  Such  a 
solution  is  incompatible  with  decent  pride  and  honest 
self-respect,  and  could  lead  only  to  mischief  and  con 
fusion,  to  wars  and  rumors  of  wrars.  What  then  will 
you  do  ?  Is  there  aught  you  can  do  but  replace  the  sov 
ereignty  you  have  dashed  down,  and  with  your  own 
sovereignty  meet  the  responsibilities  which  have  come  to 
you  in  the  evolution  of  the  time,  and  take  yourselves 
the  islands  you  have  won?  Quite  clearly  now  the  an 
swer  comes  that  no  other  course  is  possible.  The 
American  commissioners  heard  in  all  this,  as  the  great 
master  of  music  heard  in  the  first  bars  of  his  immortal 
symphony,  "the  hand  of  fate  knocking  at  the  door." 
Some  of  them  had  always  believed  in  this  outcome, 
some  had  not,  but  all  became  absolutely  convinced  that 
there  was  but  one  road  possible,  and  so  they  demanded 
all  the  Philippines  from  Spain,  and  made  the  demand 
an  ultimatum.  The  Spaniards  struggled  hard.  They 
disputed  our  right  to  make  the  demand  under  the  terms 
of  the  protocol ;  they  argued  and  resisted ;  they  threat 
ened  to  break  off  the  negotiations;  and  then  they 
yielded,  because  they  could  do  nothing  else.  This  done, 
the  treaty  was  soon  made,  and  it  was  an  admirable  in 
strument,  a  masterpiece  in  every  respect.  No  loop-hole 
was  left  for  any  claim  for  debts  or  aught  else ;  no  wrords 
could  be  found  which  could  be  strained  to  bind  the 
United  States  in  any  way  in  the  future.  The  Ameri- 


229 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

can  commissioners  came  home  with  a  triumphant 
treaty,  a  very  fit  result  of  an  entirely  victorious  war. 

Much  dispute  and  opposition  have  arisen  among  peo 
ple  successful  in  war  in  times  past,  and  will  rise  again, 
over  treaties  of  peace,  but  such  opposition  has  always 
proceeded  on  the  ground  that  the  victor  nation  received 
too  little.  The  treaty  of  the  United  States  with  Spain, 
signed  in  Paris  on  December  10,  1898,  has  the  unique 
distinction  of  having  excited  opposition  and  attack 
among  the  victors  because  it  secured  too  much  and  was 
too  triumphant.  An  organization  called  by  the  strange 
name  of  the  Anti-Imperialist  League  was  formed  in  the 
Eastern  States.  Some  men  who  had  once  been  emi 
nent  in  politics  gave  their  names  to  its  support,  and  oth 
ers  who  felt  that  they  ought  to  be  eminent  in  politics 
gave  it  their  services.  A  vigorous  crusade  was  begun, 
but  the  popular  response  in  the  way  of  the  easily  signed 
petition  was  surprisingly  small  for  the  good  sense  of 
the  American  people  made  two  points  clear  to  them. 
One  was  that  a  peace  treaty  ought  to  be  ratified,  the 
other  that  they  had  won  these  new  possessions,  and 
had  no  doubt  that  they  could  trust  themselves  to  deal 
with  them  honestly,  ably,  and  for  their  own  truest  and 
best  interests,  as  well  as  for  those  of  the  people  of  all 
the  islands.  A  failure  in  the  field  of  popular  discussion 
before  the  people  and  in  the  newspapers,  the  fight 
against  the  treaty  was  transferred  to  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States. 

The  constitutional  provision  which  requires  a  vote 
of  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  to  ratify  a  treaty  simpli 
fies  the  work  of  opposition  to  ratification.  It  seemed 
incredible  at  first  that  a  treaty  of  peace  could  possibly 

230 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

be  defeated.     Party  lines  were  not  drawn  on  tEe  ques 
tion,  and  it  was  at  first  supposed  that  resistance  to  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  would  be  confined  to  a  very 
few  Senators,  who  had  been  opposed  to  the  movement 
in  favor  of  the  Cubans,  as  well  as  to  the  entrance  into 
war,   and  \vere  now  consistently  opposed   to   its   re 
sults.     But  as  time  went  on  the  necessities  of  factions 
in  the  Democratic  party  developed  an  opposition  which 
included  a  majority  of  the  Democratic  Senators,  and 
this  made  the  minority  formidably  large — nearly  one- 
third  of  the  Senate,  if  not  in  excess  of  it.    It  is  not  need 
ful  to  trace  in  detail  the  course  of    the   debate,  which 
from  the  side  of  opposition  proceeded  on  three  lines — 
lack  of  constitutional  power  to  acquire  and  hold  the 
Philippines,  the  violation  of  the  principles  of  the  Dec 
laration  of  Independence  involved    in    doing  so,  and 
sympathy  and  admiration  for  the  Filipinos,  feelings  as 
profound  as  they  were  rapid  in  growth.    The  friends  of 
ratification  took  the  very  simple  ground  that  the  treaty 
committed  the  United  States  to  no  policy,  but  left  them 
free  to  do  exactly  as  seemed  best  with  all  the  islands, 
that  the  American  people  could  be  safely  intrusted  with 
this  grave  responsibility,  and  that  patriotism  and  com 
mon-sense  alike  demanded  the  end  of  war  and  the  re- 
establishment  of  peace,  which  could  only  be  effected  by 
the  adoption  of  the  treaty.     The  contest  was  earnest 
and  bitter,  the  canvass  energetic  to  a  degree  never  seen 
in  the  Senate,  and  the  result  close.     When  the  Senate 
went  into  executive  session  on  Monday,  February  6, 
with  the  time  for  the  vote  fixed  for  three  o'clock,  the 
treaty  had  only  58  sure  votes,  60  being  needed  for  rati 
fication;  the  opposition  had  29  sure  votes,  and  the  re- 

231 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

maining  3  were  doubtful.  At  half  past  two  one  of  the 
doubtful  voters  was  declared  to  be  for  the  treaty,  mak 
ing  59-  Just  before  three  o'clock  another  vote  was 
promised,  and  the  third  doubtful  vote  was  given  to  the 
treaty  after  the  roll  had  been  called.  The  final  vote 
stood  57  to  27 — including  the  pairs,  61  to  29,  just  two- 
thirds  and  one  vote  to  spare.  It  had  been  a  heated 
struggle.  Opinion  as  to  the  outcome  had  fluctuated, 
even  among  those  best  informed,  down  to  the  last  mo 
ment.  Yet  as  one  looks  back  when  all  is  done,  it 
seems  clear  that  no  other  result  was  possible.  The  re 
sponsibility  which  had  come  to  the  American  people 
with  the  flash  of  Dewey's  guns  on  May  i  could  not  be 
avoided,  and  the  American  people  were  too  strong,  too 
high-spirited,  too  confident,  to  run  away  from  it.  The 
hand  of  fate  was  knocking  at  the  door  of  the  Senate  as 
it  had  knocked  at  the  door  of  the  American  commis 
sioners  in  Paris.  To  that  knock  all  doors  fly  open, 
and  to  the  stern  visitant  without  but  one  answer  could 
be  given. 

Nothing  remained  after  the  end  of  the  conflict  in  the 
Senate  but  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  which  took 
place  on  April  n,  1899,  and  so  the  war  ended.  Its 
causes  lie  far  back  in  the  history  and  character  of  na 
tions.  Its  immediate  results  were  as  striking  as  they 
were  important  and  full  of  meaning.  What  the  more 
distant  outcome  of  these  results  will  be  in  the  future 
years  no  man  can  tell.  We  can  only  say  with  certainty 
that  they  will  be  far  reaching  and  momentous.  The 
war  was  brief,  but  it  served  to  let  loose  forces  which 
had  long  been  gathering  strength,  and  to  complete 
movements  which  had  been  going  on  for  centuries.  For 

232 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

three  hundred  years  the  conflict  between  the  English- 
speaking  people  on  the  one  side,  and  the  French  and 
Spanish  on  the  other,  for  the  control  of  the  New  World, 
had  been  in  progress.  France  went  down  in  1760,  the 
last  vestige  of  Spanish  power  was  swept  away  by  the 
war  of  1898.  The  result  was  inevitable,  and  the  Eng 
lish-speaking  people  owned  at  last  one-half  of  the  New 
World,  and  had  shut  out  Europe  from  all  control  in 
the  other  half  or  in  the  great  islands  of  the  West 
Indies.* 

Thus  were  the  immediate  object  and  purpose  of  the 
war  achieved  in  fulfilment  of  the  irresponsible  conflict 
of  centuries  between  races,  systems,  and  beliefs  inher 
ently  antagonistic.  But  war  is  a  fire,  and  when  it  be 
gins  no  one  can  tell  where  it  will  stop  or  what  it  will 
burn  away.  The  only  thing  we  can  be  quite  sure  of  is 
that  war,  once  entered  upon,  cannot  be  limited,  and 
may  produce  results  of  which  no  man  dreamed  at  the 
outset.  This  war,  merely  as  such,  was  not  only  short, 
but  was  far  from  being  a  large  or  extensive  one.  Yet 
it  suddenly  made  clear  many  things  not  realized  before, 
and  brought  forth  unimagined  results.  For  thirty 
years  the  people  of  the  United  States  had  been  binding 
up  the  wounds  and  trying  to  efface  the  scars  of  their 
great  and  terrible  Civil  War.  They  knew  that  they  had 
done  much,  they  felt  that  the  old  passions  had  softened 
and  were  dying.  The  war  came,  and  in  the  twinkling 
of  an  eye,  in  a  flash  of  burning,  living  light,  they  sud 
denly  saw  that  the  long  task  was  done,  that  the  land 
was  really  one  again  without  rent  or  seam,  and  men 

*The  remaining  Danish,  Dutch,  and  French  possessions  are  too 
small  to  constitute  an  exception  to  the  general  proposition. 

233 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

rejoiced  mightily  in  their  hearts  with  this  knowledge 
which  the  new  war  had  brought. 

For  thirty  years  the  people  of  the  United  States  had 
been  absorbed  in  the  development  of  their  great  her 
itage.  They  had  been  finishing  the  conquest  of  their 
continent,  and  binding  all  parts  of  it  together  with  the 
tracks  and  highways  of  commerce.  Once  this  work 
was  complete,  it  was  certain  that  the  virile,  ambitious, 
enterprising  race  which  had  done  it  would  look  abroad 
beyond  their  boundaries  and  seek  to  guard  and  extend 
their  interests  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  The  work 
was  done,  but  they  did  not  realize  it.  Even  the  Venezu 
ela  intervention,  a  pure  manifestation  of  the  new  spirit 
and  the  new  time,  did  not  make  it  clear  to  them.  Then 
the  war  note  rang  through  the  land,  and  with  dazzled 
eyes  at  first,  and  then  with  ever  clearer  and  steadier 
gaze,  they  saw  that  in  the  years  of  isolation  and  self- 
absorption  they  had  built  up  a  great  world  power,  that 
they  must  return  to  the  ocean  which  they  had  tem 
porarily  abandoned,  and  have  their  share  in  the  trade  of 
every  country  and  the  commerce  of  every  sea.  Suddenly 
came  the  awakening  to  the  great  fact  that  they  had 
founded  an  empire  on  their  Western  coasts,  that  they 
held  one  side  of  the  Pacific,  and  could  not  longer  be  in 
different  to  the  fate  of  the  other  side  in  the  remote  East. 
Now  they  read  with  instructed  vision  the  prophecy  of 
Seward,  which  foretold  that  the  future  course  of  trade 
and  empire  would  lie  in  the  Pacific.  They  knew  at  last 
that  the  stream  of  Eastern  trade,  which  for  centuries 
had  flowed  to  the  West,  building  up  great  cities  and  en 
riching  nations  as  it  passed  from  Byzantium  to  Venice, 
from  Venice  to  Portugal,  and  from  Portugal  to  Hol- 

234 


HOW  PEACE  CAME 

land  and  to  London,  was  now  to  be  divided,  and  in  part, 
at  least,  to  pour  eastward  over  the  Pacific.  Now  men 
saw  that  the  long  connection,  ever  growing  closer,  with 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  had  not  been  chance;  that  the 
culmination  of  the  annexation  movement  in  the  very 
year  of  the  Spanish  War  was  not  accident,  but  that  it 
all  came  from  the  instinct  of  the  race,  which  paused  in 
California  only  to  learn  that  its  course  was  still  west 
ward,  and  that  Americans,  and  no  one  else,  must  be 
masters  of  the  cross-roads  of  the  Pacific. 

But  while  the  United  States  had  moved  so  slowly  for 
half  a  century  toward  Hawaii,  the  work  of  one  May 
morning  carried  them  on  to  the  Philippines  and  made 
them  an  Eastern  power.  Whatever  the  final  disposition 
of  the  islands,  whether  we  hold  and  govern  much  or 
little,  our  flag  is  there,  our  footing  has  been  made,  and 
in  the  East  we  shall  remain,  because  we  are  entitled  to, 
and  will  surely  have,  our  share  of  the  great  commerce 
with  the  millions  of  China,  from  whom  we  shall  refuse 
to  be  shut  out. 

One  other  great  result  of  the  war,  like  the  last  a 
world  result.  We  found  in  the  trial  of  war  who  were 
our  enemies  in  Europe,  and  we  saw  that  they  were 
many.  We  also  found  who  our  friend  was,  not  as  a 
matter  of  sentiment  or  community  of  speech  and 
thought,  but  on  the  firm  and  solid  ground  of  common 
interests.  In  the  brief  crash  of  the  short-lived  Spanish 
war  the  English-speaking  people  came  together.  In  the 
light  of  those  eager,  hurrying  days  we  saw  that  the 
English  fleets  made  any  attack  on  Dewey,  even  by  com 
bined  Europe,  impossible;  and  England  saw  that  so 
long  as  the  United  States  was  her  friend  her  base  on  the 

235 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Atlantic  was  secure,  her  food-supply  safe,  and  that  all 
Europe  in  arms  could  not  harm  her.  Very  plain  also 
did  it  become  to  all  men  that  in  the  East,  where  Eng 
land  had  been  so  long,  and  where  we  had  just  entered, 
the  interests  of  both  nations  were  identical  in  preserv 
ing  China  for  equal  trade  to  all. 

All  these  things  the  war  made  clear  and  certain. 
What  these  new  conditions  may  come  to  mean  in  the 
future  no  one  now  can  safely  say.  But  if  that  future 
is  to  bring  the  struggle  which  many  men  peering  into 
the  darkness  foresee — a  conflict  between  the  Slav  and 
so  much  of  Europe  as  he  can  drag  with  him  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  English-speaking  man  on  the  other;  be 
tween  the  military  socialism  of  Russia  and  Germany 
and  the  individualism  and  freedom  of  the  United  States 
and  England;  between  the  power  of  the  land  and  the 
sea  power — then  the  future  historian  will  date  the  open 
ing  of  this  new  epoch  and  of  this  mighty  conflict,  at 
once  economic  and  social,  military  and  naval,  from  the 
war  of  1898,  which  in  three  months  overthrew  the  em 
pire  of  Spain  in  the  Antilles  and  the  Philippines. 


APPENDIX  A 

RESOLUTIONS   OF    CONGRESS   DEMANDING   WITHDRAWAL 
OF    SPAIN    FROM    CUBA 

Joint  resolution  for  the  recognition  of  the  independ 
ence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the  Gov 
ernment  of  Spain  relinquish  its  authority  and  govern 
ment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  to  withdraw  its  land 
and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  di 
recting  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  carry 
these  resolutions  into  effect. 

Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  ex 
isted  for  more  than  three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so 
near  our  own  borders,  have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace 
to  Christian  civilization,  culminating  as  they  have,  in 
the  destruction  of  a  United  States  battle  ship,  with  two 
hundred  and  sixty-six  of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on 
a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  can  not 
longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to  Congress 
of  April  eleventh,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 
upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited :  There 
fore, 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

237 


APPENDIX 

First.  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and 
of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to 
demand,  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does 
hereby  demand,  that  the  Government  of  Spain  at  once 
relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island 
of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from 
Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be, 
and  he  hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the 
entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the 
militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims 
any  disposition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  ju 
risdiction,  or  control  over  said  island  except  for  the 
pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when 
that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  con 
trol  of  the  island  to  its  people. 

Approved,  April  20,  1898. 

DECLARATION    OF    WAR. 

CHAP.  189. — An  Act  Declaring  that  war  exists  be 
tween  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom 
of  Spain. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Represent 
atives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress 
assembled,  First.  That  war  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby, 
declared  to  exist,  and  that  war  has  existed  since  the 
twenty-first  day  of  April,  anno  Domini  eighteen  hun- 

238 


APPENDIX 

dred  and  ninety-eight,  including  said  day,  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 

Second.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States 
be,  and  he  hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the 
entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the 
militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
necessary  to  carry  this  act  into  effect. 

Approved,  April  25,  1898. 


APPENDIX  B 

PROCLAMATION    OF    THE    PRESIDENT 

By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America: 

A    PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas,  by  a  joint  resolution  passed  by  the  Con 
gress  and  approved  April  20,  1898,  and  communicated 
to  the  Government  of  Spain,  it  was  demanded  that  said 
Government  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  gov 
ernment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land 
and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters;  and 
the  President  of  the  United  States  was  directed  and 
empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  States  to 
such  extent  as  might  be  necessary  to  carry  said  resolu 
tion  into  effect ;  and 

Whereas,  in  carrying  into  effect  said  resolution,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  deems  it  necessary  to 
set  on  foot  and  maintain  a  blockade  of  the  north  coast 
of  Cuba,  including  all  ports  on  said  coast  between  Car 
denas  and  Bahia  Honda  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos 
on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of 
the  United  States,  in  order  to  enforce  the  said  resolu 
tion,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that  the  United 

240 


APPENDIX 

States  of  America  have  instituted,  and  will  maintain  a 
blockade  of  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  including  ports 
on  said  coast  between  Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda  and 
the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba, 
aforesaid,  in  pursuance  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
and  the  law  of  nations  applicable  to  such  cases.  An 
efficient  force  will  be  posted  so  as  to  prevent  the  en 
trance  and  exit  of  vessels  from  the  ports  aforesaid.  Any 
neutral  vessel  approaching  any  of  said  ports,  or  at 
tempting  to  leave  the  same,  without  notice  or  knowl 
edge  of  the  establishment 'of  such  blockade,  will  be  duly 
warned  by  the  commander  of  the  blockading  forces, 
who  will  endorse  on  her  register  the  fact,  and  the  date, 
of  such  warning,  where  such  endorsement  was  made; 
and  if  the  same  vessel  shall  again  attempt  to  enter  any 
blockaded  port,  she  will  be  captured  and  sent  to  the 
nearest  convenient  port  for  such  proceeding  against  her 
and  her  cargo  as  prize,  as  may  be  deemed  advisable. 

Neutral  vessels  lying  in  any  of  said  ports  at  the  time 
of  the  establishment  of  such  blockade  will  be  allowed 
thirty  days  to  issue  therefrom. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
and  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be 
affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  22d  day  of 
April,  A.  D.  1898,  and  of  the  Independence 

[SEAL]     of  the  United  States,  the  one  hundred  and 

twenty-second. 

WILLIAM    McKiNLEY. 
By  the  President : 
JOHN  SHERMAN, 

Secretary  of  State. 
16  241 


APPENDIX 

'[No.  5.] 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States, 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  was  ap 
proved  on  the  twentieth  day  of  April,  1898,  entitled 
"Joint  Resolution  For  the  recognition  of  the  independ- 
"ence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the  Gov- 
"ernment  of  Spain  relinquish  its  authority  and  govern- 
"ment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  to  withdraw  its  land 
"and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and 
"directing  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the 
"land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  carry 
"these  resolutions  into  effect,"  and 

Whereas,  by  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  "An  Act  to 
"provide  for  temporarily  Increasing  the  Military  Es 
tablishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war  and 
"for  other  purposes,"  approved  April  22,  1898;  the 
President  is  authorized,  in  order  to  raise  a  volunteer 
army,  to  issue  his  proclamation  calling  for  volunteers  to 
serve  in  the  army  of  the  United  States. 

Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of 
the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me 
by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  and  deeming  sufficient 
occasion  to  exist,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  and 
hereby  do  call  forth,  volunteers  to  the  aggregate  num 
ber  of  125,000,  in  order  to  carry  into  effect  the  purpose 
of  the  said  Resolution ;  the  same  to  be  apportioned,  as 
far  as  practicable,  among  the  several  States  and  Ter 
ritories  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  according  to  pop- 

242 


APPENDIX 

ulation,  and  to  serve  for  two  years,  unless  sooner  dis 
charged.  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immedi 
ately  communicated  to  the  proper  authorities  through 
the  War  Department. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 
caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 
Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  twenty-third 
day  of  April,  A.  D.,  1898,  and  of  the  Inde- 
[SEAL]     pendence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-second. 

WILLIAM    McKiNLEY. 
By  the  President : 
JOHN  SHERMAN, 

Secretary  of  State. 


[No.  6.] 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas  by  an  Act  of  Congress  approved  April  25, 
1898,  it  is  declared  that  war  exists  and  that  war  has 
existed  since  the  2ist  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1898,  includ 
ing  said  day,  between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Kingdom  of  Spain;  and 

Whereas,  it  being  desirable  that  such  war  should  be 
conducted  upon  principles  in  harmony  with  the  present 
views  of  nations  and  sanctioned  by  their  recent  prac 
tice,  it  has  already  been  announced  that  the  policy  of 
this  Government  will  be  not  to  resort  to  privateering, 
but  to  adhere  to  the  rules  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris ; 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of 
243 


APPENDIX 

the  United  States  of  America,  by  virtue  of  the  power 
vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  do  here 
by  declare  and  proclaim : 

1.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the 
exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

2.  Neutral  goods,  not  contraband  of  war,  are  not 
liable  to  confiscation  under  the  enemy's  flag. 

3.  Blockades  in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  effec 
tive. 

4.  Spanish  merchant  vessels,  in  any  ports  or  places 
within  the  United  States,  shall  be  allowed  till  May 
21,  1898,  inclusive,  for  loading  their  cargoes  and  de 
parting  from  such  ports  or  places;  and  such  Spanish 
merchant  vessels,  if  met  at  sea  by  any  United  States 
ship,  shall  be  permitted  to  continue  their  voyage,  if,  on 
examination  of  their  papers,  it  shall  appear  that  their 
cargoes  were  taken  on  board  before  the  expiration  of 
the  above  term;    Provided,  that  nothing  herein  con 
tained  shall  apply  to  Spanish  vessels  having  on  board 
any  officer  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  enemy, 
or  any  coal  (except  such  as  may  be  necessary  for  their 
voyage),  or  any  other  article  prohibited  or  contraband 
of  war,  or  any  despatch  of  or  to  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment. 

5.  Any  Spanish  merchant  vessel  which,  prior  to 
April  21,  1898,  shall  have  sailed  from  any  foreign  port 
bound  for  any  port  or  place  in  the  United  States,  shall 
be  permitted  to  enter  such  port  or  place,  and  to  dis 
charge  her  cargo,  and  afterward  forthwith  to  depart 
without  molestation ;  and  any  such  vessel,  if  met  at  sea 
by  any  United  States  ship,  shall  be  permitted  to  con 
tinue  her  voyage  to  any  port  not  blockaded. 

244 


APPENDIX 

6.  The  right  of  search  is  to  be  exercised  with  strict 
regard  for  the  rights  of  neutrals,  and  the  voyages  of 
mail  steamers  are  not  to  be  interfered  with  except  on 
the  clearest  grounds  of  suspicion  of  a  violation  of  law 
in  respect  of  contraband  or  blockade. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 
caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  on  the  twTenty-sixth 

day  of  April,  in  the  year  of  ,our  Lord  one 

thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 

[SEAL]     and   of   the   Independence  of   the   United 

States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second. 

WILLIAM   MCKINLEY. 
By  the  President : 

ALVEY  A.  ADEE, 

Acting  Secretary  of  State. 


By  the  President  of  the  United  States, 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas  an  Act  of  Congress  was  approved  on  the 
twenty-fifth  day  of  April,  1898,  entitled  "An  Act  De 
claring  that  war  exists  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain,"  and 

Whereas,  by  an  Act  of  Congress  entitled  "An  Act  to 
provide  for  temporarily  increasing  the  Military  Estab 
lishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war  and  for 
other  purposes,"  approved  April  22,  1898;  the  Presi 
dent  is  authorized,  in  order  to  raise  a  volunteer  army, 
to  issue  his  proclamation  calling  for  volunteers  to  serve 
in  the  army  of  the  United  States. 

245 


APPENDIX 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of 
the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me 
by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  and  deeming  sufficient 
occasion  to  exist,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  and 
hereby  do  call  forth,  volunteers  to  the  aggregate  num 
ber  of  75,000  in  addition  to  the  volunteers  called  forth 
by  my  proclamation  of  the  twenty-third  of  April,  in  the 
present  year ;  the  same  to  be  apportioned,  as  far  as  prac 
ticable,  among  the  several  States  and  Territories  and 
the  District  of  Columbia,  according  to  population,  and 
to  serve  for  two  years,  unless  sooner  discharged.  The 
proportion  of  each  arm  and  the  details  of  enlistment 
and  organization  will  be  made  known  through  the  War 
Department. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 

caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  twenty-fifth 

day  of  May,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 

thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 

[SEAL]     and  of  the   Independence  of  the  United 

States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second. 

WILLIAM   MCKINLEY. 
By  the  President : 

WILLIAM  R.  DAY, 

Secretary  of  State. 


By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  my  Proclama 
tion  of  April  22,  1898,  a  blockade  of  the  ports  on  the 

246 


APPENDIX 

northern  coast  of  Cuba,  from  Cardenas  to  Bahia 
Honda,  inclusive,  and  of  the  port  of  Cienfuegos,  on  the 
south  coast  of  Cuba,  was  declared  to  have  been  insti 
tuted  ;  and 

Whereas,  it  has  become  desirable  to  extend  the 
blockade  to  other  Spanish  ports : 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of 
the  United  States,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that, 
in  addition  to  the  blockade  of  the  ports  specified  in  my 
Proclamation  of  April  22,  1898,  the  United  States  of 
America  has  instituted  and  will  maintain  an  effective 
blockade  of  all  the  ports  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba, 
from  Cape  Frances  to  Cape  Cruz,  inclusive,  and  also  of 
the  port  of  San  Juan,  in  the  island  of  Porto  Rico. 

Neutral  vessels  lying  in  any  of  the  ports  to  which  the 
blockade  is  by  the  present  Proclamation  extended,  will 
be  allowed  thirty  days  to  issue  therefrom,  with  cargo. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand, 
and  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  twenty-seventh 
day  of  June,  A.  D.,  1898,  and  of  the  Inde- 

[SEAL]     pendence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-second. 

WILLIAM    MCKINLEY. 
By  the  President : 
J.  B.  MOORE, 

Acting  Secretary  of  State. 


APPENDIX  C 

PEACE  PROTOCOL  OF  AUGUST   12,   1898,  AND  CORRES 
PONDENCE. 

MESSAGE 

OF  THE 

GOVERNMENT  OF  H.  M.  THE  QUEEN  REGENT  OF 
SPAIN,  SUBMITTED  BY  H.  Exc.  MR.  J.  CAMBON, 
AMBASSADOR  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC,  TO  WIL 
LIAM  McKiNLEY,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

MADRID,  July  22,  1898. 
MR.  PRESIDENT: 

Since  three  months  the  American  people  and  the 
Spanish  nation  are  at  war  because  Spain  did  not  con 
sent  to  grant  independence  to  Cuba  and  to  withdraw 
her  troops  therefrom. 

Spain  faced  with  resignation  such  uneven  strife,  and 
only  endeavored  to  defend  her  possessions  with  no 
other  hope  than  to  oppose,  in  the  measure  of  her 
strength,  the  undertaking  of  the  United  States,  and  to 
protect  her  honor. 

Neither  the  trials  which  adversity  has  made  us  en 
dure  nor  the  realization  that  but  faint  hope  is  left  us 
could  deter  us  from  struggling  till  the  exhaustion  of 
our  very  last  resources.  This  stout  purpose,  however, 

248 


APPENDIX 

does  not  blind  us,  and  we  are  fully  aware  of  the  re 
sponsibilities  which  would  weigh  upon  both  nations  in 
the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world  were  this  war  to  be  con 
tinued. 

This  war  not  only  inflicts  upon  the  two  peoples  who 
wage  it  the  hardships  inseparable  from  all  armed  con 
flict,  but  also  dooms  to  useless  suffering  and  unjust  sac 
rifices  the  inhabitants  of  a  territory  to  which  Spain  is 
bound  by  secular  ties  that  can  be  forgotten  by  no  nation 
either  of  the  old  or  of  the  new  world. 

To  end  calamities  already  so  great  and  to  avert  evils 
still  greater,  our  countries  might  naturally  endeavor  to 
find  upon  which  conditions  the  present  struggle  could 
be  determined  otherwise  than  by  force  of  arms. 

Spain  believes  this  understanding  possible,  and 
hopes  that  this  view  is  also  harbored  by  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  All  true  friends  of  both 
nations  share  no  doubt  the  same  hopes. 

Spain  wishes  to  show  again  that  in  this  war,  as  well 
as  in  the  one  she  carried  on  against  the  Cuban  insur 
gents,  she  had  but  one  object :  the  vindication  of  her 
prestige,  her  honor,  her  name.  During  the  war  of  in 
surrection  it  was  her  desire  to  spare  the  great  island 
from  the  'dangers  of  premature  independence;  in  the 
present  war  she  has  been  actuated  by  sentiments  in 
spired  rather  by  ties  of  blood  than  by  her  interests  and 
by  the  rights  belonging  to  her  as  mother  country. 

Spain  is  prepared  to  spare  Cuba  from  the  continua 
tion  of  the  horrors  of  war  if  the  United  States  are,  on 
their  part,  likewise  disposed. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Ameri 
can  people  may  now  learn  from  this  message  the 

249 


APPENDIX 

true  thought,  desire,  and  intention  of  the  Spanish  na 
tion. 

And  so  do  we  wish  to  learn  from  the  President  of 
the  United  States  upon  which  basis  might  be  estab 
lished  a  political  status  in  Cuba  and  might  be  termi 
nated  a  strife  which  would  continue  without  reason 
should  both  Governments  agree  upon  the  means  of  paci 
fying  the  island. 

In  the  name  of  the  Government  of  H.  M.  the  Queen 
Regent  I  have  the  honor  to  address  this  message  to 
your  excellency,  with  the  expression  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

Due  D'ALMODOVAR  DEL  RIO, 

Ministre  d'Etat. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

WASHINGTON,  fitly  jo,  1898. 
EXCELLENCY  : 

The  President  received  on  the  afternoon  of  Tues 
day,  the  26th  instant,  from  the  hand  of  his  excellency 
the  Ambassador  of  France,  representing  for  this  pur 
pose  the  Government  of  Spain,  the  message  signed  by 
your  excellency  as  minister  of  state  in  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent  of 
Spain,  and  dated  the  22d  instant,  as  to  the  possibility 
of  terminating  the  war  now  existing  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain. 

The  President  received  with  satisfaction  the  sugges 
tion  that  the  two  countries  might  mutually  endeavor  to 
ascertain  the  conditions  on  which  the  pending  strug 
gle  may  be  brought  to  an  end,  as  well  as  the  expres- 

250 


APPENDIX 

sion  of  Spain's  belief  that  an  understanding  on  the  sub 
ject  is  possible. 

During  the  protracted  negotiations  that  preceded  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  the  President  earnestly  labored 
to  avert  a  conflict,  in  the  hope  that  Spain,  in  considera 
tion  of  her  own  interests,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Span 
ish  Antilles  and  the  United  States,  would  find  a  way 
of  removing  the  conditions  which  had,  for  half  a  cen 
tury,  constantly  disturbed  the  peace  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  on  numerous  occasions  brought  the 
two  nations  to  the  verge  of  war. 

The  President  witnessed  with  profound  disappoint 
ment  the  frustration  of  his  peaceful  'efforts  by  events 
which  forced  upon  the  people  of  the  United  States  the 
unalterable  conviction  that  nothing  short  of  the  re- 
linquishment  by  Spain  of  a  claim  of  sovereignty  over 
Cuba  which  she  was  unable  to  enforce  would  relieve  a 
situation  that  had  become  unendurable. 

For  years  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  out 
of  regard  for  the  susceptibilities  of  Spain,  had  by  the 
exercise  of  its  power  and  the  expenditure  of  its  treasure 
preserved  the  obligations  of  neutrality.  But  a  point 
was  at  length  reached  at  which,  as  Spain  had  often  been 
forewarned,  this  attitude  could  no  longer  be  maintained. 
The  spectacle  at  our  very  doors  of  a  fertile  terri 
tory  wasted  by  fire  and  sword,  and  given  over  to  deso 
lation  and  famine,  was  one  to  which  our  people  could 
not  be  indifferent.  Yielding,  therefore,  to  the  demands 
of  humanity,  they  determined  to  remove  the  causes  in 
the  effects  of  which  they  had  become  so  deeply  involved. 

To  this  end  the  President,  with  the  authority  of  Con 
gress,  presented  to  Spain  a  demand  for  the  withdrawal 

251 


APPENDIX 

of  her  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba,  in  order  that 
the  people  of  the  island  might  be  enabled  to>  form  a 
government  of  their  own.  To  this  demand  Spain  re 
plied  by  severing  diplomatic  relations  with  the  United 
States,  and  by  declaring  that  she  considered  the  action 
of  this  Government  as  creating  a  state  of  war  between 
the  two  countries. 

The  President  could  not  but  feel  sincere  regret  that 
the  local  question  as  to  the  peace  and  good  government 
of  Cuba  should  thus  have  been  transformed  and  en 
larged  into  a  general  conflict  of  arms  between  two  great 
peoples.  Nevertheless,  having  accepted  the  issue  with 
all  the  hazards  which  it  involved,  he  has,  in  the  exercise 
of  his  duty,  and  of  the  rights  which  the  state  of  war 
confers,  prosecuted  hostilities  by  land  and  sea,  in  order 
to  secure  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  an  honorable 
peace.  In  so  doing  he  has  been  compelled  to  avail 
himself  unsparingly  of  the  lives  and  fortunes  'which  his 
countrymen  have  placed  at  his  command;  and  untold 
burdens  and  sacrifices,  far  transcending  any  material 
estimation,  have  been  imposed  upon  them. 

That  as  the  result  of  the  patriotic  exertions  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  the  strife  has,  as  your  ex 
cellency  observes,  proved  unequal,  inclines  the  Presi 
dent  to  offer  a  brave*  adversary  generous  terms  of 
peace. 

The  President  therefore  responding  to  your  excel 
lency's  request,  will  state  the  terms  of  peace  which  will 
be  accepted  by  him  at  the  present  time,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  hereafter. 

Your  excellency  in  discussing  the  question  of  Cuba 
intimates  that  Spain  has  desired  to  spare  the  island  the 

252 


APPENDIX 

dangers  of  premature  independence.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  not  shared  the  apprehensions 
of  Spain  in  this  regard,  but  it  recognizes  the  fact  that 
in  the  distracted  and  prostrate  condition  of  the  island, 
aid  and  guidance  will  be  necessary,  and  these  it  is  pre 
pared  to  give. 

The  United  States  will  require: 

First.  The  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  all  claim  of 
sovereignty  over  or  title  to  Cuba  and  her  immediate 
evacuation  of  the  island. 

Second.  The  President,  desirous  of  exhibiting  sig 
nal  generosity,  will  not  now  put  forward  any  demand 
for  pecuniary  indemnity.  Nevertheless  he  cannot  be 
insensible  to  the  losses  and  expenses  of  the  United 
States  incident  to  the  war  or  to  the  claims  of  our  citi 
zens  for  injuries  to  their  persons  and  property  during 
the  late  insurrection  in  Cuba.  He  must,  therefore,  re 
quire  the  cession  to  the  United  States  and  the  imme 
diate  evacuation  by  Spain  of  the  island  of  Porto  Rico 
and  other  islands  now  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  also  the  cession  of  an  is 
land  in  the  Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the  United 
States. 

Third.  On  similar  grounds  the  United  States  is  en 
titled  to  occupy  and  will  hold  the  city,  bay,  and  harbor 
of  Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
which  shall  determine  the  control,  disposition,  and 
government  of  the  Philippines. 

If  the  terms  hereby  offered  are  accepted  in  their  en 
tirety  commissioners  will  be  named  by  the  United 
States  to  meet  similarly  authorized  commissioners  on 
the  part  of  Spain  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  de- 

253 


APPENDIX 

tails  of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  signing  and  delivering 
it  under  the  terms  above  indicated. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  occasion  to  offer  to  your  excel 
lency  the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

WILLIAM  R.  DAY. 

His  Excellency  the  DUKE  OF  ALMODOVAR  DEL  Rio, 

Minister  of  State,  etc. 


MESSAGE  OF  His  EXCELLENCY  THE  DUKE  OF  ALMO 
DOVAR  DEL  Rio,  MINISTER  OF  STATE  OF  SPAIN,  SUB 
MITTED  BY  His  EXCELLENCY  MR.  J.  CAMBON,  AM 
BASSADOR  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC,  TO  HONOR 
ABLE  WILLIAM  R.  DAY,  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES. 

[Translation.] 

MADRID,  August  fth,  1898. 

MR.  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  : 

The  French  ambassador  at  Washington,  whose  good 
offices  have  enabled  the  Spanish  Government  to  address 
a  message  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  has 
forwarded  by  cable  your  excellency's  reply  to  this  doc 
ument. 

In  examining  the  arguments  used  as  a  preamble  to 
the  specification  of  the  terms  upon  which  peace  may 
be  restored  between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  it 
behooves  the  Spanish  Government  to  deduct  from  the 
order  of  events  that  the  severance  of  diplomatic  rela 
tions  with  the  United  States  had  no  other  purpose  than 

254 


APPENDIX 

to  decline  the  acceptance  of  an  ultimatum  which  Spain 
could  only  consider  as  an  attempt  against  her  rightful 
sovereignty  over  Cuba. 

Spain  did  not  declare  war ;  she  met  it  because  it  was 
the  only  means  of  defending  her  rights  in  the  Greater 
Antilles.  Thus  did  the  Queen  and  the  United  States 
see  fit  to  transform  and  enlarge  the  purely  local  ques 
tion  of  Cuba. 

From  this  fact  your  excellency  draws  the  conclusion 
that  the  question  at  stake  is  no  longer  only  the  one 
which  relates  to  the  territory  of  Cuba,  but  also  that  the 
losses  of  American  lives  and  fortunes  incident  to  the 
war  should  in  some  manner  be  compensated. 

As  to  the  first  condition,  relating  to  the  future  of 
Cuba,  the  two  Governments  reach  similar  conclusions 
in  regard  to  the  natural  inability  of  its  people  to  es 
tablish  an  independent  government ;  be  it  by  reason  of 
inadequate  development,  as  we  believe,  or  on  account 
of  the  present  distracted  and  prostrate  condition  of  the 
island,  as  your  excellency  states,  the  fact  remains  that 
Cuba  needs  guidance.  The  American  people  are  will 
ing  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  giving  this  guidance 
by  substituting  themselves  to  the  Spanish  nation,  whose 
right  to  keep  the  island  is  indisputable;  to  this  intima 
tion  we  have  nothing  to  oppose.  The  necessity  of  with 
drawing  from  the  territory  of  Cuba  being  imperative, 
the  nation  assuming  Spain's  place  must,  as  long  as  this 
territory  shall  not  have  fully  reached  the  conditions 
required  to  take  rank  among  other  sovereign  powers, 
provide  for  rules  which  will  insure  order  and  protect 
against  all  risks  the  Spanish  residents,  as  well  as  the 
Cuban  natives  still  loyal  to  the  mother  country. 

255 


APPENDIX 

In  the  name  of  the  nation  the  Spanish  Government 
hereby  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  or 
title  to  Cuba,  and  engages  to  the  irremeable  evacua 
tion  of  the  island,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes 
— a  reserve  which  we  likewise  make  with  regard  to  the 
other  proffered  terms — just  as  these  terms  will  have 
to  be  ultimately  approved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States. 

The  United  States  require,  as  an  indemnity  for  or 
an  equivalent  to  the  sacrifices  they  have  borne  during 
this  short  war,  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico  and  of  the 
other  islands  now  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in 
the  West  Indies,  and  also  the  cession  of  an  island  in 
the  Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the  Federal  Govern 
ment. 

This  demand  strips  us  of  the  very  last  memory  of 
a  glorious  past,  and  expels  us  at  once  from  the  pros 
perous  island  of  Porto  Rico  and  from  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  which  became  peopled  and  civilized 
through  the  proud  deeds  of  our  ancestors.  It  might, 
perhaps,  have  'been  possible  to  compensate  by  some 
other  cession  for  the  injuries  sustained  by  the  United 
States.  However,  the  inflexibility  of  the  demand 
obliges  us  to  cede,  and  we  shall  cede,  the  island  of  Porto 
Rico  and  the  other  islands  belonging  to  the  Crown  of 
Spain  in  the  West  Indies,  together  with  one  of  the 
islands  of  the  archipelago  of  the  Ladrones,  to  be  se 
lected  by  the  American  Government. 

The  terms  relating  to  the  Philippines  seem,  to  our 
understanding,  to  be  quite  indefinite.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  ground  on  which  the  United  States  believe  them 
selves  entitled  to  occupy  the  bay,  the  harbor,  and  the 

256 


APPENDIX 

city  of  Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of 
peace,  can  not  be  that  of  conquest,  since  in  spite  of  the 
blockade  maintained  on  sea  by  the  American  fleet, 
in  spite  of  the  siege  established  on  land  by  a  native 
supported  and  provided  for  by  the  American  admiral, 
Manila  still  holds  its  own,  and  the  Spanish  standard 
still  waves  over  the  city.  On  the  other  hand,  the  whole 
archipelago  of  the  Philippines  is  in  the  power  and  under 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  Therefore  the  Government 
of  Spain  thinks  that  the  temporary  occupation  of  Ma 
nila  should  constitute  a  guaranty.  It  is  stated  that 
the  treaty  of  peace  shall  determine  the  control,  dispo 
sition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines;  but  as  the 
intentions  of  the  Federal  Government  by  regression 
remain  veiled,  therefore  the  Spanish  Government  must 
declare  that,  while,  accepting  the  third  condition,  they 
do  not  a  priori  renounce  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  over 
the  archipelago,  leaving  it  to  the  negotiators  to  agree 
as  to  such  reforms  which  the  condition  of  these  posses 
sions  and  the  level  of  culture  of  their  natives  may  ren 
der  desirable. 

The  Government  of  Her  Majesty  accepts  the  third 
condition,  with  the  above  mentioned  declarations. 

Such  are  the  statements  and  observations  which  the 
Spanish  Government  has  the  honor  to  submit  in  reply 
to  your  excellency's  communication.  They  accept  the 
proffered  terms,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes 
of  the  Kingdom,  as  required  by  their  constitutional 
duties. 

The  agreement  between  the  two  Governments  im 
plies  the  irremeable  suspension  of  hostilities  and  the 
designation  of  commissioners  for  the  purpose  of  set- 

17 


APPENDIX 

tling  the  details  of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  of  signing 
it,  under  the  terms  above  indicated. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  occasion  to  offer  to  your  excel 
lency  the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

ALMODOVAR  DEL  Rio. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 
WASHINGTON,  August  10,  1 
EXCELLENCY  : 

Although  it  is  your  understanding  that  the  note  of 
the  Duke  of  Almodovar,  which  you  left  with  the  Presi 
dent  on  yesterday  afternoon,  is  intended  to  convey  an 
acceptance  by  the  Spanish  Government  of  the  terms 
set  forth  in  my  note  of  the  3Oth  ultimo  as  the  basis  on 
which  the  President  would  appoint  commissioners  to 
negotiate  and  conclude  with  commissioners  on  the 
part  of  Spain  a  treaty  of  peace,  I  understand  that 
we  concur  in  the  opinion  that  the  Duke's  note,  doubt 
less  owing  to  the  various  transformations  which  it  has 
undergone  in  the  course  of  its  circuitous  transmission 
by  telegraph  and  in  cipher,  is  not,  in  the  form  in  which 
it  has  reached  the  hands  of  the  President,  entirely  ex 
plicit. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  thought  that  the 
most  direct  and  certain  way  of  avoiding  misunder 
standing  is  to  embody  in  a  protocol,  to  be  signed  by 
us  as  the  representatives,  respectively,  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  the  terms  on  which  the  negotiations 
for  peace  are  to  be  undertaken. 

I  therefore  inclose  herewith  a  draft  of  such  a  proto- 

258 


APPENDIX 

col,  in  which  you  will  find  that  I  have  embodied  the 
precise  terms  tendered  to  Spain  in  my  note  of  the 
3Oth  ultimo,  together  with  appropriate  stipulations  for 
the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  arrange  the  de 
tails  of  the  immediate  evacuation  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico, 
and  other  islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the 
West  Indies,  as  well  as  for  the  appointment  of  com 
missioners  to  treat  of  peace. 

Accept,  excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 

highest  consideration. 

WILLIAM  R.  DAY. 

His  Excellency  M.  JULES  CAMBON,  etc. 


PROTOCOL. 

William  R.  Day,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States,  and  His  Excellency  Jules  Cambon,  ambassador 
extraordinary  and  plenipotentiary  of  the  Republic  of 
France  at  Washington,  respectively  possessing  for  this 
purpose  full  authority  from  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Government  of  Spain,  have  con 
cluded  and  signed  the  following  articles,  embodying 
the  terms  on  which  the  two  Governments  have  agreed 
in  respect  to  the  matters  hereinafter  set  forth,  having 
in  vieiw  the  establishment  of  peace  between  the  two 
countries,  that  is  to  say : 

ARTICLE  i.  Spain  will  relinquish  all  claim  of  sover 
eignty  over  or  title  to  Cuba. 

ARTICLE  2.  Spain  will  cede  to  the  United  States  the 
island  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Span- 

259 


APPENDIX 

ish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies,  and  also  an  island 
in  the  Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States. 

ARTICLE  3.  The  United  States  will  occupy  and  hold 
the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending  the  con 
clusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  determine  the 
control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines. 

ARTICLE  4.  Spain  will  immediately  evacuate  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  and  other  islands  under  Spanish  sover 
eignty  in  the  West  Indies;  and  to  this  end  each  Gov 
ernment  will,  within  ten  days  after  the  signing  of  this 
protocol,  appoint  commissioners,  and  the  commissioners 
so  appointed  shall,  within  thirty  days  after  the  signing 
of  this  protocol,  meet  at  Havana  for  the  purpose  of 
arranging  and  carrying  out  the  details  of  the  aforesaid 
evacuation  of  Cuba  and  the  adjacent  Spanish  islands; 
and  each  Government  will,  within  ten  days  after  the 
signing  o;f  this  protocol,  also  appoint  other  commis 
sioners,  who  shall,  within  thirty  days  after  the  signing 
of  this  protocol,  meet  at  San  Juan,  in  Porto  Rico,  for 
the  purpose  of  arranging  and  carrying  out  the  details 
of  the  aforesaid  evacuation  of  Porto  Rico  and  other 
islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies. 

ARTICLE  5.  The  United  States  and  Spain  will  each 
appoint  not  more  than  five  commissioners  to  treat  of 
peace,  and  the  commissioners  so  appointed  shall  meet 
at  Paris  not  later  than  October  i,  1898,  and  proceed 
to  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace, 
which  treaty  shall  be  subject  to  ratification  according 
to  the  respective  constitutional  forms  of  the  two  coun 
tries. 

ARTICLE  6.  Upon  the  conclusion  and  signing  of  this 
protocol  hostilities  between  the  two  countries  shall  be 

260 


APPENDIX 

suspended,  and  notice  to  that  effect  shall  be  given  as 
soon  as  possible  by  each  Government  to  the  com 
manders  of  its  military  and  naval  forces. 

[Signed  at  Washington,  August  12,  1898.] 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 
WASHINGTON,  August  10, 
EXCELLENCY : 

I  have  the  honor  to  say,  as  I  assured  you  orally  this 
morning,  that  upon  the  suspension  of  hostilities  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Spain,  as  the  result  of  the 
signing  and  sealing  of  the  protocol  upon  the  terms  of 
which  \ve  have  agreed,  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  Govern 
ment  to  take  prompt  and  efficient  means  to  aid  the  in 
troduction  of  food  supplies  into  the  ports  of  Cuba. 

Accept,  excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

WILLIAM  R.  DAY.    , 

His  Excellency  Mr.  JULES  CAMBON,  etc. 


WILLIAM  R.  DAY, 

Secretary  of  State: 

You  are  hereby  authorized  to  sign,  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  the  protocol  of  this  date  embody 
ing  the  terms  on  which  the  United  States  and  Spain 
have  agreed  to  treat  of  peace. 

WILLIAM  McKiNLEY. 
EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 

WASHINGTON,  August  12,  1898. 
261 


APPENDIX 

[Translation.] 

EMBASSY  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC 

IN  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WASHINGTON,  August  12,  1898. 

MR.  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  :  I  have  the  honor  to  in 
form  you  that  I  have  just  received,  through  the  inter 
mediation  of  the  department  of  foreign  affairs  at  Paris, 
a  telegram,  dated  Madrid,  August  n,  in  which  the 
Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio  announces  to  me  that,  by 
order  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent,  the  Spanish 
Government  confers  upon  me  full  powers  in  order  that 
I  may  sign,  without  other  formality  and  without  delay, 
the  protocol  whereof  the  terms  have  been  drawn  up  by 
common  accord  between  you  and  me.  The  instrument 
destined  to  make  regular  the  powers  which  are  thus 
given  to  me  by  telegraph  will  be  subsequently  addressed 
to  me  by  the  post. 

His  excellency  the  minister  of  state  adds  that  in  ac 
cepting  this  protocol  and  by  reason  of  the  suspension 
of  hostilities  which  will  be  the  immediate  consequence 
of  that  acceptance,  the  Spanish  Government  has  pleas 
ure  in  hoping  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
will  take  the  necessary  measures  with  a  view  to  re 
strain  (empecher)  all  aggression  on  the  part  of  the 
Cuban  separatist  forces. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  having,  on  the  other 
hand,  authorized  me  to  accept  the  powers  which  are 
conferred  upon  me  by  the  Spanish  Government,  I  shall 
hold  myself  at  your  disposition  to  sign  the  protocol  at 
the  hour  you  may  be  pleased  to  designate. 

262 


APPENDIX 

Congratulating  myself  upon  thus  cooperating  with 
you  toward  the  restoration  of  peace  between  two  na 
tions,  both  friends  of  France,  I  beg  you  to  accept,  Mr. 
Secretary  of  State,  the  fresh  assurances  of  my  very 
high  consideration. 

JULES  CAMBON. 

Hon.  WILLIAM  R.  DAY, 

Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  etc.,  Wash 
ington. 


No.  94.]  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

WASHINGTON,  August  15,  1898. 

EXCELLENCY  :  I  have  the  honor  to  make  formal  ac 
knowledgement  of  the  note  you  addressed  to  me,  un 
der  date  of  the  I2th  instant,  informing  me  of  your  re 
ceipt,  through  the  medium  of  the  department  of  foreign 
affairs  at  Paris,  of  a  telegram,  dated  Madrid,  August 
ii,  in  which  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio,  minister 
of  state  of  Spain,  by  order  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 
Regent,  conferred  upon  you  full  powers  to  sign,  with 
out  other  formality  and  without  delay,  the  protocol  al 
ready  drawn  up  by  you  and  me,  leaving  the  documen 
tary  confirmation  of  your  said  full  powers  to  follow  by 
mail ;  and  adding  that,  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
having  authorized  you  to  accept  the  powers  so  con 
ferred  upon  you  by  the  Spanish  Government,  you  were 
ready  to  sign  the  protocol  at  such  time  as  I  might  des 
ignate. 

The  signing  of  the  protocol  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
1 2th  instant  by  you  and  me,  in  the  presence  of  the  Pres 
ident,  followed  by  the  immediate  action  of  the  Presi 
dent  in  issuing  his  proclamation  suspending  hostilities, 

263 


APPENDIX 

in  accordance  with  the  appropriate  stipulation  of  that 
protocol,  testified  in  a  most  gratifying  manner  the  full 
recognition  by  this  Government  of  the  powers  con 
ferred  upon  you,  and,  I  am  glad  to  believe,  marked  the 
first  and  most  effective  step  toward  the  happy  restora 
tion  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  It 
is  especially  gratifying  to  the  President  and  to  this  Gov 
ernment  that  you,  as  the  honored  representative  of  the 
French  Republic,  allied  to  our  American  commonwealth 
by  the  unbroken  ties  of  more  than  a  century  of  close 
friendship  and  to  the  Kingdom  of  Spain  by  propinquity 
and  intimate  association,  should  have  been  thus  instru 
mental  in  contributing  to  this  auspicious  result. 

Referring  to  the  observation  contained  in  your  note 
relative  to  the  internal  order  of  Cuba  during  the  sus 
pension  of  hostilities,  I  may  remark  that  the  forces  of 
the  United  States,  in  proportion  as  they  occupy  Cuban 
territory  in  the  course  of  the  evacuation  thereof  by 
Spain  and  its  delivery  to  the  arms  of  the  United  States 
under  the  terms  of  the  protocol,  will,  it  is  believed,  be 
adequate  to  preserve  peace  and  order,  and  no  doubt  is 
entertained  of  their  ability  to  restrain  any  possible  in 
jury  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  island  in  the  country 
which  shall  by  degrees  come  under  their  control. 

Be  pleased,  Mr.  Ambassador,  to  accept  the  renewed 
assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

WILLIAM  R.  DAY. 


[Translation.] 

The  French  ambassador,  referring  to  his  communica 
tion  of  the  1 2th  instant,  has  the  honor  to  inform  the 

264 


APPENDIX 

Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  that  he  has  just 
received,  through  the  department  of  foreign  affairs  at 
Paris,  the  full  powers  which  had  been  conferred  upon 
him,  in  the  name,  ot  the  King  of  Spain,  by  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  Regent,  to  enable  him  to  sign  the  preliminary 
protocol  of  the  negotiations  for  the  establishment  of 
peace  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

Air.  J.  Cambon  requests  the  Hon.  William  R.  Day  to 
please  to  find  inclosed  the  said  document,  and  avails 
himself  of  the  occasion  to  renew  the  assurances  of  his 
highest  consideration. 

WASHINGTON,  August  jo,  1898. 

Hon.  WM.  R.  DAY, 

Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  etc.,  Wash- 
ington. 


[Translation.] 
DON  ALFONSO  XIII 

BY  THE  GRACE  OF  GOD  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION,  KING 
OF  SPAIN,  AND  IN  HIS  NAME  AND  DURING  HIS  MINOR 
ITY. 

DONA  MARIA  CRISTINA, 

QUEEN   REGENT   OF  THE  KINGDOM. 

Whereas  it  has  become  necessary  to  negotiate  and 
sign  at  Washington  a  protocol  in  which  the  prelimina 
ries  of  peace  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  of 
America  shall  be  settled,  and  as  it  is  necessary  for  me 
to  empower  for  that  purpose  a  person  possessing  the 

265 


APPENDIX 

requisite  qualifications:  Therefore,  I  have  decided  to 
select,  after  procuring  the  consent  of  His  Excellency 
the  President  of  the  French  Republic,  you,  Don  Julio 
Cambon,  ambassador  extraordinary  and  plenipotentiary 
of  the  French  Republic  in  the  United  States  of  Amer 
ica,  as  I  do,  by  these  presents,  select  and  appoint  you 
to  proceed,  invested  with  the  character  of  my  plenipo 
tentiary  to  negotiate  and  sign  with  the  plenipotentiary 
whom  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  may  designate  for  that  purpose  the 
aforesaid  protocol.  And  I  declare,  from  the  present 
moment,  all  that  you  may  agree  upon,  negotiate, 
and  sign  in  the  execution  of  this  commission  ac 
ceptable  and  valid,  and  I  will  observe  it  and  exe 
cute  it,  and  will  cause  it  to  be  observed  and  exe 
cuted  as  if  it  had  been  done  by  myself,  for  which 
I  give  you  my  whole  full  powers  in  the  most  am 
ple  form  required  by  law.  In  witness  whereof  I 
have  caused  these  presents  to  be  issued,  signed  by  my 
hand,  duly  sealed  and  countersigned  by  the  under 
signed,  my  minister  of  state.  Given  in  the  palace  at 
Madrid,  August  u,  1898. 

[L.  s.]     MARIA  CRISTINA. 

JUAN  MANUEL  SANCHE^  Y  GUTIERREZ  DE  CASTRO 

Minister  of  State. 


APPENDIX  D 
THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND  HER  MAJ 
ESTY  THE  QUEEN  REGENT  OF  SPAIN,  IN  THE  NAME  OF 
HER  AUGUST  SON  DON  ALFONSO  XIII,  desiring  to  end 
the  state  of  war  now  existing  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  have  for  that  purpose  appointed  as  Plenipotentia 
ries : 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WILLIAM  R.  DAY,  CUSHMAN  K.  DAVIS,  WILLIAM 
P.  FRYE,  GEORGE  GRAY,  and  WHITELAW  REID,  citizens 
of  the  United  States ; 

AND  HER  MAJESTY  THE  QUEEN  REGENT  OF  SPAIN, 
DON  EUGENIO  MONTERO  Rios,  President  of  the  Sen 
ate,  DON  BUENAVENTURA  DE  ABARZUZA,  Senator  of 
the  Kingdom  and  ex-Minister  of  the  Crown,  DON  JOSE 
DE  GARNICA,  Deputy  to  the  Cortes  and  Associate  Jus 
tice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  DON  WENCESLAO  RAMIREZ 
DE  VILLA-URRUTIA,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minis 
ter  Plenipotentiary  at  Brussels,  and  DON  RAFAEL  CE- 
RERO,  General  of  Division  : 

Who,  having  assembled  in  Paris,  and  having  ex 
changed  their  full  powers,  which  were  found  to  be  in 
due  and  proper  form,  have,  after  discussion  of  the 
matters  before  them,  agreed  upon  the  following  ar 
ticles  : 

267 


APPENDIX 

ARTICLE  I 

Spain  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and 
title  to  Cuba. 

And  as  the  island  is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to 
be  occupied  by  the  United  States,  the  United  States 
will,  so  long  as  such  occupation  shall  last,  assume  and 
discharge  the  obligations  that  may  under  international 
law  result  from  the  fact  of  its  occupation,  for  the  pro 
tection  of  life  and  property. 

ARTICLE  II 

Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  island  of  Porto 
Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sovereignty 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  the  island  of  Guam  in  the  Ma 
rianas  or  Ladrones. 

ARTICLE  III 

Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  archipelago 
known  as  the  Philippine  islands,  and  comprehending 
the  islands  lying  within  the  following  line : 

A  line  running  from  west  to  east  along  or  near  the 
twentieth  parallel  of  north  latitude,  and  through  the 
middle  of  the  navigable  channel  of  Bachi,  from  the  one 
hundred  and  eighteenth  (n8th)  to  the  one  hundred 
and  twenty-seventh  (i27th)  degree  meridian  of  longi 
tude  east  of  Greenwich,  thence  along  the  one  hundred 
and  twenty-seventh  (i27th)  degree  meridian  of  longi 
tude  east  of  Greenwich  to  the  parallel  of  four  degrees 
and  forty-five  minutes  (4°  45')  north  latitude,  thence 
along  the  parallel  of  four  degrees  and  forty-five  minutes 
(4°  45')  north  latitude  to  its  intersection  with  the  me 
ridian  of  longitude  one  hundred  and  nineteen  degrees 

268 


APPENDIX 

and  thirty-five  minutes  (119°  35')  east  of  Greenwich, 
thence  along  the  meridian  of  longitude  one  hundred 
and  nineteen  degrees  and  thirty-five  minutes  ( 1 19°  35') 
east  of  Greenwich  to  the  parallel  of  latitude  seven  de 
grees  and  forty  minutes  (7°  40')  north,  thence  along 
the  parallel  of  latitude  seven  degrees  and  forty  minutes 
(7°  40')  north  to  its  intersection  with  the  one  hundred 
and  sixteenth  (u6th)  degree  meridian  of  longitude 
east  of  Greenwich,  thence  by  a  direct  line  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  tenth  (loth)  degree  parallel  of  north 
latitude  with  the  one  hundred  and  eighteenth  (n8th) 
degree  meridian  of  longitude  east  of  Greenwich,  and 
thence  along  the  one  hundred  and  eighteenth  (n8th) 
degree  meridian  of  longitude  east  of  Greenwich  to  the 
point  of  beginning. 

The  United  States  will  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of 
twenty  million  dollars  ($20,000,000),  within  three 
months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the 
present  treaty. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  United  States  will,  for  the  term  of  ten  years 
from  date  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the 
present  treaty,  admit  Spanish  ships  and  merchandise 
to  the  ports  of  the  Philippine  islands  on  the  same  terms 
as  ships  and  merchandise  of  the  United  States. 

ARTICLE  V 

The  United  States  will,  upon  the  signature  of  the 
present  treaty,  send  back  to  Spain,  at  its  own  cost  the 
Spanish  soldiers  taken  as  prisoners  of  war  on  the  cap 
ture  of  Manila  by  the  American  forces.  The  arms  of 
the  soldiers  in  question  shall  be  restored  to  them. 

269 


APPENDIX 

Spain  will,  upon  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of 
the  present  treaty,  proceed  to  evacuate  the  Philippines, 
as  well  as  the  island  of  Guam,  on  terms  similar  to  those 
agreed  upon  by  the  Commissioners  appointed  to  ar 
range  for  the  evacuation  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  is 
lands  in  the  West  Indies,  under  the  protocol  of  August 
12,  1898,  which  is  to  continue  in  force  till  its  provi 
sions  are  completely  executed. 

The  time  within  which  the  evacuation  of  the  Phil 
ippine  islands  and  Guam  shall  be  completed  shall  be 
fixed  by  the  two  Governments.  Stands  of  colors,  un- 
captured  'war  vessels,  small  arms,  guns  of  all  calibres, 
with  their  carriages  and  accessories,  powder,  ammuni 
tion,  livestock,  and  materials  and  supplies  of  all  kinds, 
belonging  to  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  Spain  in  the 
Philippines  and  Guam,  remain  the  property  of  Spain. 
Pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  exclusive  of  field  artillery, 
in  the  fortifications  and  coast  defences,  shall  remain  in 
their  emplacements  for  the  term  of  six  months,  to  be 
reckoned  from  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the 
treaty;  and  the  United  States  may,  in  the  meantime, 
purchase  such  material  from  Spain,  if  a  satisfactory 
agreement  between  the  two  Governments  on  the  subject 
shall  be  reached. 

ARTICLE  VI 

Spain  will,  upon  the  signature  of  the  present  treaty, 
release  all  prisoners  of  war,  and  all  persons  detained 
or  imprisoned  for  political  offences,  in  connection  with 
the  insurrections  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  and  the 
war  with  the  United  States. 

Reciprocally,  the  United  States  will  release  all  per 
sons  made  prisoners  of  war  by  the  American  forces, 

270 


APPENDIX 

and  will  undertake  to  obtain  the  release  of  all  Spanish 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents  in  Cuba  and 
the  Philippines. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  will  at  its  own 
cost  return  to  Spain  and  the  Government  of  Spain  will 
at  its  own  cost  return  to  the  United  States,  Cuba,  Porto 
Rico,  and  the  Philippines,  according  to  the  situation 
of  their  respective  homes,  prisoners  released  or  caused 
to  be  released  by  them,  respectively,  under  this  article. 

ARTICLE  VII 

The  United  States  and  Spain  mutually  relinquish  all 
claims  for  indemnity,  national  and  individual,  of  every 
kind,  of  either  Government,  or  of  its  citizens  or  sub 
jects,  against  the  other  Government,  that  may  have 
arisen  since  the  beginning  of  the  late  insurrection  in 
Cuba  and  prior  to  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the 
present  treaty,  including  all  claims  for  indemnity  for 
the  cost  of  the  war. 

The  United  States  will  adjudicate  and  settle  the 
claims  of  its  citizens  against  Spain  relinquished  in  this 

article. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

In  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  Articles  I,  II, 
and  III  of  this  treaty,  Spain  relinquishes  in  Cuba,  and 
cedes  in  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  in  the  West  In 
dies,  in  the  island  of  Guam,  and  in  the  Philippine  Ar 
chipelago,  all  the  buildings,  wharves,  barracks,  forts, 
structures,  public  highways  and  other  immovable  prop 
erty  which,  in  conformity  with  law,  belong  to  the  pub 
lic  domain,  and  as  such  belong  to  the  Crown  of  Spain. 

And  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  relinquishment  or 
271 


APPENDIX 

cession,  as  the  case  may  be,  to  which  the  preceding  par 
agraph  refers,  cannot  in  any  respect  impair  the  property 
or  rights  which  by  law  belong  to  the  peaceful  posses 
sion  of  property  of  all  kinds,  of  provinces,  -municipali 
ties,  public  or  private  establishments,  ecclesiastical  or 
civic  bodies,  or  any  other  associations  having  legal  ca 
pacity  to  acquire  and  possess  property  in  the  aforesaid 
territories  renounced  or  ceded,  or  of  private  individ 
uals,  of  whatsoever  nationality  such  individuals  may 
be. 

The  aforesaid  relinquishment  or  cession,  as  the  case 
may  be,  includes  all  documents  exclusively  referring 
to  the  sovereignty  relinquished  or  ceded  that  may  ex 
ist  in  the  archives  of  the  Peninsula.  Where  any  docu 
ment  in  such  archives  only  in  part  relates  to  said  sov 
ereignty,  a  copy  of  such  part  will  be  furnished  when 
ever  it  shall  be  requested.  Like  rules  shall  be  recipro 
cally  observed  in  favor  of  Spain  in  respect  of  docu 
ments  in  the  archives  of  the  islands  above  referred  to. 

In  the  aforesaid  relinquishment  or  cession,  as  the 
case  may  be,  are  also  included  such  rights  as  the  Crown 
of  Spain  and  its  authorities  possess  in  respect  of  the  of 
ficial  archives  and  records,  executive  as  well  as  judicial, 
in  the  islands  above  referred  to,  which  relate  to  said 
islands  or  the  rights  and  property  of  their  inhabitants. 
Such  archives  and  records  shall  be  carefully  preserved, 
and  private  persons  shall  without  distinction  have  the 
right  to  require,  in  accordance  with  law,  authenticated 
copies  of  the  contracts,  wills  and  other  instruments 
forming  part  of  notarial  protocols  or  files,  or  which 
may  be  contained  in  the  executive  or  judicial  archives, 
be  the  latter  in  Spain  or  in  the  islands  aforesaid. 

272 


APPENDIX 

ARTICLE  IX 

Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Peninsula,  residing 
in  the  territory  over  which  Spain  by  the  present  treaty 
relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty,  may  remain  in 
such  territory  or  may  remove  therefrom,  retaining  in 
either  event  all  their  rights  of  property,  including  the 
right  to  sell  or  dispose  of  such  property  or  of  its  pro 
ceeds;  and  they  shall  also  have  the  right  to  carry  on 
their  industry,  commerce  and  professions,  being  subject 
in  respect  thereof  to  such  laws  as  are  applicable  to  other 
foreigners.  In  case  they  remain  in  the  territory  they 
may  preserve  their  allegiance  to  the  Crown  of  Spain 
by  making,  before  a  court  of  record,  within  a  year  from 
the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  this  treaty, 
a  declaration  of  their  decision  to  preserve  such  allegi 
ance;  in  default  of  which  declaration  they  shall  be  held 
to  have  renounced  it  and  to  have  adopted  the  national 
ity  of  the  territory  in  which  they  may  reside. 

The  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the  native  in 
habitants  of  the  territories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United 
States  shall  be  determined  by  the  Congress. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  inhabitants  of  the  territories  over  which  Spain 
relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty  shall  be  secured 
in  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion. 

ARTICLE  XI 

The  Spaniards  residing  in  the  territories  over  which 
Spain  by  this  treaty  cedes  or  relinquishes  her  sover 
eignty  shall  be  subject  in  matters  civil  as  well  as  crim- 

273 


APPENDIX 

inal  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  country 
wherein  they  reside,  pursuant  to  the  ordinary  laws  gov 
erning  the  same;  and  they  shall  have  the  right  to  ap 
pear  before  such  courts,  and  to  pursue  the  same  course 
as  citizens  of  the  country  to  which  the  courts  belong. 

ARTICLE  XII 

Judicial  proceedings  pending  at  the  time  of  the  ex 
change  of  ratifications  of  this  treaty  in  the  territories 
over  which  Spain  relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty 
shall  be  determined  according  to  the  following  rules : 

1.  Judgments  rendered  either  in  civil  suits  between 
private  individuals,  or  in  criminal  matters,  before  the 
date  mentioned,  and  with  respect  to  which  there  is  no 
recourse  or  right  of  review    under    the  Spanish  law, 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  final,  and  shall  be  executed  in  due 
form  by  competent  authority  in  the  territory  within 
which  such  judgments  should  be  carried  out. 

2.  Civil   suits  between   private   individuals   which 
may  on  the  date  mentioned  be  undetermined  shall  be 
prosecuted  to  judgment  before  the  court  in  which  they 
may  then  be  pending  or  in  the  court  that  may  be  sub 
stituted  therefor. 

3.  Criminal  actions  pending  on  the  date  mentioned 
before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Spain  against  citizens  of 
the  territory  which  by  this  treaty  ceases  to  be  Spanish 
shall  continue  under  its  jurisdiction  until  final  judg 
ment;  but,  such  judgment  having  been  rendered,  the 
execution  thereof  shall  be  committed  to  the  competent 
authority  of  the  place  in  which  the  case  arose. 


274 


APPENDIX 

ARTICLE  XIII 

The  rights  of  property  secured  by  copyrights  and 
patents  acquired  by  Spaniards  in  the  island  of  Cuba, 
and  in  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines  and  other  ceded  ter 
ritories,  at  the  time  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
of  this  treaty,  shall  continue  to  be  respected.  Spanish 
scientific,  literary  and  artistic  works,  not  subversive  of 
public  order  in  the  territories  in  question,  shall  continue 
to  be  admitted  free  of  duty  into  such  territories,  for  the 
period  of  ten  years,  to  be  reckoned  from  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty. 

ARTICLE  XIV 

Spain  shall  have  the  power  to  establish  consular  of 
ficers  in  the  ports  and  places  of  the  territories,  the  sov 
ereignty  over  which  has  been  either  relinquished  or 
ceded  by  the  present  treaty. 

ARTICLE  XV 

The  Government  of  each  country  will,  for  the  term 
of  ten  years,  accord  to  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  other 
country  the  same  treatment  in  respect  of  all  port 
charges,  including  entrance  and  clearance  dues,  light 
dues,  and  tonnage  duties,  as  it  accords  to  its  own  mer 
chant  vessels,  not  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade. 

This  article  may  at  any  time  be  terminated  on  six 
months'  notice  given  by  either  Government  to  the  other. 

ARTICLE  XVI 

It  is  understood  that  any  obligations  assumed  in  this 
treaty  by  the  United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba  are 

275 


APPENDIX 

limited  to  the  time  of  its  occupancy  thereof ;  but  it  will 
upon  the  termination  of  such  occupancy,  advise  any 
Government  established  in  the  island  to  assume  the 
same-  obligations. 

ARTICLE  XVII 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con 
sent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  Her  Majesty  the 
Queen  Regent  of  Spain;  and  the  ratifications  shall  be 
exchanged  at  Washington  within  six  months  from  the 
date  thereof,  or  earlier  if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  Plenipotentia 
ries,  have  signed  this  treaty  and  have  hereunto  affixed 
our  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Paris,  the  tenth  day  of  Decem 
ber,  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  ninety-eight. 

[SEAL]  WILLIAM  R.  DAY, 

[SEAL]  CUSHMAN  K.  DAVIS, 

[SEAL]  WILLIAM  P.  FRYE, 

[SEAL]  GEO.  GRAY, 

[SEAL]  WHITELAW  REID. 

Hecho  por  duplicado  en  Paris  a  diez  de  Diciembre 
del  ano  mil  ochocientos  noventa  y  ocho. 

[SEAL]  EUGENIC  MONTERO  Rios, 

[SEAL]  B.  DE  ABARZUZA, 

[SEAL]  J.  DE  GARNICA, 

[SEAL]  W.  R.  DE  VILLA  URRUTIA, 

[SEAL]  RAFAEL  CERERO. 

276 


RETURN     CIRCULATION  DEPARTMENT 

TO— +•      202  Main  Library 


LOAN  PERIOD  1 
HOME  USE 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

RENEWALS  AND  RECHARGES  MAY  BC  MADE  4  ^YS  PR-OR  TO  DUE  DATE. 
LOAN  PERIODS  ARE  1-MONTH.  3-MCNTKS,  AND  1-YtMli. 


DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 

DEC  08  1988 

RECEIVED 

Dt(j  i 

81997 

pi  'd  I  1995 

MYle^.'-AT'cx!^0' 

r!999 

-  ' 

771 

OCT2  ^ 

J  1999 

ut^bw-l  --      '•• 

2003 

M 

MAr  u 
/\Y  0  3  i 

"?  **  w  W 

rtwUL-Ai  <Oi4^  OEP"T" 

i'lr  f    1    1  1QQA. 

,     ' 

UC.L  i  j  nijn 

'• 

MAY  2  1.7 

^L     MCJOFFIIT    «AY2j 

! 

ft^1 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
FORM  NO.  DD6,  60m,  1/83  BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


LD 
(J 


Berkeley 


U-C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


8003005854 


•  — 


